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REGULATING ETHNIC BASED CONFLICTS: THE RIDDLE OF THE ETHIOPIAN CASE

A Research Paper presented by

Paulos Chanie Tsegaw

(Ethiopia)

In Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements for Obtaining the Degree of

MASTER OF ARTS IN DEVELOPMENT STUDIES

Members of the Examining Committee

Dr. M. Salih
Dr. W. Boelman

The Hague, December 1994



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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1: STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

Ethnicity is becoming a significant and complex issue in world politics. The form of ethnicity that was confined only to the expression of cultural sentiments has appeared to be a paramount instrument for ethnic based groups with political demands and organizations. This modern ethnic phenomenon seems to have taken wing after the end of the second world war, and to have grown in scope and strength until today¹. In most of the poly-ethnic societies it is found difficult to predict when and how the ethnic based movements are likely to develop, and what common factors trigger off the movements and lead them to conflicts. A certain issue might be central in one ethnic conflict, but may be irrelevant in another. The demand of the ethnic based movements is also neither uniform nor consistent. Some groups demand autonomous rights, language rights, religious rights and other rights within the existing political system; others insist on the creation of separate and independent states. The causes and demands of ethnic groups are lumped together and explained within one continuum - ethnicity - a term which defies definitional precision. As an author noted:

Connections among Biafra, Bangladesh, and Burundi, Beirut, Brussels, and Belfast were at first hesitantly made - isn't one 'tribal,' one 'linguistic,' another 'religious'? - but that is true no longer. Ethnicity has fought and bled and burned its way into public and scholarly consciousness. (Moynihan 1993:11).

Another writer pointed:

It is hard to see what would remain of ethnicity if all the associated were peeled off. (Rothchild in Markakis 1993:199)

Today, however, ethnicity with its chameleon-like character, is a world phenomena covering some of the worlds' poly-ethnic states. The aspirations and apprehensions of the ethnic based groups are erupting into a direct conflict with the established orders and among themselves and have become a source of international tension. In some 'fortunate' zones, the ethnic movements have been able to negotiate agreed changes to their political systems, notably Belgium, Canada, and Switzerland. In the 'unfortunate' zones the ethnic based conflicts are living between deadlocked wars and permanent negotiations. In this latter category some of the third world countries can be included. In these countries, the ethnic factor has become a powerful force challenging their cohesion and is taking place at a time when these countries are faced with problems of declining or stagnating economic growth, a high mortality rate, hunger, disease, draught, and other social evils.

Ethiopia, amidst its various economic, social and political problems, has been seriously challenged by ethnic based conflicts. A cursory look at the ethnographic picture shows that there are around 91 different ethnic groups². These groups, speaking around 85 languages and twice as many dialects, have lived together in the country for many centuries. The historical relationship between and among these ethnic groups, has fluctuated between harmony and conflict.

Historically, it was in the last quarter of the 19th century that these ethnic groups came under one centralized and modern state. In the ensuing periods, as the processes of centralization and modernization were emphasized, the state domineer the production and distribution of material and social resources in the society. Subsequently different ethnic based movements having different demands began to emerge. These movements having different causes, which could be political, economic, linguistic, religious, cultural or a combination of some of these factors, and having been influenced by the external circumstances, have been prominent in the country for almost the last 30 years.

Due to various intricate reasons, the previous regimes were not in a position to provide expedient regulating mechanisms to the ethnic problem. The situation, however, led to the proliferation of ethnic based movements which resulted in an immense amount of loss of human and material resources, which the country badly needed. The conflict, added to the endemic poverty, has also worsened the already poor material and physical quality of life of the peoples.

Another quest for a prudent management of ethnic based conflict and solution to other chronic social and economic problems began with the adoption of a Transitional Government Charter in July 1991, which has given birth to the present Transitional Government of Ethiopia.

The Transitional Government Charter was adopted at a conference held under the leadership of EPDRF (Ethiopian Peoples' Revolutionary Democratic Front) and involved more than 20 ethnic-based organizations and political groups. The conference was held in accordance with the agreement reached by the leaders of EPDRF, EPLF (Eritrean Peoples' Liberation Front) and OLF (Oromo Liberation Front) at the U.S. brokered peace talks held in London on May 27, 1991. The Charter was accepted by the participants (save EPLF which was an observer until the Eritrean question was solved through referendum, which, in April 1993, Eritrean voted for independence and is no more part of Ethiopia). It was also made to be a 'legal document' by which the country would be governed during the agreed transition period.

In the Transitional Government Charter a number of provisions have been enacted to guide the domestic and foreign policies of Ethiopia. In relation to the ethnic problem, which is the subject of our discussion, the following were promulgated. In the Negarit Gazeta, No. 1, of the Transitional Government of Ethiopia issued on 22nd July 1991, page 3, under Article Two, it is stated:

The right of nations, nationalities and peoples to self-determination is affirmed. To this end, each nation, nationality and people is guaranteed the right to:

- a/ preserve its identity and have it respected, promote its culture and history and use and develop its language;
- b/ administer its own affairs within its own defined territory and effectively participate in the central government on the basis of freedom, and fair and proper representation;
- c/ exercise its right to self-determination of independence, when the concerned, nation/nationality and people is conceived that the above rights are denied, abridged or abrogated.

In the Negarit Gazeta, No. 2 of the Transitional Government of Ethiopia issued on 14th January 1992, page 7, Definition 2.7, it is stated:

'Nation' or 'Nationality' means a people living in the same geographical area and having a common language and a common psychological make up of identity.

Further the nations, nationalities and peoples are included under 2 chartered cities and 12 National/Regional self-governments.

It is this issue of 'the right of nation, nationality, people to self-determination' that informs the argument developed and hence be addressed in this paper.

1.2: OBJECTIVE AND SCOPE.

Self-determination is the central theme of our analysis and it probes whether 'self-determination up to and including secession' provide the best strategy for regulating the ethnic problem in Ethiopia. Based on this premise the following questions will be addressed.

- a) What are the major causes of the ethnic problem in Ethiopia? Hence, a discussion on the socio-historical genesis of the problem.
- b) How were the ethnic problems regulated during the time of Emperor Haile Selassie and that of the Dergue?
- c) Why does the current regime in power choose 'Self-determination up to and including secession' as a strategy to regulate the ethnic problem.
- d) Is there a 'fit' between the causes of ethnic conflict and the currently proposed strategy by the Transitional Government?

The paper will have two interrelated tasks. The first is to analyze the historical interaction among the ethnic groups and the way the interaction was managed. This is done basically to figure out the underlying socio-historical causes of the ethnic conflict. The second is to examine the significance of 'the principle of self-determination up to and including secession' in addressing the causes of the ethnic conflict.

1.3: METHODOLOGY

Materials for the analysis of the socio-historical causes of the ethnic problem are drawn from secondary sources on Ethiopia's politics, economy, society and history. These include books, journal articles, other published and unpublished materials and official and unofficial documents. Written materials on ethnicity, nationalism, and the question of national self-determination will be consulted to conceptualize ethnicity and ethnic conflict and understand the 'principle of self-determination'. The 1984 Population and Housing Census Report, documents prepared by the Institute of Ethiopian Nationality will be used to see the ethnic configuration of the country. Reference will be made to written documents on the issue of ethnic conflict in Ethiopia and also on other countries.

1.4: LIMITATIONS

The paper will be constrained by the lack of historical and contemporary researches on the ethnic problem of Ethiopia. This is because they are either scant or if available they are difficult to be easily accessible to us. There is paucity of empirical data on the cultural exchange or interaction among the various ethnic groups, the impact of modernization and government policies, the effect of inter-ethnic marriages and the number of the resultant offsprings (ethnic anomalies), the actual ethnic combination of the ruling elites, complete and unbiased count of the regional distribution of the ethnic groups and other information. However, other sources will be used to bridge this information gap. An attempt will also be done to scrutinize the reliability and tenability of source materials that are to be utilized for the purpose.

The research paper may not claim to sufficiently answer the root causes of ethnic conflict and the implications of the application of the principle of self-determination. But it is only an attempt to highlight, in a more general way, these issues which are directly or indirectly becoming challenges to the life of the peoples in the country and to 'open' the way for future research.

1.5: STRUCTURE

The research paper is divided into five chapters. The first chapter comprises this 'Introduction'. As could be gathered, the statement of the problem, the objective of the study and the methodology used are outlined.

In chapter two, a general theoretical discussion will be made. This chapter endeavours to address the different theories on ethnicity and ethnic conflict and explores the principle of self-determination. Here, we will develop a working definition on ethnicity and ethnic group, and will select a theoretical framework to analyze the causes of ethnic conflict in Ethiopia.

In chapter three a brief examination of the Ethiopian past, starting from the 1st century A.D. will be made. This part will try to put the interaction among the various ethnic groups in historical perspective. This is because it is presumed that the historical analysis would/should be the bases for uncovering the causes of ethnic conflict. That is, if the analysis of the interaction is only starting from the period when the ethnic groups came under one centralized state, the actual and long historical interaction will be concealed or amputated and the socio-historical analysis will be constrained.

In chapter four the causes of the rise and the proliferation of ethnic conflict, after the emergence of the modern and centralized Ethiopian state, will be scrutinized. In the chapter the modes of regulating the ethnic conflict under the reign of Haile Selassie, the Dergue and the Current Transitional government will be described.

Chapter five will offer analytical exposition of the causes which contributed to the rise of ethnic politics in Ethiopia. In this chapter a detailed analysis of the interaction among the ethnic groups will be expounded. The basic contentions for accepting the 'principle of self-determination' will be analyzed. Based on this analysis and the description on the last two chapters, the theoretical framework tentatively selected to examine the roots of the conflict will be reviewed for its relevance. The bearing of the other frameworks will be briefly reconsidered. Then, the applicability and feasibility of the principle of self-determination in the Ethiopian context will be analyzed.

Chapter six will summarize the important points in the discussions and will consider, in a form of a general remark, an alternative way of regulating the ethnic based conflict in Ethiopia.

CHAPTER TWO

THEORETICAL OVERVIEW

2.1: IN SEARCH OF A TERM TO DESCRIBE THE PEOPLES OF ETHIOPIA

Scholars from various disciplines, politicians, and several writers (historian and philosophers included) use different terms to describe and distinguish the world's peoples. Based on their reasons, backgrounds, interests and dispositions they use terms like indigenous peoples, aborigines, tribal peoples, ethnic groups, minorities, nations and so on. There is a considerable lack of accordance on the meaning and usage of the terms nation, nationality³, ethnic group and tribe. Some consider the nation as a kind of ethnic group or ethnic group as more or less identical to nation; others consider ethnic group as a sub-group within a nation or state; still others make a distinction between them. In the mass media and casual conversations also the terms are not used consistently. The difference, in meaning and usage of the terms nation and ethnic group, is also reflected and reproduced with the definitions of ethnicity and nationalism. Some authors took the concepts as identical and some as intimately related⁴ and others unrelated⁵. There are others also who consider the difference among the concepts to be of degree⁶ but not of kind. Generally, there is considerable confusion about which terms are more appropriate to describe the World's peoples. For instance Mitchell (1974:1) has described the confusion in the following manner:

Differences, supposed or real, in the customs, beliefs, and practices that are identified as characteristics of particular sets of persons have long been accepted as an almost universal aspect of human behaviour. The awareness of these differences has been referred to as nationalism, as tribalism, and more generally, as ethnicity. However, these words, when used as anthropological or sociological constructs, have often lead to confusion."

Similarly, in the Ethiopian context, writers use different terms to describe the peoples of the country. In most of the official documents and proclamations and most scholarly written materials the terms nation and nationality are frequently employed. In some other articles and books several authors used the term ethnic group, and only few used tribe, and still some others use the terms ethnic group and nationality interchangeably.

This paper, uses the term ethnic group and ethnicity rather than nationalism as conceptual tool. We shall first provide reasons for employing ethnic group and ethnicity rather than tribe and tribalism or nation and nationalism.

2.1.1: TRIBE OR ETHNIC GROUP

The term tribe is used by some anthropologists as a technical term to indicate the villagers or the indigenous groups or minorities or nationalities or ethnic groups⁷. Few assert that the effective and 'traditional' African community is the tribe, of which a very large number can definitely be distinguished on the basis of language and other cultural traits (Kasfir 1976:29). It is used, as Epstein (1978:157) termed it referring to his own work, as "folk category, that is, term commonly employed by English-speaking Africans." Some authors also used it as a social unit that antecede ethnic group (see for example Cohen (1974:ix).

Tribe, however, is considered by many to be intimately related with the notion of 'uncivilized' and 'primitive' people and mostly used to refer the colonized people. As Steward (in Kasfir 1976:29) discussed the way the concept is used:

The concept of primitive or 'tribal' culture is based on three fundamental aspects of the behaviour of members of social societies. Tribal societies herein really have negative connotations. 'Tribes lack state organizations, class structure, literacy, and other features commonly ascribed to civilized societies'.

Such characterization, which aver 'primitiveness' or 'uncivilizedness', seems irrelevant to analyze the socio-political systems of Africa or other Third World societies and to reflect the real nature of these societies. As Young (1986:442) pointed out "'Tribe', of course, was central to the sociology of colonial hegemony". Apthrope (in Kasfir 1976:36, and Young 1986: 443) also asserted that "certainly in Anglophone Africa, what happened was the colonial regime administratively created tribes as we think of them today." The usage of the term has also been condemned for being a term used by racist colonial anthropologist for expressing primitive and barbarous mystique peculiar to Africa (Nnoli 1978:3), and because it reflects the ethnocentric or Eurocentric bias of anthropologists in making distinction between modern and traditional or so-called primitive society (Erikson 1993:10).

Although commonly employed as a technical term in the anthropological literature, its value as a tool of analysis has frequently been questioned. On this line Charsley (1974:337) noted that in the analysis of regional and national relations, as in the analysis of urban populations, tribe has therefore ceased to be a starting point, and has become a matter of process requiring explanation. The term tribe is also replaced in academic discourse by ethnic group especially after most Third World Countries attained independence.

Moreover, today it is accepted (see for example Erikson 1993) that every human being belongs to an ethnic group, whether he or she lives in Africa, Europe, Asia or America and ethnic communities and ethnic sentiments have existed throughout recorded history, although their social and political importance has been subject to periodic fluctuation. Based on the above contentions, the term tribe will not be used in the paper and ethnic group is preferred to describe the peoples of Ethiopia.

2.1.2: NATION OR ETHNIC GROUP

Problem arises in the usage of the use of the term nation. It is an enigmatic concept. An attempt will not be done to conceptualize the term 'nation', except drawing the readers attention on the elusiveness of the concept when one tries to use it in African context. Taking the two widely known definitions given by Weber and Stalin, it can be seen that the usage and definition of the term nation is found problematic.

If we consider Weber's (in Conner 1992:48) classic definition of nation, which is "a group of people whose members believe they are ancestrally related", it seems to be far from reality to be a true representative of the nations which are existing in our contemporary world⁸. On this definition Conner's (*ibid.*:48-55) critical interpretation seems to be correct when he says that the definition is based simply on myth of common descent or genealogical specificity to putative ties to a legendary figure or to an earlier people. He argued that such a myth with content and which exacts ethnic purity can not contribute to national bond, because the bond is a mass phenomenon. It is also questionable whether a large number of members of nations are aware of their genealogical purity. Conner (*ibid.*) pointed out that a specific myth of national descent which proves voguish for a time within certain circles, may be replaced by a totally incompatible myth of descent, or even jettisoned without replacement. This might indicate that if the term nation is defined in terms of genealogical specificity or common ancestry, it would be a flaw.

Let us look again on the definition of nation given by Stalin (in Hobsbawm 1992:5) "A nation is a historically evolved, stable community of language, territory, economic life and psychological make-up manifested in a community of culture". This definition is also criticized by Hobsbawm (*ibid.*:6) and several others as it is loaded with a set of criteria which did not fit into reality. These criteria, Hobsbawm evinced, are "fuzzy, shifting, ambiguous, and as useless for purposes of traveller's orientation as cloud-shapes are compared to land marks; and this, of course makes them usually convenient for propagandist and programmatic, as distinct from descriptive purposes

(op.cit.)" This shows again the complication of defining nation using either genealogical or other criteria.

The issue will be more complex if we see the derivative concept, nationalism. The widely quoted definition of nationalism, as Gellner (1983:1)⁹ argued, is a political principle, which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent. Gellner goes to explain that he sees national unit as synonymous with an ethnic group or at least an ethnic group which the nationalists claim to exist. And for other contemporary social scientists, nationalism is considered as a peculiar link between ethnicity and the state (see in Erikson 1993). Smith (1981:18) also asserted that the aim of this nationalism is always the creation of 'nations' or their maintenance and reinforcement. This shows that in societies where nations are created as cultural community, nationalism is ethnic in character and implies that the ethnic groups are simply synonymous with nations. A concept which may not reflect the form of nationalism in our present world systems and especially in Africa.

In most poly-ethnic societies, where nations are created on the bases of territorial state or political community, the form of nationalism is different - it is a state-centred nationalism¹⁰. In these societies, nationalism seems to be taken as a poly-ethnic or supra-ethnic ideology which stresses shared civil rights rather than shared cultural roots or is presented as an impartial and universal ideology based on bureaucratic principle of justice in a state incorporating a number of ethnic groups (op.cit. 1993:118-19). Nationalism in these societies, especially in the colonized countries, emerged in the 1950s in an intimate symbiosis with the rise of independence movements (Young 1986) and it was an overt reaction against colonialism or any sort of foreign domination. In the case of Ethiopia and some other countries, nationalism has also take the form of state patriotism (Smith 1976:3).

However, today in most of these poly-ethnic societies, the state-centred nationalism is seen giving its way to the form of nationalism which Gellner (1983) has called ethno-nationalism or ethnic-nationalism¹¹, which we presume a concept that could best be explained by ethnicity than by nationalism. Concurring with the above argument, the term which is preferred to describe the people of Ethiopia is ethnic group and the concept preferred to explain the interaction and analyze the conflict among them would be ethnicity. This is because beyond the reasons given above, if we accept the term nation to simply mean as 'cultural community' it is difficult to find in Ethiopia an ethnic group which is at present mono-cultural community. However, there are groups which claim that their movements are expression of

strong nationalism against colonialism. This contention, which will be discussed later, is disputable and, as Mayall and Simpson (1992:23) argued, protracted secessionist conflict in post-colonial states is the result of the successful and ineradicable formation of a dissident national identity should not be accepted without deep scrutiny.

The other problem seems as to whether to consider the irredentism prevailing in Ethiopia as an ethnic movement. That is, the case of recurrent Somali irredenta (the groups living in the south-eastern part of Ethiopia). However, because this irredentism is a movement by members of an ethnic group in one state to retrieve ethnically kindred people and their territory across borders (Horowitz 1992:119), it can be grouped under ethnic nationalism and explained by ethnicity.

Another less important concern with making a choice among the terms may seem to come from the presumed distinction. That is, it seems that nations have the right to claim the creation or formation of a state, while ethnic groups do not have that right except to demand linguistic and other rights within an existing state. But, the acceptance of this distinction is questioned after the resurgence of ethnic nationalism and especially after the end of the Cold War and the condition in Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union and other countries. More importantly, the critical factor is -in how far the ethnic group is politicised? or in how far there is a development of ethnic nationalism among the members of the ethnic group? that could make the difference either to claim a state or not.

Based on the above contentions, and on the ground that Ethiopia is a multi-ethnic society or a country incorporating a number of ethnic groups, we will use the term ethnic group rather than tribe or nation to describe the people. This does not mean that the use of ethnic group will not bring any confusion or difficulty but it is also an elusive term like the other terms indicated. Nonetheless, based on the above inconclusive explanations for using the term, it seems appropriate to use ethnic group and its derivative ethnicity in the analysis.

2.2: CONCEPTUALIZING ETHNICITY

Ethnicity has been defined in a variety of ways, depending on the discipline, field experience and interests of investigators. Although there are a number of definitions given for the concept, clear definition at a high level of generality to be analytically useful and applicable in the wide variety of situations seems to be lacking. The definition of ethnicity has been inexplicable in spite of the flourishing literature. This could be, as Cohen

(1974:ix) argued, due to the fact that ethnicity is a ubiquitous phenomenon in both developing and developed countries, past and present, and it takes a variety of form, scope and intensity, and it involves in psychic, social, historical, economic and political variables. Given these and other complexities, a precise definition of ethnicity may not be easy. However, for facilitating our analysis a definition that would be followed in this paper will be forwarded. But before that, it is important to briefly describe the two theoretical perspectives regarding ethnicity.

To begin with, the explicit emergence of an ethnicity literature dates from the 1950s, and germinated in the field of urban sociology (Young 1986: 444)¹². Following this period, for almost the last half century, different theories and approaches in order to conceptualize the phenomena, have been developed. But it was in the late 1970s two schools of thoughts evolved. These schools are the Primordialist school and the Instrumentalist school and can be briefly described as follows:

2.2.1: THE PRIMORDIALIST SCHOOL

The primordialist school of thought seeks to identify and define ethnicity in terms of the cultural and psychological dimensions of members of the group. According to Geertz (in *ibid.* 1986:448), For this school, primordial attachment is the one that stems from the 'givens'- or more precisely, as culture is inevitably involved in such matters, the assumed 'givens' of social existence are the basic defining character of ethnicity. This school of thought holds that the 'givens' are:

what every person carries with him [sic: and her] through life 'attachments' derived from place of birth, kinship relationships, religion, language, and social practices that are 'natural' for him (her), 'spiritual' in character, and that provides a basis of easy 'affinity' with other peoples from the same background and are rooted in the non-rational foundations of human personality (in Brass 1991:69-75).

The primordialist school assume that the powerful emotional charge which emanates from these 'givens' are the one that appear to surround or to underlie so much of ethnic behaviour. (Epstein 1978:xi) pointed out that it is the affective dimension, which radiates from the 'givens', that seems to surround ethnicity. Brath (1969:10-5)¹³ seems to follow a similar line, although not fully, because he see ethnic categories as classifying persons in terms of their basic, most general identity, as determined by their origin and background.

According to the primordialist school, ethnicity is conceived essentially as an innate predisposition (Cohen 1974:xii); the core of ethnicity as biological and genetic in nature and based upon descent (Brass 1991:74) and ethnic identity as a more or less immutable aspect of social persons.

Although the views raised by this school can not be totally refuted, the approach raises analytical difficulties and makes it hard to appreciate the dynamic nature of ethnicity. Cohen (*ibid*: xii) argued that this approach assumes an inflexible structure of the human psyche and implicitly denies that personality is an open system given to modifications through continual socialization under changing socio-cultural conditions.

The primordialist school has been strongly criticised as being singularly elusive and the attempts to do so have been speculative, metaphorical and intuitive (Young 1986:450). Brass (1991:70-5) objected the perspective which alleges that ethnicity is based on descent by stating that it is not actual descent that is considered essential to the definition of an ethnic group but a belief in a common descent; or that is not the place of birth or kinship or mother tongue or native religion that defines ethnicity but a belief in a common descent that draws on one or more of these attachments. Brass (*ibid.*) further questioned this school's assumption that "distinct primordial groups is sufficient to predict the future development of nations", which he argues is a stand no longer held even by a good number of their primordialist decedents for it is clearly untenable proposition. He also differ from the view held by the school of thought "ethnic attachment belong to the non-rational part of the human personality and as such, are potentially destructive of civil society", because it ignores the possibility that ethnic identity may be felt or adopted for rational as well as affective reasons to preserve one's existence or to pursue advantage through communal action. In a similar view, Ahmed (1990:20) also asserted that the picture given by the school, that is, the essentiality of genealogies and ancestral tradition in defining ethnic groups, is not clear in practice.

Generally, as has been indicated, the school neglects the variable and situational nature of ethnicity. It fails to recognize that ethnic identities are malleable and subject to change. Change is a constant variable in all spheres of life and nothing is a 'given'. Moreover, if 'givens' are taken as enduring they will not only create an analytical difficulty but also far from enabling us to understand the reality.

2.2.2: THE INSTRUMENTALIST SCHOOL.

This school takes ethnicity essentially as a vehicle for social competition. Cohen (in Mitchell 1974: 17-8) described the main argument of the school of thought as follows:

a process by which a group from one ethnic category, whose members are involved in a struggle for power and privileges with the members of a group from another ethnic category, within the framework of a *formal* political system, manipulate some customs, values, myths, symbols and ceremonials from their cultural tradition in order to articulate an *informal* political organization which is used as a weapon in that struggle' (original italics).

For the instrumentalist school, ethnicity is an instrument which essentially emanate from the form of interaction between cultural groups operating within common social context. Keyes (in Young 1986:449) noted that, according to the school, ethnicity is salient only insofar as it serves to orient people in the pursuit of other interests vis-a-vis other people who are seen as holding contractive ethnic identities.

There are writers who stress that ethnicity lies in its political functioning and ethnicity needs no historical or cultural explanation and it arises entirely from the contemporary social condition (see for example arguments in Erikson 1993). Deshen (1969:281), considering the instrumentalist school as 'political approach', indicated that the school emphasized that ethnicity is related primarily, and some times solely, to the problem of social organization that are conceived in terms of politics and the allocation of scarce resources.

The instrumentalist school is also criticized because it is one-sided and cannot account for the potency of the norms, beliefs, values, and other factors, which have their own constraining power and can not always be easily manipulated. The position of the instrumental school might also be questioned - "if ethnic identities are created wholly through political processes, then it would have been possible to create any identity at all" (op.cit. 1992:55). Although Brass follows this perspective, he nonetheless, questioned the extreme instrumentalist approach, and in this connection he posits questions such as "is ethnicity to be seen as a pursuit of interest and advantage for members of groups whose culture is infinitely malleable and manipulable by elites?" and "is culture change part of 'bargaining process' that can be best understood in terms of a market model by which ethnic group leaders and members agree to give up aspects of their culture or modify their prejudices for the right price?" (Brass 1991:73-4).

As indicated each schools of thoughts has its strong and weak sides. Both perspective have relevance to the understanding of ethnicity and ethnic groups. It would be important to select the perspective which seems to have some relevance to the problem under investigation - which in our case is examining ethnic based conflicts and their regulation. It seems that the Instrumentalist perspective is appropriate for our analysis of ethnic conflict and regulation. This does not mean, however, that all cultural elements - linguistic, religious and other symbols - will be neglected entirely from the analysis. The existence of the cultural elements will be taken as starting point because they suggest that it is likely that the elements can be used as vehicles and the members of an ethnic group can be mobilized¹⁴ on the basis of any one or more of these elements. But it should be noted that their endurance will offer no prospect for predicting the inter/intra ethnic relationship. In this connection Keyes (in Young 1986:450) pointed out that "while cultural formulations that serve to define the heritage assumed to have been determined by virtue of one's descent from mythical ancestors or historical forbears are essential to the establishment of ethnic identities, they are not sufficient in and for themselves to make ethnicity a factor in social relation".

In our analysis, it will be assumed that the existence of the cultural attributes will not be seriously felt and lead to conflict unless they are used as vehicles to invoke ethnic solidarity or to provoke the conflict or to effectively mobilise individuals. That is, to say, unless they are used as an instrument by leaders or elites to mobilize the group using any one or more of the elements their mere existence will not offer much help for ethnic conflict analysis.

Generally, leaving aside the writers who assert infinite flexibility of culture and the non-existence of ethnic groups, in our analysis we will consider the important element of the instrumentalist perspective which consider ethnicity as political, contingent, situational and circumstantial. We will also concur with this view which asserts that ethnic identities will not only change over time, but also change in terms of the specific relational situation and in some cases a single trait, language especially, seems to detach itself from other traits to define a cleavage and provides a principle for the creation of association. In other words, the instrumentalists assumption, which accepts the dynamism of ethnic identities and which took the relevance of the traits which affect a persons action will depend on the situation in which the person finds him/her self, will be taken as relevant. It is also assumed that in the context of contemporary socio-political pattern and strategies the instrumentalist approach seems to be appropriate. Hence, for explaining ethnic conflict and its regulation the

instrumentalist view seems more relevant. The definition of ethnicity and ethnic group will also follow the same line.

2.2.3: DEFINING ETHNICITY, ETHNIC GROUPS AND OTHER RELATED TERMS

The above theoretical discussions reveal the difficulty of conceptualizing ethnicity and ethnic groups. However, based on the theoretical perspectives indicated and referring to other literature on the subjects¹⁵, the following working definitions are proposed.

Ethnicity is an aspect of social relationship among people who consider themselves distinctive and share certain objective characteristics associated with common ancestry, territory, cultural practices (language, religion and the like) and other shared experiences, which are susceptible to change and variation and in some cases newly created and recently standardised, and which are perceived by both insiders and outsiders as important indicators of identity so that they can become the bases for mobilising social solidarity or in order to create internal cohesion and differentiate themselves from other groups, and which, in certain situations, result in political activity¹⁶.

An ethnic group, can thus be defined as a group of people (as indicated above) which form a part of a larger population, interacting with people from other groups within the framework of a socio-political system.

Ethnic identity is one form of social identity, that people develop in poly-ethnic societies, but which is ductile and subject to change. It is defined as the subjectively conscious social formation that emanates from the objective distinct cultural and other clusters of people (Brass 1985) and as identity with a clear 'Us' and 'They' differentiation. This identity is relative and to some extent situational, which is often difficult to ascribe it to an individual. Some time people may be forced to take on an ethnic identity, even if they would have preferred not to (see discussions in Erikson 1993 and Epstein 1978).

Culture is taken as a complex and dynamic set of solutions that a group of human being invent or borrow and adapt it to their social environment. It is considered widely to include every aspect of life: know-how, technical knowledge, customs of food and dress, music and dance, religion, mentality, values, language, symbols, socio-political and economic behaviour, methods of taking decisions and exercising power, method of production and economic relations and so on.¹⁷ As Cabral (in O'Brien 1993:78) pointed out it is not

static, contentless, and arbitrary but something which must be viewed as dynamically historical and expressive of the relationships among people and between people and nature.

The above definition of ethnicity indicates that:

- a) The groups have objective characteristics which are prone to change and variation;
- b) the subjective element is reflected when the groups perceive themselves and establish criteria for inclusion into and exclusion from the group;
- c) The view of the instrumentalists is reflected on the aspect of mobilization which is done some times for political activity. In the political activity only one factor or combination of two or more factors, i.e., either language or religion or territory or other group experience like being under colonial order, or other cultural markers could be used.
- D) Ethnicity is taken as an aspect of social relationships, i.e., an ethnic group can define it self as such only by virtue of contact and comparison with other people whom its members define as being different.
- e) It is only considered as an aspect of social phenomena because there are other forms of relationships in all societies based on class, interest groups, gender, age grades and the like. But it should be noted that there is a strong links and interaction, which are very difficult to separate, among these features and especially class relationship, interest group relationship and ethnic relationship.

Furthermore, to avoid definitional difficulties, it is important to make distinction between class and ethnicity. Class, in Marxist view, is defined to its relationship to property ownership and to the productive process in society and as potential corporate groups, i.e., sharing political interest. According to this view in the capitalist society they are categorized as the capitalist class, the petit-bourgeoisie, proletariat, the aristocracy, and the like. Weberians prefer status groups rather to classes and thus combine several criteria in delineating classes, including income, education and political influence. This definition and the above definition of ethnic group pertain to the fact that both are categoric groups or a group of a certain category¹⁸. But the difference between classes and ethnic groups is that the latter are characterised in terms of the indicated objective attributes of the group, the variability of the attributes and the subjective and behavioural patterns indicated; where as the former are characterized in terms of their relations to means of production or status groups. However, it

must be noted that some times ethnic groups can be identified as a class provided that the members of the ethnic group share the characteristics of the class category.

There is also a need to consider the distinction between ethnic groups and interest groups to avoid the confusion over the definition of the terms. The distinction, Brass (1985:10-1) makes seems relevant here. He noted that it would have been possible to avoid analytical difficulty if it were possible to accept the view that ethnic groups are simply a type of interest group seeking resource in and from the modern state. Thus, it will be difficult to take both terms as synonymous because interest group is linked to interest associations or groups formally organized to press demands upon the state; whereas ethnic groups are more concerned with cultural matters, symbols, values and self-definition and are internal to the community. However, ethnic groups might also develop internal organization and enter the political arena as interest group.

2.3: THEORIES ON ETHNIC CONFLICT

As pointed above, ethnicity is considered to be an aspect of social relationships. It entails the establishment of both 'Us-Them' contrast (dichotomisation) and a shared field of inter-ethnic discourse and interaction (complementarization) (Erkison 1993:28).

It should be noted that ethnic relations can be identified in virtually every society in the world and, contrary to much popular opinion, they may just as well be balanced and peaceful as they may be violent and volatile. Depending on the way it is regulated, this relationship can be constructive or destructive. In other words, using the current term, even if it is political ethnicity, that is the politicization and transformation of ethnic exclusivity into major political cleavages (Ake 1993:2), it could result as being the cause of ethnic violence or as a means to restructure the state so as to create a 'civil society'.¹⁹

This paper put first on analysing the destructive part of ethnicity. This is, what is considered as Ethnic conflict - a conflict which can be violent or non-violent and would take different forms. For understanding and analysing the causes of ethnic conflict, in this paper it is found preferable to utilize a theoretical framework. It has to be pointed that there are different theoretical contentions, however, an attempt will be made to highlight some the contentions and discuss in detail the perspective which is assumed relevant for our purpose.

a) The first model is 'cultural pluralism'. This model primarily assumes the complete separation of the ethnic groups existing in many of the poly-ethnic societies, by emphasizing that they 'mix but do not combine' and have separate social institutions for all phases of life except the market. It states that there is a fundamental and clustered differences in the institutional practices of members; and deep and rigid inequalities in social and political life along the lines of these institutional cleavages. Thus, it is assumed that, in such a society the relation between different ethnic groups will be notoriously unstable and turbulent because 1) extensive contact and mutual influence are kept at a low level or hardly exist and the groups lack a common social-will 2) the social system in which the groups exist involves ranking of the communities, and domination of one through the coercive machinery of the state.²⁰

b) The second line of analysis which holds that the root of ethnic conflict is uneven development (see Young 1986, Smith 1981, Brass 1985,1991). This thesis have different and various dimensions, to mention few:

i) The regional deprivation thinking²¹: According to this perspective, ethnic protest and ethnic nationalism are considered to be the outcome of regional relative deprivations. The major assumption is that since ethnic communities are generally located within specific regions, and are typically backward, with growth rates lower than those of their neighbours or the core area, it is small wonder that regional ethnic groups become discontented and frustrated, and turn to political movements which promise a reversal of their situation (Smith 1981:28). In the African context, Young (1986:444) noted, the major causes for such disparity is the penetration of capitalism and the unequal distribution of opportunities for social ascent among the different ethnic groups - a factor introduced by colonial rule.

ii) The Marxist perspective or class perspective: Leaving aside the various dimensions within this perspective, one variant of the perspective considers that the ethnic nations (groups) were assimilated to the roles and positions of social classes and their discontents and demands for autonomy were treated as disguises and masks for real material discontents and aspirations of the bourgeoisie (see in op.cit.:26). This movements were considered to be particularly well suited to the interests of the bourgeoisie, who could appeal to the ill-defined concept of 'national interest' to contain and conceal horizontal class division (*ibid.*).

iii) The other variant in the uneven development line of analysis is the view which holds that it is not objective inequality but a feeling of frustration or the balance between the goods or conditions of life to which people believe they are rightfully entitled and the goods and conditions they think they are capable of attaining or maintaining, given the social means available to them (Bertsch in Brass 1991:42).

iv) The fourth dimension is the point of view which tries to link culture differences and psychological properties. According to this line of argument the conflict is considered to be due to differences that indirectly emanates from the mental or psychological make-up of members of the different ethnic groups. According to this thinking some groups are considered as by nature thrusting, individualist, aggressive in pursuit of economic opportunity or receptive to change and others as encapsulated within a cultural code leading to self-isolation, and rejecting to new pathways to social mobility (Bascom and Herskovist in Young 1986:447). Thus, it is assumed that these difference will lead some to a higher rank in a society's social stratification and the others to a lower rank and can be a potential ground for conflict.

c) The third perspective is the politically - focused analytical line of analysis (see *ibid.* 1986:447-448). The major thesis of this view is that politics is central in shaping ethnicity and making it conflictual. Accordingly the reasons for the conflict is the perpetual overcentralization of political control over the economy and social life of the society by one ethnic group. In most African countries, it is argued that, the colonial state was the one to be blamed for playing pivotal role in shaping it. On this line Ake (1993:2) argued by saying that "the cheapness of colonial rule was an early source of political ethnicity, which induce intense political competition among the ethnic groups by offering new opportunities for some groups and denying others."

The politically - focused analytical line of analysis have another dimension which is known as rational choice model. This model assumes, as Bates (in *op.cit.*:448) illustrates "ethnic group represents, in essence, coalitions which have been formed as part of rational efforts to secure benefits created by the forces of modernization - benefits which are desired but scarce". He stressed that they are "a form of minimum winning coalitions, large enough to secure benefits in the competition for spoils but also small enough to maximize the per capita value of these benefits" (*ibid.*).

2.3.1. THE INTER-ELITE COMPETITION THEORY

The framework which is to be used tentatively to try to contemplate the ethnic based conflict in Ethiopia will be the INTER-ELITE COMPETITION THEORY.

For analytical purpose, we will avoid going into the various definitional issues, however, at the risk of simplification we will use the following definitions of the basic terms which are central to our discussion.

a) The term elite is defined by several authors and the difference is not that much pronounced because almost all refer to those groups who have the highest leading, directing and influencing status in a society. Osaghae (1991:47) pointed out that elite is usually defined in relation to non-elite and is composed of those who occupy leading positions and roles in all facets of the society and are the main aspirants to, and competitors for, political power and privilege. Lasswell (in Brass 1991) defines elites "as those who get the most of what there is to get". Others defines it as the ruling class which is always the less numerous, performs all political functions, monopolizes power, and enjoy the advantages that the power brings. Or as those who score highest on scale measuring any social value or commodity (utility) such as power, riches, knowledge (op.cit.:47). The definition given by Brass (1985, 1991) and that differentiates between class and elite will be used in the paper. Accordingly, elite is a group (category) of people who occupy leading and directing roles in society which are not necessarily economically determined and whose members do not necessarily share common (class) interest; and as influential sub group within ethnic groups and classes. In the analysis also the dichotomous (elite and non-elite)²² division of the society will be followed.

b) State refers to a complex set of persisting institutions over which elites in conflict are engaged in a struggle for control (Brass 1991) or as the "means of production" and allocator of desired benefits and privileges (Osaghae 1991:52). State power is taken as the capacity to control the state resources and be in a position to exact obedience.

c) State resources, as defined by Etzioni-Halvey (1993:95), include physical coercion resources, such as the barrels of guns as well as prisons; organizational and administrative resources, or the ability to organize people and control the resulting organizational structures such as bureaucratic organizations; symbolic resources such as knowledge, information and the ability to manipulate symbols in

constructing reality for others, material-economic resources such as capital, means of production and exchange, and economic enterprises; other resources like time, motivation and energy. These resources are all interconnected with each other, and they are frequently used in various combinations .

The major premise of the inter-elite theory is that ethnic conflict is the result of the elite competition for state power, state resource and local control. The process involves competition and conflict for political power, economic benefits, and social status between competing elite and leadership group both within and among different ethnic categories. Basically the conflicts would emanate from the type of relationships between the ethnic groups and the state, among the ethnic groups and within ethnic group. The demands that the conflict tries to achieve are not uniform. They differ as time and situation changes.

The inter-elite competition theory tries to figure out the different patterns of conflict in relation to the types of societies: The Pre-industrial and Modernizing societies (see Brass (1985, 1991) and others). In pre-industrial societies, conflicts are evident both within ethnic group and between ethnic groups and external forces, including other ethnic group and the state. In the conflict the primary issues in pre-industrial societies are not, in fact, allocation of state resources, but control of local communities. In these societies, the principal source of political and economic power is control over the land and the principal source of social control is religion. Thus, the struggle is control of local community and control over land.

In modernizing societies the primary cause for the conflict will be allocation of state resources. The causes of conflict in the pre-industrial societies will also have an impact on the conflict in the modernizing societies. The conflicts in these societies will develop intimately related with the development of new elites and social classes emerging out of the modernization process itself as literacy spreads, urbanization takes place, industrialization begins, and government employment opportunities open up. Most of these are created by the state and will help in the development of ethnic consciousness. As Brass (1985:38) emphasized it in detail:

The ethnic conflict arises because of two processes often precipitated by state action. One is almost invariably uneven spread of education, industrialization, and employment opportunities across regions, communities, castes, and classes. The second is the creation of new elite groups out of processes of social change, particularly educated elites in search of government employment and professional groups in

private practice operating in relative freedom from old forms of social control and creating new types of community networks through their own professional activities. The spread of non-religious education, including exposure to Marxist, nationalist, and other contemporary political ideologies also promotes tendencies toward secular elites, oriented toward achieving political power in institutions and arenas created by modern state.

On the same issue Osaghae (1991:52) also argued:

If the reality-creating role of the elite is not over-stated or over-simplified, no serious damage is done to the argument that it was the elites who were the competitors for the privileges and opportunities offered by the 'modernization' of society specially for top government positions that propelled ethnic political behaviour. This is specially true of, and has become more acute in the post-colonial period when the state and its control have become the *raison d'être* of all political competition.

In modernizing societies different types of conflicts can be identified. The types of conflicts which are considered critical can be described in the following manner:

a) Competition between individuals from different ethnic groups for the appointment to top government positions. The competition for the positions as well as the favour of the government is very fierce among the elite. The competition will be between, on the one hand, the elites from disadvantaged groups who claim that they are dominated, discriminated and oppressed and on the other hand the more advantaged groups. For both the government is centre piece of their competition. At this particular juncture both groups, who are struggling for the privileged positions, will intend to use ethnicity as an instrument. In the mean time, the issue of language becomes critical, because the choice of the official language and the medium of education determines which group have favoured access to the best jobs (Brass 1991:44). It is the awareness, Osaghae (op.cit) argued, that the elite cannot maintain their positions if they are not guaranteed access to state power that has led to a regulation of these competition through rules of the game embodied in various ethnic arithmetic formula.

b. The competition between the new elite and the old hierarchical bureaucracy. This will become apparent when the latter thwarted or blocked the formers upward mobility for power and exercise of his knowledge. To mention few of the problems, they can be:

i) the imbalance between the number of tertiary level educated manpower and the top administrative positions in the state apparatus. That is,

on the one hand there is a growing number of educated personnel who can not find jobs except in the government posts and on the other hand the unavailability of those top government positions because they are few or are occupied by the old bureaucratic elites.

ii) the difficulty on the part of the newly educated groups to apply their specialism according to the general rules and paradigms they have learnt, and on the other hand the resistance of the old-line bureaucrats not only to be committed to such procedures and paradigms but also to reject the groups from being positioned.

iii) the more-or-less overt discrimination along ethnic lines practised by rulers and old bureaucrats in recruitment, placement, promotion of this new educated elite.

These situations will result in making the new educated groups to feel that they are rejected. On this line, Smith (1981:120) wrote:

Rejection becomes a collective experience, and the damage falls more heavily on his new-found self-image and vision of reality. In rejecting him, bureaucrats and rulers are trying to assert the irrelevance of his knowledge, and his inferior worth as a diploma-holder. In elevating 'experience' above education, the bureaucracy attempts to undermine not just his claim to a livelihood, but also his self respect and sense of professional worth.

This situation will result on the one hand as Brass (1985:41) indicated in making the new elite to join hand and form alliances against the state authorities. But on the other hand as Smith asserted (op.cit.:125) "they will turn back to a modernised version of communal identity, which the reformists had constructed to mediate between religious authority and the scientific state. The history of the community from which they hailed would now provide the rising intelligentsia with an 'ethnic' identity sufficient to legitimate their claims to high status and power."

c. The other area of competition is party politics and elections. In Africa, as Osaghae (1991:52) noted, it is quite rare to find party politics and election which do not emphasize their ethnic character. As an author described "The formation of political parties and campaigns for elections entailed creating a political self from the social identity which inclusion in the membership of the particular culture area offered and, to do this, the educated elite had to draw on the language of primordialism and communal parochialism for the terms of political discourse' (ibid.).

ASSUMPTIONS OF THE FRAMEWORK

The theoretical argument of the inter-elite competition comprises the following assumptions:

1. The cultural forms, values and practices of the ethnic groups become political resources for the elite in competition for political power and economic advantage. They become symbols and referents for the identification of members of the group, which are called up in order to create a political identity more easily. The symbols used to create a political identity also can be shifted to adjust to political circumstances and the limitations imposed by state authorities.
2. Elite in competition are capable of interpreting, reinterpreting, and manipulating the symbols of the group for the purposes of political mobilization - using factors such as the existence of a socially mobilized population, the existence of historical and/or contemporary grievances and hostilities in relation to other groups or to the state, regional economic inequalities and others.
3. Skilful elites who lack 'objective' bases of mobilization, like systematic discrimination or evident regional inequalities, will often create images or perceptions of them by magnifying minor cases of discrimination or specific instances of regional inequality.
4. In the process of transforming cultural forms, values and practices into political symbols, elite in competition with each other for control over the allegiance or territory of the ethnic group in question strive to enhance or break the solidarity of the group.
5. It is assumed that some elites can sometimes get away with representing their groups to the state authorities even without a popular base, especially when the state authorities for their own purposes wish to recognise them as the group's sole representative.
6. Elite seeking to challenge the authenticity of an ethnic group's claim for exclusiveness will do the opposite and argue that the members of the group in question are, in fact, divided by one or more of these several criteria and that they share some of them with other ethnic groups.
7. The elite are helped in the process by the marked inequalities which exist among the groups in terms of development and opportunities of

development. This makes the task easier because, in the name of bettering the lot of the group and/or catching up with others, the elites succeed in mobilizing the masses by promoting the elite interest as the common interest.

The framework, however, will not assume that elites can do whatever they wish with the cultures and symbols of the groups they seek to represent. The assumption is that the elites in every ethnic group seems more self conscious and organized than the masses and is therefore able to mobilize and lead ethnic community. In most Third World Countries, where the masses are illiterate, apathetic and passive, the assumption has more than a conceptual significance. Elites are not unduly constrained by pressure from non-elites. This is because the pressure from the non-elite or the subordinate masses is declining because of civil war, natural disaster, famine and drought and other manmade and natural calamities. However, it is also further assumed without elite entry in to situations where there is mass subjugation by part of the dominant elite, injustice and inequalities may be accepted, and grievances may be expressed in isolated, or sporadic forms of conflict and disorder.

2.4. CONCEPTUALIZING THE PRINCIPLE OF SELF-DETERMINATION

The principle of national self-determination, in an historical accident, has been universally accepted as the legitimate formulation of popular principle. As Mayall (1983:79) indicated the concept was developed in the context of western liberal thoughts; but it was elevated tentatively by the League of nations, then conclusively by the United Nations to become the central legitimizing principle of contemporary international society. Recently, with the advent of ethnonationalism, this principle is also considered as one of the macro-political forms of ethnic conflict regulation (see for example McGarry and O'Leary 1993).

Historically, the decisive impetus for the idea was given at the close of the First World War by the two great statesmen - Wilson and Lenin. As Moynihan 1993:114 described it "Whereas for Wilson self-determination had an absolute character and was the ethical justification for the dismemberment of the polyglot German, Habsburg and Ottoman Empires; for the Bolsheviks it was essentially a utilitarian device of only transitory and relative moral relevance, designed to bring about the decomposition of all multinational states and colonial empires, including the Russian, insofar as dissolutions promoted the advance of the communist revolution."

In the course of history, the former crux of the principle "nation and only a nation can be a basis for political sovereignty" was given up and replaced by "declaration of granting independence to colonial countries and peoples". Thus, the United Nations General Assembly adopted by consensus in 1960 a declaration asserting a comprehensive set of international norms regarding the right to independence of territories subjected to colonial rule. As Young (1991:320) indicated Self-determination, as sacred right and judicial entitlement of colonized people, acquired new standing in this covenant. The two major 'problematic and contradictory' norms in the U.N Resolution 1514(XV), December 1960 (quoted in Johnson 1967) were:

Article 2: All peoples have the right to self-determination; by virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.

Article 6: Any attempt aimed at the partial or whole disruption of the national unity and the territorial integrity of a country is incompatible with the purposes and principles of the charter of the United Nations.

The post-colonial leaders of Africa, Asia, Caribbean and Pasfic Islands quickly settled on the rule - Article 6 - that none would challenge the colonial boundaries they inherited. Taking the African case, Goddard (1978:51) pointed, The Organisation of African Unity was committed to defend the legitimacy of the independent frontiers. This is in accord with the collective interest of the member states, but it also tempered by the original Pan-Africanist goals avowed by the signatories to the Addis Ababa Charter (*ibid.*). Young (1991:334) also pointed out that "the political leadership and the intellegensia were in most instances united, denied the potential ethnic self-determination movements the skills of organization and discourse indispensable to their structuration as articulated political forces. Claims for ethnic sovergnity were at this crucial historical point irredeemably contaminated as retrograde vehicles for undermining African independence."

Until the end of the Cold War the norms, especially Article 6, enjoyed international consensus, being recognized as a legal norm and no state having officially made any explicit objection to it. As Mayall and Simpson (1992:5) pointed the Cold War had a preserve consequences, it helped to consolidate the political map that resulted from the second world war and decolonization. The end of the Cold War, however, has endangered what is proposed in the Article 6 i.e the national unity and territorial integrity of most of the countries, not merely within the former Soviet Empire but also in many other parts of the world. This end of the Cold War has also partially helped in

strengthening the existing disgruntled groups and creating new ethno-nationalist movements in poly-ethnic states.

These movements, which primarily demands secession, seems to be common in many parts of the world. As indicated by McGarry and O'Leary (1993:11):

There are secessionist and semi secessionist movements in Europe (e.g. amongst the Basque, Corsican, North Irish Nationalist, Scottish, Slovak, Welsh) in Africa (e.g. the Polisario movement in the Moroccan-controlled Western Sahara, the Dinkas of southern Sudan and a bewildering variety of communities in the Horn of Africa); in the new republics of the common wealth of Independent states (e.g. Nagorno-karabah wishes to secede from Azerbaijan, South Ossetia from Georgia, Crimea from the Ukraine and the 'Dniester Republic' from Moravia); and in central and southern Asia (e.g. the Khalistan movement for sikh homeland, the Kashmiri independence movement, Tibetians in communist China, and the multiple ethnic secessionist of Burma).

The normative idea behind most of these movements is a claim for ethnic self-determination. A demand which seems related to the creation of an independent state, through the application of the principle of self-determination as stipulated under Article 2.

Nonetheless, from its inception the norm "All people have the right for self-determination" was fraught with innumerable theoretical and practical difficulties. One of the figures who critically see the dangers of the principle developed by Wilson was his advisor Robert Lansing. Lansing (in Moynihan 1993:83), who was the then U.S. secretary of state, on December 30, 1918 wrote:

The phrase is loaded with dynamite. It will raise hopes which can never be realized. It will, I fear, cost thousands of lives. In the end it is bound to be discredited, to be called the dream of an idealist who failed to realize the danger until too late to check those who attempt to put the principle into force. What a calamity that the phrase was ever uttered, What misery it will cause, think of the feelings of the author when he counts the dead who died because he coined a phrase, A man, who is a leader of public though, should beware of intemperate or undigested declarations. He is responsible for the consequences.

Contemporary writers have argued on the dilemmas inherent in the principle. Young (1993:322) describes the ambiguities in a detailed way as follows:

What is the 'self' that may legitimately invoke this claim? Is it defined by territoriality, ethno-cultural communalism, subjective collective self-assertion, or some combination of these? Is self-determination to be exercised only at once, at the moment of the covenant, or is subject to continuous review? Must it be solomonized by some participative act of the Human collectivity in question, or may a

political movement purporting to speak contractually for a "people" exercise this right? Is there some 'critical date' at which the people entitled to exercise self determination are fully constituted, with those arriving after excluded from the choice? Does self determination comport with an unassailable right of separation? Is it circumscribed by some criteria of "viability" of a sovereign unit? This roster of interrogations, suggestive rather than exhaustive, suffice to illustrate the contradictions embedded in an apparently self-evident postulate.

The other concept that was expected to be a mechanism for answering the critical question of self determination - How are the wishes of the "self" be determined? - is plebiscites. As described by Johnson (1967:59), plebiscite involves the consultation of a people by means of a vote as to its wishes. However, the operationalization of the mechanism is engulfed with delicate problems, like the parent concept. Jenning (1956) (in McGarry and O'Leary 1993:12) had pointed:

On the surface [the principle of Self-determination] seems reasonable: let the people decide. It is in fact ridiculous because the people cannot decide until somebody decides who are the people.

Pomerance (1982:4,5) has described the various problems related to the process of plebiscites as follows:

Must plebiscites be conducted in all cases, or were other methods sometimes permissible or even preferable? could reliance be placed on expert commissions or on the views of a body claiming to represent the people concerned? can powerful local elements, although in the minority, vitiate the result of the plebiscite by exerting improper influence, thus distorting the true wishes of the population? Must the plebiscite be conducted under neutral auspices and the absence of any military presence on the part of the would be annexing states? Who is to participate in the plebiscite? is it to be only the 'indigenous' population, and if so, which individuals and groups qualify for the appellation "indigenous"? Who determines the options which are to be placed before the electorate for their decision? must these options themselves be "self-determined" or may the "choice of the choices be determined by the others, so that only those options deemed by others to be reasonable or practicable in the circumstance are offered? Are the results of the plebiscite to be seen as permanent, or should provisions be made for future revision to allow an expression of will to new constellations of political forces which may arise?

In its application also self-determination was having contradictions. In some cases self-determination was often a right to be defended when it is politically advantageous and to be rejected when it is not. Especially, before the end of Cold War, there were cases where the Soviet Union finds it an excellent right for use against the west and its colonies and the west holds it eminently applicable to the peoples of USSR and its Satellites

(ibid.) The other difficulty is that the principle will possibly breed a dangerous domino effect. That is, the ethnic minorities within the seceding territories will obviously seek self determination for themselves. This condition will create as Eshete (1985) argued "A possible outcome is that if you disapprove of India, you form Pakistan; if you disapprove of Pakistan, you form Bangladesh; If you disapprove of Bangladesh, you form something else." then the process will continue.

The above explanations, however, doesn't mean to argue that the principle of self-determination is a mechanism which should be totally refuted in regulating ethnic conflict. But it is to emphasize that the application of the principle begs the considerations of the above theoretical and practical limitations as well as the political, economic, territorial, historical and other conditions before it came into force.

Nonetheless, this principle of self-determination could be a possible mechanism to resolve ethnic conflicts, if it works, by breaking up multi-ethnic states, or by allowing divorce between those ethnic communities which do not wish to live together in the same state. The mechanism can be used as a last resort to regulate ethnic conflict in deeply divided societies, that is, societies that constitute ethnic groups which are different in culture, separate in institutions, unequal in power and privilege, or disagreeing on fundamental issues. It can also be applicable if the potential for conflict among them is high and eruption of disputes and violence are quite common.

CONCLUDING COMMENTS

In the above theoretical discussion we attempted to define ethnicity and show some of the lines of analysis for ethnic conflict. It is also tried to give a brief view about the principle of self-determination. The reader should be reminded that the idea behind the discussion of the two concepts is:

- a) The first part of the theoretical overview, which deals with the ethnicity and ethnic conflict aspect, will be used to conceptualize ethnicity and to contemplate the causes of ethnic conflict in Ethiopia.
- b) The discussion on the principle of self-determination is done to show the limitation and the feasibility of the concept.
- c) Jointly, both concepts will be used to articulate how the different ethno-nationalist movements use ethnicity as a basis for self-determination claim.

d) Both concepts will be used to analyze the relevance of the principle of self-determination to the causes of ethnic conflict in Ethiopia. This principle is considered to be a last resort possible regulating mechanism if ethnicity is as explained by priomordialist view and if the conflict is as defined by cultural pluralism and uneven development lines of analysis or other very much related concepts.

CHAPTER THREE

PANORAMA OF THE ETHNOGRAPHIC PICTURE IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

Ethiopia is a complex socio-cultural system that has evolved through different historical stages. Anthropological and historical studies shows that the original units of Ethiopia's socio-cultural system are a great number of diverse, historical autonomous ethnic groups.

As a guide to identify the diverse ethnic groupings, it will be easier to use the classification used by linguists²³. The linguistic distribution suggests that there are four major language groups, known as Cushitic (often called Hamitic), Omotic, Semitic, Nilo-saharans. Although writers attribute to give their own interpretation, there is no clear cut consensus about the origin of the language groups²⁴. As Perham (1969:10) indicated "Authorities differ as to whether this race (Hamitic-Semitic), grand parents to the Ethiopians, originated in Africa or Asia - Barton (1934) argues for North Africa against Professor Seligman (1932) who favours Asia". There is, however, an agreement that the first three groups (Hamites, Semitic, and Omotic) are said to be derived from one ancestral language known as Hamito-Semitic or Afro-Asiatic (Levin 1974, Perham 1969, Baharu 1991, and others). The Nilo-sharans are considered to form an independent family (Baharu 1991).

Since antiquity these major language groups have experienced a continued internal differentiation among themselves and a differential interaction with a series of intruding external influences. But the way this internal differentiation emerges is not clearly known. The reasons, which could be applicable to any society, like occupational specialisation, and the development of some form of group complementarity, might gradually encourage the creation and enactment of distinguished signs and, eventually, the emergence of distinctive groups, with separate genealogies, each of which considers the others to be culturally distinctive from themselves (Erikson 1993:79). In any case, according to the 1984 Census records there are around 91 ethnic groups in Ethiopia (see Annex 1 for the linguistic grouping of the 56 ethnic groups which had more than 20000 members).

After their differentiation these diverse ethnic groups did not live as discrete isolated units. They have passed through a process of adoption, continual migration, conquest, acculturation, assimilation, and in general interactions within the groups and among the groups since an undetermined epoch. These groups had also experienced a great deal of influence from outside people.

At the risk of simplification it would be worth while to mention, at least in a form of a bare outline, some salient aspects of the long history of the country. This is considered helpful to understand the relationship and continual interaction among these ethnic groups. It seems also proper to assume that the question of ethnicity requires the re-thinking of the country's past and demands answer which the past can partially give.

A: THE AXUMITE EMPIRE

The Axumite empire was a preeminent epoch which had flourished on the northern part of Ethiopia from the first to seventh centuries A.D, and continued to play a significant role in northern Ethiopia until the tenth century (Levine 1974). This historical epoch had given shape to the interaction of numerous ethnic groups and marked incidence of external cultural influences. According to a Persian Chronicler of the third century, this kingdom was one of the great kingdom on earth - among the four kingdoms -the Kingdom of Babylon and Persia, the Kingdom of Rome, the Kingdom of Axumites and the Kingdom of Chinese (Habtu in Gebreyesus 1990:78). Trimingham (1952:34) noted that during the kingdom of Axum various groups of Semitic, Cushitic, and Negroid tribes (ethnic groups) had fused into racial and cultural homogeneity. Levine (1974:70) also noted that the Axumites whose rulers in period of political prosperity called themselves "Kings of Kings", enjoyed holding sway over diverse peoples, receiving tribute from them, and bringing them into a single cultural orbit.

The unprecedented event in the history of the Ethiopia which was the introduction of christianity has happened during this period. The influence of the Jews and the emergence of the Falashas were realized. Levine (*ibid.*:32) wrote "In the first few centuries A.D. there was a substantial influx of ancient Hebraic culture, most probably imported by Jews then living in South Arabia. These were absorbed by the Ge'ez speakers around Axum and by some Agew peoples. The Falasha, who call them selves Beta Israel, and to some extent the kimante can be viewed as the subsequent ethnic precipitate of this phase." (see also Trimingham 1952).²⁵

The Kings of Axum influenced a large area stretching to the north, west, south and east and established their dominion over the Beja, Saho, Nubia, the central massif and across the Redsea into the coastal region of Yemen (Tadesse (in Stahl 1974:14-5), Levin 1974:72). The period also witnessed the flourishing of rich civilization which appeared to have been an amalgam of the indigenous know-how and external influence. This kingdom existence could be explained through military expansion and inland and maritime trade. Some writers also noted, (see for example Kebede 1984:202), the process of

Ethiopian feudalism had started in Ethiopia in the 4th century A.D. as a result of the granting of land in lieu of salary or as a gift to royal individuals or to churches by the king of Axum. It also gave the impetus to the evolution of the division of the society between an agrarian highland community and a nomadic pastoral community.

The Axumite kingdom, around the seventh century, came to a process of declining. The over-stretchment of the kingdom on two continents and the birth and unique expansion of Islam has played a big role in the process. Axum lost the control of the Red sea trade. The subject people, the Yemenites, the Beja²⁶ and the Agew rose up in a rebellion to mark its decline. The Agews burned the church and killed the royalty²⁷. Finally Axum disappeared from the political stage.

The significance of the Axumite period was that it marked the ethnic interaction among the different ethnic groups especially in the norther part of the country. It unified the region through its urban centres - the city of Axum and the port of Adulis. The periods political, cultural and economic institution consequently were having impact on the succeeding periods. Tareke (1991:198) pointed out that during the period Northern Ethiopia shared common mode of production, a common polity, the same christian tradition and an "etiological charter composed of script, art, and literature". It had left also the legendary ethnic identity for the Ethiopian leaders from Shoa to claim descendant the so-called Solomonic dynasty. Even Haile Selassie, the emperor of Ethiopia from 1930-1974, claimed of being the direct descendants of the Axumite dynasty and at the same time of being the offspring of the biblical Solomon which even the Axumite kings may or may not claim.

B: THE MEDIEVAL PERIOD

This period marked the emergence of the Abyssinian society. This society was the result of the fusion of the Semitic and the Hamitic peoples, chief amongst whom were the Agew (Trimingham 1952:49 and Markakis 1974:14). In the fusion the Semitic languages Ge'ez, Tigrina, and the Amharic prevailed over the Agew languages and their social structure was transformed, although from ethnical point of view the Hamitic element was completely dominant. This society was known as the 'historic Abyssinia'. During this period in the northern part of the country two significant dynasties emerged.

The first one was the Agew dynasty which is known as the Zagwe²⁸. The dynasty has ruled for around 135 year, made its imperial centre the province of Lasta and claimed Moses as their father land. According to Levine (1974:71) the period was quite politically but a period of vital missionary

activity and a time of construction of a number of monolithic church at Lalibela. Perham (1969:31) commented that the dynasty do not appear to represent any cultural revolution. Trimingham (1952:57) also mentioned that this dynasty could hardly call it self 'kings of the kings of Ethiopia' for the sphere of their rule was very circumscribed. Tigraye, Lasta, and Angot were certainly under their control and perhaps part of Begemeder.

The second was the Abyssinian Dynasty which seized the throne in 1270. The empire had lasted for three centuries. During these period different ethnic groups, which were having their own kingdom, entered in to incessant warfare, in the guise of religion and struggle for political and regional dominance. The warfare was among the Abyssinian and with other groups. The within struggle was between the Tigreans, Falasha, Agew, and Amhara areas, i.e., in the 'historical Abyssinia' or the groups which controls the area between the Red sea and the shoan plateau. In the struggle the Amhara managed to play a dominant role. A brief account about this ethnic group is important at this point. As it will be tried to show in the following sections this group was considered to have more or less a dominant position during the medival period.

Amhara is an ethnic group which is given various claims about its origin. Tamrat (in Delibo 1974:9-11) considers this group as "one of the semitic group who emigrated from Arabia and settled among the Agew population in the region between the Tekeze and the Jama". For him the group is the earliest emigrant where its date of origin is not known because of lack of traditional material. Atma Giyorgis (in *ibid.*) pointed that "the word 'Amhara' was the collective name of Emperor Lalibela's (1133-1173) soldiers who were settled in the provinces of Wadla, Begemdir, Saint, and Wolkait in the central high lands." He wrote that "Amharas came from nowhere. They were the experienced and strong, unjust, rebel, and cruel troops of Lasta who gathered from different groups". For Giyorgis these professional military men were from the Zagwe peripheral territories like the present Wello and northern Shoa that destroyed the Zagwe dynasty and created their own new military leadership of Yikuno Amlak in 1270. Levine (1974) also wrote that "during the first millennium A.D the inhabitants of Amhara were Agew peoples who developed a distinct South-Ethio-Semitic tongue, amarinna or Amharic, quite possibly through a process of pidginization and creolization." Such sorts of explanation and others are given about this ethnic group. But in this paper, without deeply going about its origin, it will be considered as one of the native ethnic groups which have been in a constant conflictual and other forms of interaction with the other groups.

During the period, in addition to the conflictual interaction within the groups in the historic Abyssinian domain, there were also other conflictual interactions, which took place at different times and at different places, with other groups. The conflicts involve different groups like the kingdoms of Damot, Hadiyya, Gojjam; the muslim states of Ifat and Fatigar; the Muslim Sultanates of Dawaro and Bale; Felasha troops in the north; part of Shoa and the province of Menz, Beja, Agew lands, port of Zeila, Kembata, Janjero, Kefa and Wolamo and other areas which contain different ethnic groups²⁹.

These conflicts lasted for three centuries. The outcome of the conflicts resulted in extending the Amhara sphere of influence over a wide area³⁰. During this period the Amhara language spread to become the mother tongue of peoples in the provinces of Shoa, Gojjam, Gonder and most part of wello. Amharic become a lingua franca for the elites of all the regions in the Amhara sphere of influence. The official religion of the Amhara Kingdom, Monophysite Christianity, has started to facilitate the centralization of the kingdoms in close collaboration with the kings and put a major impact on the beliefs and practices of the people under the throne (Ibid. 1974).

Another major incident in population movement and ethnic alignment during the medieval period was, the time when christians and muslims in Ethiopia destroyed each other. It was a time when the Amhara and other kingdoms came under a fierce attack by the invasion led by Imam Ahmed Ibn al Ghazi, whom the Ethiopians called Ahmed Gragn, between the years 1527 and 1543. Gragn, after establishing the city of Harar as a military base, led an army of Adali and Somalia worriers who were inspired by the jihad (a muslim holy war) and expansion of their territory, conquered and plundered much of the christian Ethiopia. In this period the defeated areas relapsed into mass conversion to Islam. Hassen (1990:18) described the event by stating that "because the jihad was accompanied by warfare hitherto unwitnessed in the area, the christians and muslims devastated each other and affected a great number of people living in wide area to abandon their ancestral lands and seek refuge in difficult mountainous regions or other areas". Finally the Imam was defeated in 1543, and left the christian kingdom to not easily recover its former might (Bahru 1991:9).

During this time foreigners involvement in the moslem-christian conflicts was identified when first the Ottoman Turks give the ideology and reinforcement to the moslem forces of Ahmed Gran and latter when the portuguese backed the christians to fend off the moslems. Massawa, the main port of Ethiopia for many centuries, fell in the hands of ottomans in 1557 (Abir 1968:5).

C: THE OROMO MIGRATION

The other most significant period in the history of Ethiopia ethnic interaction is the 16th century Oromo migration. This migration is considered to be the most pivotal population movement in the country's history, changing its cultural and demographic shape as well as its political geography. This group were one of the indigenous groups of Ethiopia which belong to the Eastern Cushitic language speaking group and living in the high lands of Bale (Hassen 1990:4). According to Hassen (*ibid.*) two stages of migration were recorded. During the first stage, in the 1520s, one of the group of this ethnic group invaded the low lands of Bale, in the next decade the oromo crossed the Wabi and in the 1540s' and early 1550s' they devastated the whole of Deward and began to make war on fatagar (*op.cit.*). The second was the real landmark in the whole history of the oromo migration for the next three centuries.

The Oromo migration was in a form of conflictual and non-conflictual interactions mainly between the pastoral oromo groups on the one hand and on the other hand the christians and muslim kingdoms and other groups. The result of the conflicts were in making the Oromo groups to expand and spread over vast areas of Ethiopia as well as play crucial role in the political life of the country.

According to writers (See for example Markakis 1974, Levine 1974, Trimingham 1952, Hassen 1991, Abir 1968 and others) from the sixteenth century until the nineteenth the Oromo groups advancing from the south along the Rift valley lakes occupied part of the Harar plateau; subjected most of Shoa; expand as far as Lasta and penetrated the Sidama (Hadiyya, Wollamo, Sidamo, Enarea, and Keffa) and Agew peoples; occupy the heart of the christian Amhara-Tigrae provinces in the north and moved into the Gibe region and occupied the entire south-western portion of the plateau. In most of the territories they penetrated during this period the Oromo still remain. As Levine (1974:82) pointed the oromos made their central zone in the south and became influential in establishing independent enclaves in the central part of the country and enter directly into the mainstream of 'historic abyssinian' life and politics. This migration has resulted in making one of the Oromo group to be a master of the core provinces of Amhara and Gonder in the subsequent period.

D: THE ERA OF PRINCES

The other critical period of the Ethiopian past was the Zemene masafent or the era of the princes (roughly the period from the 1770s to the mid-

nineteenth century). During this time centralized political leadership was hardly existing and political power was in the hands of regional princes and nobilities or principalities. The princes and nobility marshalled their forces and intensified their struggle for power. They conducted wars in various regions with the view of increasing the number of their tenants and expanding their territories, as a result of which the nobility alternately experienced rises and falls (Abir 1968).

The period marked the war between changing constellations of Amhara, Tigray and Oromo warlords in Northern Ethiopia. The main contest during the period revolved around the palace of the Gonderian Empire - the capital city of the North. The power alignments for and against them were dictated less by ethnic and religious considerations than by self interest and regional aggrandizements (Bahiru 1991:12). Although some writers (see Crummey 1975:267) attribute this period to be a time in which divisive and centrifugal forces triumphed for an extended time, the regional conflicts of the Zamana Mesafint showed scarcely centrifugal tendencies. Rather, as Bahiru (*op.cit.*) stated the moves of the regional lords were to dominate the centre, not to go away from it. Even the shoan principality which was comparatively insulated from the wars and politics of Northern Ethiopia, according to Perham (1969:48), did not attempt to break away from their allegiance but sent troops to Gonder when required. During this period there were groups which were having their kingdoms or states but which do not directly involve to the intense conflict in the politics of Gonder.

E: THE PERIOD OF EXPANSION AND CONSOLIDATION

The Second half of the nineteenth century had witnessed the end of the Era of Princes and the beginning of a unified modern Ethiopia that would override earlier regional differences. This period is one of the most important phase in the country's modern history. The creation of unified Ethiopia, through centralization and expansion, could be identified with the reign of three strong emperors: Tewodros (1855-68), Yohannes (1872-89) and Menelik (1889-1913).

Tewodros, as describe by Beharu (1991:28) was "essentially a self-made man who represented the first effective response to both the internal and the external challenge - to the squabbling princes as well as to the 'Turk' - largely by dint of his personal qualities". Making his territorial base at Ethio-sudanese border - Quarra, he brought under his control the Yejju, Begermeder, wello, Shoa, Tigre, Gojjam principalities. He did not make a clean sweep of the local dynasties, but he confirmed them in their regional bases, at best appointing those he considered plain members of the dynasties.

But eventually because of the internal opposition to his authority by the local nobilities and the British punitive expedition³¹, his empire came to an end.

Yohannes, ruler of Temben and who descended from the ruling family of another area in Tigre, Agame (Gilkes 1975:26), is another most important figure in the formation of modern Ethiopia. He was the first to described Ethiopia as a political entity with defined boundary. His letter to the king of prussia, dated February 17, 1881, as quoted in Teshale (1987:21) was:

To the east and the south (east) the boundary is the sea. To the west and north, where there are no seas, it is bounded by Nuba, Suakine, Khartoum, Berber, sennar, Ennaria, Sudan, and then Dongola, Haren Dawa, Gash, Massawa, Bedun, Shoho, and Tiltal. Further the region inhabited by Galla [sic:Oromo], Shankilla, and Adal is all mine, and yet recently in the middle of Shoa, a place known by the name Harar, was taken (from us). All the same I listed these places so that my country's boundaries be known.

Yohannes IV was having a different policy of unification which was based on controlled regionalism, that is, accepting the full right of the local nobles provided the latter recognize his suzerainty. He made the nobles of Yeju, Wello, Gojam, Keffa, Gonder and Shoa to unequivocally recognize his suzerainty. He scored victory over the Egyptians and made Mereb Melash - the territory north of the Mereb river stretching to the Red sea, under his control. His internal and external victory did not last longer. His empire was challenged by the Italian occupation of Massawa. The passive resistance of Menilik, one of his vassal in Shoa, and the alliance of Menikil with Italy to fend of the threat of Yohannes³² was a problem. The Mehadist occupation of Mattamma was the strongest challenge which made his throne to came to an end.

Menilik, king of Shoa and a vassal in the reign of Yohannes, had the best claim to be considered as the founder of modern Ethiopia. His process of unification involved centralization and territorial expansion. Menilik's expansion, however, started before and after the death of Yohannes and the Italian aggression. These expansions were first towards the north, that is, in July 1876 menilik conquered Wello and in 1877 invaded Gojjam. Latter, after he become emperor he focused to the south, southeast, and southwest direction of the country irrespective of any sort of particularism (language or religion). The tradition of territorial expansion by his predecessors, the urge to control the source of the lucrative long-distance trade, the need to forestall the race for territory by the colonial powers, particularly at the final stage, and his easy access to firearms were the major impetus for his internal expansion (see Bahiru 1991, Markakis 1974, McClellan 1984:660).

During this centralization and expansion process, two poles of reaction - peaceful submission and armed resistance - were manifested (see Bahru 1991:60-72, Perham 1969, Darkwah 1975 for the details). The actors and the forces involved in the expansion were not only from only one ethnic group. Some regions who have peacefully submitted were assisted by the centre to expand their area of influence. The regions who have resisted the incorporation were brought by brutal force. Some regions who already submitted or conquered had also made alliance with the centre to enhance the expansion. During this period a considerable movement of people from Shoa (Amhara, Oromo, Gurage and others) and other northern regions to the south had occurred. This movement made possible the transformation of the state and strengthen its hold on the empire as a whole. It was during this period the various ethnic groups which passed through this long historical process of conflictual and non-conflictual interactions came under a modern and unified state.

The relationship between the newly created centre and the previous sovereign polities were not uniform. Some regions in the south, like Jimma, major part of Wellega, some part of Gojjam, and Awsa, were left autonomous but were required to pay a fixed annual tribute to the centre. Other regions in the south, like Arsi, Keffa, Welaita, part of Shoa, some part of Wellega, Borana, Illibabur, Harar became under the jurisdiction of Menilek's war generals providing them with the source of both their wealth and their military strength. The central and northern regions were left to the nobilities autonomy.

In general, Menilik era was a period where Ethiopia largely acquired the geographic size which it has today; most of the boundary lines were drawn and frontier agreements were made with foreign powers; the country were divided into smaller administrative units governed by nobles and military chiefs who were subject to the emperor; Ethiopia gradual modernization - modern government, modern school, modern army, Railway, motor car, and other new institutions and techniques- was first initiated. Despite the effort of political unification and the introduction of modern government, however, the authority of the central state remained restricted and regional or provincial overlords still enjoyed administrative powers, raising armed contingents and collecting revenues with little or no direct interference from the central state.

F: THE EXTERNAL CHALLENGE

Starting the invasion of Ahmed Gragn and during the era of princes foreigners (Turk, portugal, English, France, Italy, Egypt, Sudan) religious, commercial

and colonial interests in Ethiopia was evident. Without going to the intricate relationship among the Foreigners and Ethiopians, the major episodes in the second half of 19th century were the alliance of Yohannes with the British force and the alliance of Menilik with the Italian force at different times which resulted in the betrayal of both emperors by their respective allies.

The external challenges during the period of Yohannes and Menilik were very difficult and had contributed to be the 'justifications' for some of the ethnic based movements in the coming periods. During this time factors like the strategic and commercial importance of the Red sea region after the Suez canal was opened in 1869; the 'famous' scramble to partition the continent; the social and economic dislocation in the country; and resistance by the local princes in a form of alliance to the external forces to subvert their overlords give rise to the Imperial powers of Europe to claim the entire coast and expanding to the hinterland.

According to Trimingham (1952) Italy's first occupation was Assab in 1870, and landed a military expedition at Massawa in 1885 and in 1889 signed the treaty of Wuchalle with Menilik which recognized Italian rule over the region north of Mereb which they named Eritrea (see also Markakis 1974:24, Bahru 1991). During the Menilik's period, although diplomatic and subversive action were tried to oust the Italians from the country, the colonizers took the military option. In 1895 they crossed the Marab river and launched an invasion in the heart of Tigre province and occupy Addigrat. Menilik responded to the aggression by mobilizing his army, which was remarkable not only for its size but also as an eloquent demonstration of national unity (Baharu 1991), and crushed the enemy at the battle of Adwa in 1896.

The two faces of the victory were, the one being that it has made Ethiopia to be a torch of dignity and independence to the black people of the world under White racial domination. On the other hand it made the northern part of the country -Eritrea- to be under the colonial domination until it was reclaimed after the second world war - hence the pretext for the inextricable Eritrean problem for many years until it was resolved in April 1993.

Menilik during his period had also made negotiations and regularize the boarder line demarcation in the western frontiers with Anglo-Egyptian Sudan (15 May 1902) and southern frontier with British East Africa (6 December 1907) (Trimingham 1952:125). However, the question of the border line with Italian Somaliland was not settled and resulted in a renewed Italian aggression in 1930s (Markakis 1974:25) - and hence this has become the pretext for the complex Somali irredenta problem which is still unsolved.

To comment on the above historical events, like any other history, the history of Ethiopia is more of a history of confrontation and merger; of more or less constant interaction through trade, religious activity, intermarriage and exchange of special service; of movement and settlement; of struggle between regional lords, principalities, kingdoms; of centuries of class struggle - involving various regions in which all ethnic groups have taken part, one way or another, in the making of present day Ethiopia. (The impact of this historical events on the interaction of the ethnic groups will be briefly reviewed in chapter 4.)

Until the era of Menilik the objectives of most of the regions was control over land or expanding territory. During the periods conflict among regions which have two or more ethnic groups versus another region consisting two or more ethnic groups; or a region with one ethnic group with a region consisting the same ethnic group were prevalent. However, the subsequent periods following the era of Menilik has brought about a change in the socio-political system of the country. In the next section we will try to see the regulation of the relationship among the different ethnic groups in the new system.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE RISE AND PROLIFERATION OF ETHNIC BASED MOVEMENTS AND THE MODES OF REGULATION

4.1: HAILE SELASSIE'S 'CENTRALIZATION AND MODERNIZATION', THE RISE OF ETHNIC BASED MOVEMENTS AND THE MODES OF REGULATION

After the death of Menilik, the throne came under full control of Haile Selassie (regent 1917-1930; emperor 1930-1974). Haile Selassie's control of the throne was possible through an intriguing palace political struggle³³ among the feudal political elites for 17 years. The new emperor had continued the centralization and modernization effort that was initiated by Menilik. Although his power was interrupted by the brief Italian occupation, following his restoration in 1941 he immediately started the process of centralization and modernization.

The most critical measures the Haile Selassie government took during the period, according to some authors (Markakis 1974, Halliday and Molyneux 1981, Baharu 1991, Ottway M. and Ottway D. 1978 and others), were as follows:

- a) The centralization of the structure of power, both judiciary and administrative, which brought to an end the fragmentation of political authority. The different regions of the country were recognized into provinces, sub provinces and districts, each level governed by salaried officials appointed by the central government. The measure resulted in the gradual decline and eventual elimination of the administrative and judicial authority of the traditional regional elite.
- b) The building up of a modern professional standing army and police force. This eventually replaced the armies of regional lords thereby eliminating the basis of the political power and authority of the landed aristocracy.
- c) The elaboration of a uniform, centrally administered fiscal and tax system which laid the groundwork for a relatively more rational system of revenue generation as well as the basis for a unified fiscal and budgetary policy.
- d) The establishment of a 'National parliament and Constitution', a measure which didn't create an independent legislature and other social institutional infrastructures but rather which was basically part of

the general scheme of the consolidation of the power and authority by the ruling elites. The Parliament provided the aristocracy, which was never systematically organized as a distinct class, an official organ through which it could somehow jointly articulate and defend its 'class' interest.

e) Adoption of different economic and other social policies directed towards 'modernization'. Modern education, modern administration, modern infrastructure and other facilities. Economic policies which were in general geared towards selection of growth centres (only few urban areas) and emphasizing all effort on those areas with the assumption that the benefit will "trickle-down" to the other areas.

The state structures, institutions and instruments, which had resulted from the above measures, were easily employed by the dominant forces to repress, exploit, suppress, and marginalize the masses. The national operation was manifested in the uneven land holding system, backwardness of the various regions of country, assignment of regional governors who were not from the locality, imposition of Amharic language in schools, courts, and in all state institutions; affliction of Christianity as the state religion. In general, as Tareke (1991:89) pointed, the state system penalized and victimized the weakest but most productive sector of the society, while rewarding the idle and socially parasitic elements.

The state was a tool in the hands of a largely decadent, unproductive, corrupt, dependant and dominant elite group. This state, as Hiwet (1987) and others argued was the site of a composite social forces - royalty, the landed aristocracy and the subaltern bourgeoisie, civil and military bureaucracy - a whole composite of 'servant to the state'. The dominant elite group included the elite with modern education and the traditional elite (nobility). Both groups were under the strict control of the emperor. Ottway (1987:26), when describing the nature of the state as being the property of the emperor stated "The attempt to build the Ethiopian state under Haile Selassie was distorted by his preoccupation with his own power. Haile Selassie selectively built up the state when this strengthened his position, but weakened it when the state became a potential obstacle. The result was a system in which an elected parliament existed, but had little power; the cabinet served strictly at the pleasure of the emperor." Keller (1988) also described "the state as a weak state tenuously held together by a top-heavy, secularized bureaucracy and the traditional imperial myth."

The state was used, by this dominant group of traditional and educated elite, for accumulation as against legitimization purposes. The state itself was an

economic power not just because it determined the process of accumulation but because it was the biggest landlord, industrialist, financier and employer. The major economic base of the dominant elite group was land. Without deeply going into the details over the issue, land ownership was extremely uneven. As the following table shows the majority of the population was tenant. The table also shows the extent of absentee landlords - where most of the traditional elite in the state power can be categorized. Other related studies also show that an estimated two percent of the landowners own over 80% percent of the land (Teshale 1987). Moreover, the overwhelming majority of the rural population had to pay exorbitant rent or tribute to the nobility out of its meagre income from production.

TABLE 1: LAND HOLDING STRUCTURE DURING THE REIGN OF HAILE SELASSIE

REGION	% of tenant farmers	Absente owners as % of total	% of land owned by absentee owners
Shoa	67	35	45
ARSI	52	28	27
WELLO	32	26	13
WELEGA	59	29	18
HARARGE	54	23	48
ILLUBABUR	75	42	42
KEFFA	62	18	34
GAMU GOFA	47	10	42
SIDAMO	39	25	42
BALE	64	15	12
TOTAL AVERAGE	55.1	25.1	33.3

Source: Ministry of Land Reform and Administration. The Major features of The prevailing Land Tenure In Ethiopia. Vol. 1. Addis Ababa, 1971, pp 33 and 39 (Quoted in Lealem 1991:46)

In general, the exploitative relationship between a dominant landed aristocrat and a subordinated majority of the population was typical nature of the society. The magnitude of the exploitation was extremely high in the south and western part of the country. This system of exploitation and subjugation of the poor peasantry was made possible by the dominant elite through political and legal means of compulsion.

To distinguish the ethnic composition (in terms of descent, birth, kinship or other objective markers) of the elite in the state apparatus is very difficult. Instead regional differences had been expressed at the central government level. As the following table shows the representation of the central province of Shoa was the highest as compared to the other provinces.

TABLE 2: OFFICIALS FROM DIFFERENT REGIONS WITH THE RANK OF MINISTER AND VICE MINISTER IN THE STATE APPARATUS, 1941-1966

REGION	1942	1948	1953	1957	1959	1962	1964	1966	TOTAL-NEW APPOINTEE
SHOA	7	10	16	23	30	27	31	43	85
GOJJAM	2	1	2	2	-	-	1	3	6
GONDER	-	1	-	-	1	2	2	2	5
TIGRE	1	1	-	3	3	4	3	2	7
ERITREA	2	-	4	2	1	4	9	9	19
WELLEGA	1	2	1	1	1	3	3	5	6
SIDAMO	-	-	1	1	1	1	1	1	2
ILLUBABUR	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	2
HARAR	-	-	-	1	1	-	-	1	2
SOMALI	-	-	-	-	1	1	1	1	2
UNKNOWN	-	-	-	-	1	-	1	-	2
TOTAL	13	15	24	33	39	42	52	68	138

Source: Clapham, 1969:77.

This table, however, does not show the genealogy of the officials, except showing that there was high representation from Shoa region. But this does not mean that Shoa represents one ethnic group - if ethnic group is considered in terms of decent derived from genealogy or language group. For example, if we take the actual genealogy of the emperor him self, as Baxter (1978:288) noted, "Emperor Haile selassie was by pedigree or 'blood' was as much Oromo as Amhara, but no one would ever have classified him as an Oromo". Some also pointed that his mothers was a Gurage. This situation also applies to the other senior officials and provincial governors. As Clapham (1989:12) indicated " For the past centuries (precisely, since the emperor Menilik accession in 1889) the political and geographical centre of Ethiopia was in Shoa, a region mixed Oromo, Amhara, and other peoples, most of whose population is of Oromo origin (...) Many Shoans are ethnically unidentifiable."

4.1.1 TERRITORIAL ADMINISTRATION

Before the 1935 Italian invasion the country was divided into 34 administrative units (Cohen and Koehn 1980:19). But after the centralization and modernization effort was further pushed, Ethiopia was divided into 14 provinces, 103 sub-provinces, 505 districts and 949 sub-districts. The system of provincial administration was based on the Administrative Decree of 1942 and its feature was 'deconcentration'. The system was amended in 1966 by

"Local Self-Administration Order. The idea, as stated by the government, was "to give full provision to the people to actively participation in business of local government"³⁴. The paradox in both efforts lies on the fact that the regional and local administration was in the hands of the governors appointed by the emperor. These governors were those who were loyal to the emperor and members of the aristocrat and the nobility in the different regions. As the following table indicates the provincial and sub-provincial governors were not elected from the local people.

TABLE 3: DISTRIBUTION OF PROVINCIAL AND SUB-PROVINCIAL ADMINISTRATORS BY REGIONS FROM THE YEAR 1942-1967

REGION	OUTSIDERS	LOCAL
SHOA	17	83
TIGRE	28	72
WELLO	32	68
GOJJAM	48	52
KEFFA	71	29
WELLEGA	74	26
HARAR	74	26
ILLUBABUR	80	20
SIDAMO	81	19
ARSI	90	10

Source: Gilkes (1975:39-49)

As the above table indicates, especially in most parts of the southern region, the provincial and sub-provinces governors were not from the local people. This table is brought to simply indicate the predominance of outsiders or non-indigenous elite, especially in the southern part of Ethiopia, which were loyal to the state. As Gilkes (*ibid..*) noted, however, the figure should be treated with some caution as the data for outsiders also includes persons from other ethnic groups who had permanently settled in the provinces. The actual ethnic origin of the governors is very difficult to trace. But this assignment of non-indigenous members had been felt by many ethnic groups in some regions. It had also breed regional discontents and movements in some regions.

4.1.2: THE MODERNIZING ECONOMIC POLICIES AND THEIR IMPACT

In this period the state adopted economic policies that were directed at 'modernization'. These were like development administered by central-planning boards under the aegis of the state and strategies geared towards selection of growth centres ³⁵. These policies were also the bases for the attraction of foreign capital, the development of some physical infrastructure,

promotion of capitalist agriculture. This and other modernization policies, however, have resulted in making the few urban towns - Addis Ababa (Shoa), Asmara (Eritrea), and DireDawa (Hararge) - to have some infrastructure and other public services (See Annex 3). The rest of the society was somehow equally deprived irrespective of the ethnic composition.

The table (Annex 3) depicts regional disparity. But if the ethnic composition of each region is taken (compare with Annex 2), it will be difficult to state that one ethnic group has benefited from the modernization effort. Certain members of different ethnic groups living in the urban areas were favoured at the expense of others. The benefits of modernization effort had remained without 'trickling down' to the poor. Over 90% of the population, living in the country side were engulfed with poverty, disease, illiteracy, and repression. Economic stagnation and underdevelopment persisted. The state was unable to respond concretely to these chronic problems.

Generally, like many Third World countries, the modernization move has produced little more than roads, schools and hospitals in few urban areas and has reinforced and increased income disparities and inequality of access to life chance opportunities, made the poorest even poorest, and led progressively more authoritarian regimes (Dwivedi and Nef 1982). The modernization effort became a means to amass material resources for the dominant elite in the state apparatus. The outcome of the effort turned out the state to be a place for the fierce battle among the different groups of elites and subsequently a good ground for ethnic revitalization. However, this modernization effort and the subsequent urbanization was having an impact in introducing some cultural fabrics in some parts of the country. (The cultural impact will be briefly reviewed in chapter 4 of the paper.)

4.1.2: EDUCATION-THE VANGUARD OF MODERNIZATION - AND THE RISE OF POLITICIZED ETHNICITY

The process of education, vanguard of modernization, is the most important element that can best be attributed to be the major cause of the ensuing ethnic conflict in Ethiopia. The major reasons for the expansion of education, that is either to begin the process of national literacy or the creation of few number of educated elites to enhance the centralization process, has been debatable³⁶. Without going to the debate, during the period of Haile Selassie, the expansion of education (educating citizens at home and abroad) in Ethiopia has resulted in creating two major groups of educated elites.

4.1.2.1: THE FIRST EDUCATED GROUP (THE OLD EDUCATED ELITE)

The members of this group were those educated Ethiopians in the 1930's to the close of the 1950's. This group are referred by some as the 'new nobility'. Most of them were absorbed and made the major pillars of the state. They were provided with gainful employment offering high salaries, social prestige, opportunities for advancement in the hierarchy of the authority. As indicated in Table 2 above, most of the member of this group were those who occupied top position in the state hierarchy. The recruitment and promotion of the group to position of power was personally encouraged by the Emperor for technical as well as political reasons. They were assimilated to the nobility and aristocracy in many cases through marriage. These inducements had greatly helped in integrating this educated elite into the traditional ruling framework. As Markakis (1974) argued the group also served to dull the pangs of intellectual and political discontent and to render the intelligentsia an unusually docile group during this period. Generally this group of educated elite differ little from the traditional elite into whose circle they have been co-opted.

There was, however, a feeling of disillusionment and dissatisfaction among few members of this first educated group. This was due to the gap between their expectation and the pace of change that occurred and had resulted in a power struggle which culminated in the 1960 aborted coup. Except this incidence there was no open opposition from this old elite group. Tadesse (1993:18) argued that while this group may have been politically frustrated, the older generation of the intelligentsia was not inclined to risk its privileged position by challenging the monarch. In general, for this old elite group, the situation did not lead them to call upon the ethnic factor. Ethnicity was undercommunicated among this first educated group of elite.

4.1.2.2: THE SECOND EDUCATED GROUP (THE NEW EDUCATED ELITE)

The members of second group were those educated starting the beginning of the 1960s. The members were large in number and heterogeneous in terms of ethnic composition as compared to the old group. This group includes those who were already employed in the lower and middle levels of the hierarchy and who were still under university education.

The employed group aspiration for a higher position and the application of his new knowledge was heavily constrained. This group was victim of forced subordination and underemployment. Tadesse (*ibid.*) argued "Even though privileged, the intelligentsia's (the new educated elite) prospects for further advancements, in the realm of the ancient regime, were definitely and

frustratingly limited." He pointed that in the state bureaucracy, it occupied a subordinate position, well paid but without power or even influence. Foreign ownership and management in the private sector barred many Ethiopians from employment. The prospect for the emergence of a national bourgeoisie, an event that the this group might have welcomed, was very weak. Thus, the only escape from this "destiny-devoid of power and resource" lay through the exercise of political power, a fact that eventually turned some members of the new-educated elite into a dissident group. subsequently, some members of this group had started politicizing ethnicity as an instrument to attain their demand for getting a share in the state power and resource.

The other part of the new educated group was the University students. The members of this group were students from higher and middle class families and students from higher class families who were pursuing their education abroad. This group was threatened by the situation faced by the employed new educated elite and was actually was under an actual menace of unemployment. The group was the strongest group who openly raised questions which calls for radical changes in the structure of the state and other socio-political and economic issues.

The major causes for these new groups of elite to be radicalized, as discussed by Markakis and Nega (1978) and Tadesse (1993), were as follows:

1. The state apparatus became crowded with people of relatively young age, the rate of promotion slowed down accordingly, and rapid upward mobility, a feature of a period of expansion in the 1940s and 1950s, was now replaced by the prospect of stagnation.
2. In the late 1960s, there were approximately 100000 people employed in the public sector, one-third of whom were in the state owned enterprises. By the same time, both the civil service and the state owned enterprises had reached a saturation point, and recruitment was seriously curtailed.
3. Ethiopia entered a period of economic stringency, due to the closing of the suez canal in 1967, the consequent trade depression which reduced state revenue from that source, and a parallel decline in the price of coffee, Ethiopia's major export. The country's borrowing capacity was already badly strained. Debt servicing in the 1968 equalled 15.8% of export earnings.

4. Further expansion of the public sector was ruled out, and this coincides with the drastic decline in the rate of labour absorption in the private sector.

Finally all these factors had resulted in making the students distressed and the students started to challenge the old-elite. There are, however, additional facts that could explain why the group became radicalized. These were: a) the secular values, such as enlightenment, progress, equality, efficiency, and prosperity, communicated through the modern education system; b) the introduction of Marxist thought and other thinking like nationalism, socialism and so on; c) the rise of revolutionary upheaval in other third world countries; d) the realization of the internal power struggle among the 'servants of the state' which was evidenced by the attempted coup. These and other related factors had helped this group to emerge as the regimes political nemesis.

This newly educated group, using this newly acquired ideological tools and strongly aiming to restructure the state and frustrated by their future destiny, was among the forces to question the legitimacy of the political system.

The competition among the old traditional and educated elite and the new educated elite was intense. In the eyes of the new educated elite the older elite in the position of power, were the first targets. They were considered among the obstacles that must be dislodged if Ethiopia is to move rapidly towards modernization. Without further details, these newly educated group, being united, was one of the forces to openly expose and question the subjugation of the rural and urban poor by the 'servants of the state'. When this new elite opposition reached at its climax, the old elite started taking military measures to curb the opposition³⁷. This measure, however, had made many student activists fled out of the country and those who got the chance of joining other local movements started to join and subsequently add to the movement the ethnic formula. It has also further aggravated the situation and in the following periods the student movement was highly intensified.

In the course of the movement against the regime, the new-educated elite group was divided entirely into different factions. One group asserted the problem of Ethiopia is a problem of class contradiction, the other group insisted it is the problem of nationalities and others held both positions. It was at this juncture ethnicity was gradually overcommunicated by the group which asserted 'the question of nationality'. Amharic, the official language of the state and which was vigorously promoted as a national language was strictly felt by some group to be the means of oppression and subjugation. This was the first basic incident where, in the political discourse among

this group, politicized ethnicity starts to play a predominant role. Tadesse (*ibid.*) wrote "It was during this period that, probably to the surprise of many, some Addis Abeba born and reared Tigrigna speakers and oromos started speaking in their first languages on the university campus and elsewhere. Oromo ethnic identity was galvanized by the formation of the Mecha and Tulema association...Similar feeling were aroused among Tigraye students who believed that their poverty-stricken province was condemned to eternal stagnation by its exclusion in the Amhara-dominated state bureaucracy". Ottway M. & Ottway D. (1978:28) also evinced that "After the mid-1960s, Tigrean and Eritrean students refused to speak Amharic any longer, and all discussions involving the entire student body generally took place in English as a neutral *lingua franca* acceptable to all ethnic groups".

Generally it was at this period, politicized Ethnicity or 'the question of nationality' become the political discourse among the new educated elite group. The group who professed 'the question of nationality' invoked Lenin's notion of self-determination, which until now has remained to be a bone of contention. Starting this period, the question of ethnicity has been the most politically lucrative issue in the hands of this group of the new educated elite. Under the guise of this question, the country has paid a cost more than its capacity in terms of life and resource.

4.1.3: THE MAJOR ETHNO-NATIONALIST AND REGIONAL CHALLENGES.

The regime starting the earlier periods of power consolidation up to the time it collapsed, was resisted from different corners. The major causes for the challenges were the action of state elites and the reaction of the regional (traditional and some new and old educated) elites. These were, on the one hand the unrestricted centralization effort and the policies of 'modernization' followed by the state elites and on the other hand the reaction of the regional elites to the centralization and modernization policies. In most of these confrontations foreign conspiracy, on both sides, has played a critical role. The most important challenges can be summarized as follows:

RESISTANCE ONE - ERITREA

The first debilitating challenge for the state was from Eritrea which was part of Ethiopia until 1993. As pointed earlier, this part of Ethiopia was colonized by Italians from 1897-1914, remained under British rule until 1952. Through a united nations - sponsored compromise between the pro-independence and unionist groups, Eritrea became self-governed in 1952 within a federal union with Ethiopia (Gilkes 1975, Markakis and Nega 1978, Tadesse 1993 and

others). This federal arrangement, which was an auspicious start, was abrogated by the central state in 1962.

The Addis Ababa ruling elite and very few group of traditional and old educated elites in the region had made a blunder in crippling the system of Eritrean government - which is based on election, having its own constitution, free press and trade-union movements (Markakis 1988). This system was in sharp contrast with the way the other parts of the country were ruled. The elite in the central state power was afraid of maintaining the arrangement because if the other regions follow the same path, it will be an actual threat in sustaining themselves in power.

On the Eritrean side this loss of self-rule was first felt by the moslem elite, who knows their fate will not only be losing top position government employment in the region or else where but also join their counterpart (Moslems) in the other regions as 'second-class citizens'³⁸. The second group who strongly reacted militantly to this dismantling act were the elites who were committed to be part of Ethiopia under the self-rule arrangement. This second group had also realized that they will be subjugated after the federal arrangement failed. Both groups have eventually created independent opposition groups started fighting with the central state. Leaving aside the details, the most important members especially in the second group, who joined and took part in the leadership of the opposition groups were the university students from Addis Ababa who were frustrated and disillusioned with the situation confronted by the total university students. The other members were those disgruntled by the measures (land reform and nationalization of major manufacturing and distribution industries) taken by Military Government (Dergue). These university students and the others members of the opposition groups were the strongest groups that configured the movements political and ideological life.

The struggle between the ethno-nationalist movements and the state was highly intensified after the downfall of the Haile Selassie and Dergue took power. The groups created an Identity - the Eritrean nationality, derived from a territorial experience of European imperial rule for almost 60 years. Then, the fighting was intensified and has resulted, more than any thing, in a heavy loss of human and other resources in the region and the country at large. The state and the opposition groups, both helped and shaped by the conspiracy of more than 20 foreign powers, had struggled for almost three decades and the war was the longest and protracted conflict in Africa. In the subsequent period this situation has also brought a definite catalytic effect, i.e., in making the elite from other ethnic groups to use ethnicity as an instrument or a manipulating tool for competition for state power.

RESISTANCE TWO - SOMALI

The somali irredenta has been a challenge for the government. The boarder demarcation which had been done with out considering the ethnic combination during the colonial era has been a major problem in most African countries. The Somali - Ethiopian case is not also an exception. After Somali become independent in 1960, the Somali nationalists started to raise dual claims. As indicated by Tareke (1991:139), while on the one hand, it involved the right of self-determination and on the other hand it was a territorial claim - which includes Ogaden and a section of southeastern part of Ethiopia, an extensive area that is not entirely inhibited by Somali but which the ethno-nationalists referred to as Western Somalia. To this end the Somali government helped incite the revolt, and it armed, trained and financed the rebels in the area which it claims. Then the Western Somalia Liberation Movement (WSLF) was formed in Mogadishu, claiming to represent the inhabitants of Ogaden.

With out going to details, the somali irredenta also deepened by actions committed by the Ethiopian state. Originally the problem was intensified, as Markakis (1974:369) pointed, when the Ethiopian Government seek to collect taxes from the nomads and attempt to limit their movement. Later on, as Baharu (1991:216) pointed, the religious antagonism, taxation, land measurement, and political and economic domination and imposition of provincial governor from outside the locality had triggered the rebellion.

The state of tension erupted in an armed clash on the Ethiopian - Somali boarder in 1963. The inability of both government to give a lasting solution to the problem and the foreign conspiracy have made the two poorest countries of the world to fight in the subsequent period. The problem is still unsolved ethnic problem for Ethiopia. This situation has also contributed to the ethnic movements in the south eastern part (Bale and Hararge) of Ethiopia up to the present time.

RESISTANCE THREE - FROM OTHER REGIONS

Centralization and modernization, which brought about changes in administrative and fiscal policy of the central state, had become major factors in sharpening regional cleavages. The major setbacks were from the Tigray, Bale and Gojjam provinces, which are dominantly inhabited by Tigrawai, Oromo and Amhara ethnic groups respectively. The uprising from this provinces, with out further details, was mainly triggered by the traditional elite or local nobility. The militancy of these traditional elites was because the central government undercut the nobility's political autonomy and

control of land. This major factor coupled with maldistribution of political and administrative power, taxation, religious inequality, land alienation, foreign conspiracy had intensified the conflict between the traditional elite and the central state. These factors had also resulted in making the peasantry, although less organized, to protest and revolt against the state.

The Challenges from the provincial nobility and the peasantry were handled by a combination two measures. The first was using brutal force. The other was personal diplomacy, which took the form of co-opting the local notable through marriage, giving them titles, land, and bringing them to the capital city and make them materially comfortable. But both of these measures were only postponing the problem. This conflictual situations have become one of the major factor to trigger and be base for the ensuing ethnic politicization by the new elite in the competition for state power in the following periods.

Finally, due to many other factors including the ethnic element, the state under the reign of Haile Selassie, which some authors described as 'traditional autocracy', 'feudal autocracy', 'absolute monarchy', 'constitutionalist absolutism', 'feudo-bourgeois monarchy' 'empire state' 'imperial power' 'feudo-bourgeois capitalist' - and so on had collapsed. Without going to the debates surrounding these and other labels given to the state, the state turned out to be 'irrelevant state'. This term, which Ihonvbere (1994) used to explain some African states, refers to the state that has virtually lost its ability to provide its leadership and direction, mobilize human and material resources and effectively mediate intra- and inter-class contradictions and other conflicts.

4.2: THE MILITARY GOVERNMENT (DERGUE), THE PROLIFERATION OF ETHNIC BASED MOVEMENTS AND THE MODES OF REGULATION

The Haile Selassie regime was deposed in 1974. It was a revolutionary situation which resulted in dismantling the regime and subsequent execution of most of the old-elite in the state power. The way this situation occurred, i.e. the arguments over "revolution from above" or "revolution from below" will not be debated in the paper. But to give highlight about the incidence, it could be said that at the initial stage the downfall of the regime was possible by the urban civil unrest, but within short period of time it has profoundly changed every aspect of the society. As many writers pointed, the unrest took the form of strikes, demonstration, criticism of men in high offices, and other acts of civil disobedience, involved a small portion of the country's population, and was mainly concentrated in the capital and a few major provincial towns. The main social elements that played an active part in the movement were the civil servants (mainly the new educated elite),

workers in some manufacturing sectors (transport and printing), religious groups, teachers and students. The involvement of the peasantry, potentially the most powerful class in the country, was minimal, except in southern part of the country where some peasants carried out acts of violence against selected landlords.

The protests and demands, by the citizens in the major urban areas, during this period were administrative reforms, the removal of higher officials alleged to be corrupt and unjust and improvements of wages and working conditions. The other critical questions, like 'land to the tiller' and others were raised by the new educated elite. At this particular juncture politicized ethnicity was surprisingly mild. But after few months it was the question of ethnicity which played a critical role in the revolutionary crises.

In the process of the revolution, a new political force - the military elite - appeared on the scene. This group was the Coordinating Committee of the Armed Forces and the Police - widely known as the Dergue. The Dergue highjacked the power and assumed uncontested responsibility for the struggle against the old regime and for the benefit there after. This pivotal factor changed the vista and was cornerstones in the subsequent tragedy of the country. The dergue, advised by some groups of the new educated elite, took measures like land reform and the nationalization of the main manufacturing and distribution industries.

Following these episodes two major circumstances whereby ethnicity as an instrument for competition of state power and resource and protection of personal privileges were uncovered.

4.2.1: THE OLD (EDUCATED AND TRADITIONAL) ELITE ETHNIC MANIPULATION

The first group who exploit the ethnic factor were the old traditional and old-educated elite, that is, the groups who were under the old irrelevant state. The old elite who aspire to comeback to the throne resisted all measures especially the land reform proclamation. To indicate some incidents, the following can be indicated:

- a) In the southern part, the Oromo landlords (other than those in Bale and Hararge Province) were trying to mobilize some members of the Oromo ethnic group. As Ottway M. and Ottway D. (1978:84) pointed "what is perhaps surprising is that the revived Galla (Oromo) nationalism should at time take the form of opposition to the very central government that had decreed land reform and ended 'Amhara' domination in the southern

provinces. This strange turn of events was principally due to the manipulation of Galla (Oromo) 'nationalism' by Galla (Oromo) landlords who suffered from land reform." But at this particular moment the ethnic factor was not an effective instrument for mobilization by the members of the old elite of some groups of the Oromo ethnic group. This was mainly because the land reform proclamation was more appealing to many members of the Oromo groups than the ethnic factor. Among the groups in the regions dominantly inhabited by the members of the Oromos, the ethnic factor was somehow used in part of Bale and Hararge provinces where there already existed a movement by some group around the region fuelled by neighbouring Somali. This somali involvement and the ethnic factor was effective for furthering the interest of the disgruntled local landlords and local chieftains. According to Halliday and Molyneux (1981:197), in Bale province, scene of the pre-revolutionary guerrilla resistance, the old partisan leader Wako Gutu restarted operation in 1978 with Somali assistance; instead of using the word Oromo he called his front by the neologistic term 'Somali-Abo'. The other movement in the eastern mountain around Hararge was also led by a local chieftain Sheik Jara who has raised new forces amongst Harrari and Qotto Oromo(*ibid.*). At present both opposition movements are operating in the country.

b) The governor of Tigre, a member of the Tigrean royal family and grandson-in-law of the Emperor Haile selassie was another figure who has tried to use the ethnic factor to mobilize members of the Tigrawai ethnic group in Tigraye province. Ottway M. and Ottway D. (*op.cit.*:86) pointed "Mengesha's (the governor) reaction was much more modern: instead of fighting alone to defend his honour he organized an anti-government movement appealing to Tigrean ethnic pride. The name he chose for his organization, the Tigrean Liberating Front, conveyed the impression that he was not a traditional ruler in revolt, but was attempting to free a people oppressed by 'external domination'....(later on) his national, rather than strictly provincial, ambitions were confirmed in early 1975 when he left Tigre and joined other aristocrat to form the Ethiopian Democratic Movement (EDU)".

c) Many Amhara landed aristocrat were trying to use the ethnic factor as means of mobilizing the peasantry. After the old order was dismantled there were many localized resistances by the Aristocrat. Although they were short lived many of the incidents can attest the old elite's power of mobilizing the poor peasantry using persuasive ethnic markers. A good example was the case of two aristocrat in Menze (Shoa).

After the collapse of the old regime, the two aristocrat slipped away from Addis Ababa to organize a rebellion in their home district of Manz. Since they realized that the area is strongly Coptic Christian, they have used religion as a tool for manipulation. Ottway M. and Ottway D. (*ibid.*:87) noted "Their explanation was ominous indeed: the government was dominated by moslems who would destroy the Coptic Church and take away land from christians. As proof, the brothers played tape recorded statements of alleged government declarations broadcasted over Radio Which stated as such". This and other methods of mobilizing the poor peasantry was rampant in most of the regions of the country.

d) The successful old - elite motivated ethnic resistance movement was in the Afar region. During the old regime, the elite of the ethnic group were given a degree of autonomy. This relative freedom and other economic factors, like, the ethnic elite being share holders of the foreign owned commercial farms in the area - a situation which transform the traditional chiefs to wealthy landowners and businessmen, were making them to downplay ethnicity as an instrument. Rather, these elite were some how successfully in promoting the feeling of 'Ethiopian nationalism' among members of the Afar ethnic group. When expressing their feeling towards Ethiopia they say 'Not only the Afar but also the camels of the region know the Ethiopian Flag'. However, when the military government took power the situation was changed. Ottway M. and Ottway D. (*ibid.*:95) after an interview with the Sultan of the Afar, has wrote, quoting the Sultan saying "Until now we have had no problems with the new government. So long as they do not touch our land or our religion, there will be no problems." But when the Dergue enacted the land reform program and other nationalization measures, the Afar elite were discontented. The resistance against the regime by the name 'Afar liberation front' started. This movement has survived largely because of support from foreign powers. As Ottway M. and Ottway D. (*ibid.*) wrote " The Afar Liberation Front would probably have sputtered out like other landlord-led local rebellions were it not for the involvement of outside powers, notably socialist Somalia and conservative Saudi Arabia. Both countries were interested in supporting the Front, Somali because it wanted to weaken in what ever way possible the central Ethiopian government and Saudi Arabia because of its general opposition to Marxism." In the region another liberation movement was also created with lesser number of followers which is known as Afar National Liberation Movement. Both opposition movements are still operating.

4.2.2: THE NEW-EDUCATED ELITE ETHNIC MANIPULATION

In the aftermath of the old order downfall, 'the moment of truth came'. The fight between the new-elite and the military elite to control the state was apparent. The Military elite seize the power and starts to run the whole show. As Keller (1988) pointed "In fact within months of seizing power, the new regime began systematically to buttress the preeminent role of "men in uniform" in the vanguard of the revolution". This situation was frustrating for the new educated elite groups who were active in the revolution and claim to be the best architect in configuring the state structure. As Markakis (1974:191) noted:

The Educated Ethiopian, like his counterpart throughout the developing world, is imbued with the notion that education constitutes the primary qualification for the exercise of political power, and the conviction that power to rule over the illiterate masses should be entrusted to the educated minority.

This unfulfilled expectation led to the disappointment and division among the new educated elite. The division resulted in a predicament where one group was supporting and another group opposing the military elite. Markakis (1989) stated that while one faction, MEISON (All Ethiopians' Socialist Movement), choose to work with the Dergue in the hope of becoming its political mentor, another faction the Ethiopian People Revolutionary party (EPRP), declared war against the regime and its radical allies. This predicament was further aggravated when the opposing and supporting groups again fracturing and forming another groups which concede and contest with the Degrue. Ottway M. and Ottway D. (1978:101) discussing the situation in the student movement pointed that "The student movement was fragmented. Not only were students studying in North America, Europe, and inside the country organized into rival factions, but each group was splintered internally and absorbed in power struggles. ... The tendency towards factionalism and intransigence was only reinforced by the revolution, which destroyed all concepts of legitimacy and opened up unlimited opportunity for ruthless and ambitious men to rise to position of power". Hiwet (1987:55) describing the plight of one of the strongest opposition multiethnic party argued that "the crisis of the EPRP mounted-between those who were determined to pursue a relentless insurrectionist stance and those seeking accommodation with the regime. The crackup of the EPRP along surrealistic fault lines of "Menshevik/Bolshevik" was the grimmest and most farcical aspect of the left politics: Politics as discourse and praxis degenerated to the level of gangsterism - the ex-comrades exposed the leadership of their respective groupings".

These complicated processes of succumbing, resisting, grouping, cracking and regrouping had been 'institutionalized' and led eventually to unruly killing. In the mean time, the Military elite -the ruthless men group who get the opening to snatch power, continued shattering who ever is openly opposing or conspiring its control over state power and resource. The net effect was unmeasurable loss of human, material, moral resource of the country - the heartless liquidation of an entire generation of Ethiopia's intellectual cream. Samatar (1986:20) explained the situation by stating that "for years the educated class in Ethiopia - Students, teachers, professors, intellectuals, labour leaders and assorted leftists - made common causes in undermining Haile Selassie's imperial regime and worked feverishly to bring about a socialist revolution. When the much prayed-for revolutionary millennium finally arrived, its leftist devotees turned out to be victimized by it. The fate, for instance, of the EPRP, MEISON, SEDEED and other Marxist organization demonstrated the truth of the cliche that revolutions devour their own children".

It should be underlined here, during the period, there were no large scale fighting and bloodletting between one ethnic group against another ethnic group. This is to say that the members of the different ethnic groups, which are burdened with poverty and blinded by ignorance, continue to interact and coexist peacefully. On this line Wedajo (1986) pointed that "It would be wrong however to suggest that each conflict is one dimensional in the sense that one cohesive group being arrayed against another cohesive group. Within each governing leadership or political movement, factions at odd with one another constantly vie for absolute control, often seeking external military and political support to that end."

It is at this complicated period, when the hyper-polarized left and the Dergue were locked in a mortal struggle over state power and in the end the Dergue had to defeat the left at the price of itself moving left (Hiwet 1987), ethnic politics was started to be fully used as an indispensable political tool. The state become a focal point because it controls the production and distribution of material and social resources.

Those group of the new elite who lost the battle at the centre, turned their face to utilize the ethnic factor as a best alternative. The groups, which opted for the ethnic factor, created 'ethnic liberation movements' as a result of opposition to Dergue's adamant rejection to genuinely create mechanism to share power among the elite. On this line Hiwet (*ibid*:58) pointed:

In deed the mantle of political messianism has gone to the 'national liberation fronts', organized and led by elements of the intelligentsia of their respective constituencies. A majority of these fronts are, however, more political in their nationalism than liberationist. At any rate their nationalism (ethno-nationalism) has come home to roost.

Each ethno-nationalist movement start to write the history of the ethnic group by pushing back to the remotest time possible. Hence, Eritrean talk about 'Eritrea' in the fourteenth and fifteenth century when there was not even an Italy yet; Oromos talk of the great Oromo nation before Menilik; Tigreans take pride in Axum (Nega and Tibebu 1989) - all repeating the same line of myth like the old regime's folk Solomonic decent. Halliday and Molyneux (1981:195) commented:

whilst each followed the nationalist proclivity of harking back to a past distinctness with correspondingly 'historical' boundaries, they were in fact more inchoate movements, responding to the 1974 revolution by predicting self-determination for much more loosely defined geographical areas. The Tigrean proposed an area that include all Tigrinya-speakers - and hence implicitly claimed much of Eritrea, the Somali claimed a region called Ogaden after the tribe which lived there - which covered the three Ethiopian provinces of Bale, Hararge, and Sidamo and included many Oromo speakers; the Oromo talked of an area called Oromia which could on linguistic grounds, have covered up to twelve provinces and included many others nationalities.

The new elite groups which opted for the ethnic factor have used the myths and symbolism which are critical elements of ethnic-political communication. In their political debate they quarrel over putting forward their demand for power on behalf of their instrument - the ethnic group or the region. The controversy was fierce and have consumed much of their time and effort which would have been invested to liberate the poor from destitution. These debates have revolved around different issues, like, 'nationality' question (being accommodated within a new Ethiopian national framework) or a 'colonial' question (forming an independent 'state'). Some groups have changed the alleged questions, i.e., from the question of nationality to colonial question ; others also changed from colonial to nationality question. Wedago (1986:43) stated:

The TPLF's demand has changed from colonial to a question of nationality, EPLF changed its principal demand from one of nationality to a colonial question, the Oromo's cause was originally presented as nationality question and has been transformed in to a colonial question.

The major ethno-nationalist movements that were either created or strengthened during these period as a result of manipulation by the new - elite were the following:

- 1) Although the movement has started earlier, it was during this period EPLF, (which was formed in 1970 and triumphed over ELF which was formed in 1961), get strong hold and become the most substantial challenge for the military elite. It was starting 1975 a large number of technically qualified Eritrean joined the EPLF and the movement was strengthened. This was possible because, in addition to the situation outlined earlier, the 'socialist transformation' measures taken by Dergue has affected the interest of many citizens from that region.
- 2) The new-elite from Tigray ethnic group start the most serious armed struggle in 1975 by naming the organization - The Tigray People Liberation Movement (TPLF). The declared objective of the group was the achievement of meaningful Tigrayan autonomy within democratically structured Ethiopian framework.
- 3) The new-elite from Oromo ethnic group formed - The Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) in 1974. The declared aim of the OLF is the liberation of Oromo and the establishment of an independent republic of Oromo.

Generally, during the two regimes the struggle for power among the elite have resulted in mobilizations and manipulations of members of the different ethnic groups by the old and the new elite and in creating and strengthening ethno-national and ethnic autonomy movements. However this does not mean the external powers were a passive observers. The most consistent factors in distorting legitimate considerations have been the foreign economic and political interests which have fomented and aggravated conflicts and provided material and ideological support to both the contenders and power holders.

4.2.3: THE ETHNIC COMPOSITION OF THE DERGUE

The Ethnic composition of the members of Dergue is difficult to determine either in terms of region or ethnic descent, kinship or other ethnic markers. Writers give a confusing description. Some authors ascribe the dominant power holders to be members of the Amhara ethnic group. For example, in a report by STORM: Somali, Tigray and Oromo Resistance Monitor No 2 (in Baxter 1983:130) it is stated that: "The Amhara-dominated military Junta has not even dropped the pretence that 'No nationality will dominate another'. This can be deduced from the composition of the commission which is supposed to organize the party of the working people of Ethiopia (COPWE). Of the 123 central committee members, 109 are from the Amhara nationality ... Of the 7 Executive Committee members, only one is non-Amhara ... 13 of the 14 Chief Administrators of Ethiopia's regions are Amhara". Hassen (1991) also argued, the military regime, which wants to keep power in the hands of the Amhara-Tigray elites, had 126 members of which nearly 100 were Amhara origin, of whom many were the children of the *neftanya* (armed-settlers) from the Oromo territory. Within

the Dergue the Amhara not only constituted the overwhelming majority but also the hard core Amhara officers controlled the Dergue and, with it, the state power itself.

On the other hand, there is an opposite argument. Ottway M. and Ottway D. (1978:28) stated that "With the advent of the revolution ... the Amhara and Tigrean dominated ruling class was over thrown by a Military movement dominated by Gallas (Oromos). Later, much of the opposition to the Dergue at both political extremes came from the Amhara and Tigre elites while much of its support came from other ethnic groups, particularly Gallas (Oromos). He also stated that "the political Bureau and its supporters were the Galla (Oromo) faction and the EPRP and its backers were Amharas and Tigreans reacting against the rise of power of the Gallas (Oromos)." Lefort (1980:110) argued also "It must not be forgotten that within the Dergue the most powerful impulse at work, even if it remained very diffuse, was Oromo Revenge. Markakis (1989:8) also stated that " although its exact ethnic composition was not known, the dergue itself was not homogeneous, and several of its prominent members were not Amhara". Clapham (1989) also pointed that "the group which held power were referred by many as an Amhara. The Amhara are widely, if inaccurately, perceived as the ruling elite of Ethiopia, in part, because of the simplistic equation caused by the use of Amharic as a national language."

This contradictory description simply shows that the regime did not represent only one ethnic group. Rather it was a collection of a group of elites having different and diffused ethnic genealogy. This military elite, which cling to the state power, was full of 'interesting compromises'. For example, Mengistu Haile Mariam, the most powerful man of the military elite, parentage was from one of the ethnic groups in the southern part.

4.2.4: DERGUE AND THE MODE OF REGULATING THE ETHNIC BASED MOVEMENTS

The revolutionary process has resulted in a number of radical changes. The old order was abolished, the prohibition on printing and broadcasting languages other than Amharic was lifted, Islam was granted official standing. The land reform program was enacted - an act which was supposed to suspend the economic base of ethnic conflict. This land reform has also played a tremendous role in the altering the social profile of Ethiopia's rural community. In the fierce fighting for state power and resource was temporarily concluded by the ascendancy of the military elite and few members from the civilian new-elite. Some groups of the new elite, which opted for the ethnic factor in competition for the state power and resource, accelerate

the disputation to a point which allows no accommodation. This group was the most formidable for Dergue after garbing power.

At the beginning the Dergue had no coherent programme to handle the challenging issues and especially the ethno-nationalist movements. The military solution was followed by Dergue to crush any opposition. Later on, advised by his civilian new-elite, it had followed the 'socialist transformation' path. For the ethnic problem, in addition to the military solution, Dergue has followed the soviet nationality theory for regulating the ethnic problem. Two of the programmes which were supposed to directly address the ethnic issue were:

a) The programme of National Democratic revolution which was issued in April 1975 was proposed. The program stated "The right to self-determination of all nationalities will be recognised and fully respected. No nationality will dominate another since history, culture, language and religion of each nationality will have equal recognition in accordance with the spirit of socialism. The unity of Ethiopia's nationalities will be based on their common struggle against feudalism, imperialism, bureaucratic capitalism and all reactionary forces...[and] on the desire to construct a new life and a new society based on equality, brotherhood and mutual respect.' 'Given Ethiopian's existing situation, the problem of nationalities is accorded full right to self government." (cited in Fisseha-Tsion M. 1988:166)

b) In september 1987, a constitution of the people's democratic republic of Ethiopia was adopted. Chapter one Article Two of the constitution, proclaimed in the Negarit Gazetta 47th year No. 1, state:

1. The people's of democratic republic of Ethiopia is a unitary state in which all nationalities live in equally.
2. The people's democratic republic of Ethiopia shall ensure the equality of nationalities, combat chauvinism and narrow nationalism, and strengthen the unity of the working people of nationalities.
4. The people's Democratic republic of Ethiopia shall insure the realization of regional autonomy.

In addition to the above and other measures, various negotiations were conducted between the Dergue and the ethno-nationalist movements. However, all the negotiations failed because both groups were not having the conviction to agree. It is surprising to see some of the negotiations failed

over the issues like: the arrangement of the conference table (circular or rectangular), the selection of chairman, the agenda to be discussed and other minor issues with out reaching to the critical issues - how to share power.

However, there was a paradox between the slogans and the actual actions taken by Dergue. This was, on the one hand, the regime was sloganizing "self-determination minus secession" "regional autonomy" "negotiation with the armed ethno-nationalist movements". On the other hand it was massively expanding the apparatus of the state, taking for granted that State power will be the answer to all problems. More important, it has regarded the imposition of centralized state and party structure as the solution to the problem. As Young (1986:449) described "The capacity of the Ethiopian state to implement a blueprint as complex as that prescribed by the soviet theory, while maintaining the Leninist centralized autocratic hegemony which appear to be the core value of the regime is open to doubt." It was not only doubtful but the critical factor which finally led to the end of Dergue's rule.

Nonetheless, because of the absence of the political-will on both contending groups (the elite in the state power or the ethno-nationalist movements) the implementation of the above or other alternative solutions waned. The military solution was taken as the only conclusion. A long and protracted war was fought between the Dergue and the ethno-nationalist movements. The most intensified struggle was waged between Dergue and the two movements - Tigrean People liberation Front (TPLF) and Eritrean people liberation Front (EPLF). As Markakis (1989:15) described it "thanks to the intervention of foreign interests, the armed conflict lasted much longer, and was fought on a much higher technological level, than the country's resource allow." The war has resulted, especially in the Northern part, in a gruesome statistics of death, mass exodus of refugees, destruction of property, and other disastrous effect on the economy and social set up of the country.

Due to this prolonged war and other factors like U.S. diplomatic intervention and the collapse of the Soviet Union (the end of the Cold War), the Dergue regime, the second irrelevant state, came to an end in May 1991 . Among the new - elite group which opted for the ethnic factor at the start of the revolution, the two strongest groups TPLF and EPLF came to power. In order to avoid further conflicts among the two groups EPLF took its part Eritrea. Eritrea become an independent country in April 1993 and this was said to be confirmed by a referendum given to the Eritrean people.

4.3: THE NEW TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT AND THE PROPOSED MODE OF REGULATING THE ETHNIC FEUD

TPLF, which has merged other satellite movements and spawned into a multi-ethnic party known as Ethiopian People Democratic Front in late 1989, made the state power under its control. The two major satellite movements were Ethiopian People Democratic Movement (EPDM), and the other one is Oromo People Democratic Movement (OPDO) (another group claiming to represent the Oromo people other than OLF).

Some of ethno-nationalist movements created when Dergue took power were unfortunate to control state power. Among these groups the strongest was the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF). There were also other movements in the Afar and Somali areas. Because their armed struggle was not decisive like TPLF and EPLF, their choice was to join hands at least temporarily, with the winners.

EPDRF after taking power, in collaboration with more than 20 ethnic-based organizations and political groups, has adopted a provisional charter in July 1991. To regulate the ethnic problem 'self-determination up to and including succession' was promulgated.

As Berhanu G., a TPLF representative (1989:36) described the motive behind seems:

All the peoples of Ethiopia must be given a stake in unity. They must be convinced that the future Ethiopia will be one where all people have an equal right and opportunity to decide its destiny. They must be shown that their identity will be a cause for respect. They have to have real guarantees that all their democratic rights, including their right to self-determination, will not be denied to them. ... Such rights and guarantees can come only if the right of nations and nationalities to self-determination up to and including secession is unequivocally accepted as a guiding principle of the state. Under such conditions, we can be sure that all the peoples of Ethiopia will enthusiastically support any genuine call for the maintenance of the unity of Ethiopia on a new and democratic basis.

This principle of self-determination, which is to be precise "ethnic self-determination" that is included in the Charter of the Transitional Government of Ethiopia seems to be based on the following contentions:

- 1) the previous governments were dominated by one and only one ethnic group.
- 2) the ethnic groups are culturally distinctive and discrete bounded isolates which did not have any thing in common. A good example of this position could be the statement of the President of the Transitional Government of Ethiopia, Ato Meles Zenawi. In an interview with Levine

(1992), he stated that " The Tigreans had Axum, but what could that mean to the Gurage? The Agew had Lalibela, but what could that mean to the Oromo? The Gonderes had castles, but what could that mean to the Wolayita?" (Ethiopian Review September 1992)

3) the ethnic groups are brought under the Ethiopian state at the end of the 19th century through the process of 'colonialism' or domination.

Thus, it was said that the ethnic groups have to be given the right of self-determination up to and including secession.

Immediately after EPDRF took power, in addition to those ethnic movements which existed before, a good number ethnic based political organization were/are still mushrooming. These ethnic movements, labelled as 'Libration Fronts' and 'Democratic Fronts', were mostly created by the ethnic elites who aspire to share power. For most of the elites the pretence behind their motive was to 'liberate their groups from the ethnic group that they believed dominated or will dominate'.

At present, there are two or more ethnic political movements for one ethnic group. These ethnic movements, which represent one ethnic group, are divided in to different groups. Some groups have made alliance with those elites who control the state power and the others are expressing their discontent in different ways including armed confrontation. It is difficult to know the exact number of the ethno-nationalist movements, because the number changes from time to time. However, except some clashes here and there between some ethnic movements and the groups in the state power, an outbreak of a uni-dimensional ethnic violence is not observed.

To summarize this chapter, in the above sections we have tried to show the process of the rise and proliferation of the ethnic based movements in Ethiopia. It has been observed that after the centralized state was strengthened and controlled the societal resources the state has become the focus of conflict. It has been noticed that those elites who control the state have used its power to defend their own privileged positions. The other group of the elite seek to restructure the state in order to gain access to its power, but failing that utilized ethnicity as an instrument and made demands of autonomy or independence. We showed that the previous regimes used different means to regulate the ethnic conflict but it was not successfully. As it is pointed out the present group of elite in power has come up with 'self-determination up to and including secession' with the above indicated contentions for accepting it. In the following sections we will try to examine the contentions along with the impact of applying self-determination in Ethiopian case and other related issues.

CHAPTER FIVE

SYNTHESIS CUM ANALYSIS OF THE ETHNIC INTERACTION, THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND THE PRINCIPLE OF SELF-DETERMINATION

This chapter will discuss three elements. First it will consider the contentions given for accepting the principle of self-determination by linking them with the historical interaction among the different ethnic groups. Second the theoretical lines of analysis for ethnic conflict will be reviewed to see whether they could explain the case of Ethiopian ethnic conflict. Thirdly based on the above explanations and other factors, the applicability of the principle of self-determination will be examined.

5.1: REFLECTION ON THE HISTORICAL INTERACTION AMONG THE ETHNIC GROUPS

Before reflecting on the historical interaction among the peoples of Ethiopia, it will be better to point out the two major contentions the looms over the discourse on the ethnic based conflict in the country. These are basically related to the cultural analysis and the 'colonial' or 'one ethnic group domination thesis'. The justifications for accepting the principle of self-determination also emanates from the perception derived from the contentions.

The first contention is the cultural analysis which seems to follow the primordialist view. The underlying conflicts are also explained by the cultural pluralism line of analysis. The plank in this cultural analysis is the understanding that the various ethnic groups are considered, borrowing O'Brain's (1993:71) terms, natural objects, slightly modernized traditional identities, relics or billiard balls. The view holds that ethnic groups as qualitatively the same kind irrespective of the ensuing internal and external dynamism through out the historical period. Thus, it is taken for granted, that the relation between the ethnic groups will be precarious because extensive contact and mutual influence hardly existed and the groups lacked common cultural practices and other commonly shared experiences.

The other is the 'colonial' or 'one ethnic group domination' thesis, which purports the Amhara ethnic group or the Shoan Amhara dynasty have colonized or dominated the other diverse ethnic groups. Thus, it is accepted, the ethnic groups exist in a social system whereby they are ruled, controlled or dominated by one ethnic group through the coercive machinery of the state commanded by this ethnic group.

5.1.1: THE CULTURAL ANALYSIS

Writers on Ethiopia and the contending ethnic elites have different views on explaining the cultural exchange that has happened during the long historical process. Two categories can be identified.

The first are those who assert that the ethnic groups have maintained their cultural attributes with out any alteration. These writers consider the groups, taking the expression of as an author, as each with its characteristic culture, conceived as an integrated and bounded system, set of against equally bounded systems and entities which spin off each other like so many hard and rounded billiard balls (in *ibid.*:66). For instance, Trimingham (1952:94) stated " Due to the nature of the Galla (Oromo) political structure and the pride of the Amharic ruling race caused the christian to withdraw to more restricted territories, leaving the invaders inserted in intervening regions and, though living side by side for centuries, the people remained divided and at enmity one with another, each retaining its own identity comparatively unmodified."

Nonetheless, this assertion does not hold true if one takes one of the regions - Wello, where the Amhara and Oromo have come in to constant contact. Ali (1983) in explaining the outcome of the contact among the groups has described that the Oromo occupied a large part of wello and they become the dominant inhabitants of Borena, Warra Illu, Warra Himano, Qalu and Ambassel. In the 17th, 18th, and 19th, centuries they were in continuous interaction with their Amhara neighbours and because of this by the middle of the 19th century, it had already become difficult to differentiate between the Amhara and the Oromo (*ibid.*).

The others line of cultural analysis is geared towards asserting one or two ethnic groups have diffused their culture by making others passive receivers. Such sort of assertions and assumptions which tries to assert that one culture is superior to another and which imply that one culture has forced itself on the other or one culture do have special qualities of absorbing others are rampant. But in how far the claims and assumptions will reflect the reality is extremely questionable.

For example, Levine (1974:164) assumes that Amhara and Tigre society played the primary role in diffusing Amhara culture, with the assimilated Oromo acting as mere receivers or carriers, when stating that "Where the Oromo culture is fragile, Amhara culture was durable". On the other hand Hassen (1990:20-2) When describing the process of assimilation and adoption of the oromo in the 16th century had described " The Oromo genius for assimilation

quickly claimed any non-romo, defeated or other wise (...) Oromo pastoralists absorbed into their socio-political structure cushitic and semitic speaking tribes as clients or serfs. Baxter (1994:175) also stated that "Oromo have consistently demonstrated a capacity to 'Oromize' the inhabitants of the lands into which they have expanded." On the other hand there is a different view by Baxter(1978:288) who argued that "in the past certainly many Oromo have become Amhara or 'passed as Amhara'". Others also claim, see for example Asfaw (1988:16) which stated that "under the pretext of modernization, Amhara culture and christianity were diffused among the Oromos and other oppressed nationalities".

These and other contentions are common. However, cultural differences are analytically illusive -they can not be measured, and such assertions may lead to wrong conclusions. There are also political and moral dangers associated with an analytical emphasis on cultural differences between the ethnic groups. One thing is sure, that is, they can be used for creating 'cultural distances' which will eventually be used as a tool for manipulation and a theoretical justification for those who assert primordial ethnic loyalty. Such claims would have been convincing if cultural attributes could be possibly identified by colour or number so that one can freely say this is X ethnic group culture and that is Y ethnic group.

Against the above positions, however, there are writers who explain the cultural exchange. Before going deeply to our analysis the following three sets of examples can be cited to show how other writers demonstrate the interaction among the different ethic groups. The first is Asmelash's (in Salole 1979:23) argument against the position of Levine. He argued that "The remarkable process of cultural exchange between (Oromo and Habesha) deserves full length investigation because of its far reaching implications for the emergence of a shared national culture. The process can not be reduced to a simplistic picture in which Gallinna (romo) speakers become Amhara, or Amhara speakers become Galla (Oromo). It is rather, a very complex situation in which many cultural vectors are interacting to produce a resultant that is fundamentally new. Any attempt to analyze the national culture, as Levine does, is an attempt to describe the whole by reference to one of its part, and as such, it is a misrepresentation of reality."

The second is Delibo (1974:18) argument on the way the Sidama and Amhara interacted between 1270 and 1530. He noted, "...they had many things in common. They had similar cultural developments. They shared the same economic resources and environment. By the socioeconomic process of trade, marriage, enslavement, war, and religious proselytism they had spread their blood throughout the area."The other example could be also, Fekadu (in op.cit.:22)

argument, when he said that it is inappropriate to speak of Gurage peoples collectively, and suggests that the soddo Gurage are more usefully considered as Oromo and/or Amhara rather than Gurage, and that the ethnic boundary between the Soddo Gurage and the Soddo Oromo is much more fluid than that between the soddo Gurage and the other Gurage people. Fekadu adds that the soddo have emulated the culture and behaviour of the urban and bureaucratic Amhara to such an extent that it is difficult to distinguish them from the former or from other urbanized Ethiopians such as the Oromo and the Tigre. They are Christian and tend to marry frequently with Oromo and Amhara (*ibid.*)

Coming to our analysis, as it tried to show in the historical highlight, most of the ethnic groups have passed through a long process of interaction and integration. This interaction has led to a remarkable cultural exchanges having a considerable impact on the groups consciousness, ideology, way of life and behaviour and the psychological make-up of members of the society. As we have tried to indicate the historical interaction seem to be basically conditioned through conflicts. These conflicts were partly the causes which strengthened and promoted the relationship. Beyond the conflictual interaction, through out the long history of the country, there have been different factors which made possible the extensive interaction among the different ethnic groups and made possible the cultural exchange among the groups. These factors are discussed as follows:

5.1.1.1: TRADE

Trade has been one of the most important means to create the interaction among the ethnic groups. In Ethiopia there were two means in which trade was conducted in the country. These were the caravan routes and the local markets (both open air periodic markets and located in the towns) which serves as a meeting point not only for one ethnic group but also for a number of ethnic groups and traders from distant places. These were very large regional markets like Axum in the north east, Harare in the southeast, Gonder in the north west, Bonga in the southwest. There were other important markets like Hirmata which drew Different ethnic groups like Amhara, Oromo, Timbaro, Kefa, Janjero, Welamo, Konta and other groups; and Sekota which mixes northern Oromo, Gurage, Inaraya, Kefa, Guma and other various Southern groups (Levine 1974). On this line Gamst (1970:383) also noted "Starting the antiquity in Ethiopia the market places are customerly opened for each area according to a weekly cycle with one operating on monday, a distant neighbour on tuesday and another more distant one on wednesday and so forth. They are located in cleared area distant from habitations or within or near a village. Each set of cyclical market places unite peasants from many communities in face to face contact with one another and with the local political administration.

These contacts lead to increased cultural exchanges through the creation of a larger inter-community reference group for peasant behaviour".

The caravan routes crossing the north and south of Ethiopia were one of the main bases for the process of ethnic interaction. These have been in existence starting the Axumite period but has attained particular prominence in the nineteenth century. As Bahiru (1991) explained especially during the nineteenth century two major trade routes which link the south-western part with the north, and the western part to the eastern part were prominent. Other caravan trades between the lowlands and high lands, i.e., between the Afar and Wello and the Annuak and the Oromo and trans-frontier trade from Wallega and Sudan and from the southern Ethiopia to the coast of Somalia has played a considerable role in interrelating the different ethnic groups.

The trade network and the different markets have played a role in facilitating the link among the different ethnic groups both around the boarder areas and the central highlands of Ethiopia. After the advent of 'modernization' the trade relationships was highly intensified to create a condition for the interaction among the ethnic groups and introduction of new cultural attributes.

5.1.1.2: DIVISION OF LABOUR

This element has made possible the creation of intra-and inter-ethnic horizontal ties and promoted ethnic interaction and cultural exchanges. One aspect of inter-dependence of communities, is fostered by division of labour with some communities specializing in certain kind of production and others on different kind of production. It will be difficult to assume that each and every ethnic groups in Ethiopia are economically self-sufficient. Gamast (1970:382) indicated that actually the peasant household in Ethiopia does not produce much of what it consumes, but is dependent upon a wider network of household to which it sells part of its surplus in return for goods and services it does not produce for itself. He also asserted that the average Ethiopian peasant depends upon other households, often in other communities, from ironwork, pottery, cloth, leather, products of mining, agricultural products not cultivated in his community, and for services such as those of the ubiquitous minstrels, tanners, and various religious and medico-religious practitioners. From this one can infer that in how far the division of labour - which made possible the specialization of one community in a given product and involvement in exchange - can make possible the exchange of cultural fabrics. It is through this interdependency that the cultural of one ethnic group will possibly be exchanged with the other ethnic groups.

5.1.1.3: RELIGION

Religion, both Christianity and Islam, have played an astounding role in developing the beliefs, value system, sentiments of each ethnic group. According to the 1984 population census it is reported that 60.84% of the population is Christian and 32.9% is Moslem. In the history of the country both religions have tremendously shaped the ethnic interaction and facilitated the creation of the social strata (see the Annex 4 for the regional distribution).

Christianity, which was introduced in the 4th century, in addition to be a powerful element in cementing the relationship among the ethnic groups, has played a critical role in the country's political, social and economic system until the end of the reign of the late Emperor Haile Selassie. The strongest integrating force in the old Abyssinian society - especially the Amhara and Tigre ethnic groups - was Christianity. These groups were the first to accept Christianity and disseminate it forcefully or otherwise through their lords. During the medieval period Christianity had also provided the ideological justification for the process of expansion (Markakis 1974:32). Before the end of the reign of Haile Selassie, the church owned the bulk of the land in the country and controlled the existence of the peasantry. According to Tamirat (1984:199), Christianity starting the medieval period has intervened in the daily life of the peasant motivating him to act in accordance with the wishes and class interests of the ruling feudal elite.

Despite its exploitative nature, the church has played a big role in shaping the cultural life of the members of various ethnic groups. The church ideology has also guided the behaviour of the followers and have been a source of unity among the various ethnic groups. Gamast (1970) describing the impact wrote that "Activated through the rituals, holy days, sacred sites of marked ceremonials or supernatural importance draw together peasants. Drawing together all peasants are the universal rites, ideology, and accounts for a holy beings, belonging not just to a locality but to the church within the state". The religious relations of peasants are not challenged even by the economic and political relations. Moreover, the Churchs and the monasteries that are widely scattered through out the country have contributed in shaping and influencing the life of the society.

The Islam religion has also played a tremendous role in shaping the socio-economic life of members of many ethnic groups. According to Trimingham (1952) the expansion of Islam into north-east Africa was between the tenth and twelfth century. He wrote that Islam communities in the coastal regions and within the Christian state, commonly called the (Jabarti) which can not

be differentiated ethnically from the other Abyssinians, have existed long before the Gran invasion in the sixteenth century. During the Gran invasion, however, many christians were forcefully or otherwise were converted into Islam. The size of followers among members of different ethnic groups expanded considerably during and following this Gran invasion. The Oromo and sidama groups espoused Islam in large number during the 18th century (Markaikis 1974). The Islam religion like christianity was the major impulse for territorial expansion of some ethnic groups in the 16th century, i.e, as indicated above, the conflict between the christians and the muslims in Ethiopia was not only religious but a movement of expansion of the Afar(Danakil) and somali to the central highlands.

Islam has also played an important role in the combining the various ethnic groups especially in the southern and eastern part of the country. Among other factors, one of the reason which enhanced the interaction of the among some members of the Oromo, Somali and Sidama ethnic groups seems to be the Islam religion. The repression of the Islam during the Haile Selassie regime was also a common cause of dissatisfaction among the followers, irrespective of their Ethnic origin.

The impact of both religions in facilitating the interaction and in being a unifying factor among the various ethnic groups have been tremendous. The religions were also used by the followers to create an identity which is more sound than other types of identity. Most of the followers tend to 'share their tears' with someone who observe the same religion rather than another person from the same ethnic descent. Elites have also used this identity as a means of political manipulation in their competition for state power. Generally, religion has played a role in making the different ethnic groups to interact in ceremonial, recreational and other activities and relatively unified them politically, socially and culturally.

5.1.1.4: THE AGRARIAN EXPERIENCE -THE BASIS FOR THE ECONOMIC RELATION

The other unique feature of the Ethiopian society which was shared by all the ethnic groups was the underlying land holding system - the Ethiopian "feudal" system. This land holding system, before it was dismantled during the reign of Dergue, had extremely shaped the socioeconomic formation of the society. With out deeply going to the controversies surrounding the nature of feudalism and the class structure or social stratification, it can be safely concluded that the society was bounded with two extreme strata. On one extreme 90% of the population that is a mass long-suffering peasantry which has been living under mass poverty, disease, hunger, exploitation and ignorance. On the other end a handful of dominant elite - landed aristocrat,

nobility and the old educated elite. The peasant, prior to and under the regime of Haile Selassie was extremely subjugated by the landed elite (from the same ethnic group or other area) the church, the central government, and the ruling family. In the Ethiopian 'feudal' structure the peasant easily fits under the rubric of serf. This was one of the basic factor, which was experienced irrespective of the ethnic origin, that could possibly explain the life of the peasantry. The oppression with out mercy of 90% of the population for a long period of time might be one of the meaningful element that gives shape to the style of life and mode of thinking of the members of the society.

After the fall of Haile Selassie regime the land holding system was changed. A radical land reform policy was enacted. The reform disposed all landlords and the land was distributed to the peasants residing in the community. This reform, however, as Rahmato (1993) argued that "has failed where it has succeeded". He also argued that the Land reform has transformed rural Ethiopia into a society of self-labouring peasants and replaced the land lord with the state, providing the latter with direct and unencumbered access to the peasantry. It politicised land because access to it became increasingly dependant on a host of factors, including peasants' relations with the state manipulated peasant associations and compliance with government directives (*ibid.*: 40). This again has been the experience of the peasantry after the fall of Haile Selassie. The common feature which explains the outlook of the greater part of the member of the Ethiopian society.

5.1.1.5: URBANIZATION

Urbanization along with global modernization have also played a role in facilitating the ethnic interaction and fusion of new cultural fabrics. In the history of Ethiopia a long historical process of urbanization have been observed. There were small towns along the caravan lines, towns used as temporary or permanent residence of the christian feudal elites, garrison towns during the Menilik expansion and in the 20th century and towns which were established on the Addis Ababa-Djibouti railway station which has started in 1894 (See Berhane 1994). After the process of modernization and centralization started, the rapid expansion of big and small urban centres during the 20th century have been realized. Starting this period, especially during the reign of Haile Selassie, capital was flowing-in from the united states, Japan, England, Italy, India and other countries and it was making its way to the industrial and commercial sector of the Ethiopian economy. Some light industries were developing in cities like Addis Ababa, Dire Dawa and Asmara. Large scale commercial production were also expanding in the rural areas. Both urbanization and modernization, which were more intensified

due to the integration of the society with world capitalist system, has been a major force in altering the culture of the society. The situation has been facilitated through the introduction of improved communication in the form of roads, transport vehicles, telegraph, and telephone and other facilities; the introduction of new products and services in the urban centres; the rural - urban and the urban-rural migration; the expansion of government offices and the spread of people from different ethnic groups to different regions in various forms and capacities; the development of schools, hospitals and other institutions; the growth of trade centres and other facilities have an immense impact in the fusion of different cultural fabrics through out the society.

Generally, although it may not seem to affect the majority of the society, the steadily increasing feature of urbanization and global modernization have caused a transformation of many members of different ethnic groups, that is, bringing the peasants, elites, and the remaining members in to the urban way of life. According to 1984 Population Census report there were 322 towns in the country, in which 10% of the population is residing.

URBAN POPULATION AS % OF TOTAL POPULATION IN 1984

REGION	TOTAL POPULATION	URBAN POPULATION	% OF URBAN
ARSI	1662232	108909	6.6
BALE	1006490	67592	6.7
ERITREA	2703998	407563	15.1
GAMO GOFFA	1248033	52099	4.2
GOJJAM	3244881	215211	6.7
GONDER	2921124	204083	7.0
HARARGE	4161167	274264	6.6
ILLUBABUR	963954	50766	5.3
KEFFA	2450368	129986	5.3
SHOA	8090569	598812	7.4
SIDAMO	3790577	228062	6.0
TIGRAYE	2409699	223620	9.3
WELLEGA	2477276	120432	4.8
WELLO	3642013	226016	6.2
ADDIS ABABA	1412577	1412577	100
TOTAL	42184952	4313915	10.23

Source: Wubneh M. Time Series Data On Socioeconomic characteristics of Ethiopia. 1990. Addis Ababa.

The above table shows population living in the towns along with the regional distribution. Looking on all this factors, it will be mere simplification to assume that the ethnic groups have maintained their primordial cultural attributes, regardless of the impact of urbanization and modernization in cracking the cultural boundaries and introducing new cultural fabrics.

5.1.1.6: POPULATION MOVEMENT

As it tried to indicate the history of Ethiopia is the history of population movement. This movement were not only uni-directional but also multi-directional. The reason for movement were factors like a search for new land or pasture, conquest, access to resource and territory, famine, epidemics and so on (Pankhurst 1993:168). After the modernization and centralization was started, state initiated resettlement programmes has been considerably carried out. The table in Annex 5, compiled from the Population Census report of 1984, shows the number Migrants and settlers of different ethnic origins from one region to another region. Accordingly the total number as of 1984 was around two million people.

It is in this process that some cultural fabrics of a particular immigrant group will be transformed through contact and acculturation. Some of the cultural resources, shaped and modified, will be put to new uses in the new context. Some aspects of the cultural attributes brought-in by the new-comers will be dropped. The new-comer will be forced to accept the cultural resource that have significant value in the community.

The population movement will also breed inter-marriage between the members of different ethnic groups. In the Ethiopian history marriage between the regional lords and local notables, as a mark of coopting each other and expressing unity among themselves, was very common. This situation and the migration had played a big role in the process of marriage across ethnic boundaries with some possible variations here and there. In general these conditions will result in having an enormous impact on the interaction of the various ethnic groups and the cultural exchange among the groups.

5.1.1.7: THE ETHIOPIAN INDEPENDENCE

The long history of Ethiopian independence can be a living example to show the unity of the different ethnic groups against common enemy. The Turks, Portuguese, and Egyptians were defeated at different time in their attempt to establish themselves in the country. The Italians were also first defeated in 1896 and later on during their brief occupation from 1935-41 they were resisted in every part of the society. Some argue that the independence of the country, especially in the 1896 Italian war, was due to the capacity of

the leaders to exploit the cupidity of the European colonialist (See for example Tekle:1989:482). This assertion is political simplification. The reality which explains the defeat of foreign aggression was not only the capacity of the leaders but the feeling of Ethiopian nationalism among the different ethnic groups. However, the benefit and the credit was attributed only to a given number of individuals. As Donham and James (1986: xiv) explained "Without the contribution of Ethiopian Southern peoples, whose sweat and blood go unrecorded in 'Ethiopianist' annals, the Battle of Adwa in 1896 might not have been won". Nonetheless, the long standing independence can reveal that in how far the sense of communalism and cooperation has developed among the members of the different ethnic groups.

5.1.1.8: INTERNAL DYNAMISM

The internal dynamism of each ethnic group is another element to be considered. There are so many cases which indicates the changes in cultural attributes due to the internal dynamics of the ethnic groups. One case which can be cited as an example is the change of the Oromo socio-political system among some members of the Oromo ethnic group. On this issue Hassen (1991) argued that by the beginning of the 17th century, Oromo social organization (an egalitarian and republican system of socio-political organization based on age group known as Gada) was starting to breakdown and replaced by monarchical institution. According to him this was attributed due to internal conflict among members of the ethnic groups, the vested interest of some members of the group - who were involved in slave trade and lucrative trades in gold, ivory; the resultant differentiation in wealth, rapid increase in population and the role played by the elite to undermine the old (Gada) system. Other cases which indicates the transformation of different ethnic groups from pastoralist farming to sedentary farming are examples of internal dynamism. It should be noted hers that this conditions will not only bring about cultural changes but also breeds interaction among ethnic groups which follow same type of socio-economic and political systems.

COMMENTS ON THE CULTURAL ANALYSIS

Given the historical situation and the above factors, it will be very difficult to state that each ethnic group have maintained its ethnic markers or cultural attributes, like, know-how, technical knowledge, custom of food and dress, music and dance, mentality, values, symbols, socio-political and economic behaviour, indigenous methods of taking decision and exercising power, methods of production and economic relations and so on. Rather it will be proper to assume that **most** of the cultural attributes of the ethnic groups have intermingled to the extent of making difficulty of identifying a given

set of cultural attribute to an ethnic group except the language which seems to define the cleavage and provide a principle for association.

This does not mean to argue that Ethiopia is a "melting pot" or have turned out to be a country with common culture and language, but to note that the boundaries between the cultures have bled and the cultural distances between the ethnic groups is not something unbridgeable. The earlier diversity of culture that undergo an exceptional process of cultural exchange, although the degree differs in areas of low mobility, requires to be reconsidered.

The other element to be considered in the cultural analysis is the usage of the ethnic labels, which are best utilized as an instrument of mobilization. These labels which may not be based on actual decent but that draws on one of the attachments - especially language, are usually employed by the ethnic brokers (elite) to differentiate themselves from other groups and for justifying the claim for forming an ethnic based state. It is true that even in high mobility areas, irrespective of all these cultural exchanges, most of the members of the ethnic groups have retained their ethnic labels. The ethnic labels "Amhara" "Tigre" "Oromo" "Gurage" and so on still apply. But this does not mean that the ethnic markers (genealogy, language, religion and others) still persist for all members and it has to be emphasized that the focus on this ethnic labels may obscure or abuse the actual ethnic interaction and cultural exchange.

The ethnic identity, which is also drawn mostly from this ethnic label and which most of the time changeable, movable, ambiguous and dependent on context, should be reexamined before it can be used as a 'real' identifier, especially in the Ethiopian context. This identifier has to be questioned before it is galvanized and used to claim a State. Even if one take language or religion as a real identifier, it has to be seen in how far it could be a guarantee to form a stable and peaceful ethnic-state, as it so tragically demonstrated in Somalia or else where.

In short, the cultural analysis, which is followed by the elites of the ethno-nationalist movements - which took the ethnic groups as discrete bounded isolates and which is based on the ethnic labels and stereotype identity - is highly questionable. It seems, simplistically, borrowing from Erkison (1993):

while one's grand parents may have lived as traditional X or Y or Z ethnic group without giving it any thought as their singular identifier(...) today's generation does every thing in its power to revive the customs and traditions that their grandparents followed without knowing it, and which their parents tried so hard to forget.

Thus, the analysis which took the groups as unchanged in terms of genealogical or other cultural criteria requires deep reconsideration.

5.1.2 THE 'COLONIAL' OR THE 'ONE ETHNIC GROUP DOMINATION' THESIS

Some groups of intellectuals, in their academic debate over the Ethiopian state formation, widely employ the concept - 'colonialism'. Most of the arguments were basically focused on the definition and type of 'colonialism'. Some group argued that the process of state formation was through pre-capitalist colonialism and others debate that it was feudo-militaristic-colonialism. Others relate it to the 19th century colonialism or imperialism or colonialism associated with industrial capitalism. This latter groups used the term "black colonialism" to differentiate it from 'white colonialism'. Leaving aside the discourses, the issue in this paper is to show how the new-elites in their ethno-nationalist movements use of the term to justify their claim for independence.

As it has been noted earlier there were two basic doctrines which explains the principle of self-determination. The first one was associated with the creation of 'one-nation-one-state', and the other was intimately related in the fight for colonial independence. In the course of history the idea engraved in the former doctrine 'a nation and only a nation can be the basis for political sovereignty' was given up in the struggle against colonialism. The latter, which upholds the 'illegitimacy of rule by conquest of foreign (alien) state' has been sustained for a long time since the second world war.

When examining the ethno-nationalist movements in Ethiopia, which have flourished in the 1970s and after that, they retrace the two stage development in their justification for the application of the principle of ethnic self-determination. So that, if possible they could dislodge the dominant elite and put themselves on state power or create alliance to share power, and if not to form their own state which is free of contenders.

Eshete (1986:24), also argued in the following manner on the way the ethno-nationalist movements have swap their claims. He wrote:

Consider the Eritrean Movement, the Oromo Movement, the Tigaraye movement, the Somali movement and so on. In the early stages, all these movements claimed that they represented a nation and on that very ground claimed the rights of independence. (...) This strand of nationalism was eventually found to be undesirable by all parties, including members of the nationalist movements. Because of this and other related difficulties, the one-nation-one-state interpretation of national self-determination was finally abandoned. The leadership of

the nationalist movements switched its allegiance to the colonial constural of national self-determination.

For the Oromo ethno-national movements, the argument is centred on the notion that one ethnic group - the Amhara or by some only the Shoan Amhara (in one of region in the country) - is considered to be the colonizer. For the group the time of 'colonialism' was referred starting the period of the creation of modern centralized Ethiopia state. For the Eritreans ethno-nationalist movement 'colonialism' was retraced not because of the ineradicable formation of a dissident national identity but due to the abrogation of the federal arrangement which endanger the elites economic and political opportunity. For the other groups also 'colonialism' was used to serve as a pretext for self-rule because they consider it is unjust to be ruled coercively by "others". The focus of all the movements was on the Shoa region, where the central state operates.

The region Shoa, for the contending elites in the ethnic movements was essentially identified with 'colonisation', and was considered fully as dominated by an Amhara or Abyssinia. But Shoa has been a place for culturally heterogeneous peoples for over four centuries, during which considerable cultural exchange must have taken place. This region has combined the sidama, Oromo and the Abyssinians and has resulted in being a community which posses newly created and recently standardized cultural and other ethnic attributes resulting from a fusion of these different ethnic groups.

If the argument followed that Shoa has been a place for one ethnic group or represent only the Amhara, it seems unfounded claim. Looking at the pedigree of the first king of Shoa, Negassie, it is said that he was neither of Abyssinian decent nor Abyssinian appointee but was a self-made Oromo war-leader who made his own position although he styled it after an Abyssinian model (Darkwah 1975). Menilik kingdom is also questionable to be a continuation or representative of the Abyssinians kingdom. Delibo (1974) stated that it is inappropriate to view Menilik empire as if it had only an Amhara one. Salole (1979:22) argued that from the Abyssinian point of view, the Shoas are excluded altogether from the true Amharic category. Other writers also consider the animosity between Shoa and the other parts of Abyssinian kingdom. For example Gebre-hiwot Baykedagn (1911) wrote "From ancient time until now, Shoas have considered Gonderians and Tigreans to be malicious people. It is true until now, all the high appointments, especially ministerial posts are in the hands of only Shoas. Any person from Tigraye, Samien, Begemedir, Lasta, and Gojjam, being considered as foreigners, are excluded from high governmental decisions" (in Salole 1979:22).

Writing about the Shoa ruling line, Markakis (1974:196) stated that "the imperial line had a considerable admixture of Galla strains in it". Salole (*op.cit.*) argued that "I suggest that the reappraisal of the 'facts', as they have to become a reiteration, will show that the assimilative theories which underlie so much of the Ethiopian studies are misleading and inadequate; in particular I suggest that a reanalysis of the historical relationship which developed between the Amhara and Oromo within Shoa is long overdue. The assimilative model of ethnic relations has underestimated the extent to which a distinct Shoan, rather than Habesha, identity has developed. Unfortunately our knowledge of Shoa history, like our knowledge of past and present Shoan society, is largely conjectural."

As it is indicated earlier it was during the reign of Menilik that the centre has expanded towards the periphery especially to the south, east and west. There were also population movement from the north and the centre to these areas. However, the notion that these people who move and settled were only northern settlers i.e. the archetype Abyssinia from the high lands of Tigray, Gonder etc. is questionable. For example, through interview with migrants, McClelan (1984) found that in the Sidamo area the Majority of 'northerner' settlers were Shoan Oromo or Gurages- peoples who were semi-assimilated into the hybrid that formed the nucleus of the modern Ethiopian state.

During the reign of Haile Selassie and the Dergue, as it was pointed out, the causes for the rise of the ethno-national movements were not related to any sort of 'colonialism' or one ethnic group domination thesis. But It should be emphasized that there was a domination of the whole society by a different groups who holds state power. Yet it is highly unlikely to say that the group is related to a given ethnic group only. Thus, the 'colonial' or one Ethnic group domination thesis seems to be confusing and questionable, and Eshete (1986:25) argued:

Now this course ('colonialism' thesis) does not promote any principle of political democracy; it is; a new form of group anarchy. The people who subscribe to it, particularly those in the nationalist movements, have to weight the consequences of its application to their own case. It is always going to be possible for, say, the Afar people to feel that they have been colonized by the highland Eritreans, then they have genuine claim to independence. I imagine, to the extent that the Oromo can say this about anybody else, various southern peoples could say it is just well about them. It's no surprise then that the major advocates of this position are foreigners, because they don't have to institute such a policy, nor live under it. In saying this, I don't mean to question their motives. I think their motive are quite benign: they are just trying to make a living. But whatever the merits of their work, the colonial framework that foreigners try to impose on Ethiopia does

not yield a principled resolution of any serious difficulty faced by the peoples of the Horn.

Thus, the ethno-nationalist elite 'colonialism' thesis, which purports that one alien ethnic group has controlled and dominated the other ethnic group, requires reconsideration.

5.2: REFLECTION ON THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

In chapter 2 of the paper it has been tried to outline the different lines of analysis which could possibly explain the causes of ethnic conflict. It is also tried to tentatively set one of the theories as a possible candidate to explain the Ethiopian case. Before trying to review this framework, it is important to briefly look the relevance of some of the lines of analysis to the Ethiopian case. In so doing, the following could be observed:

The cultural pluralism line of analysis, as it is tried to indicate on the cultural analysis part, seems to be questionable. This is because it neglects the complexity, fluidity, and degree of interpenetration as well as conflict among the ethnic groups. It also denies the unranked nature of the ethnic groups in the Ethiopian society and rigidly asserts that each and every ethnic unit forms a separate and self contained community. This seems to be against the fact that the ethnic relationship is interlocking and overlapping. Moreover, all the ethnic groups, although with some degree of variation, have passed through a long history of interaction which makes their extreme distinctiveness very doubtful.

The line of analysis which tries to link cultural differences and psychological properties is also disputable. This model, which assumes that the conflict is due to the difference in mentality and psychological make-up of the members of the ethnic groups is insincere. This is because it will be difficult to categorize a given members of ethnic group to be by their nature thrusting and receptive to change and the other members of the ethnic groups to have the opposite characteristics. One could question that - is it possible to consider only the Gurage or the Oromo or the Tigre or the Amhara or so on to be by nature open-minded and the others dull? Or is it possible to put some of the ethnic groups confident and hard working and the others lame? This prospective do not necessarily give good descriptions of what people actually do and to borrow Young (1986:448) description, this line of analysis is an exercise burdened with ethnocentric dangers.

One of the variant of the Marxian perspective, which was pointed earlier, seems to be one sided, that is it takes class to be real than the ethnic group or as Mugubane (in Osaghae 1991:47) pointed, it posits that class

analysis as more realistic than ethnic analysis and superior to it. Thus, without deeply going to the details, because the analysis in the paper is ethnicity and this variant of the Marxist perspective only tries to excel class without giving due attention to ethnicity, it is not possible to fully utilize the class analysis. But this does not mean its application is totally rejected, as it is tried to indicate in few of the cases the ethnic groups were used as an instrument for maintaining the class interest of the elite groups. This had been seen when the old elites have tried to use the ethnic factor for protecting their personal and class interest. However, it was not possible to realize that these elite groups for having a strong and homogeneous class character and using ethnic groups as an instrument for furthering the interest of their particular class.

The other theory is the regional deprivation line of analysis. This model had been used by some to explain the cause of ethnic conflict in Ethiopia. This model can be questioned whether it could explain the Ethiopian ethnic conflict case or not. This is because if one take the objective economical deprivation element, its relevance to the Ethiopian case will be unlikely because all regions are more or less equally deprived irrespective of their ethnic combination (see Annex ...). This is because the concentration of economic facilities is in the capital cities and few major towns which are ethnically heterogeneous. More over it is difficult to prove whether there is strong relationship between ethnic movements and relative backward regions. And there are incidents where the economically privileged are the one who demand separation, a good example in this context is the Eritrean case. If one looks the Table 2 , which indicates the officials from different regions, Eritreans had a majority representation. The information in the Annex 3 also elucidates that the region is one of the three regions which is relatively better off than the other regions.

The other lines of analysis also will not fully explain the Ethiopian ethnic conflict case. This is to say the with out neglecting their application in other parts of the world, they are found less relevant for the Ethiopian case. The inter-elite competition theory, which was discussed to contemplate the root causes of the ethnic conflict, compared to the other theories is found relevant to explain the Ethiopian case. This framework and the Ethiopian case converge on the following major points of causes of ethnic conflict.

- a) The emergence of new-elites, together with the modernization process
 - expansion of education, urbanization and government employment opportunity.

- b) The exposure of the new elite to Marxism, nationalism, and other contemporary political ideology;
- c) The competition of the new elite for the privileges and opportunities offered by the modernization of the society especially for top government positions;
- d) The question of language, which become critical because the choice of official language and the medium of education will some how determines which groups have access to the best jobs;
- e) The competition between the new elite and the old hierarchical bureaucracy, which is reflected when the carrier opportunity is blocked for the former because it is already saturated with the latter;
- f) The recruitment policy of the old hierarchical bureaucracy, which more or less reflect overt discrimination along ethnic lines;
- g) The incapacity of the new elite to apply his newly acquired knowledge to transform the society and restructure the state; and the other indicated assumptions of the theory seems to hold true in the Ethiopian case.

It was these and other related factors which leads to the ensuing ethnic arithmetic formula. In the competition, as it is tried to indicate in both the description and the assumption of the theoretical framework, the cultural form, values and practices being interpreted or reinterpreted are used as political resources for the elites. The different justification - like the claimed history of the ethnic group, regional inequality, 'colonialism', grievances of the ethnic group with the state, and other factors are used by the elites in the competition. The conflict and alliance among the elite, which claim to represent one given ethnic group, could also be a good case to show the competition. Thus, it can be said that the 'inter elite competition theory' could relatively explain best the Ethiopian ethnic conflict case.

5.3: EXAMINING THE APPLICATION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF SELF-DETERMINATION AS A MODE OF REGULATING ETHNIC CONFLICT IN ETHIOPIA.

In the section which highlights the principle of self-determination, it is considered to be problematic both in acceptance and feasibility. It is also considered, however, a last resort feasible measure for regulating ethnic conflict in a deeply divided society or if the conflict can be explained by the cultural pluralism or uneven development lines of analysis or by 'colonialism' or one ethnic group domination thesis. However, these basic grounds for accepting the principle, as argued earlier by linking them to the long history of the Ethiopia, are found to be problematic and confusing.

The other major element that needs deeper consideration is in how far the principle of self-determination will address the real problem in the Ethiopian context. The real cause, as indicated in detail, is the quest of the elite to genuinely share power. This demand of the elite seems appropriate and is a normal phenomena every where in the world. Simply to make a passing remark, 'democracy', which is some times claimed to be the issue for accepting the principle, first and foremost can not be imagined without the elite. Democracy, as Weber, Mosca, Schumpeter (in Etzioni-Halevey (1993:60) argued, is not rule by the people, but by the elected elite. These writers pointed that the prevalent notion that democracy is capable of realizing certain ideals, or that it is able to lead to widespread public participation in the political decision-making process, is unrealistic. For schumpeter (*ibid.*) the essence of democracy lies in its being a certain arrangement for reaching political, legislative and administrative decisions; and this arrangement is the leaders' attainment of power - and thus the ability to make such decisions - through competition for the people's votes.

Nonetheless, in the Ethiopian case instead of accepting the elite, avoiding the contesting elite has been complicating the problem. The dominant elite, past and present, has been rejecting this contending elite claim to represent the member of his ethnic groups. For example President Meles Zenawi (Quoted in the Government Newspaper - Ethiopian Herald february 11, 1994) when addressing the Somali elders said: " Although a nation may have the right to opt for independence through a free election and referendum, the issue of secession would not be the right of a party or a clan, but the right of the people and a nation." This statement is confusing - Who are the people? aren't the clan a people? how can the people speakout their demands? couldn't it be through the party? and other questions can be raised. It seems fair to assume that in the Ethiopian context the issue of secession have not been raised by the people, but it is the ethnic elite in the party who claim to represent the group that raises the question. Such statements, like the above one, from the dominant elite, however, has been a mechanism for rejecting the ethnic elite and is a sign for doubting the truthful application of the principle.

Furthermore, if the principle of self-determination is not only a political exercise but some thing to be practical and accepting the 'self' being defined by language and taking the new Transitional Government regional map 1 (see Annex 6), the following are only few of the challenges that are to be encountered.

1) The first challenge in the application of self-determination starts from the assigning of a defined territory for the 91 ethnic groups. As the table in the Annex 2 shows:

- a) From the 91 ethnic groups the 56 ethnic groups had more than 200000 people, from the 56 ethnic groups 25 had more than 100000, from the 25 ethnic groups 7 had more than 1 million. (the rest, which are more than 30 ethnic groups but having less than 20000 population, are not indicated in the table).
- b) More than 16 ethnic groups were found dispersed in more than 4 regions. The 4 largest ethnic groups- Oromo with population of 12387664, Amhara with population of 12055250, Tigrawai with population of 4149697 and Gurage with population of 1855905 - are found dispersed in all the regions of the country. (This is according to the old regional map (Map 2 Annex 6) which consisted 14 regions the but the analysis holds more or less true if the current Transitional Government regional map is taken).
- c) Each provinces contain different ethnic groups. The least is Arssi which contains 7 ethnic groups and the highest is Keffa which contains 31 ethnic groups.

REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF THE 91 ETHNIC GROUPS

REGION	ARSSI	BALE	GAMOGOFA	GOJJAM	GONDER	HARARGE	ILLUBABOR	KEFFA	SHOA	SIDAMO	WELLEGA	WELLO	A.A.*
ETHNIC GROUPS	7	8	30	12	10	14	12	31	27	29	17	10	14

Source: Compiled from Office of The Population and housing census. 1990. Population and Housing Census.1984. Analytical Report of different regions.

Note * - Addis Ababa

What is the possible arrangement for accommodating these and other complex issues? what is going to be the fate of the Oromos, Amharas, Tigrawai, Gurages and the others who are living 'out side' areas from which they are supposedly originated. Should they be evicted from their place where they have been peacefully living for many years?

2) Suppose the principle of self-determination is applied - how will the population of Addis Ababa determine their fate? According to 1984 population census the population of this capital city is 110745 Oromos, 700225 Amhara, 243218 Tigrawai, 255132 Gurage and the rest 113795 are from different ethnic origin (see Annex 2). If plebiscite is given to the residents of Addis Ababa, there is no doubt it will be for the Amhara because it is a majority, are the other people to be considered as a refugees?

3) There has been population movements starting the early periods in the history of the country. For example, most of the population of Wello, Raya in Tigray - are oromo of the 16th century. Where is the category of this people -Oromo or Amhara or Tigray. The same also apply for some other peoples. What is the 'date' at which the people entitled to exercise self-determination are fully composed? Who are the ones to be excluded from the choice?

4) If plebiscite is carried out - Who is to participate in the plebiscite of the so called Amhara or Oromo or Gurage or other ethnic group regions (which are places for more than 20 ethnic groups)? Is it to be only the indigenous population, and if so, which individuals and groups qualify for being considered as indigenous? A person living for 10 years or more or 50 years or more? What will be the status of the groups having a fewer number of population?

5) Which territorial map is authentic? The territorial maps of the current Transitional Government map (see map 1) or the Oromo Liberation Front (see Map 3 Annex 6) or the others which will be drawn if self-determination is implemented? One complex issue is, according to the territorial map drawn by the transitional government, Addis ababa is considered as a region. If we refer the territorial map envisaged by the Oromo Liberation front, Addis Ababa is under the Oromo territory. If we consider the population of the region the majority is Amhara - whose claim for that region is correct ?

6) What is the fate of the people whose parent are a from two or more ethnic groups? a person whose father is an Oromo and his mother an Amhara or his grand fathers mother is a Gurage and his grand mother father is a Tigre or any combination. Taking the phrase of Victor Turner as 'Betwixt and between' (In Erikson 1991) or Mary Douglas 'ethnic anomalies' (*ibid.*) - what is their ethnic identity. How are they going to determine their 'self'.

7) In the southern part of Ethiopia there are groups which are regrouped by the current transitional government as the southern Ethiopian people Administrative region. This groups include more than 30 ethnic groups but are defined under five regions (Gambela, Keficho, Hamar, Welayta, Gurage on Map 1). How is self-determination to be applied in this region? Is it surrounded by some criteria of "viability" of a sovereign unit? Is there a possibility of drawing a territorial map which can demarcate all these ethnic groups? If plebiscites is conducted and the groups wants to live together and at another time there is a disagreement among the elites, is the self-determination to be exercised only at once or is subject to continuous review?

8) Is self-determination only a right on a paper to be defended as a democratic right or only a 'scare-crow' and to be rejected when it is demanded? - is there a possibility that this right is to be given for the Oromos, the Somali or to the Afar and so on. If not, why?

These and other important elements, like the long historical interaction among the ethnic group and the factors indicated in the cultural analysis and more importantly the economic viability of some of the ethnic groups, should have been reconsidered before the self-determination is included in the Charter and create expectations which might not be fulfilled. Lansing, 1918 prediction: "The phrase is loaded with dynamite. It will raise hopes which can never be realized. It will, I fear, cost thousands of lives" seems to upholds the current Ethiopian situation. Thus, based on the above contentions the principle of self-determination seems to be puzzling and tragic if applied in the Ethiopian context.

In this chapter we have tried to see the two contentions - cultural prularism and one ethnic group domination or 'colonialism' thesis - given for the application of the principle of self-determination. It is argued that the contentions can not fully explain the situation the Ethiopian case and needs reconsideration. By reflecting on our theoretical part we have tried to see that the inter-elite theory can relatively explain the Ethiopian Ethnic conflict case. It is also tried to indicate that, although questionable, if the principle of self-determination is accepted it applicability in Ethiopian case will face different challenges.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

The purpose of this paper was analysing some of the causes of ethnic based conflicts in Ethiopia and linking to the proposed regulating mechanism - 'self-determination up to and including secession'. In so doing, it has been tried to conceptualize the concept of ethnicity; define ethnic group; illuminate some theoretical lines of analysis pertaining to ethnic conflict; and highlight the concept of self-determination. The paper has also briefly outlined the history of the country and the complex pattern of fusion and fission among ethnic groups; the rise and proliferation of ethnic based movements and their regulation; and how ethnicity has been used as an instrument by the ethno-nationalist movements.

It has been pointed that ethnicity is a social relationship among ethnic groups and had been existing through out the history of the country. The political and economic significant as well as the pattern of the relationship, however, has been subject to intermittent fluctuation. The relationship among the ethnic groups, being either in a form of conflictual or non-conflictual, has been prominent.

In the analysis it has been indicated that, after emperor Haile Selassie took power, the conflictual relationships within and among the different ethnic groups have taken two forms. The first was the conflict between the traditional elites of the different regions and the state. During this period the main issue in the conflict was resistance against the centralization and 'modernization' policies. These policies, which incapacitated the traditional regional elites political autonomy and local control and which had resulted in mal-distribution of political and administrative powers among the regions, taxation, religious and linguistic inequalities, land alienation and so on, were the main bases of contention. Although the ethnic consideration in the conflict during the period was minimal, this conflict among the regional elites and the state elite has been the ground for the second form of conflict - where ethnicity took a predominant role.

The modern ethnic based conflict has taken wing during the final days of the reign of Haile Selassie. At this stage the conflict was between the elite (the traditional elite and the old educated) who control the state power and the new educated elite who emerged out of the modernization policy that this state followed. The factor that give impetus for the conflict was control over the fully centralized and 'modernized' state, which domineer the means of production and distribution of material and social resource. This state had been an agency of accumulation and subjugation for the old and traditional elite for a long period of time. Eventually, the new-elites,

equipped with different ideologies like Marxism, Nationalism, Socialism and others, and wanting to restructure the state and to be like the dominant group in power started to directly claim to share the control of state power and resource. The new-elite group denied this claim has started utilizing ethnicity to be an instrument to justify the exaction. Thus, it was found out that it was starting the final periods of the reign of Emperor Haile Selassie ethnicity has started to be a major political instrument for the elites in competition for state power and resource. At this moment the ethnic groups were also started to be mobilized for this opportunistic purpose.

A conflict situation was intensified during the military regime. This was the period which attest the climax of the ethnic formula. The ethnic factor was impossible to be regulated. This was because, on the one hand, the dominant elites who control the state were adamant to not share power and resource, and on the other hand the ethnic elite were resolute to have access to the power and resource. There was nothing to bridge this gap except the long and protracted war. It is surprising to note that the radical land reform policy, equality of nationalities, language, religion, 'self-determination minus secession' and other measures that comes out of the Dergue could not stop the contending elite from the claim. The measures have failed because they did not directly address the major causes of the problem.

The current Transitional government has proposed 'self-determination up to and including secession'. The basis for proposing the measure seems to emanate from the conception of ethnic conflict from the cultural pluralist and uneven development lines of analysis as well as from the consideration that the society was a deeply divided society. Or what the contending elites claims - cultural distinctiveness or 'colonialism' or domination of one ethnic group.

It was found out that, the situation could not fully affirm us the problem was due to the said contentions. But the critical factor has been found out to be - control of 'the means of production'. Thus, among the other theories which were supposed to explain the ethnic based conflict, the Inter-elite competition theory was found relatively relevant to explain the case of Ethiopian ethnic conflict.

Two sets of riddles in the regulation of the ethnic conflict have been realized. The first one was the unfitness of the measure taken to regulate the ethnic problem to address the critical factors that underlie the ethnic based conflict. This riddle has been existing ever since the ethnic factor started to be used as an instrument for the elite in competition. The other riddle is the demand of the ethno-nationalist movements for the application

of the principle and the need of the current elite on the state power to maintain the integrity of Ethiopia minus Eritrea, i.e. denying the 'said' right. For the ethno-nationalist movement it seems a proper demand because if they are not allowed to genuinely share power they have to raise their arms, but this demand is a threat for the interest to those who cling to power.

However, this riddles will get a settlement but short of 'self-determination up to and including secession'. With out going to details of 'prescriptions', which the elite in power know but intentionally forgot or do not want to implement, the measure that could be primerly considered, for the ethnic conflict created by the elite in competition, could be creating the mechanism where all the contending elites join hands to LIBERATE THE SOCIETY FROM IMPOVERTISHMENT AND DEPRIVATION. This may seem simplistic, but the point is even to apply the enigmatic 'principle of self-determination', it seems crucial that an agreement has to be reached among the group of elites on various issues to avoid possible tragic and disastrous outcome. Moreover, the first gesture of the major elites of the other ethno-nationalist movements at the beginning of the transition, although it was short lived, is a good sign that there is a possibility of making alliance and accommodate the problem. Implementing this prescription does not require any thing but the moral obligation and the political will of the contending elites. As it is also tried to indicate, through out the period after modern ethnicity has taken grip, the non-existence of uni-dimensional violent conflict of one ethnic group against another ethnic group should be used as an opportunity for the elite to cooperate and transform the society.

The other point to make is that the current elite in power has to learn from experience. It was true that the previous elite group in power has done every thing to stay in power because they have every thing to lose by giving up the 'State Palace'. However, the final price they paid was execution or going to prison cells and more than any thing they have made also the impoverished mass to pay a price, which was not supposed to pay. This situation has also led to increased repression, corruption, poor domestic policy choice, increasing debt, staggering economic decline and various forms of external intervention. This conditions should not be repeated and has to be given an end. To borrow Schatzberg's (1993:457) expression, the new rulers - may long starved in terms of their access to, and control over, the state - must not overindulge their appetites; they must not eat too much. If the new rulers rapidly become 'men with big tummies' while the 'thin people' continue to starve, then nothing will have been gained.

To finalize, the current elite in power should learn from experience and come up with a prudent mechanism to genuinely share power. This could be possible

if the elites are rotated so that a much wider range of people have access to the power and prerequisites to office. To repeat, the essence of the widely 'confessed' term 'democracy' is rule by elite. It has to be underlined that the beginning of 'democratic wisdom' should be creating a mechanism for sharing power and state resource among the elites. The elites have to go beyond 'ethnic self-determination' before neighbours become enemies and the society could go into intricate and insurmountable problem. The elites have to mete out power among themselves so that the poor can get a chance for a peaceful life and The Ethnic Conflict in Ethiopia could get an end.

NOTES

1. Smith (1981:20) in his book *The Ethnic Revival* has pointed out that the modern ethnic revival which has started in the late 1950s and the following periods in all parts of the world as follows: In the West - the Breton, Catalan and Quebecois movements; Scots, Welsh, Corsicans and Jurassiens autonomous movements; Occitanians, Alsatians, Frisians, Manx, Cronnich, Galicians, French Basque, Faoese, and others; in the Eastern Europe - The Croats, Slovenes, Slovaks, Transylvians, Tatars, Ukrainians and Lithuanian; In Africa - The Ewe, BaKongo, Somali, Lunda, Yoruba, Ibo, Baganda, Eritreans and Saharaus; in Asia - Kurds, Palestinians, Turkmen, Pathan, Balchis, Mizos, Nagas, Ambonese, Shan and Karen.

2. This is according to the 1984 National Census Finding reported by the Office Of The Population And Housing Census Commission. 1990. Although the data given on the report may have some distortions (see Pankhurst 1993), the information provided will be used in the paper because it is the only available compiled data regarding the ethnic combination in the country and the distortions may not have an impact because the data is used as a rough indicator.

3. The term nationality is intentionally overlooked because the difference between ethnic groups and nationalities seems insignificant, especially in describing people, although few authors avoid to use the term nationality as a term that is employed by some Marxist writers. In the paper both terms are taken as synonymous.

4. see for example Erikson (1993:118) which has stressed that "(N)ationalism and ethnicity are kindred concepts, and the majority of nationalisms are ethnic character. The distinction between nationalism and ethnicity as analytical concept is simple one, if we stick to the formal level of definitions. A nationalist ideology is an ethnic ideology which demands a state on behalf of the ethnic group."

5. Anthropologists who have written about nationalism have generally seen it as a variant of ethnicity (*ibid:101*).

6. Moynihan (1993:4) has argued " I believe it is helpful to distinguish between ethnic groups and nation, between ethnicity and nationality. It is a distinction of degree. The nation is the "highest" form of the ethnic group, denoting a subjective state of mind as regards ancestry, but also, almost always, an objective claim to forms of territorial autonomy ranging from a regional assembly to full-blown independence. Nation states seems inclined to go to war with one another, but ethnic groups fight all the time. Inevitably, many of these ethnic clashes make their way into the realm of international politics".

7. See for example Knutsson (1969:86) who used the term tribal group in Ethiopia to denote the people inhabiting a given area and speak the same language.

8. According to Walker conner (1972), of 132 independent states in 1971, only 12 were ethnically homogenous, representing 9.1 percent of the total, while another 25 (18.9 %) have a single community comprising over 90% of the

state's population. A further 25 have a single community representing 50-74% of the state's population. On the other side, in 39 states (or 25.9%), the largest ethnic groups comprised more than 50% of the population; while in 53 states (40.2%), the population is divided into more than five significant groups.

9. See for example in Hobsbawm (1992:9), Erikson (1993:99) and others.

10. This is taken as the territorialized nationalism (Young 1986:439) which is referred to as "statist nationalism"; or nationalism which is defined, by Silvert (in Salih 1984:45), as the acceptance of the state as the impersonal and ultimate arbiter of human affairs.

11. The term is taken from authors who regard the recurrent ethnic aspect of nationalism as ethno-nationalism or ethnic nationalism (Conner 1992, Smith 1976 and others) and this can be contrasted with the statist nationalism in poly-ethnic states.

12. During the initial period the study had been largely the preserve of anthropologists and social psychologists and it had focused on urban centres Young (1986:444) and Erikson (1993:21).

13. Brath sees ethnic groups as categories of ascriptions and identification of actors themselves, and have the characteristic of organizing interaction between people. (...) the ethnic categories as organizational vessels are fixed, static always there even when not relevant to behaviour and ethnic groups only persist as significant units if they imply marked differences in behaviour, i.e., cultural differentia. (1969:10-15)

14. Mobilization is defined as the conscious acceptance of membership in the same social unit by holders of (or, more precisely, claimants to) a particular trait. This consciousness may continue for a brief or a long time and be felt intensely or superficially depending on the circumstances or situation (Kassfir 1976:48).

15. Different authors define ethnicity in a number of ways. It is defined only based on objective determinants, i.e., a variety of objective criteria, including language, territory, political organization, culture, common name and descent legend, diet, dress or any trait which suggests a clear separation among groups of people. It can also be defined subjectively based on normative behaviours like the group consciousness of participants, identification, loyalty, stereotypes, mythologies, theories, slogans, ideologies and ceremonials. Also as a combination of both. Discussions on ethnicity may use definitions based on the elite behaviour, on mass behaviour, or on the interaction of the two (Kassfir 1976:33). Further the definition of ethnicity may depend heavily on one's conception of humankind as motivated either by rational calculations of his[sic:her] self-interest, or by fundamental values rooted in his(her) subconscious, or by some combination of the two (*ibid.*)

16. This definition adopted by taking some elements from the meanings given by Brass (1991:19 and 1985:17); Erikson (1992:13) and Kassfir (1976:44); (Osaghae 1991:44-45); and Cohen (1969:xi).

17. This definition is adopted from many other definitions (See for example Cabral in O'Brien 1993, Verhelst 1990, and others) given to the term and can be contrasted with other definitions which either considers culture as static phenomena or only related to indigenous and original solutions invented by the groups without any alteration. It can also be contrasted with those who narrowly define culture to include only music and dance or one single character.

18. There is a need to clarify the point. Taking the definitions given by Mare (1993:6-7), "Category refers to the labelling of a number of people or things according to similar characteristics. A category of people is one created by an outside observer and the 'members' of the category may have no idea of similarity or even be aware that they have been allocated to a category. Or it could be a group of people who are aware of and accept as belonging together and categorized as similar, and where members of the group accept their interrelationship, even though they may not all know other members of the group."

19. This is not to say that politicized ethnicity will be an alternative for the inability of the state to create a 'civil society'. This is because, leaving aside the other economic and social problems that countries will possibly face, the complete break-down of the state, as it has happened, in Somalia, Rwanda, Liberia attest to the fact that clan or ethnic affinities cannot replace the state in the contemporary world.

20. The protagonist of this school of thought are J.S. Furnivall (in Young 1986:445, Kasfir 1976:52-54, Barth 1969:16) and M.G. Smith (in Kasfir 1976:52, Erikson 1993:49). There are others like Reyntjens (1993:36) which wrote "Although all societies are plural to some extent, most of those in the third world, and in Africa in particular, are characterized by very strong primordial subnational attachments. What distinguishes them from most societies in the North Atlantic area is that people's loyalties are not with the state, but with those subnational groups based on language, religion, custom, region, race, or assumed blood ties."

21. There is a variant of this relative deprivation theory which is called 'internal colonialism' school. The thesis of the school, as described by Smith (1981:28), holds that the major western states annexed, not only overseas colonies, but also internal ones within their hinterland, in their search for larger markets and cheaper labour. This model assumes that the ethnic conflict is the result of inequalities between the ethnic groups in poly-ethnic states and the discrimination practised by the dominant ethnic group or its elites towards other non-dominant ethnic groups. This school also argued that the capitalist world and imperialist state expansion have led to a differential distribution of state resources and valued employment opportunities among ethnic groups and hence, resulted in pervasive ethnic struggles. (see Brass 1991:251)

22. In analysing the elite in a society, there are two types analysis: the dichotomous analysis and the trichotomous analysis. Those who tend to use the dichotomous analysis divide society between those who hold power and those who do not. Those who use the trichotomous analysis divide society into elites, who are located at the very top of the power and influence structure;

sub-elites, who occupy the middle structure; the public, who occupies the lowest rank in this constellation. (Etzioni-Halvey 1993:95)

23. This is because as different authors like Barton 1937 (in Pelham 1969:10) suggest "language can be taken as a rough guide and is, indeed, sometimes the only one available". This base is also used by many authors to identify the ethnic groups in Ethiopia (see for example Levine 1974, Trimingham 1952, Baharu 1991, Pelham 1969 and others).

24. The major controversy is the question of the origin of the Semitic speakers in Ethiopia. The origin of these groups is obscure. Many writers consider this group to be immigrants from South Arabia and constituting the core population of Northeastern Ethiopia and are credited with introducing a cultural complex that included the Semitic language, the art of writing, architectural technology, the practice of irrigation, sabean religious and political symbol. Although it can be said there was a good deal of interaction between Northern Ethiopia and South Arabia and it is reasonable to suppose that only some elements of the above civilization originated in South Arabia, there is no clear evidence that any of these cultural traits appeared in South Arabia earlier than on Ethiopia.

25. Trimingham (1952:36) also noted that 'In this period Judaism penetrated through the diaspora to remote centres in the interior where it became an ethnically characteristics of groups of Agew who continued to maintain their national integrity against the other stream of semetizing influence radiating from Axum. Most of the judaized Agew later became Monophysite Christians and were the primary source of the Jewish customs which are found in Abyssinian Christianity.'

26. According to Termingham (1952:47) "the Beja are one of the most important ethnic factors in the region between the Nile and the Red sea. Owing to the relative poverty of their country, they were subject, like other nomadic tribes, to waves of expansion which carried them into the richer lands of the Nile valley and the northern Ethiopian plateau."

27. According to the legends it is told that a pagan Queen known as Gudit destroyed Axum, massacred priests and burned the churches and the city. This legend, however, is said to be backed by historical documents (see Delibo (1974:8) and pelham (1969:33)).

28. The founder of this dynasty is claimed by some to be the Queen which destroyed Axum, by others the son-in-law of the last king of the Axumite dynasty and by others as an independent rise and development of the Agew political system.

29. Details of the conflictual interaction and the other forms of integrations, the period in which the battles were carried out are given by Termingham 1952, Levine 1974, Delibo 1974, Hassen 1991, and others.

30. During this period, although it will not be easy to establish the frontiers of the empire, in the 1500s the empire was extended roughly from river Barks and Massawa to the north down to Lake Abaya in the south; from the Red Sea coast and the territories along the gulf of Aden in the east to the present frontier with the Sudan to the west (Darkwah 1975:1).

31. This was the major reason for his downfall. This has happened because Tewodros's request of foreign assistance, to fulfil his eagerness for introducing European technology and to fend off Egyptian and other internal challenges, was not getting response from his foreign 'allies'. Tewodros put his pressure by detaining Europeans in his territory. The British responded to this pressure by sending a military expedition.

32. Menilik during this time turned to the Italians for closer collaboration to fend off the threat of Yohannes. As professor Robinson (in Gebreyesus 1990:82) wrote in this regard "In the very last year of Yohannes' reign (...) Menelik came perilously close to allying himself with Ethiopia's potentially most dangerous enemy -Italy."

33. It is important to note that Menilik in 1908 officially proclaimed his grandson Lij Yasu. This heir was a son Ras Mikael - a Wello Oromo ruler who had been forced by Emperor Yohannes to espouse Christianity and had subsequently emerged as a major regional power (Markakis 1974:197). The Wife of Menilik, Empress Taitu - an Oromo from Wello and a powerful figure in the shoa dynasty, was also having her candidate for the throne. This candidate was Zeweditu, a daughter of Menelik and a step daughter of Taitu, who was married to Ras Mekael. In an effort to consolidate his power, Lij Yasu was making alliance with the nobilities of Gojjam and Tigre who were at odds with the shoan nobility and began to look support from the southern Oromo nobility groups and other Muslim groups in the south. But his relation with the muslims opened the ground for the Shoan nobility to incriminate him for betraying the Christian throne. This situation has resulted in the overthrow of Lij Yasu and on the other hand placement of Zeweditu on the throne by making Haile Selassie the regent and heir of the throne.

34. Details of the decrees can be referred in Cohen and Koehn (1980).

35. For example if we take the first five year development plan articulated in the late 1950s the following was evident: " condition for developing the economy of particular regions vary. scarcity of financial means necessitate a concentration of investment in those areas where the most favourable conditions exists (natural resources, communications, sources of electric power general and technical education of population etc.). In the initial phase the economic development of some regions will therefore proceed faster while that of others will lag behind though, in the long run, the general improvement of conditions, education, health services etc. will secure the amelioration and integration of economic and social life through out the empire." (in Seleshi 1988).

36. As Gilkes (1975:88) argued the expansion of education both in Addis Abeba and in the provinces was to provide not the beginning of nation wide literacy, but a small cadre, educated to fit into the more modern administration that was becoming necessary. He stated the impetus come from the Emperor and there is no doubt that it is when seen by him as a part of the centralization process; as a method of reinforcing imperial control.

37. One important incident to be mentioned is what is happening on December 1969, where many students were killed at the university campus and led them to be dissidents (see details in Tadesse 1993:71).

38. Second-class citizens is used to refer that Islam was not having equal official status like Orthodox Christian religion; and also compared to the christians, moslems ascendancy to state power was limited.

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A N N E X E S

Annex 1

**DISTRIBUTION OF ETHNIC GROUPS WITH POPULATION OF MORE THAN
20000 ACCORDING TO THE FOUR MAJOR LINGUSITIC GROUPING**

CUSHITC LANGUAGE GROUP	OMOTIC LANGUAGE GROUP	SEMITIC LANGUAGE GROUP	NILO-SAHARAN LANGUAGE GROUP
Agew	Ari	Adere	Agnua
Afar	Basketo	Amara	Gumuz
Alaba	Bencho	Argoba	Jablawi
Beja	Dizi	Gurage	Kunama
Belen	Dorze	Tigrawai	Meain
Borena	Domoti	Tigre	Nara
Burji	Gamo		Nuwer
Desanech	Gidole		
Felasha	Gofa		
Gedio	Hamere		
Gewada	keffa		
Guji	Konta		
Hadia	Koyra		
Kimant	Male		
Kembata	Malo		
Konso	Mao		
Oromo	Mocha		
Saho	Shaka		
Sidama	Shankila		
Somali	Shinasha		
Timbaro	welaita		
	yemsa		
	Yemsa		
TOTAL	21	22	6
			7

Source: Compiled from a) Office Of The Population And Housing Census Commision. Population and Housing Census 1984. Analytical Report of different Regions. 1990. Addis Ababa. b) Delibo: 1985 c) Institute Of Ethiopian Nationalities:1985.

Annex 2

REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF ETHNIC GROUPS WITH POPULATION OF MORE THAN 20000

	ETHNIC GROUP	ARSSI	BALE	ERITREA	GAMOGOFA	GOJJAM	GONDER	HARARGE	ILLUBABOR	KEFFA	SHOA	SIDAMO	TIGRAYE	WELLEGA	WELLO	ADDIS.A.	UNCOVERED*	TOTAL	
1	ADERE	-	-	-	-	-	-	16286	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	5974	7258	29518	
2	AFAR	-	-	-	-	-	-	160834	-	-	7065	-	-	-	-	-	238443	583120	
3	AGEW	-	-	-	-	261693	26074	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1095	30977	489834	
4	AGNUA	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	28044	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2455	30499	
5	ALABA	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	80880	2311	-	-	-	-	648	83839	
6	AMARA	296842	83265	-	52625	2859268	2545732	295550	54150	95851	1835206	122280	-	108806	2938215	700225	67235	12055250	
7	ARGOBA	-	-	-	-	-	-	14595	-	-	21679	-	-	-	-	13614	-	1989	51877
8	ARI	-	-	-	107764	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1360	109124	
9	BASKETO	-	-	-	44684	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	787	45471	
10	BEJA	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1257	-	-	-	7784	115301	124342	
11	BELENE	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	88453	88453	
12	BENCHO	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1802	120334	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	898	123034
13	BORENA	-	-	-	-	-	-	4352	-	2003	1585	142363	-	5474	-	-	-	2987	158764
14	BURJI	-	-	-	3214	-	-	-	-	-	6104	31576	-	-	-	-	2365	43259	
15	DASANCH	-	-	-	17545	-	-	-	-	2097	-	1809	-	-	-	-	11178	32629	
16	DIZI	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1041	20066	-	-	-	-	-	-	1222	22329	
17	DOMOTE	-	-	-	2118	-	-	-	-	268821	2849	-	-	-	-	-	1764	275552	
18	DORZE	-	-	-	16379	-	-	-	-	-	1310	3753	-	-	-	21775	707	43924	
19	FELASHA	-	-	-	-	29711	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3174	34056	
20	GAMO	-	-	-	457757	-	-	-	-	-	1631	-	-	-	-	2404	2141	463933	
21	GEDIO	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1119	453099	-	-	-	-	1190	455408	
22	GEWADA	-	-	-	19043	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1079	20122	
23	GIDOLE	-	-	-	28086	-	-	1803	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1159	31048	
24	GOFA	-	-	-	151109	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2932	154041	
25	GUJI	-	9223	-	2396	-	-	-	-	1797	4080	446244	-	-	-	-	-	17682	481422
26	GUMUZ	-	-	-	-	2104	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	31729	33833	
27	GURAGE	20925	7673	-	2235	1102	-	19326	7084	29278	1455305	49500	-	5202	1429	255132	1714	1855905	
28	HADIYA	-	-	-	-	-	-	2126	-	8673	613160	13480	-	-	-	2898	3175	643512	
29	HAMER	-	-	-	24766	-	-	-	-	1561	-	-	-	-	-	-	432	26759	
30	JABALAWI	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	43395	-	734	44129	
31	KEFFA	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	30494	410281	-	-	-	-	-	-	2434	443209	
32	KIMANT	-	-	-	-	2841	163936	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1200	-	1191	169168	

cont..

ETHNIC GROUP	ARSSI	BALE	ERITREA	GAMOGOFA	GOJJAM	GONDER	HARARGE	ILLUBABOR	KEFFA	SHOA	SIDAMO	TIGRAYE	WELLEGA	WELLO	ADDIS.A.	UNCOVERED*	TOTAL
33 KEMBATA	1385	-	-	-	-	-	2691	-	3350	410940	8642	-	-	-	4120	1684	432812
34 KONSO	-	-	-	87824	-	-	-	-	-	-	5622	-	-	-	-	1273	94719
35 KONTA	-	-	-	2640	-	-	-	-	33935	-	-	-	-	-	-	2730	39305
36 KOYRA	-	-	-	3178	-	-	-	-	-	3747	61390	-	-	-	-	1537	69852
37 KUNAMA	-	-	-	-	3609	-	-	-	1461	-	-	-	-	-	-	94929	99999
38 MALE	-	-	-	30600	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	287	30887
39 MALO	-	-	-	39395	3181	-	2121	-	3907	1521	1694	-	2440	-	-	3780	58039
40 MAO	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3721	-	20370	-	-	1996	26087
41 MEAIN	-	-	-	-	1280	-	-	-	41281	-	-	-	-	-	-	7844	50405
42 NARA	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	49229	49229
43 MOCHA	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	10753	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	46752	57505
44 NUWER	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	27074	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	753	27827
45 OROMO	1274848	631288	-	19847	55501	17364	2167814	737501	1202982	3309493	111959	-	2203710	361984	243218	50155	12387664
46 SAHO	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3191	-	1579	-	-	139715	144485
47 SIDAMA	2787	8312	-	-	-	-	-	-	2862	9940	1230196	-	2658	1057	-	3909	1261721
48 SHAKA	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	6972	15352	7450	-	-	-	-	-	989	30763
49 SHANKILA	-	-	-	-	34679	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3446	-	-	606	38731
50 SHINASHA	-	-	-	-	17840	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2162	20002
51 SOMALI	-	243761	-	-	-	-	1343825	-	-	1118	14490	-	-	-	1636	8564	1613394
52 TEMBARO	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2680	52795	2164	-	-	-	-	299	57938
53 TIGRAWAI	4301	1482	-	2209	6302	190183	10768	3300	6598	30119	4746	-	5236	69302	110745	3704406	4149697
54 TIGRE	-	-	-	-	-	1753	-	-	-	-	3886	-	-	2589	18797	656060	683085
55 WELAITA	4034	1608	-	57674	-	-	5296	-	4206	45311	965510	-	-	-	8200	1119	1092958
56 YEMSA	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	114811	-	-	-	-	-	-	1095	115906
OTHERS**	57668	30724	-	83244	27733	40547	145511	67743	74652	119137	170987	2478425	74375	9981	39108		
TOTAL	1662790	1017336	2748304	1256332	3273524	3018909	4192898	975958	246883	8023544	3855870	2478425	2477862	3746144	1423111	42619846	

Note: UNCOVERED* - Include the number of population who are living in regions which were not fully surveyed (Eritrea and Tigray) and regions which were partially surveyed.

OTHERS** - Include ethnic groups which have less than 1000 people in each region, people whose ethnic origin is not specified, foreigners and naturalized people.

Source: Compiled from:a) Office Of The Population And Housing Census Commission. Population and Housing Census 1984. Analytical Report at National level. 1991.

b) Office Of The Population And Housing Census Commission. Population and Housing Census 1984. Analytical Report of different Regions. 1990.

Annex 3

REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF HEALTH FACILITIES, SCHOOLS AND INDUSTRIAL ESTABLISHMENTS FOR SELECTED YEARS.

REGION	HEALTH INSTITUTIONS				NUMBER OF SCHOOLS						INDUSTRIAL ESTABLISHMENTS	
	CLINICS		HOSPITALS		ELEMENTARY		JUNIOR		SECONDARY			
	1975	1986	1975	1986	1975	1986	1975	1986	1975	1986	1975	1986
ARSSI	45	109	2	2	135	333	19	50	3	14	-	-
BALE	34	81	1	1	83	310	8	20	1	5	-	-
ERITREA	121	176	17	15	428	237	66	58	14	19	112	94
GAMOGOFA	49	83	5	3	77	323	8	18	3	5	-	-
GOJJAM	47	109	3	4	135	676	14	58	4	17	-	-
GONDER	51	125	10	3	184	578	21	33	4	18	-	-
HARRARGE	111	167	2	11	214	659	47	65	7	13	25	18
ILLUBABOR	51	107	2	2	137	405	14	35	4	10	-	-
KEFFA	61	126	3	2	93	499	11	40	3	9	-	-
SHEWA	122	322	11	10	538	1443	100	246	25	50	244**	265**
SIDAMO	89	169	5	5	148	786	31	56	6	13	-	-
TIGRAYE	64	101	4	4	178	82	19	24	7	11	-	-
WELLEGA	78	214	4	5	463	723	28	100	10	15	-	-
WELLO	70	151	4	5	158	649	23	45	3	15	-	-
ADDIS ABEBA	16	135	13	14	225	197	98	188	30	31	-	-
UNCLASSIFIED*											49*	32*
TOTAL	1009	2175	86	86	3196	7900	507	1036	124	245	430	409

Note:

* Total industrial establishments for the rest of the regions.

** Around 85% of the industries in Shoa are in Addis Ababa.

Source : Wubneh, M. (1990), Time Series Data on Socioeconomic Characteristics of Ethiopia

Annex 4

REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF POPULATION BY RELIGION

RELEGION	ARSSI	BALE	GAMOGOFA	GOJJAM	GONDER	HARARGE	ILLUBABOR	KEFFA	SHOA	SIDAMO	WELLEGA	WELLO	ADDIS.A.	TOTAL*
ORTHODOX	725739	186382	441757	3098221	2723491	393393	437763	946545	5372835	1042553	1906255	1599827	1225246	20100007
PROTESTANT	4137	5637	146372	3728	7073	4748	12006	21733	560196	1083193	185109	39900	14811	2088643
CATHOLIC	2949	1423	34246	1060	1496	8500	3459	15923	106446	146598	17494	1547	13096	354237
MUSLIM	923495	544046	23465	119834	238818	3764784	443574	1214707	1877033	332710	331081	2088254	162050	12063851
TRADITIONAL	3058	30948	602083	40265	3637	6049	68116	247489		1160322	23816	10686		2196469
OTHERS	1347	8262	10707	7421	42697	8186	4544	15475	97123	34528	10285	3342	7908	251825
NOT STATED	2065	330638	1757	2995	1697	7238	781	3080	9908	6423	3822	2588	0	372992
TOTAL	1662790	1107336	1260387	3273524	3018909	4192898	970243	2464952	8023541	3806327	2477862	3746144	1423111	37428024

Note:

* the total figure do not include Eritrea and Tigray

Source: Compiled from: Office Of The Population And Housing Census Commision. Population and Housing Census 1984. Analytical Report of different Regions. 1990.

Annex 5

DISTRIBUTION OF INTER-REGIONAL LIFE TIME MIGRANTS BY REGION OF ORIGIN AND DESTINATION. 1984.

ORIGIN	DESTINATION													UNCOVERED (*)	TOTAL OUT-MIGRATION		
	ARSSI	BALE	ERITREA	GAMOGOFA	GOJJAM	GONDER	HARRERGE	ILLUBABUR	KEFFA	SHOA	SIDAMO	TIGRAYE	WELEGA	WELLO	ADDISABABA		
ARSSI	--	17273	-	-	-	-	5714	-	-	34613	3603	-	-	-	-	19631	80834
BALE	11520	--	-	-	-	-	2859	-	-	9507	5103	-	-	-	-	8851	37840
ERITREA	-	-	--	-	2414	3752	2487	-	-	9056	-	-	-	3142	-	54396	75247
GAMOGOFA	-	-	-	--	-	-	-	-	-	4476	9095	-	-	-	-	27143	40714
GOJJAM	-	-	-	-	--	6306	2540	2942	4173	9316	-	-	7957	-	-	37916	71150
GONDER	-	-	-	1048	37813	--	2770	3247	3632	9255	-	-	3659	1979	-	35317	98720
HARARGE	17967	3032	-	-	-	-	--	-	-	12780	-	-	-	-	-	31142	64921
ILUBABUR	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	--	8327	6434	-	-	5523	-	-	10545	30829
KEFFA	-	-	-	1290	-	-	-	18446	--	7223	-	-	-	-	-	17157	44116
SHOA	89956	26376	-	3881	4450	1810	36657	7449	42451	--	39520	-	15313	7871	347021	3475	626230
SIDAMO	5252	14301	-	14161	-	-	4863	-	-	31067	--	-	-	-	-	22391	92035
TIGRAYE	-	-	-	-	2751	7906	3561	-	-	8029	-	-	2914	6702	-	84582	116445
WELEGA	-	-	-	-	3322	-	-	17834	5365	11161	-	-	--	-	-	19531	57213
WELLO	4944	14379	-	2324	15025	10256	8871	6848	11589	45742	3700	-	25925	--	-	84582	234185
ADDIS ABABA	3466	-	-	1303	2842	1903	9796	-	3851	30330	5154	-	3161	2662	--	7728	72196
OTHERS (**)	9542	8323	-	3467	6891	3611	3900	7406	14819	0	11701	-	9698	5751	296345		
TOTAL(IN-MIGRATION)	142647	83684	72327	27654	75508	35544	84018	64172	94207	228989	77876	10426	74150	28107	643366		1742675


Note:

UNCOVERED* - Include people who are living in regions which were not fully surveyed (Eritrea and Tigray), region which the complete data is not provided (Addis Ababa) and regions which were partially surveyed.

OTHERS** - Include people whose ethnic origin is not specified.

Source: Compiled from:a) Office Of The Population And Housing Census Commission. Population and Housing Census 1984. Analytical Report at National Level. 1991.

b) Office Of The Population And Housing Census Commission. Population and Housing Census 1984. Analytical Report of different Regions. 1990.



MAP 1 Administrative Regions of Transitional Government of Ethiopia (1992).

Source: Pankhurst 1993:179.



MAP 2 Administrative Regions (Provinces) of Ethiopia (1942-1987).

Source: Pankhurst 1993:180.



MAP 3 Territory of Oromia as pictured by Oromo Nationalists (1991).

Source: Baxter 1994:168.