



Rohingya Refugees as Victims of One-sided Violence:

Surviving Camp Life, Envisaging the Future

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Dedication

This paper is dedicated to the Rohingya children who dream “beyond the horizon” of the refugee camps in Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh.

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List of Acronyms

AI	Amnesty International
ARSA	Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army
BGB	Border Guard Bangladesh
HRW	Human Rights Watch
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IOM	International Organisation for Migration
MSF	Medecins Sans Frontieres
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund

Abstract

This study is about Rohingya refugees and camp life, in Cox's Bazar in Bangladesh. In terms of theory the starting point is the impact of one-sided violence on livelihoods of displaced people. It considers their past flight from Burma and their present struggles to survive amidst the resource shortages inside the refugee camps where they find themselves forcibly contained. The study aims to explore the strategies that Rohingya refugees use to survive in the restricting conditions of the camp, how they perceive violence and how violent displacement has affected their livelihoods. In addition, the study asked how Rohingya refugees envisage their future, and the prospects for return. In order to answer some of these questions, the author conducted a survey of 85 heads of households (80 male 5 female), selected randomly from two different sectors in two camps. Qualitative interviews were also conducted with 22 informants, 13 refugees, five locals and four NGO workers (in total 18 male 4 female). A pilot was conducted to refine the survey questions, and the final results collated through use of MS Excel to produce tables, graphs, diagrams and other visual representations of results. There were three key findings. First, the survey results and interviews confirm that the Rohingya are genuine refugees, in the sense that they fled and were unable to take their assets and documents with them. Second, in the present the study shows that they struggle to find means of living, work, money and basic services in the camp. Although they are fed, it is at subsistence level. Thirdly, return is unlikely for geo-strategic reasons, and is also not considered a serious possibility by the refugees themselves. Because of this, combined with the extent and duration of one-sided violence in Burma, the Rohingya now find themselves unable to foresee their own future, whether in Bangladesh or elsewhere, and to plan accordingly. The study concludes that international attention is required to resolve the future of the Rohingya in a sustainable manner.

Relevance to Development Studies

Whilst an estimated 25.4 million people in the world are surviving as refugees, some 10 million are stateless. Of the world's 68.5 million forcibly displaced people, 85% are hosted by the developing countries (UNHCR n.d.). Among many others, violence is considered as a major driver of displacement of people (Duch-Brown and Fonfria 2016: 2). Evidence suggest that states, in many cases, ran violent campaigns against minorities, living within its territory, in disguise of establishing peace, making thousands homeless also refugees. Violence affects the livelihoods of civilians, making them socioeconomically vulnerable. Life in a refugee camp is full of uncertainty and crisis. Yet, the refugees, being amid constraints, try to survive the camp life also envisage future. This study intends to understand the impact of a state-sponsored one-sided violence against the civilian Rohingya, a minority group from Burma, who are now surviving in the refugee camps in Bangladesh, with uncertainty over their respectful return to Burma. This research intends to look at the crucial features of one-sided violence and its impact on a minority group. Besides, this study attempts to understand how the victims of violence, being in the refugee camps, perceive violence. Thus, this study contributes to the field of sustainable development.

Key Words

Rohingya, Refugee, One-sided Violence, Livelihoods, Future, Camp Life, Households

Chapter 1 Introduction

1.1 Introduction

“It is difficult for anyone who has never been forcibly displaced to imagine what it is like to be a refugee”

-- former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan (Ullah 2011: 139).

The Rohingya population, an ethnic religious minority from Burma's¹ north-west Rakhine state, is considered as one of the most persecuted human groups in the world (Milton et al. 2017: 1; Brooten et al. 2015: 717; Yunus 2017: 14). This community has been subjected to widespread also systematic state-sponsored as well as sectarian violence a number of times in last four decades. The worst in the series happened in 2017 when around 723,000 (UNHCR 2018a: DOI) Rohingya people fled targeted violence and serious human rights violations in Rakhine (formerly known as Arakan) state by the Burmese security forces, mainly the army -- Tatmadaw². The Burmese security forces started the ‘clearing’ operation against Rohingya on 25th August. The fleeing Rohingya people have taken shelter, after crossing border also river, in refugee camps in Teknaf, the southernmost sub-district in Bangladesh under Cox's Bazar district. The refugee influx included pregnant women, young children, the sick, wounded, and the elderly (UNHCR 2018a: DOI).

The Rohingya crisis is a complex also longstanding one. At the same time, it is one of the biggest humanitarian crises in the world. It is complex because multiple actors are either directly or indirectly involved in it. This is a massive humanitarian crisis as 1 to 1.5 million (In 2015:19) Rohingya people have been directly affected by it over the past four decades. They were made stateless in 1982 with the passing of the Burmese citizenship law (Tajuddin 2018: 422; Fink 2018: 159).

The experience of forced displacement from the lands where the Rohingya population belong to is not a new one for his human group. Before their latest flight in 2017, they were forcibly displaced, at least, four more times in the past from their villages to Bangladesh, and to Internally Displaced Person (IDP) camps in Rakhine for several times (MSF 2002: DOI). Burma does not recognises the ‘Rohingya’ ethnicity of this minority group, rather it considers them as “illegal migrants” coming from Bangladesh (Howe 2018: 247; Zawacki 2013: 18; Kipgen 2013: 236).

In refugee camps, the livelihood of Rohingya refugees is depended on humanitarian assistance. According to UNHCR (2018a: DOI), the refugees are surviving within “limited services and scarce resources”. Thousands of refugees have built temporary shelters -- mainly with ingredients consist of bamboo, rope and tarpaulins, to live in the camps where 75% of them share shelters between more than one families (UNHCR 2018a: DOI). Ninety three percent of the refugees are living below the UNHCR emergency standard of 45 square metres per person (UNHCR 2018: DOI). In Bangladesh, they are not allowed to go beyond a certain point towards the mainland -- Kutupalong station, a public market-place near the Kutupalong-Balukhali mega camp.

It has been 15 months since the Rohingya refugees started arriving Bangladesh in August 2017. However, the process of their voluntary also respectable repatriation is yet to begin. Besides, the issue of repatriation is not in the hands of refugees. Instead, it depends on several regional also global actors including Burma, Bangladesh, and UN.

¹ Military rulers changed country name from Burma to Myanmar in 1989. In this paper, author decides to use Burma instead of Myanmar.

² Official name of Burmese armed forces.

1.2 Contextual Background

The latest influx of Rohingya people joined the previously stranded 213,000 Rohingya refugees, who had fled Rakhine too, following a series of military campaigns and sectarian violence in previous years (UNHCR 2018b: DOI), raising the total number of refugees close to one million. However, the biometric registration of Rohingya refugees, conducted by Bangladesh, suggests the total number of Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh is over one million (Mahmud 2018: DOI).

A report published by the UN formed Independent International Fact-Finding Mission³ in September 2018 claims that there were marks of “serious human rights violations and abuses” carried against the Rohingya population in Rakhine by the Burmese security forces (UN Fact-Finding Mission 2018: 1). The UN report (2018: 1) also finds some senior generals of Burmese military responsible for these crimes, and it recommends that military officers are investigated and persecuted in an international criminal tribunal for genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. More than 40% of all Rohingya villages in Rakhine were partially or entirely destroyed during the military operations (UN Fact Finding Mission 2018: 179). Despite mentioning the fact that exact number of deaths might not be counted ever, the UN Fact-Finding Mission (2018: 353) suggests that more than 10,000 people were killed in that military operations. To describe the killing spree of the soldiers, UN Fact-Finding Mission (2018: 352) states:

“The security forces entered village after village, opening fire on villagers and burning their houses. Villagers were killed both indiscriminately and in a targeted manner. They were locked in or thrown into burning houses and lined up and executed.”

In 1978, an estimated 200,000 Rohingya people entered Bangladesh following a military campaign that recorded killing and rape. In between 1991-1992, some 260,000 members of Rohingya community fled Rakhine again following another military operations in between 1991-92 (Mahmood et al. 2016:1843-44). Besies, in 2012-2013, an estimated 140,000 Rohingya people were forcibly placed into IDPs in Rakhine by the Burmese soldiers while 1000 lost lives as they tried to cross the Bay of Bengal by small boats to reach Bangladesh and Thailand (Mahmood et al. 2016:1843-44).

The Rohingya population, following their previous displacements, were repatriated as per the agreements which were signed between Bangladesh and Burma. However, human rights organisations claim that many refugees were forcibly deported to Burma by the host country – Bangladesh, after the 1991-1992 exodus of Rohingya people (MSF 2002: DOI). Besides, Burma also refused to take back some Rohingya refugees on the ground of lacking proper documents, forcing a large number of Rohingya people to be stranded in two refugee camps -- Kutupalong and Nayapara in Teknaf (MSF 2002: 24).

Prospects of return of Rohingya refugees, who reached Bangladesh in 2017, seem unrealistic, however, in the short- and even medium- to long-term. Meanwhile, the refugees have expressed their unwillingness to go back to Burma until their “safety is guaranteed” and “rights are recognised” (Gluck 2018: DOI).

³ The Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Burma was established by the UN Human Rights Council resolution 34/22 to investigate the allegations of human rights violation in Kachin, Rakhine and Shan states in Burma since 2011. In this paper, the intext citation of this the report published by this mission will be “UN Fact-Finding Mission”.

1.2.1 Who are the Rohingya Population?

Rohingya community is an ethnic, linguistic, and religious minority group, living in Buthidaung, Maungdaw and Rathedaung townships, in Rakhine (Arakan Project 2016: 1) According to Sassen (2017a: DOI), Rohingya people have been connected to Burmese land since 15th century when the Muslims started gathering in the Kingdom of Arakan (now Rakhine). The members of Rohingya community, as claimed by Chowdhury (cited in Kipgen 2013: 236), are the decedents of Muslim Arabs, Moors, Persians, Turks, Mughals and Bengalis who reached Arakan as “traders, warriors, and saints through overland and sea routes”. The 2014 Population and Housing Census of Burma (2015: 12) states that there were 1,090,000 “not enumerated” people in Rakhine who, according to the Arakan Project (2016: 1), were the Rohingya Muslims. The word Rohingya, according to Kipgen (2013: 235), is a controversial one in Burma. The Burmese government does not use this word in the official platforms also documents. In an occasion in May 2016, Burma’s de facto leader Aung San Suu Kyi requested USA not to use the word “Rohingya” as the word, according to one of her spokespersons, was not “useful as part of national reconciliation” (Paddock 2016: DOI).

Rohingya people belong to 4.3% Muslims (The 2014 Myanmar Population and Housing Census 2015: 26) of Burma’s total 52 million⁴ population. The Buddhists constitute the highest 87.9% while the Christians forms 6.2% of the total population in Burma (The 2014 Myanmar Population and Housing Census 2015: 26). When 78% people of Burma speak Tibeto-Burman⁵ (close to Burma’s official language - Burmese) language (Bianco 2013: 17), the Rohingya people speak in a separate language that coincides with the local dialect of Bangladesh’s southern district - Cox’s Bazar. Being the victims of repeated violence over the years, the Rohingya people are mainly in Bangladesh, where there are an estimated over one million Rohingya in 2018, but also in India, Pakistan, United Arab Emirates, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia and even in Saudi Arabia (BBC 2018: DOI; UNHCR 2018: 8).

1.2.2 The Camp Setting

The new plight of refugees, who reached Bangladesh in 2017, are living in Kutupalong and Balukhali camps also in the extension areas of these two camps -- Burma Para, Hakimpara, Leda, Unchiprang, and in Nayapara camps in Teknaf (Humanitarian Data Exchange n.d.). However, the size of these camps was not big enough to accommodate the newcomers. Therefore, the areas of the camps were extended towards the forested hills, a big portion what was within the protected wildlife reserve areas. The refugees built their own shelters on the hills, clearing trees also labelling lands. The materials to build the emergency shelters were mainly provided by UNHCR⁶. According to an Acaps-NPM report (2018: 4) some 1,060 hectares of forestland was destroyed between August to December 2017 to accommodate the new plight of refugees.

The members of Bangladesh army are present in and around the camp areas to ensure security also to operate check points to ensure that refugees do not go beyond the camp areas. Police and members of intelligence wings are also deployed in the camps -- both in uniform also in plain clothe. There are also some groups, selected from the refugees, who work as security guards inside the camps at night⁷.

There are three types of leaderships available in refugee camps -- Majhi⁸, Head Majhi and Chairman. Majhis are those who usually lead one or two blocks of a camp while Head Majhis supervise two

⁴ World Bank website: latest record of 2016 <<https://data.worldbank.org/country/myanmar>>

⁵ Tibeto-Burman language is close to Burma’s official language - Burmese.

⁶ Personal conversations with refugees, locals, and NGO workers.

⁷ Based on researcher’s conversations with refugees.

⁸ Majhi system was introduced in camps after the Rohingya exodus in 1991-1992.

or more blocks. The chairmen are those who look after a large section (more than three) blocks of a camps (author's conversations with refugees and Majhis). These three types of leaders maintain regular contact with the government officials, security personnel, and NGO workers. There are some allegations against Majhis for quite a long time now that they abuse power also are involved in corruption (International Crisis Group 2018: 6).



Photo 1: Satellite image of Kutupalong and Balukhali Camp site, May 2017 (Reuters 2017)



Photo 2: Satellite image of Kutupalong and Balukhali Camp site, November 2017 (Reuters 2017)

1.3 Problem Statement: State-created refugees

Among the ethnic minorities that constitute one third of Burma's entire population (Gunawan and Priambodo 2013: 161), the Rohingya minority has experienced the "worst challenges" over the course of time (Mithun 2018: 1). In Burma, human rights including freedom of movement of Rohingya people were severely restricted in Rakhine as Lewa (2009: DOI) states that Rohingya people needed to collect passes from security personnel to travel outside their neighbourhoods, even if they wanted to go to a neighbouring village. Back home, the livelihoods of Rohingya population were depended on farming, fishing and small businesses like operating grocery shops⁹. Besides, Rohingya men were often forced by the military to work unpaid in army base camps (Mithun 2018: 17). According to an IOM report (cited in Sassen 2017a: DOI) Rakhine is one of the least developed region in Burma, struggling with "widespread poverty".

Today, more than one million Rohingya are living in refugee camps in Teknaf which is also a relatively impoverished region compared to the rest of Bangladesh. Whilst the national literacy is 61.5 percent, it stands at just 39.3 percent for Cox's Bazar district. Tensions are created by environmental hazards associated with camp construction. Hassan et al (2018: 1) state that forestland has been 'razed' to accommodate the new influx in Teknaf which has created "ecological problems and disturbed wildlife habitats". Some makeshift refugee shelters have been built "in or near corridors for the wild elephants" what has even resulted in at least one refugee death (Hassan et. al 2018: 1).

During the 2017 violence, some 288 Rohingya villages were completely burned to ground by the Burmese soldiers (UNHCR 2017: DOI), causing massive economic harm to Rohingya population, and destroying the basis for their livelihoods. Media reports suggest that thousands of victims failed to carry valuables and other necessary belongings with them on their way to Bangladesh. They fled conflict scenes quickly for the sake of protecting their lives. Many families lost their only earning member in the violence. To explain the condition of Rohingya refugees to the world, the UNHRC website states: "They (Rohingya refugees) have nothing and need everything". Therefore, the material losses as well as the loss of human lives, suffered by the Rohingya people, will affect the resettlement process upon their possible return to Burma in the future. This has led the researcher to formulate the idea of conducting this study, intended to examine the impact of violence on Rohingya refugees, especially on their livelihoods. The researcher decided to conduct this study after attending an international conference on Rohingya crisis, held in Dhaka, back in April 2018. After reviewing the papers presented in the conference, the researcher noticed that there was a lack of attention on the livelihoods issue of the refugees.

Meanwhile, the Bangladeshi media reports claim that a section of Rohingya refugees are getting involved in criminal activities, including drug-peddling, in order to manage their livelihoods in the camp while some Rohingya women are said to be forced into prostitution to survive and thus feed their children. This study was interested to explore the background to such reports, and perhaps to question them. In addition, media reports have been coming in about the deterioration of relationship between the host community and Rohingya refugees in and around the camp settings since 2017.

1.4 Research Objectives and Questions

The study intends to understand the impact of violence on the livelihoods of Rohingya population. It further focuses on the constraints that the refugees are experiencing in camp life. In the context of their ability to survive four different displacements in Burma prior to their latest flight, over four decades, the following key questions guide this study:

⁹ Personal conversations with refugees.

- i) How have Rohingya adapted to cope with challenges associated with limited resources and camp life in Cox's Bazar?
- ii) How do Rohingya refugees envisage their future, particularly from a livelihoods (and return) perspective?

The hypothesis of this study is that violence and fear, as perhaps the most important factors to shape the subjective views of the Rohingya refugees, prevent them from imagining their future, and makes it harder for them to cope in the present. This hypothesis is returned to in Chapter 5.

1.5 Ethical Consideration and Limitations

While conducting research on refugees, the issue of ethical challenges come to fore as, according to Leaning (2001: 1432), refugees are 'vulnerable' as a subject for research also, as Mackenzie et al (2007: 300) argue, "unethical and potentially exploitative" studies are being conducted on refugees. Generally, the flow of refugees takes place in the "midst of complex emergencies" and refugees in the host country enjoy minimum political rights (Leaning 2001: 1432) and a 'few' other rights (Jacobsen and Landau 2003: 187). Therefore, before starting a fieldwork in a refugee camp, a researcher should be aware of the complexities in a refugee camp. The author of this paper learnt about the situations in the Rohingya refugee camps beforehand. All interviews with refugees were conducted in the natural settings of the camps, without causing any harm to the settings. Since the Rohingya refugees experienced brutal atrocities before their flight from Burma, the researcher was cautious while asking questions related to violence, irrespective of age and gender of the interviewees. The author also asked the interviewees if there was any objection from their ends to be named in the paper.

Like other researches in the field of social sciences, this study also has some limitations which will hopefully encourage the researcher to conduct further studies in this field, as according to Greener (2018: 568), mentioning limitations in a research project "not only demonstrate rigour but also gives researcher a chance to identify clear directions for future research". One of the main limitations in this project was the size of sample for the household interviews. The researcher interviewed heads of 85 households in a community where the total number of population was almost one million. It was not possible for the researcher to do a representative sampling due to constrain of time, resources, manpower also shortage of expertise. Another limitation of this study that the interviewees -- until the researcher introduced himself also explained the purpose -- considered the researcher as someone from the government or a NGO who would provide them something in the future.

1.6 Outline of Chapters

This research paper is organised in six chapters. Chapter one narrates the context also the background of the topic. It also includes research questions and hypothesis. Chapter two explains the methods that have been used to conduct the fieldwork. It also talks about the limitations of the project. Chapter three discusses the theoretical framework also concepts that predominantly guides the study also the analysis in the following chapters. It further presents a brief picture of the historical exclusion of the Rohingya population in Burma also the advent of two phenomena in the picture – rise of Buddhist nationalism in Burma also economic activities in Rakhine. Chapter four analyses, based on the primary data, the present conditions in camp including the constraints the refugees are facing. Chapter five expands the analysis, based on the primary data, towards the subjective views of the refugees about

their future. It further discusses the potential impact of violence on the livelihoods of refugees, upon their return to Burma. Finally, a conclusion of this study has been drawn in Chapter six.

Chapter 2 Methodologies

2.1 Introduction


A mixed method approach was followed to conduct this study. The researcher did structured interviews with the heads of 85 Rohingya refugee households to generate quantitative data while a total of 22 persons (13 refugees, five local Bangladeshis, and four NGO workers) were interviewed in the form of unstructured interview to produce qualitative responses. Both the household interviews and qualitative interviews with the refugees were conducted in the Kutupalong and Balukhali camps in Cox's Bazar, around 440km south from Bangladesh's capital Dhaka. However, three of the five local Bangladeshis were interviewed outside but close to the camp settings. The fieldwork was carried out between 28th July to 10th August 2018. Before starting the fieldwork, the researcher collected permission from one of the magistrates who was involved in the administrative activities in the camp areas.

2.2 Sources of Data

This study predominantly deals with primary data, collected through household interviews with the heads of Rohingya refugee households, also the qualitative interviews with the Rohingya refugees, NGO workers and local Bangladeshis.

2.2.1 Household Interviews:

Of the total 85 heads of refugee households, 60 were from Kutupalong refugee camp while 25 were from Balukhali camp. The household interview sessions were conducted face-to-face with the respondents at their emergency shelters in the camps. A household was considered as a group of people who live under one roof also share common foods.



The convenience sampling, a method under the non-probability sampling techniques, has been followed to conduct the household interviews. This form of sampling technique is useful when randomization is not possible, considering the issues of time and resources, due to the size of population (Etikan et. al. 2016: 1). An estimated 630,928 Rohingya refugees have taken shelter in Kutupalong and Balukhali camps since 25 August 2017 (Humanitarian Data Exchange 2018: DOI). Therefore, carrying out a representative sampling was not possible for the author, considering time, resource, and manpower. The target population (ref-

ugees) also meet other conditions of convenience sampling strategy which are -- “homogeneous, easy accessibility, geographical proximity, and availability at a given time” (Etikan 2016: 2).

A male graduate student from a local college assisted the researcher to conduct the interviews. Although the researcher has a fair command in the dialect that Rohingya refugees speak, the accompanying local student used to play a role of an interpreter when it was necessary for the researcher. The author of this paper argues that interviews with the heads of the households were crucial to examine various aspects of camp life, especially the issues related to livelihoods, of the refugees, also to understand the subjective views of the respondents regarding their future. As Fowler (2012: 3) says that a “well-developed” survey can find the subjective opinions of a group of people. He also opines that various facts including “behaviour and situations” of a particular group can be explored by interviewing a sample (a section of people) of that group.

The informal conversations with refugees contributed to gather insights about how the respondents were affected by the violence, and how they perceive violence in their lives. The interviews with NGO workers have produced information about the present key problems that refugees are facing in their camp life. The conversations with Bangladeshis helped to understand the attitude that the locals pose towards refugees also the level of contact that takes place between these two groups.

Of the 85 respondents of the household interviews, only five were female. One of the reasons behind interviewing less number of women was the fact that Rohingya households are male-headed. Since the researcher decided to interview the heads of the households, the higher number of male participation was expected. Of the five female respondents, two lost their husbands in violence in 2017 while husbands of two other respondents died before 2017 in Rakhine. Husband of one female respondent lives in Malaysia.

Although the heads of a households mainly answered the survey questions, at least one female member of some households also contributed in some of the interview sessions alongside the male heads. The contribution of the female members [wives or mothers or both, of the household heads] came to the scene when the main interviewees failed to answer a question with necessary information. However, in those cases as well, the female members were behind some form of curtains. According to the Rohingya refugees, the female members of their families are discouraged to show up before a male stranger.

Permission was sought from the heads of the households before starting interviews entering their shelters. No household head refused to give interview when the researcher explained the purpose of interviewing them. On an average, each interview session took 25-35 minutes, depending on the narratives.

2.2.2 Qualitative Interviews:

A total of 22 persons (13 refugees, five local Bangladeshis, and four NGO workers) were also interviewed in the form of unstructured interview in and around the camps for qualitative data. This was a form of purposive sampling, which involved chatting with groups of Rohingya refugees in tea stalls and small shops in the Camp areas. Of this group of respondents, 18 were male and four were female. The researcher used the method of unstructured interviews as this helped, as a researcher, to establish a positive rapport with the informants. Unstructured interviews are more like a discussion rather than formal questions and answers. This kind of interview creates an environment where interviewees “feel relaxed and unassessed” while expressing their opinions to the interviewers (Hannabus cited in Sandy and Dumay 2011: 245). Based on own judgement, the researcher selected the interviewees who appeared “proficient and well-informed” about the crisis also were “willing to provide information by knowledge or experience” (Etikan 2016: 2). Purposive sampling for unstructured

interviews was not at all random, since it required quite a high level of trust, and was mostly done through informal contacts.

2.3 Data Collection Techniques

In order to understand the feasibility of the survey also sharpening the survey questionnaire, a pilot which, is considered as an important element of a research (Hassan et. al. 2006: 70), was conducted amongst the heads of 14 households in the Kutupalong camp. to pre-testing the feasibility also effectiveness of survey or interview questionnaires. A pilot helps to trace the problems in research instruments before conducting the full study (Lancaster et. al. as cited in Hassan et. al. 2006:71). As part of sharpening the questionnaire also make the information asked easier for respondents to understand, some changes were made to the questionnaire, following the pilot testing process, to achieve this clarity.

Diagram 1 shows the physical steps taken by the researcher to select households for the household interviews, which took the form of a survey based on a semi-structured questionnaire. For the household Survey, the main sites as shown in the Diagram were along the main roads in Kutupalong Main Camp and in Balukhali Main Camp. The researchers stood on top of a hill in the Kutupalong camp and interviewed 15 households in each direction, leaving 10 households in between two households. A similar technique was followed in the Balukhali camp too. It appears this has long been a recognised sampling strategy for conducting household surveys.¹⁰




Diagram 1: A Visual Illustration of the Survey Household Sampling Methods

2.4 Conclusion

Overall this chapter has shown how the fieldwork was designed and conducted, also highlighted some of the steps taken to overcome the limitations of time, resources and the challenge of a household survey in the conditions of the refugee camp. According to Maxcy (2003: 52), the mixed method approach is a “practical revelation” that has deeply influenced the field of social science research. The outcome of a mixed method approach has been intended to provide more of a “depth and rich” understanding of the situation of Rohingya

¹⁰ This advice was received from Matthias Rieger, to ensure a wide dispersal of households to control for various groups of Rohingya being spatially concentrated in one part or other of the camp.

refugees in Bangladesh, and especially of their sociocultural conditions and economic and livelihood problems (Maxcy 2003: 52). The mixed method design also incorporates techniques of qualitative and quantitative methods that in combination help to both answer the research questions posed, and to give some background and contextualisation to the factual information generated by the survey. In this way, it is hoped that a mix of methods can answer questions which either qualitative or quantitative methods on their own could not (Tashakkori and Teddlie 2003: 11).

Chapter 3 Contextualising and Theorising Violence

3.1 Introduction

As mentioned in Chapter 1, the Rohingya population have been subjected to structural and physical, private, and state-sponsored violence over the period of last four decades, making this ethnic group stateless also refugees. According to Zarni and Cowley (2014: 683) the “systematic erasure of Rohingya group identity” by the state began in 1978 (see Chapter 1) through a military operation. The process is still continuing (Zarni and Cowley 2014: 683). As the UN Fact-Finding Mission report (2018: 110) reads:

“The Rohingya are in a situation of severe, systemic and institutionalised oppression from birth to death. Their extreme vulnerability is a consequence of State policies and practices implemented over decades, steadily marginalising the Rohingya.”

In line with other scholars in the field, the author of this paper argues that coordinated military attack against Rohingya in 2017 was not an isolated one rather it was the continuation of the systematic destruction of an ethnic minority group by the state. In this chapter, we will first consider the historical context of rising intolerance against Rohingya in Burma, rooted in colonial policies, before introducing key concepts from Conflict Studies used to theorise the case study.

3.2. Intolerance of Rohingya and the War on Terror

In recent studies of the Rohingya problem, it has become almost an established ‘fact’ that British colonialism in Burma, involved ‘divide and rule’ policies that help to explain the current dilemma of identity politics in Burma, and why the Rohingya have become more or less a stateless people in exile (Wade 2017: 304; Ibrahiim 2016: 317). In the Second World War, the Rohingya fought with the British, whilst other Arakanese Buddhists fought with the Japanese. The Buddhists fought for Japanese to secure independence from the British. Soon after the war, a communal violence erupted in Rakhine that drove the Muslims away from their lands also caused deaths (Fair 2018: 66). In 1947, right before the British handed over independence to India, the Muslim leaders from Rakhine requested a prominent Muslim leader of the then undivided India to add northern Rakhine in the Muslim-majority-province East Pakistan which is now Bangladesh (Fair 2018: 66). Again in 1960, the then prime minister of Burma, as part of election campaign strategies, promised to the Muslims that Rakhine would be given the status of an ethnic state like other ethnic territories. However, it did not happen as the military juntas took the control of state power in 1962 following a coup, killing democracy in Burma for next decades (Fair 2018: 66). The military rulers then carried out two brutal campaigns against the Rohingya Muslims in 1977-1978 and in 1992, displacing thousands from their lands to Bangladesh (Fair 2018: 67). To overcome this legacy of divided politics from the colonial era, the post-independence Burmese regime appealed to the values of nation-building, at least in formal terms. Thus, the preamble of the Burmese (Myanmar) Constitution (2008) says: “We, the National people, have been living in unity and oneness.” The Chapter VIII of the Burmese Constitution (2008) guarantees equal rights to every person and it vows not to discriminate any citizen “based on race, birth, religion, official position, status, culture, sex and wealth.” However, in practical, the ethnic minorities in Burma have been affected by series of violence and conflict since country’s independence in 1948 (Mithun 2018: 1).

While briefing the diplomats, based in Yangon¹¹, in August 2017 on the latest military operations, Burma's National Security Adviser U Thaung Tun said: "All military operations against terrorist attacks are legal." He further labelled ARSA attack on Burmese security personnel as a "crime against Myanmar citizens, against the nation, and against law and order" (Aung 2017: DOI) -- a statement that clearly indicates that Burma wants to legalise its brutal attack on Rohingya, connecting it with the dominant global discourse -- War on Terror. Popularised after 9/11, this campaign was used against various human groups by different governments across the world, in the name of establishing peace. Amnesty International (as cited in Soueif 2009: 28) narrated this war on terror campaign as "a war on human rights." One of the countries in South Asia that managed to tag a coordinated state action against so-called Tamil 'terrorists' with this global campaign was Sri Lanka. In the name of establishing peace, the Sri Lankan government started a war against the Tamils, an ethnic minority, who had been fighting for years to establish a separate Tamil state (Niland 2014: 3). Zarni and Cowley (2014: 683) call Burma's exclusionary campaign against Rohingya a "slow-burning genocide" which has been on execution for last 35 years.

3.3 Genocide and Ethnic Cleansing: Religion and Identity

Shortly after beginning of the military operations against Rohingya in 2017, the UN Human Rights Chief called the military aggression a "textbook example of ethnic cleansing" (UN News 2017: DOI). Later in September 2018 a UN Fact-Finding Mission report (2018: 64) states: "...factors allowing the inference of genocidal intent are present" in the crimes committed against Rohingya. Before the start of brutal 2017 military campaign against Rohingya, Azeem Ibrahim, a noted academic in the field of strategic studies, stated that 'reality' that Rohingya population were 'facing' was a threat of genocide (Ibrahim 2017: 1).

Genocide is a "deliberate, purposeful, and focused" crime which is also considered as a form of "practical execution" (Anderton and Brauer 2016: 3). Genocide is committed with an intention to "destroy a group of people" (Waller cited in Anderton and Brauer 2016: 3). About the 2017 military attack against Rohingya, the UN Fact-Finding Mission report (2028: 178) says: "...killing was widespread, systematic, also intentional".

The Article II of UN's Genocide Convention (1948) defines genocide as "genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: (a) Killing members of the group; (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; (e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group (United Nations 1951: 277).

The military campaign against the Rohingya population was indiscriminate also irrespective of ages. At least 730 children, aged below five, were killed within one month of beginning of operations (MSF 2018: 17) The UN Fact-Finding Mission report (2018: 353) finds that serious bodily harm was caused to Rohingya people during and before the 2017 atrocities. According to International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (1999: 47), causing serious bodily harm refers to the harm that "seriously injures the health, causes disfigurement or causes any serious injury to the external, internal organs or senses." About the bodily harm suffered by the Rohingya people, the UN Fact-Finding Mission report (2018: 353) states:

"...many who survived the "clearance operations" bear the after-effects of bullet, burn and knife wounds that cause not only disfigurement, but

¹¹ Yangon is the capital of Burma.

long-term and serious injury. Women and girls who had their breasts cut off and those who lost limbs or parts of limbs suffered serious injury to external organs rising to the level of serious bodily harm.”

The members of Burmese security forces committed a widespread sexual violence against Rohingya women during and shortly before the 2017 military operation (MSF 2018: 17; UN Fact-Finding Mission 2018: 48). Besides, serious mental harm has been caused to Rohingya people who managed to flee the violence (UN Fact-Finding Mission report 2018: 354). According to MSF (2018: 18), some 3.3% Rohingya women, irrespective of their ages, who were displaced between 25 August 2017 to 24 September 2017, experienced sexual violence by Burmese soldiers.

Duch-Brown and Fonfría (2016: 1) argue that genocide and mass killing is an extreme form of “political exclusionary tactics”. Being the victims of serious physical violence also structural violence, the Rohingya population, a protected, ethnic, racial and religious group (UN Fact-Finding Mission report 2018: 352), are at the edge of destruction. Almost 90% members of this community are now living in exile -- as stateless also refugees (Aljazeera 2018: DOI). In every incident, the violence against the Rohingya civilians was one-sided. Therefore, the section below will discuss the conceptual framework of one-sided violence, and its implications on Rohingya people.

Another phenomenon that has appeared, as observed by some researchers including Mithun (2018: 9), in contemporary Burmese socio-political sphere, is the notion of using Buddhism to build Burmese nationalism what, according to Mithun (2018: 10), has created “problem” for rest of the ethnic and religious minorities including Rohingya as the approach denies the “multicultural reality” in Burma. While Brooten (2015: 135) argues that practice of “strong Buddhist nationalism” started rising in Burma since 1978 under military rulers, Mithun (2018: 10) argues that military rulers used Buddhist nationalism to destroy other ethnic minorities, especially Rohingya Muslims (Mithun 2018: 9). There is a misconception among the Burmese Buddhists for years that Muslims, particularly the Rohingya, is a “threat to the racial purity” (C4ADS 2016: 19). Besides, the radical Buddhist monks pose extreme hatred towards the Rohingya Muslims (Fair 2018: 69) what has also fueled state’s hostile attitudes towards Rohingya. Jonathan Friedman (cited in Gravers 2015: 2) states that there is a link among religion, nationalism and violence in relation to the construction of globalized identity politics. While Kunovich and Hodson (1999: 643) argue that “religiosity is often associated with intolerance”, Graver (2015: 2) thinks that the religion is gradually turning out a “dominant dimension” of the identity-based politics across the globe, and the anti-Muslim campaign in Burma is a part the global phenomenon of making religion “more communitarian and ethnicized” (Graver 2015: 4). According to Kipgen, one of the roots of the recent aggression against the Rohingya is inherited into the undissolved question of Rohingya Muslim identity (Kipgen 2013: 303), as the social identity theory believes that intergroup conflict may arise due to the identity-based rivalry (Seul 1999: 553).

In 2012, a section of Buddhist monks led an anti-Muslim campaign (Gravers 2015: 1), mainly targeting the Rohingya Muslims (Zarni 2013: 52), that displaced Rohingya from their lands also caused their lives. Buddhist monks in Burma consider Islam as a “danger to other religions, culture, nation and economy” (Gravers 2015: 2). Therefore, the author argues that anti-Muslim attitude in Burma, which is largely nurtured by the Buddhist monks also the state polices, has been used as an instrument in the exclusionary process of Rohingya.

3.4 Theorising One-Sided Violence

Anderton and Brauer (2016: 4) prepared a list of 200 incidents of mass atrocities, occurred all over the world since 1990, where at least one thousand civilians were killed in each of the incident by the governments. The concept one-sided violence is referred to “direct and deliberate killings of civilians” (Eck and Hultman (2007: 233), and this form of violence is often conducted against “defenceless civilian minorities” by powerful actors -- mainly the political authorities. The Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP 2016: DOI) defines one-sided violence as:

“The use of armed force by the government of a state or by a formally organised group against civilians which results in at least 25 deaths in a year.”

According to Eck and Hultman (2007: 235), intentional killings mean “any action that is taken to deliberately kill civilians” while direct killings refer to “deaths caused directly by an actor such as by bombing or shooting.” The UN also various rights bodies have accused the members of Burmese security forces of committing crimes including killing, rape, and mass arson against the civilian Rohingya. The UN Independent Fact-Finding Mission report (2018: 346) claims that Burmese military’s operations was against the civilian Rohingya population. The UN report reads:

“Everyone and everything was a target. Large-scale massacres were carried out. Men, women and children were killed and subjected to unimaginable abuse. Entire villages were wiped off the map.” (See Appendix 3)

Historically, it is not evident, at least until 2016, that Rohingya population have retaliated, forming an organised force, against the professional Burmese soldiers. In August 2017, the members of Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA), reportedly an armed Rohingya insurgency, killed 12 Burmese security personnel with knives and home-made bombs (BBC 2017: DOI) what the Burmese government used as an excuse to start the military operations against Rohingya civilians. The UN Fact-Finding Mission report (2018: 18) says that ARSA is a “poorly armed and poorly trained” team that largely depends on “untrained villagers” to conduct attacks on Burmese soldiers with sticks and knives”. However, the Rohingya refugees during interview sessions with researcher, said they do not have any connection with ARSA. “We are innocent people. We are neither involved in ARSA activities nor support their action,” said a refugee Asaduzzaman¹². Another refugee Zahirul Alam¹³, said: “We pay the price of ARSA attack on Burmese police. We are not with ARSA. We want peace.” Whilst the Burmese government, according to BBC (2017: DOI), calls ARSA a terrorist group, a spokesperson of this group told journalist Winchester (Asia Times 2017: DOI) that they do not have any link with “transnational jihadist terror groups”, rather they fight to restore the rights of Rohingya people. The spokesperson also claims that ARSA started its operation in Rakhine in 2013 in response to the brutal attacks on Rohingya by the security forces also a section of Buddhists in 2012 (Asia Times 2017: DOI) -- a statement that largely supports the concept that grievance (originates from sense of injustice) creates conflict (Mursheed 2002: 387).

¹² Appendix 2

¹³ Appendix 2

3.5 Investments in Rakhine: A Rational Choice?

Another discourse has recently appeared into the terrain of Rohingya crisis, which is -- foreign investments into the mega economic projects in Rakhine – a state that carries “enormous economic potential” as it has mineral resources -- oil, natural gas, maritime resources (Htwe 2017: DOI), “copper mineralization” and glod (Win 1998: 110-113). One of the key campaigners of this discourse is noted Dutch-American sociologist Saskia Sassen. According to her, displacement of Rohingya people in 2017 is connected with the acquisition of 3,100,000 acres lands from “Rohingya’s area” in Rakhine for Burma’s “economic development” scheme (Sassen 2017b: DOI). These lands, as argued by Sassen (2017b: DOI), will be handed over to Chinese for the construction of a deep-sea port at Kyaukpyu in Rakhine, which estimated cost is \$7.3, and an industrial park in the state, which estimated cost is \$3.2 billion, -- two projects that would contribute to China’s target of “internationalizing its economy” (Sassen 2017b: DOI). Besides, a Chinese consortium won a bid to build a deep-sea port and a special economic zone in Rakhine (Fair 2018: 74.) Apart from China, India has a \$484-million project in Rakhine that connects Sittwe port in Rakhine and Mizoram state in India “through multimodal means” (Chaudhury 2017: DOI).

In Burma, as Sassen (2017a: DOI) argues, Rohingya people have been driven away from Rakhine to protect “military-economic interests,” related to acquisition of land and mega development projects. This argument, which is relatively new also contested, categorically supports the concept of greed and grievance, promoted mainly by Paul Collier and associates (Murshed and Tadjoeddin 2009: 89), that describes conditions where a conflict may break out. While greed explains “elite competition” for controlling “natural resources and capture rents” (Murshed 2002: 387), the grievance explains a feeling that originates from injustice. The presence of elements of either greed or grievance or both may fuel a conflict. As Ostby (2008: 143) assesses that “both economic and ethnic polarization” may trigger conflict. In the domain of rational choice approach, conflict is considered as choice, meaning “non-cooperative” action, and this non-cooperation may be generated from various socioeconomic factors including constraints and mistrust (Murshed and Tadjoeddin 2009: 88). China’s unequivocal support to Burma in UN, as argued by Fair (2018: 72), is driven from economic interest as the Asian powerhouse is going to build several mega projects in Rakhine which are also part of China’s Belt and Road Initiative - BRI (Fair 2018: 72). If this discourse is taken into consideration, the escalating aggression against Rohingya in Rakhine should be analysed under the shadows of post-cold era’s popular thesis that argues that development and security are interdependent (Duffield 2005: 142). In present global context, development is not seen as something exclusively essential in one country rather it is the part of “global stability” (Stiglitz as cited in Duffield 2005: 142). While describing the notion of global development policy, Duffield (2005: 141) argues that internal conflict within a country is treated as an enemy of sustainable development. It also works as a nexus what Duffield (2005: 153) explains this way: “...you cannot have self-reliance without the absence of internal conflict, and you cannot be free of internal conflict without self-reliance”. Here, the sustainable development thesis advocates the idea of ‘containment’ (of internal conflict) in order to securitize economic development (self-reliance) thus ‘global stability’ (Duffield 2005: 152). Taking all possibilities into account, the researcher at this point argues that the alledged connections between the displacement of Rohingya and the investment in Rakhine should be researched deeply.

3.6 Conclusion: Theorising from a Refugee-Centred Perspective?

The UNHCR defines refugee as: “Someone who has been forced to flee his or her country because of persecution, war or violence. A refugee has a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, political opinion or membership in a particular social group” (UNHCR n.d.). In line with this definition, it is a fact that Rohingya people are refugees in classic sense as they had to flee their neighbourhoods in the face of a brutal military atrocity, leaving their belongings also resources behind.

This chapter concludes saying that Rohingya population have been the victim of both structural and direct violence, executed by the state as an actor. Besides, their position in a border state in Burma that has economic potentials, and religious belief and ethnic identity, perhaps, have appeared as a curse to them. It seems they are wrong people in wrong place that has made them a prey of one-sided violence.

Chapter 4 Rohingya in Bangladesh: Camp Life

4.1 Introduction

This chapter first describes the landscape and livelihoods of Teknaf sub-district where the refugee camps are located and then details the characteristics of the respondents, reasons behind their departure from Burma, and their experiences of flight, the problems they are facing now and how are they seeking to overcome these problems, especially in relation to livelihoods, but also around services, housing, sanitation, education, healthcare and family relationships. This chapter is focused almost entirely on the views and perceptions of Rohingya refugees themselves, and how they view their own past and present.

4.2 Livelihoods and Landscape in Teknaf Sub-district

Teknaf is the southernmost sub-district in Bangladesh, bordering Burma, where the Rohingya refugee camps are located. The Naaf River has created partition between Bangladesh and Burma. After crossing Naaf river, Rohingya refugees reached Teknaf in 2017. A Water and Sanitation Program report (2012:47) describes Teknaf as one of the “extremely” hard-to-reach areas to provide facilities to the receivers. An Acaps-NPM report (2018: 1) says that Teknaf is one of the ‘socially deprived’ sub-districts in Bangladesh where people experience poor living condition due to ‘insufficient infrastructure’. Only one third of Teknaf’s total population afford drinking water source in their households (Acaps-NPM 2018:1). Teknaf is mainly a rural track with Bay of Bengal at the extreme south. Since this region is close to the sea, there is a shortage of cultivatable land as lowlands get flooded by saline water, coming from sea. A significant portion of this region is forested hills. Both the locals and Rohingya refugees, who are stranded in Teknaf since 1992, depend largely on forest to collect firewood and other materials. With the latest flight of refugees counted, Rohingya now constitute one third of total population in Teknaf (acaps-NPM: 1)

The wildlife sanctuary in Teknaf is close to refugee camps, and it is affected in many ways by the activities of refugees (Khan et al. 2012: 13). The locals, according to Hassan et. al (2018: 16), are worried as the price of essentials also fare of public transportation has increased following the arrival of refugees in 2017. A long-term presence of refugees may hamper the tourism industry in coastal area also may cause “incidence and transmission of infectious diseases” in the region. The new influx of refugees has cleared about 4,000 acres of forested hills in Teknaf to make space to build temporary shelters (Mahmud 2018: 2).

The locals as well as the Rohingya refugees, who came to Bangladesh at different times following persecution in Burma, work as day-labourers in the fishing industry to manage livelihoods. Some also work in agricultural sector and in salt production fields (Humanitarian Response 2017: 10).

4.3 Description of the Camps

Until 2017 the area of the new camps was mostly dense hilly jungle. Thousands of tents have been built clearing forest to accommodate the new plight of refugees. The roads amongst the shelters are muddy. However, some roads have been built to connect the main camps, also for the transportation of relief items in lorries. There are some wet lowlands in between the hills where bamboo-made bridges have been built to enable refugees to cross on foot. A few locals visit the area to do business, but most of those in the camp area are refugees. According to many including UNHCR (2018c: DOI) a good number of refugees are at risk of landslide during monsoon as their shelters are built on the slopes of hills. Besides, Teknaf

region is one of the cyclone-prone areas in Bangladesh as storms created in Bay of Bengal often hit Teknaf region.

Although only 27% of the household respondents claim that local Bangladeshis are hostile towards them, interviews with local Bangladeshi reveal something opposite. In an informal conversation at a tea stall in Balukhali camp, Abdul Azim¹⁴, a local contractor, says that locals, especially people from the nearby villages, are angry on the refugees due to some reasons. According to him, the locals did not like destruction of forestland to build shelters for the refugees. He says:

“Many local people’s livelihoods were depended on forest. Due to destruction of forest to accommodate refugees, these people had to choose alternative work. Therefore, they are angry on the refugees.”

Azim says that there is a minimum chance that these trees will grow again after Rohingya’s departure as refugees have uprooted the roots of trees to use those as firewood. The teachers of local high-schools and colleges are disappointed too as many students obtained poor results in last annual exams due to their part-time jobs with NGOs in the camps.

Of the survey respondents, who think that local Bangladeshis are hostile towards them, some claim that they need to share a portion of their relief items with locals when they go to forest to collect firewood. Noor Mohammad¹⁵, a 14-year-old Rohingya, who lost his father in last violence, says that he faces misconducts from the locals when he goes to nearby forests to collect firewood. He says: “I share a portion of my relief items -- lentil, rice or oil witht he locals to be allowed to gather firewood from the forests.”

After talking to the refugees, the researcher undersood that there was a sense of gratefulness in the minds of refugees towards the people of Bangladesh which hold them back to comment on the hostility of locals. The following statement given by Amir Hamza¹⁶, an elderly refugee, says it all: “They (Bangladeshis people) have given us shelter...we are living on their lands. It is not a problem if they become a bit harsh towards us. We should not feel sad for that.”

4.4 A piece of Burma in Bangladesh

The daily activities of the Rohingya refugees are circled in and around the camp area. They are now living inside the geographical territory of Bangladesh. However, on first visit to the refugee camps, one may get a bit confused to understand whether s/he is inside Bangladesh’s territory or in Burma, watching all the banners and posters written in Burmese letters, listening to Burmese music playing in a roadside barbershop, also looking at the products available in a roadside shop. There are a variety of Burmese products including biscuits, tobacco, toys, sweetmeats, bakery products are displayed in the roadside shops in the cams -- run by the refugees.

As the research was walking along the Balukhali camp one afternoon, something really interesting drew his attention. The researcher saw that a group of young refugee boys playing volleyball in a muddy filed, using their legs and heads not hands. On curiosity, the researcher talked to a refugee who was standing beside the volleyball court. “This is how we play it” said Osman Ali. Alongside thousands, the Burmese military has driven these young boys away from their villages. The refugees could not bring their belongings with them, but they have brought their practices, habits, and beliefs. Observing the daily activities and practices

¹⁴ Appendix 2

¹⁵ Appendix 2

¹⁶ Appendix 2

of the refugees in the camp area, it seemed to the researcher he was standing on a piece of Burma inside Bangladesh's territory.

4.5 Characteristics of Respondents

Of the total survey respondents, 95% was male and 5% was female. The reason behind the participation of less number of female was explained in Chapter 2.




Chart 1: Visual representation of 'Age Range of Respondents'.

Of the participants, the highest portion was relatively young -- between age range 17-30 while the lowest portion was between the age range 71-80. It shows there is a verity in terms of age amongst the household heads in Rohingya community. The average age of survey respondents was 40. While cent percent respondents were Muslim, 95% of them were married and 5% were widows or widowers (see appendix 7).





Chart 2: Visual representation of 'Language Skills' of respondents.

Rohingya community speak Rohingya dialect that largely matches with the local dialect of Bangladesh's Chittagong region. Only 34.12% of the survey respondents can speak Burmese -- the official language of Burma. Apart from this, some 3.53% refugees can speak Bangla -- the official language of Bangladesh. This less number of Burmese speakers amongst the refugees indicates that there was minimum effort from the Burmese authority to teach Rohingya minority the official language -- an effort that can be considered as part Burma's policy of otherizing Rohingya from the mainstream society. Ignoring language a 'meaningful'

social interaction is not possible (Camara and Syakango 2011: 15). Of the household interviewees, 86% are illiterate while 14% can read and write either in Arabic or Burmese, or both. None of the survey respondents know English (see appendix 7).



Graph 1: Visual representation of 'Flow of Rohingya refugees to Bangladesh'.

As the above graph shows that almost 75% of the total respondents reached Bangladesh in between August and September 2017 while 58.82% arrived in September alone. This trend indicates the gravity of the escalating violence occurred in Rakhine in that particular period. According to UNHCR, 75% of the total refugees, who left Rakhine during and after the 2017 violence, reached Bangladesh in September 2017 (UNHCR 2018a: DOI). The flows of Rohingya refugees to Bangladesh continues even in May 2018, ten months from the beginning of military operations (UNHCR 2018a: DOI). The average size of households, as the survey data reveals, is 5.68 while average number of children per household is 3.19. However, 22 households, which is 25.88% of total, have children equal or more than five. This shows that the tendency of having more than two children is high amongst the Rohingya community (see appendix 7).

Some 55.38% households, who participated in survey, say that they send their boys, aged between 5-15, to schools or madrasas (institutes which offer religious education), or both in the camps. Some 16.92% households say that their children do not go to school while 27.69% households state that some of their children go to schools or madrasas in the camps. There is a tendency of not sending the girls, aged above eight or nine, to schools or madrasas. As Zafar Ahmed¹⁷, a father of two girls and one boy, who did not send his daughters to schools when they turned eight, says: "Boys need education more than girls. If a girl can write her name that is enough for her. She will go to her husband's place after marriage and will work there in the house."

A field-level female staff¹⁸ of a Danish-based NGO, who works in Balukhali camp, says the parents of Rohingya families did not encourage their girls to go to schools in Rakhine on various grounds. The most common one was that parents were concern about the safety of their daughters. Secondly, the Rohingya families, due to their religious beliefs, think that the

¹⁷ Appendix 2

¹⁸ Preferred anonymity

girls should not go outside their homes when they are around the age of their first menstruation. Mahbubul Islam¹⁹, a programme officer of an NGO that provides education to Rohingya children, says that the Rohingya children are interested to learn new things. Mahbubul says they offer English, Burmese, mathematics also some life skill techniques including the sense of hygiene to the children. This school does not give lessons on Bangla (official language of Bangladesh) as Rohingya children are not registered as refugees. According to him, the school offers snacks to students who are aged between 4-14. The students spend 2-3 hours at the school. Some children in the camps are struggling with trauma. As Mahbub says:

“Parents or siblings of some children were killed before their eyes. If we ask them to narrate those incidents, they become traumatized and start crying.”

Like Mahbub, other NGO officials who were interviewed by the researcher, think that children who lost their parents need special care in camp setting that is full of difficulties. A Save the Children research (2018: DOI) says that one in two refugee children who left Rakhine during the 2017 violence lost their parents. An estimated 6,000 unaccompanied Rohingya children are at risk of “exploitation and abuse” in the refugee camps in Cox’s Bazar (Save the Children 2018: DOI). In the camps, the teenagers usually spend time without doing anything as there is a shortage of schools for the teenagers also there is no work available for this group.

Of the total survey respondents, farming was the profession back home to 55% while other major professions of the respondents were fishing, day-labouring, and small trading (see appendix 7). The survey data describes that respondents were not rich in Rakhine, but economically active, meaning the men used work which generated money for their families.

4.6 ‘Only Thing that We Managed to Bring with was Life’

As shown in the context of this study (Chapter 1), the degree and extent of violence experienced by Rohingya in Burma prior to their flight in 2017, was considerable. Some even consider this a case of genocide (Ibrahim 2017: 316). While replying to the query of reason behind their departure from Burma, 67% survey respondents say that they were directly affected by the violence while 33% say they fled in fear of being attacked by the Burmese military. Those who were affected directly say either members of their families were killed, injured in the violence or their houses were burnt down in the attack. Some claim that military personnel threw rocket launchers at their houses to burn those completely down. Romiz Uddin²⁰, a refugee who was displaced from his house in Rakhine’s Maungdaw township said:

“I was working in the field that day when my wife rushed to me and said that people from a neighbouring village were fleeing towards Bangladesh border. She was scared. On my way to home from the field, I asked the fleeing people about the reason behind their movement. They told me that military had been killing people in their village also burning the houses. After that I did not give a second thought but leaving my house with my children and wife for Bangladesh. We had to leave our house quickly as we heard that military had been approaching towards our village which was not far from the affected village. Therefore, we could not bring anything but some clothes and dry foods. I was afraid of being attacked

¹⁹ Appendix 2

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by the military personnel. Later, I heard from my neighbours who joined us here in the camps a few days later that my house was burnt by the military.”

Of the households that participated in the survey, 32% lost family members in the violence. Of the deceased, 88.89% used to contribute financially in the households back home. Such loss of human labour as well as human capital has affected the respective household, and its impact on the respective households will continue in the future, even after their return to Burma. Loss of human lives has affected the families at least in three ways. One is financially while others are socially, and psychologically. The children, who lost their one or both parents, will have to grow up without parental care -- type of a loss that cannot be met. Ayesha Begum²¹, 70, who has partially lost her hearing capacity due to old age complications, is now surviving in Kutupalong camp with her seven-year-old grandson. She has lost her daughter, son-in-law, and a grandchild in 2017 military atrocity. Her grandson also got lost on their way to Bangladesh, but she managed to discover him in the camp with the help of others who accompanied her here to the camp from Burma. She says that she used live with her daughter’s family who had a nice house back in Rakhine. “My only job was to play with the younger grandchild. Now, I pass nights sleepless here in the camp. All the memories of the military torture haunt me every minute”, she states. With limited eyesight and weak hearing, she cannot collect aid materials on her own, instead she depends on others to do so. She even cannot take care of her grandson who spends time roaming around here and there inside the camp. “What will I and my grandson do if they send us back to Burma? Here we are surviving on relief. Who will feed us if we go back to Burma now?” -- she replied as the researcher asked whether she wants to go back or not. At one point of the conversation, Ayesha Begum recalls the memories of leading a peaceful life back in Rakhine when Aung San, the father of Burma’s present leader Aung San Suu Kyi, had been ruling the country.




Chart 3: Visual Representation of ‘Things the Households Left Behind’.

“*Shudhu Porannai Bhachai Aichchi a?*” (only thing we managed to bring with was life). This is what Mostafa Khatun²², 40, a female Rohingya refugee, said in Kutupalong camp while

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replying to the query of what they could manage to carry along with them on their way to Bangladesh. Like her, most of the refugees crossed border empty handed. As UNHCR mentions: "They (Rohingya refugees) arrived exhausted, hungry and sick...they have nothing and need everything." As Column Chart 2 shows, in order to protect life from the violence, the Rohingya population had to leave their villages as quickly as possible, and they had to leave behind things including houses, farmland, cattle, chickens and ducks, stored crops, crops in land, cash, furniture and documents. Of the survey respondents, 74.12% had farmland to cultivate back in Rakhine while cent percent had own houses.

Some 95.29% household heads say that they had stored rice at their places while 63.53% respondents claim there was crops in the field as they left Burma. These figures point us towards the fact that they were not ready to reach Bangladesh, leaving their belongings unattended. These responses also narrate that a significant number of Rohingya were from the background of peasants. Of the survey respondents, 84.71% had cattle in households back home while 98.82% had chickens and ducks. Rohingya peasants used to use cattle to prepare farmland to grow crops while chickens and ducks used to produce eggs and meats for the families, meeting their demand for protein. Therefore, the cattle, chickens, and ducks are considered as the important elements for the household economy in Rohingya society. As many as 78.82% Rohingya refugees could not even bring important documents including legal stamps of their lands and identity cards with them. The documents are so crucial for the Rohingya refugees as Burma, after cancelling the citizenship right of Rohingya in 1982, issued identity cards to this group of people. Meanwhile, the Burma, on the question of the repatriation of the refugees, has said that they would take back the refugees who have proper documents. Therefore, the fact of their respectful return to Burma also depends on the availability of their identity cards issued by the Burmese authorities. Many Rohingya members had been preserving the official papers of their lands for years. As they could not bring the official papers of their lands with them to Bangladesh, it would be difficult for them to claim their lands following their possible return to Burma.

4.7 Problems in the Camp

As many as 61.18% household respondents say that there are some problems in their shelters. The problems include -- rain water pour off the roof, insufficient space and lack of privacy. Some 76.92% household heads complain that mud-made-floors get wet as the rain water enters through the roof while 23.08% respondents say that space in their shelters is not sufficient to accommodate all the household members at a time. Mahmud Macky, an NGO worker involved in the non-food item distribution programme, says that they are aware of the fact that rain water enters into some shelters. According to this survey, the average size of a refugee shelters is 190.97 square feet while the space available per head is 5.89 square feet which is lower than the UNHCR set emergency shelter standard for living space of 3.5 square metre (37.67sq. ft) per person in warm climates, excluding kitchen space (UNHCR Emergency Handbook 2015: 3). Some 75% Rohingya refugees, as estimated by the UNHCR, share their shelters among themselves while 93% live below the UNHCR emergency standard (UNHCR 2018: DOI). Shelters are mostly made of tarpaulin, polythene, and bamboo. However, there are some shelters which roofs are made of sun-grass or tin. Of the participating households, the roofs of 83.53% was built with tarpaulin while 12.94% and 3.53% shelters were made of sungrass and tin respectively. In case of wall, polythene was used in 85.88% households while bamboo-made fence was used in 14.12% shelters. Bamboos were used in all shelters as the pillars.

Of the total surveyed households, 70.59% do not have separate kitchen. They cook inside their shelters. The survey results show that cent percent refugees have access to drinking

water also water for bathing and cooking. All refugees also receive toilet facility, healthcare service and medication. However, there is no electricity to almost half of the households while solar-energy-run lights are available to 49.41% households. Besides, there is no arrangement for the refugees to dump garbage. Therefore, they dump household trashes at different places indiscriminately close to their shelters, causing harm to environment also posing threats to health hazards.




Chart 4: Visual representation of 'Difficulties in Accessing Drinking Water'

It is not difficult, as the chart above shows, to access drinking water in the camps for almost 55% households. However, around 14% households feel that accessing drinking water is extremely difficult for them while almost 32% find it difficult. The respondents identified two reasons behind this difficulty level. Almost 77% household-respondents say that water sources (hand-pump-well or tap) are located a bit far from their shelters and it is difficult to climb up hills to carry water to their shelters from the sources. Some 23% of the respondents say that there is a pressure on water sources as too many households collect water from the same sources, and they need to wait in the que for long to collect water.




Chart 5: Visual representation of 'Difficulties in Accessing Healthcare Facilities'

In case of accessing healthcare facilities, heads of the 62.35% households say, as the chart above demonstrates, that it is not difficult for them to receive the service. However, 32.94% find it difficult while 2.35% see it extremely difficult. The reasons behind these difficulties, as mentioned by the respondents, are -- it consumes time to receive the service,

shortage of medication, and healthcare centres are far from shelters for some refugees. For details of the problems households faced in accessing toilet facilities, see Appendix 7.

4.8 Survival Strategies

The refugee camps are extremely densely populated with minimum infrastructures for communication (see appendix 4). However, this group of vulnerable people are trying to survive – utilising the minimum resources and opportunities available there. As the researcher walked through the camps, he noticed that vegetables were being grown on the roofs of the shelters also in the minimum space available between the shelters. It suggests that Rohingya population has a strong connection with the nature – mostly with soil (for detail go to appendix 5).

At least one member of 73% households which participated in the survey, fell sick in last six months (between February-July 2018) of the survey. In order to recover, patients from 66.13% households consulted doctors at healthcare centres inside the camps while patients from 3.23% households visited hospitals outside the camps as they could not recover in the treatments offered by the healthcare centres inside the camps. Besides, patients from 30.65% households purchased medication from the drug stores available in and outside the camps.




Chart 6: Visual representation of 'Number of Times Fish/Meat Taken in Month'

All the households in the refugee camps, as the survey reveals, receive rice, lentil, and oil as relief items on regular basis while some households receive salt and potato occasionally. In camps, the livelihoods of the Rohingya refugees is depended on the humanitarian assistances, provided by INGOs and NGOs. The survey also reveals, as the chart above shows, that members of almost 53% households eat either meat or fish at least five to seven times in a month while around 19% take it eight to 10 days and around 18% have it more than 15 times in a month. Ayaz Mia, a household head in the Kutupalong camp, says that usually they eat rice and lentil. However, he sells a portion of lentil, rice or oil that he receives as relief items when he wants to eat fish, meat or vegetables. However, for Zamir Ali²³, a 45-year-old refugee in the Balukhali camp, it is not possible to sell a share of food that he receives as relief due to the size of his household. He says:

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“There are nine persons in my family, and the amount of food we receive is not enough. So, I can't sell food to buy fish, meat or vegetable. We only eat fish or meat when I can earn some money working for an NGO in the camp.”

Only 13% of the households that joined the survey received cash support at least once since they arrived in Bangladesh. Almost 51% households borrowed money from neighbours or relatives to bear family expenses. Of them, as the chart below describes, the heads of 56% households could not return the loan while 32% managed to return it partially and 12% have returned it successfully.




Chart 7: Visual representation of ‘Trend of Returning Loan’

There is hardly any option available for work for the refugees in and around the camp settings. Besides, the Rohingya are not legally allowed to work in Bangladesh as they are not recognised as refugees by the country. The only opportunity for work that pays off is working for an NGO as a day-labour. However, this form of work comes occasionally also it is very competitive, considering the ratio of work and number of Rohingya workforce. Therefore, as the chart below shows, only 7% heads of households, who participated in the survey, has work in the camps that pays off on a regular basis while 49% use to work occasionally, and 44% never work in Bangladesh since they arrived.




Chart 8: Visual representation of ‘Types of work done by household heads in Bangladesh’

Of the 56% household heads, who have work or had worked that pay or paid off, some 81.25% have worked occasionally for NGOs on daily basis inside the camps while 10.42% have job in the NGOs on monthly contact, and 8.33% run small businesses in the camps. Of the survey respondents, who have worked for the NGOs or run own businesses, 71% earned \$3-4 per day while 29% earned \$1-2 per day. It should be mentioned that refugees cannot work for the NGOs whenever they want. Rather, it depends on other factors including the level of contact that they nurture with Majhis (see chapter 1). According to the household heads who took part in the survey, they worked for the NGOs for around 10-15 days in total since they started lives in the camps. It suggests that even the refugees who work very occasionally in the camp earn, on an average, less than \$1.90 a day, thus belong to the world's 736 million community who are living in extreme poverty (World Bank 2015: DOI).

The refugees, both those who could and could not find work, say that NGOs hire refugees to do a wide range of work including to make shelters, build roads, toilets, and other infrastructures inside the camp area. In order to hire labour from the refugees, the NGO officials approach the Majhis (explained in Chapter 1) who basically manage labourers from his respective blocks for the NGOs. Sometimes, a Majhi distributes work amongst the refugees in rotation, giving each household a chance to earn some income.




Chart 9: Visual representation of 'Reason behind not working in Bangladesh'

As many as 66.67% of the total survey respondents, who have not worked so far in Bangladesh, say that work is not available in the camps and they are afraid of going to the nearby villages looking for job. Of this group, almost 20% are physically unfit to do hard work. Sohrab Hossain²⁴, a refugee in the Balukhali camp who has worked for around 14 days in several NGO projects, says that there is a competition amongst refugees to find a place in the list to work for NGOs. "I got the opportunity to work as I have a good relationship with my Majhi also as I agreed to share a portion of my daily wage with him."

Asked whether the food items that they receive as relief can meet the household demand for food, the heads of 92% of households replies, to some extent, it does. However, only 8% of survey respondents stated that the food provided met the household demand fully. It might be asked, who this 8% might be? Although the survey cannot help to identify what makes them 'different', it can be suggested that they may include those who mostly benefit from work opportunities in the camps, or who run small shops and manage through these means or others, such as savings, to bring home enough money to supplement what is provided by the camp authorities as rations.




Chart 10: Visual representation of “Things households need beside present relief”

As the chart above shows, the highest number of households -- almost 39% of the total - need cash and firewood. Javed Hossain, a 49-year-old refugee in Kutupalong camp, says: “I do not have a single penny to spend. I have three small children. Sometimes, they ask for money to buy toys or something else from a nearby shop. But, I cannot give them a single penny.” There is considerable dissatisfaction amongst most household heads that they do not have ways of earning cash. Hazrat Ali²⁵, a 63-year-old refugee in Kutupalong camp, says:

“We used to eat good foods on every Friday back in Burma. Here, we cannot think of having a good meal. I had a respectful life back home. There was no crisis in my family. Here, we are depended on alms which is not respectful.”

There is also a high demand for firewood in the camp. The heads of the households say that the amount of firewood they receive as relief finishes well before the next distribution of firewood is due, fortnightly. Therefore, they go to the nearby forest to collect firewood and dig up roots of trees. Mahmud Makkie²⁶, an NGO worker involved in the non-food item distribution scheme, says that NGOs working in the camp, are also increasing the volume of gas containers distributed amongst the refugees, given that the firewood supplies are inadequate and that refugees do not receive enough wood to cook for a fortnight. As Makkie explains: “We are aware of the fact that they [refugees] go to the forests to collect firewood, posing threat to the ecological balance of the reserve forest.”

4.9 Conclusion

This chapter has presented the way refugees are surviving in the camp settings in terms of problems they are facing also the limited opportunities available there for them to continue their refugee journey in Bangladesh. It also examines that there is hardly any hope for the refugees to find regular work outside the camp settings, considering the relatively shabby socioeconomic conditions in Teknaf region. The chapter concludes that Rohingya refugees are seriously hurt by the organised violence that has made them economically vulnerable as

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their livelihoods is entirely depended on rations. Therefore, in order to improve their living condition, at least to some extent, the refugees need work that pays off.

Chapter 5 Rohingya in the Camp: Looking Forward?

5.1 Introduction

It has been 12 months since an accord was signed between the governments of Bangladesh and Burma in November 2017 (Lee and Aung 2017: DOI) to start the repatriation process of Rohingya refugees. However, as of today, there is no clear sign of beginning of repatriation process. In January 2018, both governments announced that they had decided to finish the repatriation process within next two years (Lee and Paul 2018: DOI). Meanwhile, the rights bodies, humanitarian agencies and UN have expressed concern over the peaceful repatriation of Rohingya. The latest statement released by UN High Commissioner for Refugees on 11 November 2018 says that UNHCR does not ‘believe’ that present situation in Rakhine is “conducive to the voluntary, safe, dignified, and sustainable return of refugees” (Reliefweb 2018: DOI). Taking this fact into consideration, this chapter presents the subjective views of Rohingya refugees about their possible return to Burma -- how they approach it also what they demand before their repatriation. It also discusses the role of geopolitical political actors in this regard.

5.2 Return: Not in Their Hands

UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres has recently said: “The worst would be to move these people (Rohingya) from camps in Bangladesh to camps in Myanmar Burma” (Safi 2018: DOI). An AI report (2018: 4) claims that Burmese authorities, at the beginning of 2018, started building new infrastructures including basecamps for the security forces in and around the burnt Rohingya villages, narrowing down the possibility of Rohingya people’s return to their original lands. AI report (2018: 4) also fears that ruins of the burnt Rohingya villages was cleared as an attempt to “destroying evidence of military crimes” that were committed against Rohingya. Therefore, it is apparent that return of refugees in short-term is unrealistic.

Besides, the Rohingya refugees too have expressed their unwillingness to go back to Rakhine until their “safety is guaranteed” and “rights are recognised” (Gluck 2018: DOI). While conducting interviews with the refugees, the author noticed a sense of anger among the respondents to the question of their return to Burma. This time they want a permanent solution to this longstanding crisis that has made them stateless also refugees. As a 19-year-old refugee Mohammad Ayaz²⁷ was saying:

“Our rights are denied there (Burma). We even need to take permission from them (Burmese authority) to cultivate crops in our lands. Our rights need to be specified and recognized before our flight from here to Burma. Besides, we want justice. Our people have been killed and our women have been raped. Our resources have been looted and our houses have been burnt. We want compensation for our losses. I want to go back to my original place, but this time it needs to be resolved permanently. As I grew up, I understood gradually that I don’t have a state, a nationality.

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That's mean I am stateless which was such a terrible feeling to live with. I will not move from here to Burma until our demands are met.”

Khin Zaw Win, a former Myanmar political prisoner and the director of Yangon-based capacity-building institution -- Tampadipa Institute, in a dialogue²⁸ in The Hague, in March 2018, says that Burmese government is “inactive” and “not interested” to resolve crisis in Rakhine, especially to acknowledge the rights of the Rohingya. He argues that Rohingya population has been “dehumanized” through government-run propaganda in Myanmar.




Chart 11: Visual representation of ‘Refugee opinion about return to Burma’

While asked, almost 93% of the survey respondents state that they are not sure whether they would be able to go back to Burma where they have lived and farmed for decades. Of the total survey sample, 44.71% think they would not be able to go back to Burma while 48.24%, as the above chart shows, state they maybe go back to Burma. However, only 7.06% survey respondents think that they would be able to go back to Burma. Obaidullah²⁹, 27, a refugee in the Kutupalong camp who lost his elder brother in 2017 violence, says:

“I will go anywhere in the world but Burma. They (Burmese military) will kill us. They (Burmese military) do not treat us as human. They have burned down our houses so that we never go back.”

The statements like the one above influenced the author to assess the effect of violence on Rohingya refugees, especially in case of making decision regarding their return to Burma. The following correlation tables shows that there is connection between the violence that the refugees have experienced last year and their present opinion regarding going back to Burma.

	Nt_Daff	Opore
Nt_Daff	1.0000	
Opore	0.1519	1.0000

Table 1: Visual representation of a correlation

28 Author of this paper joined the event.

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As Table 1 shows, refugee households not directly affected by violence are more willing to go back to Burma, since they managed to carry more belongings with them to Bangladesh in comparison with those more directly affected by violence, who brought only a minimum of belongings with them. In Table 1, 'Nt_Daff' (not directly affected) refers to those who neither lost family members in violence nor witnessed their houses in flames. This group left their homes in fear of being affected by violence. The table shows a positive correlation between 'NT-daff' and 'Opore' (Opinion about return). The researcher assumes those not directly affected by violence may need less effort to restart their lives after their possible return to Burma, compared with those directly affected by violence, who lost their homes, resources and family members. The latter are arguably more traumatised than the former, who fled in fear of being attacked.

		FL_Beh~d	Opore
FL_Behind	1.0000		
	0.1906	1.0000	

Table 2: Visual representation of a correlation

The correlation Table 1 is positive but low. This implies that other factors may affect the decision regarding return. The author then explored another variable, 'farmland', to see if this would affect the opinion of refugees regarding return. As seen in Table 2, here too there is a small positive correlation. This means refugees who left behind farmlands (land that produced crops and supported livestock) are more inclined to return to their original home areas, than those who did not have farmlands in Rakhine. It is assumed, at least considering that 55% of the survey respondents are peasants (see Chapter 4), that crops produced in farmlands used to contribute significantly to Rohingya refugees' livelihoods back home, typically of rural people in the global South. Farmland is also considered a livelihood asset for most rural households (Rigg 2006: 184).

When comparing these two correlation tables, we see that farmland has a much bigger effect on opinion formulation of refugees regarding their return to Burma than violence. However, the researcher argues, in line with others including Hammond (2018: DOI) and Riley et al (2017: 304), that many Rohingya refugees in camps are suffering from posttraumatic stress disorder due to the fear and violence they experienced back home. This included reports of killings, house burnings and sexual violence. According to Riley et al (2017: 4) Rohingya refugees are also suffering psychologically due to the constraints of camp life, which include "problem with food, lack of freedom of movement" (Hammond 2018: DOI). All these constraints further push the refugees into "depression, anxiety, and hopelessness." (Hammond 2018: DOI). Therefore, the researcher argues that due to experiences of brutal violence, many of the refugees cannot see a future for themselves from their present position. Here, the correlation tables confirm part of the main hypothesis of this study, suggesting that violence and fear can be important factors shaping the subjective views of Rohingya refugees. In particular, experiencing violence can preventing them envisioning their future. Taking this reality into consideration, the following section illustrates how Rohingya refugees perceive time in relation to their future, and possible (forced) return to Burma.

5.3 Time Stands Still for Rohingya

A complete blindness was noticed among a significant share of the total survey respondents – 38% – who, when asked for their views regarding when it might be necessary for their return to Burma, replied: 'No idea' or 'I do not know'. These answers impelled the researcher to analyse this issue of lack of capacity to predict a time when things might 'return to normal'.

According to Cwerner (2001: 7), as migrants move, so does time. Cwerner's statement indicates that Rohingya refugees may still be living in the memories of violence that has made time stand still for many of them in a foreign land. The movement of refugees is limited in and around the camp areas, and they pass most of the day waiting, as they have no options for work. They enjoy limited rights and survive under resource constraints. According to Kindipan-Dulawan (2016: 30), people in this situation can fall into a "sticky time", of "enforced idleness" (cited in Kindipan-Dulawan 2016: 30). These realities have put the Rohingya into a situation where they have nothing in their hands but time to wait for others' decision about their future right to remain in the camp, or their obligation to return to their homeland. The following account by Nazimullah³⁰ says it all:

"I am worried about the future of my children. I know that a dark future is waiting ahead if we fail to go back to our land. There cannot be a better future in a refugee camp. But, I cannot help myself...everything depends on the government of Burma and Bangladesh also on NGO people. I need to wait."




Chart 12: Visual representation of 'Opinion about time that might be needed to return'

Some 41% of the survey respondents, who think that they would be able to go back to Burma, believe that it would take at least couple of years from the time when the survey was conducted (July-August 2018) to go back to Burma while 21% of this group see say it would take at least five years. In practice, safe and dignified return of the refugees depends on the role of a number of regional and global actors including Burma, Bangladesh, UN, and the two powerhouses in Asia, India and China.

5.4 Livelihood: Struggle Ahead

According to the Integrated Household Living Conditions Survey in Myanmar 2009-2010 (2011: xi), an estimated 44% of the total population in Rakhine live below the poverty line. While asked, cent present survey attendants say that there is no chance of getting their property intact on their possible return. They say their houses and other infrastructures have been

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burnt down or destroyed, and their resources have been looted. Lufar Rahman³¹, 51, a refugee living in Balukhali camp, says: “I had seven cows and 18 goats which I left unattended. They must have taken already by somebody.” Mostafa Khatun³², 40, a female refugee living in Kutupalong camp who lost his son in the violence, says:

“They (military) hurled rocket lancer at our house to burn it. I saw our house burning as I ran to save my life. On our way to Bangladesh, we saw smoke in the air coming from our burnt houses. Nothing is left back home for us.”

Mostafa Khatun’s account raises fear regarding the possibility of maintaining livelihoods on the possible return of the refugees. All the survey respondents say that it would not be possible for them to bear the household cost immediately after their return to Burma. They say that they would need support to rebuild houses to live in, buy cattle to cultivate crops in filed, also restart their businesses. These opinions suggest that violence has made Rohingya refugees economically vulnerable – due to what they are suffering now in camps also will suffer in the future, if they are not given due incentives to restart their lives on their possible return to Burma.

5.5 Uncertain Future in Bangladesh

In Bangladesh, the Rohingya refugees are not officially recognised as ‘refugee’ as the country is not a signatory to the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and to its 1967 Protocol (Phiri 2012: DOI) Instead, the Bangladesh government recognises them as “migrants coming from Burma”³³. Meanwhile, it has been observed by the aid workers that the fabrics of relationship between the local Bangladeshis and refugees are deteriorating day by day. The same group of people who once welcomed the refugees, watching their sufferings in the border, are now annoyed with the presence of refugees. The following account of Abdul Azim³⁴, a local Bangladeshi says it all:

“While the members of BGB were resisting Rohingya people to enter into Bangladesh territory, we stepped in to convince the BGB soldiers to allow them (refugees) to get into Bangladesh territory. We did that as we could not hold ourselves back watching their sufferings. They (refugees) were hungry, wet, exhausted, and injured. Many were screaming for food. Then, we (local residents) cooked food at our houses and feed them on the borders. This is what we did for them. But, what happened next? They arrived in thousands and destroyed our forest, occupied our hills. Now, we are suffering in many ways because of the refugees. The local people do not want them to stay here any longer. Our government should put pressure on Burma to take its people back.”

Azim’s account indicates that the relationship between Bangladeshis and refugees will deteriorate further in the days ahead. Meanwhile, the Bangladesh government in 2018 tried to move 100,000 refugees from Teknaf to a remote island called *Thengar Char*. However, it did not happen due to objections from the aid agencies which found the island “uninhabitable” also vulnerable to flood and cyclone (Ferrie 2018: DOI). Besides, there was no effort

³¹ Appendix 2

³² Appendix 2

³³ NGO workers informed researcher during fieldwork

³⁴ Appendix 2

visible so far from Bangladesh to integrate this huge number of refugees in the mainstream society but to forward diplomatic efforts to ensure the departure of refugees.




Chart 13: Visual representation of ‘Opinion about working in Bangladesh, if offered’

Despite all these uncertainties, 90% of the total survey respondents say that they are ready to work in Bangladesh if they are allowed also offered. “Any work according to my physical strength,” says Samad Ali³⁵. Like Samad, many other heads of the households say they need work that pay off to survive in Bangladesh. Shafayet Hossain³⁶, a 19-year-old refugee who completed 10-grade schooling back in Rakhine says:

“I think supply of relief items will decrease in the future. But, the size of our families will increase. So, we will need work in the future to survive in the camp. We should be allowed to go the cities to find a job as there is no job available in the camp.”

However, while asked about doing alternative work in Bangladesh, 39% of the total survey respondents who have expressed their desire to work, say that they would not be able to do alternative work but what they used to do back in Rakhine. Ashraf Ali³⁷, said: “I do not know anything but farming. If you now ask me to work in a factory, I would not be able to do it.”

³⁵ Appendix 2

³⁶ Appendix 2

³⁷ Appendix 2




Chart 14: Visual representation of ‘Opinion about future in Bangladesh’

The chart above shows that the highest percentage of respondents (27.06% of the total) do not have any idea about their future in Bangladesh if they cannot go back soon. “*Allah jane, aarar hatot kichu na?*” (It depends on God’s will, there is nothing in our hands). This was the account of Mohammad Alom, the head of a refugee household, living in Block 77 in Kutupalong camp. The life of refugees is very much camp centred. They hardly have any agency to decide their future. The refugee children are not taught Bangla (official language of Bangladesh) in the schools run inside the camps for the refugee children. Therefore, they cannot see a better life in Bangladesh if they fail to go back to Burma. However, as the column chart above shows that 21.18% household interviewees think that they will have to live in a bad condition in Bangladesh if stay here for a longer period. As a household head Jalal Hossain³⁸, was saying:

“There is no chance that we will have a better life in Bangladesh. We will have to remain confined in camps and depend on relief to survive the way other Rohingya who could not go back after their displacement in 1991. I was lucky that I could go back at that time. What will do here? We do not have anything here. How long they will feed us?”

5.6 Conclusion

Bangladesh is an over-populated country, with 1265 persons (World Bank n.d.) per square kilometre and 12.9% of these living in extreme poverty (World Bank 2017: DOI). Besides, Bangladesh has faced the challenges of giving shelters to the Rohingya population at least five times in contemporary history. Considering the socioeconomic condition (see Chapter 4) of Cox’s Bazar where the refugee camps are located, we should not expect refugees to have a better life in future if they stay here for a longer period. The matter of social integration of refugees seems unrealistic in the short-term. This chapter therefore concludes that

³⁸ Appendix 2

the refugees' return to Burma does not depend either on the will of refugees themselves or on the Bangladesh government. In a very complicated reality, at this point in time, the survey results and responses of other interviewees suggest that the refugees cannot do much more than wait for others to act in this regard. It is however a matter of some concern that refugees will continue to suffer, as the data suggests, upon their possible return to Burma as well as if they remain. Certainly, the sustainability of their livelihoods, the labour power of households and their capacity for imagining their future have all been seriously affected by the recent history of violence.

Chapter 6 Conclusion

6.1 Introduction

This chapter summarises the study by discussing briefly how the Rohingya refugees are surviving in the refugee camps in Bangladesh. Further, it recapitulates the analysis that has been developed based on the subjective opinions of refugees regarding their present condition also the future. In addition to that this chapter, in short, suggests some initiatives that should be ensured to support the refugees overcoming the present challenges in camp life also to deal with the potential difficulties 'waiting' ahead, either upon their possible return to Burma or long-term stay in Bangladesh. In the end, researcher's future plan in line with the present study will be mentioned.

6.2 Concluding Remarks

This study demonstrates that Rohingya refugees are surviving in a fragile condition, associated with limited supply of resources and opportunities, in the refugee camps in Cox's Bazar, Bangladesh. By interviewing the heads of the refugee households, the researcher has found that the livelihoods of Rohingya refugees have been seriously affected by the violence that they experienced in 2017 in Burma. The degree of violence, that include indiscriminate killings, looting, burning of houses, sexual exploitation, has made the displaced Rohingya people economically too vulnerable that they, in terms of managing livelihoods, are suffering in their camp life also fearing to continue struggling in the future. In terms of earning also purchasing capacity, the Rohingya refugees are surviving below the international poverty line which is \$1.90 a day.

Further, this research finds that this group of people are refugees in true sense as they had to start their refugee journey -- leaving their personal also households possessions behind -- across the jungle also crossing sea and river because of persecution or fear of being persecuted. Besides, they cannot envisage a 'better future' from the position where they are in now, rather they envisage more sufferings in their camp life in the days ahead, if they fail to go back to their original lands with dignity also assurance of not becoming the victims of similar one-sided brutal violence in the future. Since the refugees do not have work and right to mobility, time has stopped moving for them. The refugees consider mobility as a vital factor, at least in relation to their livelihoods, to find means of living as there is hardly any work available for them in and around the camp settings. The present situation is so uncertain that the refugees cannot plan also think about what is next. In addition to that, the refugees even do not know how long they will continue their refugee journey.

This study finds that the refugees will need support to restart their lives upon their possible return to Burma as they lost almost everything of their households resources during the violence. This paper finds, based on the secondary literatures analysis also testimonies of the refugees, that the military-led attack on the Rohingya population in 2017 was not an isolated event rather a 'planned one'. It was a part of Burma's extreme exclusionary policy against Rohingya, because of later's religious identity, which has been on board for at least 40 years. The finding illustrates that the military attack was a sheer example of a one-sided violence as it was executed against the innocent Rohingya civilians, maybe with an intention to securitise the Rakhine state (home of Rohingya) where the mega economic projects, funded by the regional economies, are underway.

What is surprising is the lack of literature on the Rohingya, from the refugees' own perspective. For example, there is just one article (by Riley et al) on trauma among this population displaced in 2016, the year before the mass migration. Due to this silence among scholars, the researcher plans to conduct a follow-up survey with a similar group of Rohingya households one year after the original survey, in July-August 2019. The intention is to observe and analyse differences in the conditions and opinions of the Rohingya refugees regarding their own livelihoods and their future. Therefore, this paper should be considered as the baseline study for future research with the Rohingya refugees, who look likely to remain stranded in the massive camps in Cox's Bazar, Bangladesh for the foreseeable future.

In terms of possible return, as this paper finds, the refugees do not have any level of agency as it depends on the action of other state-level actors. Therefore, at this time, the Rohingya are unable to envisage a respectful or safe repatriation to Burma. In line with this concern, the study recommends that the international community should visit the violence-prone state of Rakhine (home of the Rohingya) to assess whether the situation has evolved or is conducive for the return of refugees, before any action is taken to repatriate them to Burma. In addition, the researcher suggests that the opinions and fears of the refugees regarding their return to Burma should be taken into serious consideration before any recommendations that they move back to Burma. The reassurances of the Burmese government should not be taken at face value, regarding suitable 'IDP camps' in Burma, where over 100,000 Rohingya still remain in very poor conditions, about which there is no information. Furthermore, this study suggests that the international community should increase its provision of humanitarian assistance to the Rohingya refugees to reduce the pressures both on the local population in Cox's Bazar, and on the government of Bangladesh. This aid should be provided both in the camps and also in case the refugees return in future to Rakhine, if possible. Since they have few resources left, are indebted and mostly out of work, this minority group would need support to restart their lives, wherever they end up. This paper recommends that special measures be taken to improve the socioeconomic conditions of refugees and locals alike, who live in Cox's Bazar, a poor region being affected by poverty and environmental disaster. Perhaps then, it will be more conceivable that the Rohingya refugees might one day, at least partially, be integrated into mainstream Bangladeshi society. Their return is unlikely to happen soon.

List of Appendices

Appendix 1 Rakhine State and Refugee Camps (Bangladesh) in Map



(International Crisis Group 2018)

Appendix 2 List of Informal Interview Participants

Name of Interviewees/ Age/Sex/Interview Location/Date/Dura- tion	Identity/Profession	Interview Extracts
Abdul Azim, 38, Male, Tea Shop, Balukhali Refugee Camp, Teknaf, Cox's Bazar, 1 August 2018 Around 25 minutes	A local Bangladeshi con- tractor. He serves labours and materials to NGOs to build roads, toilets, deep tube well pump in Kutupalong and Balukhali camp	“Many local people's liveli- hoods were depended on the forestlands. Due to de- struction of forest, they had to choose alternative work. Therefore, they are angry on the refugees”
Amir Hamza, 63, male, Block 54, Kutupalong Camp, Cox's Bazar 5 August 2018 Around 20 minutes	A Rohingya refugee came from Maungdaw, Rakhine state.	“They (Bangladeshis peo- ple) have given us shel- ter...we are living on their lands. It is not a problem if they (Bangladeshis) be a bit hostile towards us. We should not be sad for this.”
Asaduzzaman, 40, male, Tea Stall, Balukhali Camp, Cox's Bazar 4 August 2018 Around 20 minutes	A Rohingya refugee dis- placed in 2017	“We are innocent people. We are neither involved in ARSA activities nor sup- port their action,”
Ashraf Ali, 48, Male, Block 58, Kutupalong Camp, Cox's Bazar 8 August 2018 Around 10 minutes	A Rohingya refugee who used to live in Rathedung, Rakhine, before his flight for Bangladesh. He is a household head.	“I do not know anything but working in the field. If you now ask me to work in a factory, I would not be able to do it.”
Ayesha Begum, 70, female Block G2, Kutupalong Camp, Cox's Bazar 30 July 2018 Around 25 minutes	Rohingya refugee from Rathedung, Rakhine. She lost all her family members but a seven-year-old grand- son	“My only job was to play with the younger grand- child. Now, I pass nights sleepless here in the camp. All the memories of the military torture haunt me every minute.”
Hazrat Ali, 63, Male, Kutupalong camp, Cox's Bazar	A Rohingya refugee	“We used to eat good foods on every Friday back in Burma. Here, we cannot think of having a

6 August 2018 Around 15 minutes		good meal. I had a respectful life back home. There was no crisis in my family. Here, we are depended on alms which is not respectful.”
Jalal Hossain, 58, male, Emergency shelter, Blcok 66, Balukhali Camp, Cox's Bazar 5 August 2018 Around 30 minutes	He was forcibly displaced in 1991 before his last flight in 2017	“There is no chance that we will have a better life in Bangladesh. We will have to remain confined in camps and depend on relief to survive the way other Rohingya who could not go back after their displacement in 1991. I was lucky that I could go back at that time. What will do here? We do not have anything here. How long they will feed us?”
Lufar Rahman, 51, Male, Tea Shop, Balukhali camp, Cox's Bazar	A Rohingya refugee	“I had seven cows and 18 goats. I had to leave the cattle unattended. They must have taken already by somebody.”
Mohammad Ayez, 19, Male, a NGO-run school, Balukhali Camp, Cox's Bazar 6 August 2018 Around 20 minutes	A Rohingya refugee who teaches Burmese language to children in a NGO-run school in Balukhali Camp	“Our rights are denied there. We even need to take permission from them (Burmese authority) to cultivate crops in our lands. Our rights need to be specified and recognized before our repatriation from here to Burma. Besides, we want justice. Our people have been killed and our women have been raped. Our resources have been looted and our houses have been burnt. We want compensation for our losses. I want to go back to my original place, but this time it needs to be resolved permanently. As I grew up, I understood gradually that I don't have a state, a nationality. That's mean I am stateless which was such a terrible feeling to live with. I will not move from here

		for Burma until our demands are met.”
Mostafa Khatun, 40, female, Kutupalong Camp, Cox's Bazar 8 August 2018	A housewife	“ <i>Shudhu jaanta niya aschi?</i> ” (The only thing we managed to bring with was life).
Mahbubul Islam, 27, male, Balukhali Camp, Cox's Bazar 4 August 2018 Around 30 minutes	Bangladeshi Programme Organiser Un-registered Myanmar Nationals (UMN) project Codec	“Parents or siblings of some children were killed before their eyes. If we ask them to narrate those incidents, they become traumatized and start crying.”
Mahmud Makkie, Male, Balukhali camp, Cox's Bazar 5 August 2018 Around 10 minutes	Bangladeshi also an employee of Red Crescent Society. He is involved in non-food item distribution scheme in the Balukhali camp	“We are also aware of the fact that they [refugees] go to the forests to collect firewood, posing threat to the reserve forest.”
Nazimullah, 55, Male, Tea shop, Kutupalong Camp, Cox's Bazar 7 August 2018 Around 15 minutes	A Rohingya refugee who arrived Bangladesh in September 2017. His neighbourhood back in Maungdaw was affected by the violence.	“I am worried about the future of my children. I know that a dark future is waiting ahead if we fail to go back to our land. There cannot be a better future in a refugee camp. But, I cannot help myself...everything depends on the government of Burma and Bangladesh also on NGO people. I need to wait.”
Noor Mohammad, 14, boy, Block 54, Kutupalong Refugee Camp, Cox's Bazar 7 August 2018 Around 15 minutes	A Rohingya refugee teenage boy who lost his father in 2017 violence in Rakhine. Neither he goes to school nor he has income generating work in Bangladesh. Before his displacement, he used to live with his parents and siblings in Maungdow, Rakhine.	“We use firewood to cook. The amount of firewood we receive from NGOs is not sufficient. So, when I go to forest, I give them (locals) lentil, rice or oil to get permission for collecting firewood.”
Obaidullah, 27, Male, Block 29, Kutupalong Camp, Cox's Bazar 7 August 2018 Around 10 minutes	A Rohingya refugee who was displaced from Rakhine's Maungdow.	“I will go anywhere in the world but Burma. They (Burmese military) will kill us. They (Burmese military) do not treat us as human. They have burned


		down our houses so that we cannot go back.”
Romiz Uddin, 45, male, Small grocery shop, Balukhali camp, Cox's Bazar 3 August 2018 Around 20 minutes	A Rohingya refugee He used to live in Buthidaung with his family before leaving Burma in September 2017 for Bangladesh	“I was working in the field that day when my wife rushed to me and said that people from a neighbouring village were fleeing towards the Bangladesh border. She was scared. On my way to home from the field, I asked the fleeing people about the reason behind their movement towards Bangladesh border. They told me that military had been killing people in their village also burning the houses. After that I did not give a second thought but leaving my house with my children and wife for Bangladesh. We had to leave our house quickly as we heard that military had been approaching towards our village which was not far from the affected village. Therefore, we could not bring anything but some clothes and dry foods. I was afraid of being attacked by the military personnel. Later, I heard from my neighbours who joined us here in Bangladesh a few days later that my house has been burnt by the military.”
Samad Ali, 26, male, Tea Stall, Kutupalong Camp, Cox's Bazar, 8 August 2018 Around 10 minutes	A refugee who arrived Bangladesh in September 2017	“Any work according to my physical strength”
Shafayet Hossain, 19, Male, Block 22, Balukhali camp, Cox's Bazar 3 August 2018 Around 15 minutes	A Rohingya refugee	“I think supply of relief items will decrease in the future. But, the size of our families will increase. So, we will need work in the future to survive in the camp. We should be allowed to go the cities to

		find a job as there is no job available in the camp.”
Sohrab Hossain, 35, male, Block 27, Balukhali camp, Cox's Bazar	A Rohingya refugee displaced from Rakhine's Maungdaw	“I got the opportunity to work as I had a good relationship with my Majhi also as I agreed to share a portion of my daily wage with him.”
Zafar Ahmed, 48, male, Block 58, Kutupalong Camp, Cox's Bazar 30 July 2018 Around 15 minutes	A Rohingya refugee who used to live in Maungdaw township in Rakhine state before his flight for Bangladesh	“Boys need education more than girls. If a girl can write her name, it is enough for her. She will go to her husband's place after marriage and will work in the house.”
Zamir Ali, 45, Male, Block 62, Balukhali camp, Cox's Bazar 6 August 2018 Around 15 minutes	A Rohingya refugee, coming from Rathedung, Rakhine	“There are nine persons in my family, and the amount of food we receive is not enough. So, I can't sell food to buy fish, meat or vegetable. We only eat fish or meat when I can earn some money working in an NGO.”
Zahirul Alam, 26, male, Tea Stall, Kutupalong Camp, Cox's Bazar 7 August 2018 Around 30 minutes	A refugee displaced in 2017	“We pay the price of ARSA attack on Burmese police. We are not with ARSA. We want peace.”

Appendix 3 Images of Burnt Rohingya villages



A burnt Rohingya village in Maungdaw, Rakhine (Reuters photo cited in *Straits Times* 2018)



Affected Rohingya villages in Rakhine (Human Rights Watch 2017)

Appendix 4 Aerial view of a refugee camp in Cox's Bazar



Arial view of a Rohingya refugee camp, Cox's Bazar (Food Security Cluster, Bangladesh, n.d.)

Appendix 5 Glimpse of Camp Life



Two Rohingya women collecting water from a nearby water source for their household in Balukhali Camp. Photo: Author



A baby sleeping in an emergency shelter in Kutupalong Camp. Photo: Author



A Rohingya household farming vegetables beside its shelter. Photo: Author



A refugee carrying firewood, collected from a nearby forest, for household. Photo: Author

Appendix 6 Household Interview Questionnaire

Special Notes:

Questionnaire Number:

Starting Time:

Date:

Ending Time:

Hello, my name is On academic purposes, we are conducting a survey with Rohingya refugees who are living in the refugee camps in Bangladesh. If necessary, your responses will be kept strictly confidential. May we interview you? Do you have any objection against it?

Interviewee: Position in Household:

Gender: i) Male
 ii) Female

Age: How old are you?

Religion: What is your religion?

Marital Status: What is your marital status?

 i) Single ii) Married
 iii) Divorced iv) Widow/widower

Language: Which language do you speak? [more than one answer acceptable]

1. Rohingya Dialect
2. Burmese
3. Bangla

General Questions:

1. What is your address in the camp?
2. What is the name of the neighbourhood where you lived in Burma (Myanmar)?
3. When did you arrive in Bangladesh? [Please specify month and year.]
 i) August 2017 ii) September 2017 iii) October 2017
 iv) November 2017 v) December 2017 vi) January 2018
 vii) February 2018 viii) March 2018 ix) April 2018
 x) Other
4. Why did you leave Burma?
 ii) Military attacked our house
 iii) Due to fear of being attacked by the military
 vi) Other [please specify]
5. Can you read and write in any language?
 i) Yes ii) Partially iii) No
6. Did you have a family back in Burma?
 i) Yes ii) No
7. Have you lost any family member in the 2017 violence?
 i) Yes ii) No iii) Not sure
 7.1) (If the answer is Yes) Did s/he/they use to contribute financially in the family?

i) Yes ii) Partly iii) No

8. What did you leave behind?

No	Leave Behind	Yes	No
1.	Farmland		
2.	House		
3.	Cattle		
4.	Chicken and Duck		
5.	Stored Crops		
6.	Crops in land		
7.	Cash		
8.	Furniture		
9.	Documents		
10.	Other [please specify]		

9. Do you have a family here in the camp?

i) Yes ii) No

9.1) [If the answer is Yes] How many members are there in your family?

9.2) Of them, how many are children?

9.3) Could you tell us their ages separately [from youngest to eldest]?

Num-ber	Children	Age
1	Child 1	
2	Child 2	
3	Child 3	
4	Child 4	
5	Child 5	
6	Child 6	
7	Child 7	
8	Child 8	

9.4) Do your child/children (age between 5 to 17 years) have access to formal education in the camp?

i) Yes iii) Partially ii) No

9.5) (If the answer is Yes or Partially) What kind of institution do they attend?

i) NGO-run school ii) Mosque-based Madrasa iii) Others [please specify]

9.6) (If the answer is No), why do not they attend educational institutions?

i) No institution for children aged above

ii) They never went to school/madrassa

iii) They do not like school/madrassa

iv) I can't afford expense

v) Other (please specify)

10. Please tell us the measurement (if you know) of your makeshift house in the camp.

10.1) What were the main materials used to build your shelter?

Length		Width	
Haat (hand)	Feet	Haat (Hand)	Feet
20	30	10	15
19	28.5	9	13.5
18	27	8	12
17	25.5	7	10.5
16	24	6	9
15	22.5	5	7.5
14	21	4	6
13	19.5		
12	18		
11	16.5		
10	15		

10.1) What were the main materials used to build your shelter?

1. Tarpaulin
2. Sungrass
3. Polythene
4. Bamboo
5. Rope
6. Wood
7. Other [please specify]

11. Is there any problem in your shelter?

- i) Yes
- ii) No
- iii) Sometimes

11.1) (If the answer is Yes or Sometimes), what are the problems?

- i) Rain water comes inside through the roof
- ii) Floor gets wet during rain
- iii) Wind takes away roof and side-wall
- iv) Insufficient space for family members
- v) Lack of privacy
- vi) Other (please specify)

12. Do you have a separate kitchen in the shelter?

- i) Yes
- ii) No

13. Do you receive the following facilities?

No	Facilities	Yes	No
1.	Drinking water		
2.	Water for bathing and cooking		
3.	Toilet		
4.	Healthcare		
5.	Medication		
6.	Solar electricity		
7.	Garbage dumping spot		
8.	Counselling		
9.	Other [please specify]		

14. How difficult is it for you to access drinking water in the camp?

i) Difficult ii) Extremely difficult iii) Sometimes difficult iv) Not difficult

14.1) [If the answer is difficult, extremely difficult or sometimes difficult] Why is this?

[more than one answer is acceptable]

- i) Tube-well/tab is far from the household
- ii) One tube-well/tab for too many people
- iii) Scarcity of tube-well/tab
- iv) Other [please specify]

15. Are you satisfied with the quality of the drinking water?

i) Yes ii) No

15.1) If the answer is 'No', what is the problem with the water?

i) Bad odour ii) Not clean iii) Other (please specify)

16. How difficult is it for you and your family members to access healthcare service in the camp?

- i) Difficult
- ii) Sometimes difficult
- iii) Extremely difficult
- iv) Not difficult

16. 1) [If the answer is difficult, sometimes difficult or extremely difficult] Why is this? [more than one answer acceptable]

- i) No healthcare centres available nearby
- ii) Shortage of healthcare facilities
- iii) It takes long to receive treatment
- iv) Medication not available
- iv) Other [please specify]

17. Are you satisfied with the toilet facilities?

i) Yes ii) No iii) Sometimes

17.1) (If the answer is No) What are the problems with the toilet facilities? [more than one answer acceptable]

- i) Toilet is far from the house
- ii) Not safe at night for the women
- iii) Too many people use one toilet
- iv) Water is not available in the toilet
- v) Not clean/hygienic
- vi) Children cannot use it

18. Did you or any of your family member fall sick in last 6 months?

i) Yes ii) No

18.1) What you did to recover?

- i) Visited a healthcare centre inside the camp
- ii) Visited a hospital/clinic outside the camp
- iii) Doctor came to see the patient
- iv) Collected medication from an organization
- v) Collected medication from a nearby drug store on own
- vi) Recovered naturally
- vi) Other [please specify]

19. Do you and your family members receive the following materials as aid?

No	Materials	Yes	No
1.	Rice		
2.	Flour		
3.	Oil		
4.	Salt		

5.	Lentil		
6.	Milk		
7.	Fish		
8.	Meat		
9.	Vegetables		
10.	Regular Clothe		
11.	Warm Clothe		
12.	Shoes		

20. What is your regular food menu?

Breakfast	Lunch	Dinner

21. How often can you afford fish or meat?

- i) Never
- ii) 1-2 times in a month
- iii) 3-5 times in a month
- iv) 6-10 times in a month
- iv) More

22. Did you receive cash support from any organisation/person after arriving Bangladesh?

- i) Yes
- ii) No
- iii) Refused

23. Did you ever take cash as loan from anyone after arriving here?

- i) Yes
- ii) No

23.1) Did you manage to return the loan?

- i) Yes
- ii) Partly
- iv) No

24. Do you face any restriction when you want to go outside the camp area?

- i) Yes
- ii) Sometimes
- ii) No

24.1) [If the answer is Yes or Sometimes] Could you tell us what are those restrictions?

- i) Law-enforcers do not allow us to go outside the camp area
- ii) Locals do not like us outside the camp
- ii) Others (please specify)

25. On any given day, what portion of the people you talk to outside the household are local Bangladeshis?

- i) None
- ii) a very few
- iii) about half
- iv) almost all
- v) not sure
- vi) Refused

26. On any given day, what portion of the people you talk to outside the household are also Rohingya refugees?

- i) All
- ii) Almost all

- iii) About half
- iv) Very few

27. What was your primary profession back in Burma?

- i) Farming
- ii) Fishing
- iii) Day-Labour
- iv) Housewife
- v) Vendor
- vi) Teacher
- vii) Imam (religious leader)
- viii) Shop owner
- ix) Student
- x) Tailor
- xi) Trader
- xii) Unemployed
- xiii) Potter
- xiv) Could not work because of disability/illness/age
- xv) Driver
- xvi) Other [please specify]

28. Do you have, or have you had any job/work here in Bangladesh that pays/paid?

- i) Yes
- ii) Occasionally
- iii) No
- iv) Refused

28.1) [If the answer is Yes or Occasionally] What is/was it?

- i) Work/worked for an NGO inside camp on daily basis
- ii) Work/worked outside camp as a day labour
- iii) Work/worked outside camp as a domestic help
- iv) Sell/used to sell vegetables inside camp
- v) Operate a small shop inside camp
- vi) Other [please specify]

28.2) How many days do/did you work?

28.3) On an average, what amount do/did you get paid or earn daily?

29. If the interviewee never worked in Bangladesh, what were the reasons behind? [more than one possible answer acceptable]

- i) Work not available inside camp
- ii) Not allowed to move outside camp to find work
- iii) Hard to find work outside camp
- iv) Physically not fit to work
- v) Can't work due to family responsibility
- vi) I do not want to work
- vii) Afraid of doing work outside camp
- viii) Other [Please explain]

30. Please tell us about the following household materials. (Please put 'X' where necessary).

No	Materials & Facilities	In Possession Now	Possession in Burma	Carried from Burma to Bangladesh	Received as aid in camp
1.	Bed & Pillows				
4.	Stove				
3.	Charcoal/Fire-wood/fuel to cook				
4.	Pans				
5.	Soap				

31. Do you feel the materials/foods you receive as aid are adequate for your family?

- i) Yes
- ii) To some extent
- iii) No
- iv) Refused

32. [If the answer is No] What else do you need?

33. Do you feel yourself safe in the camp?

- i) Yes
- ii) No
- iii) Confused
- iv) Sometimes

30.1) If the answer is 'No', how insecure do you feel?

- i) Insecure
- ii) Very Insecure
- iii) Not very insecure
- iv) Extremely insecure

34. Do you see yourself going back?

- i) Yes
- ii) Maybe
- iii) Never

35. [If the answer is Yes or Maybe] When?

- i) Soon
- ii) Very soon
- iii) Not very soon
- iv) In couple of years
- v) In five years or more
- vi) Don't know when

36. (If return is not possible in short time) How do you see your future in Bangladesh?

37. Are the local Bangladeshis hostile towards you?

- i) Yes
- ii) No

38. On your return, do you think that you would find your property intact?

- i) Yes
- ii) No

39. On your return, do you think you will be able to manage your livelihood?

- i) Yes
- ii) No

40. If allowed, will you work here in Bangladesh?




- i) Yes
- ii) No





41. Would you prefer alternative work here in Bangladesh (other than your original profession)?




- i) Yes
- ii) No




Thank you for your cooperation




Appendix 7 Supplementary Household Interview Data

























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