

'De-radicalization' of Convicted Terrorists inside Indonesia's Prisons: What Alternatives?

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List of Acronyms

AIPJ	Australia Indonesia Partnership for Justice
ASF-NZ	Asia Security Fund – New Zealand
BNPT	Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terrorisme (National Counter-Terrorism Agency)
CVE	Countering Violent Extremism
DFAT	Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade
DGC	Directorate General of Correction
FCO-UK	Foreign Commonwealth Office – United Kingdom
GAM	Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (Aceh Movement for Independence)
GWoT	Global War on Terror
ICG	International Crisis Group
ICITAP	International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance
IGO	International Governmental Organization
INGO	International Non-Governmental Organization
INSEP	Institute for Social Empowerment
IPAC	Institute for Policy Analysis and Conflict
ISIS	Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
JAD	Jamaah Anshorut Daulah
JI	Al-Jamaah Al-Islamiyah
JCLEC	Jakarta Centre for Law Enforcement cooperation
LPPMI	Lembaga Pendidikan dan Pemberdayaan Masyarakat Islam (Institute for Education and Empowerment of Islamic Society)
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NSW	New South Wales
NII	Negara Islam Indonesia (Islamic State of Indonesia)
NU	Nahdlatul Ulama
OPM	Organisasi Papua Merdeka (Organization for Papua Independence)
PAKAR	Pusat Kajian Radikalisme (Center of Radicalism Studies)
PP	Peraturan Pemerintah (Government Law)
PRIK	Pusat Riset Ilmu Kepolisian (Police Science Research Center)
SDGs	Sustainable Development Goals
SFCG	Search for Common Ground
UU	Undang-Undang (National Law)
UNICRI	United Nations for Interregional Crime and Research Institute
UNODC	United Nations Office for Drugs and Crime
US-DoS	United States-Department of State
VEP	Violent Extremists Prisoners
VERA	Violent Extremists Risk Assessment

YPP

Yayasan Prasasti Perdamaian (Institute of International Peace-Building)

Abstract

This research is concerned with the problems that occur in the rehabilitation of convicted terrorists or known as Violent Extremist Prisoners (VEP) inside the Indonesian prison system under the current global countering violent extremism (CVE) regime. In Indonesia, those problems consist of prisoners' rejection of existing rehabilitation programs, further radicalization of other inmates and the recruitments inside the prison to violent extremist organization. By using a combination of approaches in the tradition of discourse analysis and semi-structured interviews, this thesis questioned dominant discourses and theories of de-radicalization as way to rehabilitate convicted terrorists which is predominantly used by the Indonesian National Counter-Terrorism Agency (BNPT), International organizations, and several NGOs. The dominant discourses from both actors resulted to Daniel Koehler's classification of Type D and Type E de-radicalization model by emphasizing huge aspect of ideology and governmentality. This approach is likely to face rejection from inmates due to three factors: power-relations within securitization regime, solidarity, and identity construction in the anatomy of Salafi-Jihadism as the social movement. Therefore, this research finds that current discourse of de-radicalization maintain VEP to label government as 'infidels' and NGOs as 'strangers' as the reason of rejection. Studying disengagement and de-radicalization within social movement analysis will unpack the missing discourse hence bringing transformative manner for the current production of knowledge regarding policy of terrorist rehabilitation in the Indonesian context.

Relevance to Development Studies

Radicalization and terrorism are among the interesting topics which are mainly discussed inside security discourse in post 9/11 world. Since then, there are many integrative approaches to relate these security approaches with current development agenda as it mentioned in one of the twenty goals within Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs): Peace, Justice, and Security. However, this thesis offers critical approach towards prisoners' rehabilitation issue by problematizing the coercive power of de-radicalization between International actors and powerful states towards the terrorists under securitization regime. This thesis will try to unpack the manner of rehabilitation process from different perspectives by looking from social movement angle and trust-building effort. Hopefully, it acknowledges social movement grievances as it can be the first path to shift securitization to dialogue, peace-building, and conflict transformation as it is needed to enhance prisoners' capabilities in being productive for society after imprisonment. Therefore, this thesis is relevant for development practitioners and policy-makers to equip them with alternative knowledge and skills in building critical engagement to the problem of so-called "terrorist-rehabilitation".

Keywords

Terrorism, rehabilitation, war on terrorism, violent extremist prisoners, de-radicalization, governmentality, securitization, social movements, governance

Chapter 1

Introduction: Contextualizing ‘Terrorists’ Rehabilitation

1.1 Radicalization: National and Global Trajectories

In 2003, Indonesia joined the discourse of the “Global War on Terror” (GWoT), by signing the Anti-Terrorism Law No.15/2003. The Indonesian government also established an elite police force known as the Special Detachment Unit 88 (Densus 88), specifically trained to hunt and arrest members of *Al Jama’ah Al Islamiyah* (JI), the largest so-called ‘terrorist’ group in South East Asia. The War on Terror policy continued after a series of bomb attacks on the Australian Embassy in 2004, the Marriott Hotel also in 2004, and the bombing in Bali in 2005. Another attack on Marriott Hotel in 2009 showed success was limited. After the second Marriot explosion, President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono published President Regulations No.46 2010 to create National Counter-Terrorism Agency (BNPT) whose tasks included preventing, taking action and de-radicalizing terrorist offenders. BNPT itself consisted of elite, especially recruited elements from the military, the police, and even scholars.

Eleven years after the Cold War ended, world politics completely changed the discourse of “Salafi-jihadism” after the 9/11 attack took place. The United States Government launched its “Global War on Terror”, and later was joined by several other Western countries. Anti-Terrorism legislation, echoing that in Western countries, was adapted worldwide including Indonesia. The campaign of military invasion in Afghanistan to hunt Osama bin Laden, the Al-Qaeda leader who was claimed to be “responsible” for 9/11, involved undercover operations to arrest, detain and torture suspected terrorist leaders. United States and its proponents of self-proclaimed “freedom and democracy” aimed to eliminate Al-Qaeda and all militant Muslim movements across the world, fighting their ideas globally, as an identified threat to US national interests. Indonesia at first seemed to adopt a fairly neutral stance. Although several Churches had been bombed by violent Islamists even before 9/11 on Christmas Night in 2000, Hamzah Haz, Indonesian Vice President on 9/11 said terrorism was not a national security concern in Indonesia at that time. Instead, Indonesia was still recovering from the security threats posed by separatist movements such as Organisasi Papua Merdeka in Papua (OPM) and Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM) in Aceh (Wuryandari 2014:73). These movements alongside with communal conflicts which involved ethnicity and religion were seen as the dominant security threats in mainstream political discourse at that time. This viewpoint soon changed, with the bomb blast in Paddy’s Club in Bali in October 2002, which not only killed 202 people but was reported worldwide given the mostly ‘tourist’ casualties involved.

Indonesia as the biggest country in Southeast Asia, is also home to the largest Muslim population in the world, 210 million people. Despite the Muslim majority, the foundation of the Indonesian state was consensus among the people across their diverse ethnicities, religions and political background. This resulted in a secular-religious state under Pancasila¹

¹ **Pancasila** (Five pillars) is the official and philosophical ideology of Indonesia. Pancasila was a combination between theocracy, liberal democracy, and socialist foundation of

national ideology. Looking back to history this has several consequences for the Islamist political factions which aspire to establish an Islamic government in Indonesia. Soon after independence in 1945, the new Indonesian government failed to reach agreement with the former colonisers, the Dutch. Even in 1948, the Renville Treaty sparked disappointment and one Indonesia Islamic Army faction leader, S.M Kartosoewirjo, declared '*Negara Islam Indonesia*' (Indonesia is an Islamic State, 'NIP' for short) in 1949. From independence onwards, NII aimed to establish Islamic Government in Indonesia. The NII movement spread to several islands in the 1950s, and was finally crushed in 1962 in Indonesian Government military operations. Kartosoewirjo was executed for treason in 1965.

However, the remnants of NII followers and its ideas still gained foothold in West and Central Java; the birthplace of the movement. One of the newly recruited NII activists from Solo, Central Java, Abu Bakar Ba'asyir and his colleague Abdullah Sungkar revived the idea of NII Islamism by modernizing NII discourses by adding elements of transnational Islamism, adapting the ideas of Sayyid Qutb, Muhammad bin Abdul Wahab, and Ibnu Taimiyyah, well-known Islamist scholars (Juansyah 2017:23). Ba'asyir and Sungkar waged resistance towards New Order Regime through community radio, where they preached sermons and called for boycotts in the 1977 elections. Both eventually fled to Malaysia in 1982 to avoid further persecution from a government which had imprisoned them before. Ba'asyir's and Sungkar's resistance marked the start of a new era of Islamist activism in Indonesia, parallel to the rise of the Tarbiyah movements' in Indonesian public universities. These two parallel movements brought the new transnational ideology adopted from the Muslim Brotherhood movement in Egypt and 'Wahabist' networks in Saudi and the Gulf. Around the 1980's, many Islamist activists were traveling to Afghanistan through the Ba'asyir network, being assisted from Malaysia as foreign fighters to help the local *Mujahiddin* fighting the Soviet Union invasion (Juansyah 2017:62). The call to summon fighters from all over the world came from religious statement (*fatwa*) from Saudi Arabian Clerics, Syekh Abdullah bin Baz in the midst of Cold-War politics constellation. This reinforced an alliance between the United States and Saudi Arabia (Juansyah 2017:66). Baz was also a teacher of Abdullah bin Azzam, founder of a globalised jihad ideology known as "Salafi-Jihadism" after Sayyid Qutb. The goal was to fight injustice towards the Muslim world in general, wherever it arose on the planet. Thus, the idea of global jihad (Salafi-Jihadism) from Abdullah Azzam finally encountered and connected with hundreds of Indonesian foreign fighters who fought then returned to Indonesia. These returned fighters maintained regular contacts with Ba'asyir and Sungkar as in 1993, they established JI the first Salafi-Jihadist organization in Southeast Asia (Solahuddin 2013:126-145). Some of these convinced jihadists continued to wage jihad in the Southern Philippines in Mindanao and in South Thailand. After the Soeharto regime fell in 1998, Ba'asyir and Sungkar returned to Indonesia the following year, to continue their struggle.

1.2 What is the Problem?

Since 2003, the Special Detachment Unit 88 has arrested hundreds of suspected terrorists, and Indonesian courts have sentenced 600 people on terrorism charges. In 2004, an initiative to start de-radicalization was undertaken by the Indonesian national police force. Among those prisoners, 200 prisoners who were jailed were ordered to receive

the state. The five principles consists of deity, humanity, unity, general assembly, social justice. It was formulated in 1945 by national founding fathers.

rehabilitation inside prisons in form of de-radicalization programs. In 2016, there were at least 293 convicted terrorists or known as Violent Extremists Prisoners (VEP) being held in 73 Indonesian prisons. Below are some figures explaining the numbers of people – mostly men - convicted of ‘terrorism’ (i.e. jihadism) in Indonesia during 2013-2018.

Table 1.1 Numbers of Convicted ‘Terrorists’ inside Indonesian Prison²

Year	VEP Inside Indonesian Prisons (inmates)
2013	300
2014	274
2015	280
2016	293
2017	284
2018	278

Source: (Direktorat Jenderal Pemasyarakatan 2018)

In 2013, to ensure rehabilitating of the terrorist inmates, the Indonesian government in association with BNPT, launched a blueprint for de-radicalization. According to the BNPT Director of De-radicalization, Prof Irfan Idris, BNPT’s de-radicalization goal is to shift inmates’ paradigm or to reframe their radical ideology from violent towards non-violent behaviour, and from extreme understandings of Jihad toward moderate and peaceful understandings of Jihad and Islam (Idris 2017:46). Adhe Bhakti, Directors of the Center of Radicalism Studies (PAKAR) an independent think-tank, mentioned that BNPT classified the behaviour of Violent Extremists Prisoners (VEP) inside prison as follows:

1. Cooperative, willing to participate on the program, and persuade others
2. Cooperative, willing to participate on the program
3. Non-cooperative but willing to talk to officer
4. Non-cooperative and unwilling to talk with the officer

The de-radicalization program in Indonesia showed its success as government claimed that they managed to reduced recidivism to as little as 5% of those who underwent the program (Idris and Taufiqurrohman 2015:76). However, the de-radicalization program in Indonesian prisons continues to have difficulties as most prisoners refuse to follow the de-radicalization program at all, and therefore exclude themselves from it. This reflects that the program is optional. Opposition to participating in existing rehabilitation programs was identified as a problem, according to conversations I had with prison officers, former inmates and former jihadists, inside and outside Indonesian prisons during 2013 until 2017, as part of my daily work (see section 1.4). De-radicalization programs did not always work out as planned, it seemed.

Some new developments and dynamics emerging related to the sometimes intensive interactions among VEPs inside prisons. In 2014, while some of the inmates start receiving BNPT de-radicalization program, the rise of Islamic States (ISIS) networks in Indonesia started to influence one of the Imams in one of the major prison complexes. The leader of a new group, Jamaah Anshorut Daulah (JAD or Followers of the Islamic State), Imam

² Not including detainees

Aman Abdurrahman, started teaching ideas close to those of ISIS, contributing towards violent extremist inmates' re-radicalisation in prison. Under the influence of Aman, most inmates especially those affiliated and followed ISIS, rejected the de-radicalization program, and actually moved further in some cases towards VE. This meant that the inmates still listed as "*un-cooperative*" by the prison authorities were being radicalised inside prison, which was not something new but still represented a challenge to the rehabilitation program. Ultimately this left them in a relation of distrust in relation to the government apparatus, and government officials. Those uncooperative prisoners did not follow any activity inside prison and finally released untouched by any program hence once more committed act of terror as happened to Afif als Sunakim, who was released without parole from Cipinang Prison in September 2015 but re-engage with terrorism in January 2016 which killed himself and also to happened former inmates, Juhanda, former inmates in who attacked Church with Molotov Cocktail in Samarinda, East Kalimantan in 2017.

In fact, prior to those recidivism cases above some International Organizations as well as local NGOs already provided technical assistance to the BNPT and DGC in relation to prisoners' rehabilitation and to mitigate the risks of recidivism among previously VEP. Those actors labelled their de-radicalization project with different terms, such as "Identification", "Risk Assessment", "Prisoners Management", "Re-socialization", "Disengagement", "Conflict Management", "Psychological Treatment", and "Psychological Profiling." All involved based on their theoretical difference related to their underlying assumption, frame, and context. Despite these slight differences all perspectives and understandings are rallied under the umbrella of de-radicalization program. The program spans the broad processes of from rehabilitation, to parole and social reintegration into Indonesian society.

1.3 Research Questions:

Looking into this problem, this research will try to understand the policy frames underlying different programs which shaped discursive practices of the relevant actors and their programmes on what they mean for rehabilitating the VEP. It resulted on how de-radicalization as the set of rehabilitations should be implemented and how this is related to the phenomena of rejection of convicted terrorists within Indonesian prison system. Therefore, this research paper comes with the research question as follows:

In relation to the dominant discursive practices of Government and non-state actors, how can we explain the rejection of de-radicalization policies by convicted terrorists in Indonesian prisons?

1.3.1 Research Sub-Questions:

In an endeavour to answer main research question, the strategy of this research in addressing its problem will be done in two ways: (1) Understanding the practice which justifies the de-radicalization as the policy to correct and transform the behaviour of Violent Extremists Prisoners (VEP); (2) Unpack the assumption of de-radicalization which claims it help to shift the behaviour of Violent Extremists Prisoners (VEP). This research will try to look systematically into several issues surrounding de-radicalization practices. It consists of four aspects: the current policies, the global discourses, the rejection from VEP, and absence of knowledge. The latter is required as an evaluative purpose towards the current development theory and policy of de-radicalization. These aspects can be manifested in several

sub-research questions which are needed to guide the explanation before reach its final answer. Therefore, this research paper provides four sub-research questions as follows:

1. What are current policies of de-radicalization in Indonesian prisons?
2. How do global discourses of de-radicalization shape policy practices and counter-terrorist interventions by the Indonesian Government, International Organizations, and Local NGOs aimed at rehabilitating convicted terrorists in Indonesian Prison System?
3. **What** challenges of rejection are encountered by different actors in Indonesia (state, International Organizations, NGOs) in the rehabilitation process?
4. What is absent in the current production of knowledge and practice in terrorist rehabilitation in the Indonesian context?

1.4 Motivation and Methodological Journey

This research paper is inspired by my observations as a person who had worked for four years (2013-2017) in Search for Common Ground, an INGO whose mission to transform conflict, from adversarial attitude to peace-building based on collaboration through building commonalities. I was assisting Department of Inmates Empowerment and Parole, Directorate General of Correction (DGC), Republic of Indonesia to empower VEP and building peace infrastructure during incarceration from social reintegration according to correction system. My work demanded me to engage in a conversation and dialogue with VEP related their experience in handling conflict and reflected it as Julie Chernov Hwang mentioned the work that I did in his book (Hwang 2018:157). To prevent researcher bias, I will strictly adhere to research ethics and try my best to maintain my scientific integrity as a researcher and not as someone who involved personally to this issue.

This research applied qualitative inquiry as the main approaches. As the primary data, the research had taken ten semi-structured interviews from four different backgrounds of de-radicalization stakeholders. The first one is prison staff in Jakarta experienced in handling convicted 'terrorists' for seven years inside prison. He regarded as the gatekeepers of convicted 'terrorists'. Their experience in handling convicted 'terrorists' sometimes underestimated. In fact, those are person who often deal with the convicted terrorists most of the time in prison. Therefore, their story and information are important to explain the best practice and also the problem they have related to rehabilitation program for convicted terrorists. Second, the BNPT staff from de-radicalization section related to current de-radicalization policy and strategy as well as to know the assumption and discourse as the main drivers in conducting de-radicalization program. Third, the interview will be also conducted towards former VEP who experienced in receiving de-radicalization program inside prison and other common practice of de-radicalization. This research used former inmates instead of ongoing inmates because the latter are still in the rehabilitation process and have not completely received whole phase of de-radicalization program such as post-release assistance. The interview with former inmates will consist of two who are affiliated to JI and one is to ISIS to see the differences of attitude towards de-radicalization program. Lastly, the research will conduct interview towards NGOs which works to support de-radicalization program. It is aimed to understand why de-radicalization became hegemonic discourse as well as to provide narratives on what is happening and problematic issues related to de-radicalization. Due to ethical and security reasons, some of respondents' name will be mentioned in *pseudonym*.

Meanwhile, the secondary data collection consists of policy documents such as de-radicalization blueprint, project reports, manual book which contained information related

to de-radicalization policies. That information is needed to understand past and present dynamics regarding how de-radicalization in Indonesia has been conducted as well as to become additional or supporting information which cannot be covered from primary sources. In analysing these data this research will use two discourse analysis methods. It is aimed to understand the logic of policy argumentation and capture the dominant discourses within de-radicalization policy and its power trajectory which are disseminated through journals, seminars, political cooperation, and development projects as Susan Goodwin mentioned:

“Policy as discourse approaches start from the assumptions that all actions, objects, and practices are socially meaningful and that the interpretation of these meanings is shaped by the social and political struggle in specific socio-historical contexts” (Goodwin 2009:170).

This indicates that discourse-making involves power-relations among international actors and the narrative among influential actors as the evidence regarding the heart of de-radicalization practice. The first method used is the argumentation analysis table which is developed by Scriven and Gasper. They developed a seven step model to help identify the logical structure, assumptions, and argumentation of any given policies (as discussed in Gasper 2000:3-4). This method will be used to examine the policy assumption and argumentation of BNPT de-radicalization blueprint as it explain how terrorist inmates should be understood and manifested into certain policies to rehabilitate them. The second methods of discourse analysis is the ‘What is the Problem Represented’ (WPR) approach developed by Carol Bacchi. “The ‘WPR’ approach is a resource, or tool, intended to facilitate critical interrogation of public policies” (Bletsas & Beasley 2012:21). However, this research paper will adapt the version of WPR table by categorizing policy based on actors; State and INGO/IGO, instead examining policy based on each institution. I will use WPR approach table analysis to examine and find the problem represented within program of BNPT, International Organization, and NGO in executing de-radicalization and disengagement program inside correction system.

1.5 Justification and the Challenges of the Research

The importance of this research is located on how it tries to reveal absences despite government claim for successfully conducted de-radicalization program as VEP rehabilitation policy. Although there are low numbers of recidivism but some of the VEP evidently were still addressing rejection and putting grievances as well as expressing disappointment about problems of de-radicalization program they received from the government.

Therefore, looking into this urgency, this study is really focusing to address the root causes of rejection of de-radicalization program which may seem simple to explain with conflict theory³. However, there was no reflective research which explains how de-radicalization practitioners can build rehabilitation approaches and perspectives that aimed to reduce the tense of conflict as well as building transformative path to peaceful relations. Thus, it provides alternative to the current de-radicalization program as it uphold inmates’ political rights in the age of identity politics.

³³ **Conflict theory** can be understood as struggle for control over material resources, politics, and the institutions that make up society, and one's social status relative to others (determined not just by class but by gender, culture, and religion)” (Crossman 2018)

The challenges and limitation to this research is to cover more interview respondents and documents for ensuring the quality of the primary data because of safety concern and sensitivity of the issues. It took lengthy bureaucratic procedure to access information from Directorate General of Correction, BNPT, and other International Organizations since they are law enforcement and security agency. It works the same with the former inmates, since most of the former inmates were not easy to persuade where trust and relations should be built upon. However, these limitations are solved by trust-building and existing informal relations which make all of them can comfortably speak and tell the story they had in de-radicalization issues.

1.6 Chapter Outline

Beside this introductory chapter, this research paper consists of four other chapters. The next chapter will discuss the theoretical framework used, and presents the concepts of securitization, disengagement and de-radicalization, as well as considering literature on social movements. Chapter three and four will examine the discursive practices of de-radicalization and disengagement programs in relation to VEP inside prisons. It will seek to understand VEP rejection of these programs, and identifies the need for alternative approaches to rehabilitation beyond 'de-radicalization'. The last chapter summarizes the key findings and return to each sub-question to review the overall findings in relation to the main research question.

Chapter 2

Theorising ‘Terrorists’ Rehabilitation in Indonesia

2.1 Introduction

This chapter discusses the theoretical framework which is used as paradigm of this research. Firstly, we are going to discuss regarding War on Terror and Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) as the product of securitization which defines whom is regarded as terrorists in post 9/11 world and how it works. Secondly, the discussion will move to the explanation of so-called terrorist rehabilitation which involves the debate between two theories; de-radicalization and disengagement. Lastly, this research paper will provide the theory regarding Salafi-Jihadism as the social movement which is now mostly perceived as the security threat rather than as movements which address deprivation and grievances.

2.2 What is WOT and Countering Violent Extremism (CVE)

In this section, I regard the establishment of GWoT after 9/11 is the securitization towards Salafi-Jihadist organization. Securitization theory offers analytical approaches to understand how the discourse Salafi-jihadism after 9/11 attack was being produced. Securitization is political act by this sense “Has a particular discursive and political force and is a concept that does something – securitize – rather than an objective (or subjective) condition” (Buzan & Hansen 2009:214). Swarts and Karakatsanis mentioned securitization as “the process by which political elites frame an issue as involving fundamental issues of security and survival against an existential threat...”(Swarts and Karakatsanis 2013:98). The stage of securitization consisted of 1). The particular speech act of securitization, with a securitizing actor (2) claiming an existential threat to (3) a valued referent object...to (4) make the audience tolerate (they may not) extraordinary measures (Hintjens 2018). Securitization involves inter-subjectivity process among political actors as Thierry Balzacq argued the process of effective communication of securitization involved three factors: audience, context and the securitizing agent as he explained:

“In short, the first... has three components — audience’s frame of reference; its readiness to be convinced, which depends on whether it perceives the securitizing actor as knowing the issue and as trustworthy; and (its ability to grant or deny) a formal mandate to public officials. The second set of factors concerns contextual effects on the audience’s responsiveness to the securitizing actor’s arguments — relevant aspects... that influence the listener, and the impact of the immediate situation on the way the securitizing author’s sentences are interpreted by the listener. The third set involves the capacity of the securitizing actor to use appropriate words... in order to win the support of the target audience for political purposes” (Balzacq 2010:92)

This argument explains how President Bush as the political actors and securitized agent at that time designed appropriate speech act towards Salafi-jihadist organizations as the referent object in the “War on Terror” policies. He made a successful categorization

between US as the keeper of freedom and democracy, and Al-Qaeda, the Salafi Jihadist organization as the evil by propagating the slogan “Either you with us or with them.” (Leudar et.al 2014: 243-266). This slogan was useful to convince global audiences and justify US campaign to invade Afghanistan then hunt Al-Qaeda leader, Osama bin Laden. One of the major implication since GWoT have been applied is that Islamist political movement who wage their struggle towards government were mostly being exposed, suspected, and securitized as the major threat to national security and stability through counter-terrorism project. Nevertheless, GWoT, sustained some criticism for rampant human rights abuse. Therefore, US foreign policy evolved GWoT under different approaches under title “Countering Violent Extremism” (CVE). CVE consists of broad and comprehensive approach in countering-terrorism ranging from prevention, rehabilitation, and reintegration for during conflict or post-conflict situation. It is the soft approach to reduce military intervention. It still securitized Salafi-Jihadi ideology which is claimed as the mastermind behind political movement of ISIS

Indonesian government took three steps towards the securitization of Salafi-Jihadist organization. The first step was by strengthening political and security cooperation with US Government for counter-terrorism effort in Southeast Asia. US Government urged Indonesia to do three things “1) Adopting antiterrorism law 2) to arrests the suspected terrorists and the “spiritual leader” of Al-Jamaah Al-Islamiyah (JI) 3) to outlaw the Al-Jamaah Al-Islamiyah as terrorists organizations”(Zuhri 2016:97). The second step was taken after President Megawati Soekarnoputri launched Government Regulations in Lieu of Law (Perpu) No.1 /2002, six days after Bali Bomb on 12 October 2002 which killed 88 Australians, 23 UK, and 7 US Citizen (‘Bali Death’ 2003). The third step is when the National parliament increased the status of this Perpu as the anti-terrorism Law No.15/2003 in April 2003. The law was passed due to the speech act from external countries and members of parliament who saw that NII now had transformed as JI (Solahudin 2013:145) and continued to terrorize several cities targeting International corporations McDonalds and also police offices. The institutionalization of counter-terrorism through this law gave legal framework for government to give mandate towards national police to define the terrorist, the acts, and the actors to counter-terrorism in Indonesia. This law make Indonesian National Police started received abundant of funds and assistance from US and Australia which were manifested to military equipment, capacity building and training for law enforcement personnel, and other strategic cooperation with national police) which increased annually (Febrica 2010:581-586 and Seniwati & Alimudin 2016:92). GWoT favors Indonesian Government to shift the perception of JI from national insurgency under the new discourse; terrorism.

2.3 De-radicalization and Disengagement

The genesis of so-called ‘terrorist’ rehabilitation can be traced during British Colonial administration that treated male and female detainees from Kikuyu ethnic who rebelled in The Mau-Mau Uprising (1952-1960) into full-scale rehabilitation program called ‘pipeline’ which aimed to transform them becoming progressive citizen (Gunaratna 2015:10). Nowadays, the debate of terrorist rehabilitation spanned into two big concepts: de-radicalization and disengagement. Richard Barrett and Laila Bokhari in their article called *Deradicalization and Rehabilitation Programmes Targeting Religious Terrorists and Extremists in the Muslim World* defined de-radicalization as “countering the appeal militancy, changing attitudes” (Barett & Bokhari 2009:170). Daniel Koehler in his book titled *Understanding De-radicalization: Methods, Tools, and Programs for Countering Violent Extremism* (2017) defined de-radicalization as:

“A process of re-pluralization when a person affected to violent extremist ideology is persuaded to discover an alternative perspective, values, visions, and behaviour or options towards the violent ideology in pursuing their goal” (Koehler 2017:89).

Koehler interprets de-radicalization as the set of intervention which aims to counter and remove the radical worldview of extremists to finally be able to reintegrate with society and state. It consists of comprehensive approaches and tools for rehabilitating terrorist inmates inside prison. Radicalization at first time was defined as the process of someone or community of becoming violence because of constant deprivation and increased grievances fuelled by indoctrination of political ideologies at that time. Discourse of de-radicalization was used to describe the process of rehabilitation and transformation of behaviour of those members of terrorist group or gang members in Europe. However, since post-Cold War and especially after 9/11, this framework of radicalization and de-radicalization have used to what world politics constructed as the terrorists; Salafi-Jihadists Organization.

The discourse for de-radicalization as the terrorist rehabilitation program became stronger after RAND, an influential think-tank institution published the report called *De-radicalizing Islamist Extremists* (2010). RAND argued that Islamist extremists should de-radicalize instead of being just disengaged from violence. It believes that disengagement still open the risk of recidivism when prisoners had an opportunity manipulate non-violent behaviour inside prison but once they back to their former network, they will recommit violence (Rabasa et.al 2010:35). Therefore, de-radicalization is needed to accompany the process of disengagement to completely change convicted terrorists behaviour.

RAND’s de-radicalization framework offers comprehensive strategy in removing violent ideology, transforming behaviour, and preparing better reintegration for VEP. Scholars on these particular stances mostly come from the strategic and security studies where realist mind set are dominant. Rohan Gunaratna believed that de-radicalization is the battlefield to rehabilitate of violent Islam extremists through comprehensive manner. To de-radicalize the ‘terrorists’, government should do three things: provide better religious education, state, and family. Those multiple approaches (religious, family, vocational, and psychological) are needed to change the mindset and behaviour to make VEP renounce their ideology (Gunaratna 2009).

To bring Gunaratna’s ideas into practice, Andrew Silke introduces ‘risk assessment’ to address the types of intervention needed to de-radicalization (Silke 2014:108-1022). In Indonesia, the practice of risk and need assessment is endorsed by Zora Sukabdi and group of Psychologists from University of Indonesia. Sukabdi, in her article titled *Psychological Rehabilitation for Ideology-Based Terrorism Offenders* (2017), created ten steps to rehabilitate terrorist inmates. Those are a comprehensive methods aimed to measure, assess, and classify terrorist inmates hence providing suitable approaches treatment related to make them re-establish and human capacity and human function (Sukabdi 2017:1). Those scholars believe that security and psychological regime inside prison such as classification, risk assessment tools, and capacity-building of law enforcement is important way to provide effective CVE program under de-radicalization, hence removing ideology of violent extremism from the minds of VEP. De-radicalization practice legitimizes the exercise of power to discipline and punish of inmates inside correction facilities. It acquires “governmentality” in which Michel Foucault defined as “the technique and procedure to control human behaviour” (Foucault 1997:82) Governmentality is needed to maintain absolute power of state towards possession of capital and order.

At the other spectrum of debate, there are several scholars who come from disengagement discourse in understanding rehabilitation of VEP. These scholars mostly came from critical political theory, social sciences, and anthropology. John Horgan, Mary Beth

Altier, and Christian Thoroughgood in their article titled *Turning Away from Terrorism: Lessons from Psychology, Sociology, and Criminology* (2014) defined Disengagement as:

“The process of ceasing terrorist activity. Rather than one finite step, we suggest disengagement is a dynamic process resulting in a shift to a new role (and identity) outside of the organization” (Altier, et.al 2014:648).

The important argument from this spectrum is also contributed by the work of political scientist, Julie Chernov Hwang. In her book titled *Why Terrorists Quit* (2018) she interviewed fifty former violent extremists in Indonesia on why they decided to disengage from violence. She found that disengagement and the transformation of violent extremists was happened at least because of four peer-related factors 1) disillusionment towards jihad tactics 2) Their leaders 3) rational assessment, and 4) relationships (Hwang 2018:51). When that moment occurs it shifted their belief on violence (Hwang 2017:277-295). The criticism towards de-radicalization program is delivered by Tom Pettinger in which he emphasized the manner of rehabilitation program inside prison. He argued that De-radicalization is harmful methods as it force VEP to subjugate to the national ideology by being taught what is correct moderate religious teaching or what is to be politically correct living in harmony within country (Pettinger 2017:1-59). Those scholars are trying to reveal socio-structural problem and identity politics as the heart of understanding on how violent extremists should be addressed. Despite of security issues, these scholars believe violent extremism is more likely about political and conflict management issue which is not necessarily solved through forceful power-relations under securitization and zero-sum game in addressing conflict.

2.3 Curing with Kindness? Other approaches

De-radicalization experiences from other countries can be of some interest as well. How de-radicalization is current conducted in other parts of global practice, when it comes to rehabilitating VEP? Saudi Arabian and Danish experiences are very contrasting.. Saudi Arabian government uses a 3-step program involving: prevention, rehabilitation, and aftercare (Brzuszkiewicz 2017). This approach is the main strategy to de-radicalize inmates, who were also given counselling by psychologists, psychiatrists, Islamic jurisprudence experts and Imam (Brzuszkiewicz 2017). Saudi Arabia practices a policy that provides convicted terrorists better facilities and more resources than other inmates, with the intention that by these means, the jihadi inmates will no longer think about jihad as their only salvation, and will instead think about family, prosperity, and well-being.

Meanwhile, another contrasting experience is that of Denmark. The Danish government believes that radicalism and violent extremism is the product of a lack of social integration on the part of minorities, rather than deriving from misguided religious beliefs. Therefore, community members at local level in Denmark were given mandates to integrate and embrace alienated group by promoting Danish values of democracy where each citizen can understand rules, norms, and responsibilities (Rabasa et.al 2010:151). This is supposed to enhance social cohesion within the components of pluralist Danish society. The Danish government has also aimed to combat discrimination by building awareness on the part of family, religious leader, employers, prison, and other institutions that discrimination can result in profound alienation of young Muslim men in particular. (Rabasa 2010: 152-156).

To theorize these various experiences, Koehler categorizes de-radicalization inside prison as micro-level intervention which focuses on individual change. He made de-radicalization typology based on actors, contact approach, and relevance of ideological

component into seven models: A, B, C, D, E, F, and G. Following are table summary regarding Koehler typology of de-radicalization policy according to countries practices worldwide:

Table 2.1 Koehler's Typology of De-radicalization

Type	Description
A	Focusing the role of non-governmental actors and not having a direct contact with de-radicalization target as they implement the program to the intended audiences such as former gang member or right-wing movements but the program content strong ideological approach (Koehler 2017:119).
B	Focusing the role of non-governmental actors and not having a direct engagement with de-radicalization target. Also the program does not acquire ideological approach to transform the target (Koehler 2017:123).
C	Focusing the role of non-governmental actors but this organization actively profile the de-radicalization target as it individually engage with them under both approach: with or without the ideological content (Koehler 2017:124)
D	Focusing the role of government actor as it actively identifies de-radicalization target through profiling and engage them individually through programs which pursue ideological change through theological approach (Koehler 2017:125).
E	Focusing the role of government actor as it actively identifies de-radicalization target and engage them through one on one mentoring programs which combined small portion of ideological treatment and large portion of practical skills such as socio economic assistance, vocational skills development (Koehler 2017:127).
F	Focusing on governmental actors which do a large-scale program with very big and broad audience. They do not engage with de-radicalization target but open participation from stakeholders (such as family, community) to engage with government without any ideological intervention (Koehler 2017:129).
G	Focusing on the collaboration between government-private sector/ NGOs which work together towards broad audiences and not directly engage with de-radicalization target. However, this type acquires ideological change through religious approach or family engagement (Koehler 2017:133).

Therefore, understanding Koehler's typology will give us clear ideas to categorize which de-radicalization model does Indonesian Government and its proponents belongs based on its policy, discourse, actors, and other specific characteristic.

2.4 Debating Salafi-Jihadism as a Social Movement

Salafism is *manhaj* (methods) in believing Islam through seeking purification and textual interpretation of Qur'an and Hadits based on the practice from the first and second generation of Islamic people after Prophet Muhammad. Din Wahid, an Indonesian Islamic Scholar, divided Salafist within three big branches: 1) Purist: putting total subjugation to government or ruler and focus to sermon and education 2) Haraki: who argues that Islam should cover whole aspect of life, not only ritual but also social, economy, and politics hence they wage political struggle under political faction 3) Jihadi: who argues that you should take arms and wage the political struggle through war against the authority which

prevents you to fully implementing Islamic law (Din Wahid 2014:373). In this research, we are going to look to the Salafi Jihadism within diverse spectrums of Salafism. The western securitization regime and its hostile construction towards Salafi-Jihadism may have influenced the policy makers to understand it under security and conflict discourse. The result is we never analyse their existence through social-movement lens and perspectives (Hansen 2014:1).

Prior to its securitization as the terrorists, Salafi Jihadism as part of political Islam has been already emerging even since in the middle of 20th century. It appears within specific context by referring to the material condition such as colonialism, the falling of Ottoman Empire in 1923, the Israeli-Palestine war in 1947, and the Afghan-Soviet War in 1979. The rise of Salafi-Jihadism came from the struggle of Islamists movements against political injustice which happened in Middle East during Palestinian-Israeli conflict which drove the Egyptian-secular young guy named Sayyid Qutb launched movements as Bayat described below:

“Islamist movements in the Middle East and North Africa as the third (after political and economic) phase of anti-colonial struggles-discursive struggles against Western modernity, struggles for cultural identity and independence..” (Bayat, 2006: 895).

Driven by those grievances, Qutb tried to regain political Islam by mobilizing people in social movements that is defined as “a conscious, collective, organized attempt to bring about or resist large-scale change in the social order by non-institutionalized means.” (Wilson 1973:8). In this sense, we can see how Salafi Jihadism as the ideology and movement are formed through scholars like Qutb and Abdullah bin Azzam who manifested the deprivation and grievances among Muslim people through their writings which called people for collective action by waging jihad and declaring resistance against the government which repressed political Islam and is unable to fight injustice in Israeli-Palestine conflict.

Alberto Melucci specifically identifies some basic orientations of social movements: solidarity and conflict as Eric Hiariej used it to explain the rise of Salafi Jihadism as the Islamic fundamentalist below:

“Solidarity means the ability of actors who are involved in a social movement to recognize, and in return to be recognized by, their fellow activists as being part of the similar social collectiveness. Conflict-oriented social movements involve antagonism between two or more actors over the control of valuable social resources available to society at large..” (Hiariej 2009:13-14)

By this explanation we will see how Salafi-Jihadism under social movement theory applies in the research to explain VEP attitude inside prison. In Indonesia, Islamic fundamentalism that awaked in form of Salafi Jihadism came as the result from four material conditions: the remnants of NII activists which amalgam with transnational Islamist movement’s ideology, the return of foreign fighters from Afghanistan, Authoritarianism of New Order regime, and the Indonesia’s inter-religious conflict in post-Soeharto Regime (as discussed in Bruinessen 2001:2). Eric Hiariej’s findings in “*The Politics of Becoming Fundamentalists in the age of Global Consumer Culture* (2009)” argued that Islamic Fundamentalism in this current trends was also influenced by today’s globalization, capitalism, and consumer culture in which it shaped the perspective and world-view of most the Islamist activists movement as they claimed it was a response towards day to day oppression to their identity and deprivation to their self-actualization (Hiariej 2009:22).

And the process of becoming fundamentalist is their related to their long standing social process related to the global structure.

Hiariej's thoughts on Islamic fundamentalism as new social movements have correlated with Scott Attran's anthropological approach in understanding Salafi-Jihadist group. He believes that these violent extremist committed 'terrors' because of more than just an ideological factor as he argued "people don't simply kill because of cause, they kill and die for each other" (Atran 2010:2). It takes value such as collective, fraternity, and brotherhood in which they are being taken away from today's modernity. Through this perspective, we can have better understanding what are the social process and structural factors which can contribute to the making of Salafi-Jihadism as well as the root causes for them in justifying their violent act according to their context.

2.5 Conclusion

Thus, this research paper uses these three theorizations for explaining the contesting power-relations, identity, and structural constrained as it is useful to answer the research questions. The contrast theorizations between securitization and social movement also between de-radicalization and disengagement will try to find then bridge the gap on what is missing on the discourse when de-radicalization policy was conducted or even we can question to the de-radicalization and its implication in order to manage those conflicting powers in world politics.

Chapter 3

Rehabilitation of ‘Terrorists’ in Indonesian Prisons

3.1 Introduction

This chapter mainly discusses the Indonesian government discursive practices and IGO/NGO policies in implementing disengagement and de-radicalization projects inside Indonesian prison. The analysis will emphasize on the underlying assumption of the practice and also capture how International and local actor represented the problem of terrorists rehabilitation issues as part of the global discourse. This chapter highlights the VEP rejection of de-radicalization and disengagement programmes based on interviews with three former VEPs. This chapter ends with an explanation of correlations between types of de-radicalization programmes and the problem of their rejection according to securitization and social movement theory. Thus, this chapter will provide answers to the research questions about current de-radicalization policies, the global discourse that shapes de-radicalization practices, and the challenges in handling VEP under de-radicalization program.

3.2 Government Discursive Practices

The history of de-radicalization Indonesia can be traced back since August 1962 when Indonesian Government under President Soekarno granted amnesty to 32 elites of NII movements who were already surrendered. President Soekarno at that time granted them the amnesty under condition that they should pledge in the God’s name, their loyalty to Indonesian Government, its constitution, and its political order which was uphold based on Pancasila. For some years after the amnesty, Special Operation Intelligence under Soeharto Regime in Indonesia distributed money and gave leaders and activist exclusive rights to sell commodities. The aim was to domesticize them from waging rebellion and war towards the government as well as to legitimize the politics of New Order Regime (Juansyah 2016:40). New order regime also incorporated civic responsibility into the national education curriculum to uphold Pancasila as the national ideology within schools and any education institution.

Indonesian Government used anti-terrorism law to fight JI which was responsible for many bombings. The anti-terrorism law has shifted the government discourses regarding security threat priority from subversive separatist groups to the religious-based violent extremists groups including Salafi Jihadist-led organization. The law gave mandate to Indonesian National Police, through Special Detachment 88 to deal with these new terrorist organizations. By 2007, they had already arrested hundreds suspected terrorists inside prison and there was no specific law that enforced the rehabilitation of terrorists during their incarceration. Prior to 2010, National Police formed *ad hoc* de-radicalization team to conduct inmate rehabilitation led by Suryadharma (ICG 2007 and IPAC 2014) and Tito Karnavian. He initiated engagements with VEP and provide them with services that they needed (Ali Firmana & Solahudin 2017:233-260). Adhe Bakti affirmed this argument “Pak Tito was very royal to Basri (inmates), sometimes he bought his needs and give money 2 million to three million rupiah per visit” (Interview with Adhe Bakti, Jakarta August 13, 2018). Tito maintained contact with the inmates until the establishment of BNPT.


The de-radicalization policy inside prison in Indonesia is conducted based on BNPT Blueprint, which was published between 2014/2015. This Blueprint was made by Deputy I

for BNPT in collaboration with The Nusa Institute, a think-tank NGO that works for research and public policy. BNPT Director of De-radicalization, Irfan Idris chose to work with the The Nusa Institute due to his close relation with its director, Nazaruddin Umar, an Islamic scholars and later also Imam of Istiqlal Mosque (The Grand Mosque of Indonesia) who had long relationship with Tito Karnavian as National Police representatives. Moreover, he comes from the same region as Idris (Makassar, South Sulawesi). The combination between strong Islamic backgrounds, the long relationship with powerful actor of counter-terrorism, and cultural ties has lead Umar and his team from Nusa Institute, which consisted of Islamic scholars, to influence the discourses about understanding of terrorism and de-radicalization (Personal Communication with Imam Malik, CVE Practitioners, Jakarta 28 September 2018).

3.2.1 Categorisation in Dealing with VEP

The de-radicalization blueprint consisted of the strategy on how VEP should be treated inside prison in which they have to follow identification, re-education, re-socialization, and reintegration the latter is given after they are released in parole. The blueprint scheme of de-radicalization is derived by the discourse from RAND corporations report “De-radicalizing Islamists Extremists”. It also took quotations from the social psychologists such as Arie W. Kruganski and security scholars from Singapore, Rohan Gunaratna. The combination of knowledge in terrorism between RAND, Kruganski, and Gunaratna had inspired the Nusa Institute to categorize the offenders based their role such as below:

Figure 3.1 The typology of VEP according to BNPT Blueprint (Sutrimo et.al 2015:1)



This blueprint categorizes the VEP according to their role in the terrorist groups and the following is the explanation on the types of VEP derived from the blueprint (BNPT 2015:18-19):

- a. **Ideologists:** The clerics or ulama” who spread the teachings and motivation of jihad. They are Imams among their followers and establish salafi-jihadists organization.
- b. **Militant:** The leaders of the violent extremist factions that implement the words of the Imams. They command several people to conduct violent action and also possess military skills such as using firearms, making explosives, and designing tactics for combat.
- c. **Supporters:** The persons who are involved in the mission of Salafi-jihadist group. They are usually charged with joining the terrorists groups, hiding notable suspects, smuggling weapons, or providing access which contributes towards acts of terror.
- d. **Sympathizers:** The ones who decide to follow violent extremists group with or without consent but contribute to the jihad. They are usually caught in the situation or being recruited inside prison.

This categorization blueprint argues that De-radicalization program should be targeted to militants and the supporters of Salafi-jihadism who are incarcerated. It is difficult to de-radicalize the core as Adhe Bhakti testified:

“Once, we invited Toni, the bomb victim to meet Abu Bakar Ba’asyir and Aman Abdurrahman in order to touch their empathy and make them stop propagating violence. However, at the end Ba’ssyir said “Oh please, that you should not to go around (to meet us or other jihadist) anymore, you will go to heaven just like us” as Abdurrahman also said “Please stop do this Mr. Toni, (we know that) you are an American Agent...” (Interview with Adhe Bhakti, Jakarta 13 Agustus 2018).


The difficulty to de-radicalize “core figures” such as Abu Bakar and Aman is the evidence that there are so-called ‘organic intellectuals’ that works within Salafi-Jihadist social movements. They are the leaders of the movements who have clear perception about what are their goals in a religion and whom they perceive as the enemy against whom they wage war. Both ideologists know about the securitization project involving subjugation of Salafi-jihadist movements although by deploying soft approach.

3.2.2 The Plan for De-radicalization

Parallel to the government typology, High Rank-National Police Officers, Petrus Golose and Tito Karnavian added the discourse of de-radicalization by developing the theory of conducting de-radicalization. Golose argued that philosophical aspect of de-radicalization should cover three principles: humanist, soul approach, and the touching of grassroots (Idris & Taufiqurrohman 2015:73). Meanwhile, Karnavian argued that radicalization came from five components: 1) the recruiters 2) the recruited 3) message justified by legitimizing ideology 4) method of radicalization 5) socio and psychological context. Therefore, he proposed five steps to conducting de-radicalization based on the roots of radicalization 1) undermining violent ideology narratives 2) tackling the recruiters 3) neutralizing people who are vulnerable to radicalization 4) undermining radicalization method 5) recovering the context, external factors which may facilitate radicalization process (Carnavian 2015:188-189). Nevertheless, instead of adopting Karnavian’s theory, BNPT continued to stick onto de-radicalization blueprint that aimed to prevent the offenders of reiteration of terrorism under the following scheme:

Figure 3.2 BNPT Scheme for De-radicalization inside Prison (Sutrimo et.al 2015:2)

Figure 3. Model of De-radicalization of Terrorism Prisoners in Prisons (Sutrimo, 2015)



The process of rehabilitation starts with an Identification process, which is aimed at measuring and categorizing inmates' levels of engagement with violent Islamist ideology and their commitment to violence and needs for social reintegration. After profiling and identification, they conduct the de-radicalization program, which includes rehabilitation, re-education, and re-socialization. The substance of rehabilitation, re-education, and re-socialization consists of nation-building and civic insights (*Wawasan Kebangsaan*), religion insights (*Wawasan Keagamaan*), and Entrepreneurship (*Kewirausahaan*). In the next section, I will further explain how the scheme above relates to the discourse and policy assumptions behind this de-radicalization plan.

3.2.3 Underlying Assumptions of the Plan

The discourse behind the BNPT de-radicalization scheme is also supported by BNPT staff and de-radicalization practitioners. The Head Section of BNPT De-radicalization unit, Firmana (pseudonym) mentioned “we need Islamic clerics with their moderate and peaceful approach because we would like to reframe their perspective and understanding on how they see Islam”, from extreme to accept difference. Yudhistira, prison staff from Cipinang prison, Jakarta also mentioned the same argument “Their understanding of Islam is bending over, and it should be leaned forward into the right path, towards peaceful Islam that co-exist with national ideology” (Interview with Yudhistira, Jakarta, August 10 2018)). Those statements from government officials also supported by people from NGOs sectors. For example, Adhe Bhakti also mentioned that ‘terrorism’ happened due their distorted understandings about Islam. The religious distortion has justified the act of violence and terror (Interview with Adhe Bhakti, Jakarta 13 August 2018). Idham Eka, Directors of Daya Makara, mentioned that terrorism happened due to wrong contextualization of understanding jihad, in which they used Quranic verses that justify war and installing Islamic values through violence in peaceful countries. Therefore, the religious misleading discourse is quite dominant from this issue (Interview with Idham Eka Putra, Jakarta 13 August 2018). Therefore, both government and civil society argue that de-radicalization heavily rests on the two big premises: the inmates’ or so-called Islamists’ lack of understanding of the nation-building ideas that provide the foundations of Indonesia; particularly on how Indonesia and Pancasila as national ideology was also built through Ulama’ consensus under Islamic thought and values. Secondly, Indonesia as the largest Muslim population in the world has two biggest Islamic Civil Society Organizations, Nahdlatul Ulama’ (NU) and Muhammadiyah. These two religious organizations claimed that those terrorists misinterpreted and wrongly contextualized Islam in Indonesia by exploding a bomb and killing people in the name of Islam. Meanwhile, the rest of Islamic population still live at peace, hence there must be something wrong with their understanding of Islam. International Crisis Group (ICG), in its report in 2008, also suggested recommendation that Indonesian Government should involve clerics from NU and Muhammadiyah to de-radicalize the terrorist inmates (Zuhri 2016:111).

As an updated regulation, in order to receive parole and remission through Government Regulations (Peraturan Pemerintah/PP) No.99/2012, the terrorist inmates who would like to apply for parole should follow the series de-radicalization program held by BNPT and sign a statement letter where they pledge their loyalty towards Indonesian Government and Pancasila as the only ideology. This policy seemed to repeat to the events when Indonesian government gave amnesty to NII elites back in 1962. Therefore, the discourse and conversation on handling VEP sum up the goal of BNPT de-radicalization programs inside prison in which according to de-radicalization blueprint was to “leave their radical ideology and replace it with Pancasila ideology” (BNPT 2015) and the synthesis table below, adapted based on Scriven & Gasper (2000) model, depicts BNPT and government argumentation in conducting rehabilitation and re-education derived from the blueprint.

Table 3.1 The Logical Structure on Government De-radicalization inside Prison

I propose that claim	Given that data	And the principle that warrant	Unless (Rebuttal)
“BNPT rehabilitation aimed to distance the target from their radical ideology by giving the right understanding of religion (Islam)… through moderation of ideology” (p.86-92)	Islam does not teach violence. Muhammadiyah and Nadhatul Ulama’ are big Muslim organization and do not commit violence. They have moderate understanding	This VEP has wrong understanding of Islam and Radical ideology can be moderated	There is rejection from inmates to follow program.
BNPT rehabilitation aimed to recover psychological condition, extreme and radical thinking mind set, hence assisting inmates to rediscover their mental conditions according to religious guidance and socio-context where they live in diversity. (p.86)	Terrorists committed attack in the name of moral and religious reason that Indonesia’s government system are infidels and not Islamic.	VEP has a psychological problem to understand Islam and contextualize the social condition of Indonesia that’s why they are doing violence in the name of Islam.	The terrorists does not have psychological problem, and can justify on why they are being extreme or radical.
“BNPT re-education aims to give enlightenment through religious understanding which seeks peace, tolerance, openness, and respecting of differences..” (p.96).	Their radical Islamic thoughts are waging war and violence towards infidels or non-believers of Islam.	VEP have a narrow minded understanding of Islam They do not know about that there is peaceful Islamic ideas People’s attitude can be changed from radical to tolerant Muslim.	The inmates knows very well about Islam and have different interpretation
“BNPT re-education aims to provide knowledge about nationhood, loving your motherlands, and Republic of Indonesia... (p. 96)	This inmates reject nationalism as they believe in Islamist Ideology	They do not understand nationalism and Pancasila as national ideology that corresponds with Islamic teachings.	The inmates already knows the correlation and have a different knowledge and epistemology of Islam
“BNPT re-socialization aims to prepare inmates reintegration through vocational training and entrepreneurial assistance as the skill to live within society.” (p.103)	Those terrorists will be released and back again in society without jobs, and their status as former prisoners.	Former inmates should live again normally in society by being independent and productive in economy thus forgetting jihad.	Inmates are aich people with many businesses.

Adapted from (Gasper 2000:18)

In implementing this logic, BNPT De-radicalization Directorate has been given mandate by Indonesian Government in de-radicalizing VEP. Despite the persuasive approach being conducted, BNPT continued to be an institution that is produced by the series of securitization policies towards Salafi-Jihadists whom state regarded as the terrorists. BNPT became the legitimized hands of the state in defeating the terrorists in every corner, including inside prison. It has moved the new frontier of counter-terrorism battle; inside prison with an ultimate goal: to subjugate the terrorists under national ideology. In achieving its mission, BNPT hired psychologists from University of Indonesia to conduct assessments and profile the VEP. BNPT comes roughly once in a month or at least periodically to prison to conduct the de-radicalization program, “BNPT asked the inmates about their needs and what they want to do after their release” (Interview with Yudhistira, Jakarta, 10 August 2018). BNPT combined civic and religious indoctrination from religious scholars as VEP have been misunderstood about Islam. They also recruited several religious leaders and scholars to go inside prison and make a dialogue with VEP, which are the main target for de-radicalization. BNPT worked with religious leaders and

former Islamists combatant as police did that by deploying Nasir Abas and Ali Imron⁴ to persuade the jihadists to 'back on the right track' (Ali Firmana & Solahudin 2017:233-260 and Abuza 2009:193-211). Inspired by Middle East (Saudi Arabia and UAE) experience who build De-radicalization Centre and Research, BNPT was also building a special prison under title 'De-radicalization Program in Sentul, Bogor. This special prison has 49 cells and can contain 147 inmates (IPAC 2016).

Thus, from the explanation above we can conclude that Indonesian Government discourse in de-radicalization was historically rooted from their *habitus*⁵ in managing national Islamist insurgency. The securitization towards Salafi-Jihadism has manifested into anti-terrorism law and the establishment of BNPT. The latter is the mandated institution that represents the state and its superior power is to make the terrorists renounce their violent ideology through acceptance of Pancasila as the national Ideology, and also social-economic assistance. This finding rejects Koehler's argument that classifies Indonesian as purely type E in de-radicalization typology. Koehler argued that Indonesia runs the type E of de-radicalization because ideology only covers a small portion of program comparing the big chunks of practical skills (Koehler 2017:127). However, this research shows that Government de-radicalization program is ambiguously positioned between type E and D since it also involves the major elements of Type D. The government discourse acquires not only entrepreneurial assistance to rehabilitate inmates but also governmentality through an ideological approach that uses religious and civic debate to try and achieve cognitive openings. The reasons to say that the Indonesian government also implements type D are twofold: firstly, they wanted to shift the Ideology of each inmate from an extreme Islamism to a more moderate Islam that complies with the Pancasila ideology by institutionalizing this process in the application PP:99/2012 as a requirement for parole. Secondly, it is the BNPT strategy to bring together religious scholars, clerics, and psychologists to engage in an asymmetric dialogue to try and de-radicalize VEP.

3.3 Non-State Actors and International Organization

Beside the government, many civil society organizations through NGO and research institutions already have gained initiatives and endeavoured to work on terrorism issues since 2009. One of the most influential discourse-makers in terrorism issues in Indonesia is Sidney Jones. She is the former executive director and Senior Advisor for International Crisis Group (ICG) and the Director for Institute for Policy Analysis and Conflict (IPAC). ICG is a think-tank institution that aims to provide intelligent analysis and recommendations for policy-makers to prevent violent conflict that is trending and shaping global discourse of world conflict including terrorism and religious militants (ICG 2018). It was the branch of Carnegie Endowment for Peace Institution, which serves the interest of many International Organizations. Since Indonesia joined GWoT, Jones actively produced knowledge and published policy recommendations related to terrorism and prison such as violent extremist movements inside prison, de-radicalization program, prison reform, and

⁴Ali Imron was one of the perpetrator of Bali Bombings in 2002 and Nasir Abbas was the ex-commander of JI in Malaysia who trained many jihadists in Southeast Asia.

⁵ **Habitus:** 'the way' society becomes. It is created through a social process leading to patterns that are enduring and transferrable from one context to another. "Habitus is created by a kind of interplay between the two over time: dispositions that are both shaped by past events and structures, and that shape current practices and structures." (Bourdieu 1984: 170).

prisoners' radicalization. Jones often appears as a speaker in many counter-terrorism forums and also teaches law enforcement apparatus such as police and prison officers in JCLEC Training programs, including students such as Yudhistira. Her recommendations were once strongly considered by Tito Karnavian, but under the current BNPT regime, it seemed they have overlooked her research findings (Personal communication with Deka Anwar, IPAC researcher, Jakarta September 2018). Jones produces discourses which we can refer as the speech act within securitization, as she put the frame that activities of violent extremists group and conflicting faction within among social group as the pressing issues and need to be tackled by high security measure. It is also affirmed that ICG is regarded as the securitizing agent who advocates certain discourse in the knowledge production of conflict (Blieseman de Guevara 2014:545-562)

NGOs also have conducted several intervention programs towards VEP. Most of the NGOs who were going inside prison must have a prior relation or cooperation with law enforcement, either police, BNPT, or Directorate General Correction (DGC). They have displayed several methods in de-radicalizing the target. For example, Psychologists from University of Indonesia under leadership of Prof. Sarlito W. Sarwono with Islamic Scholars from Center of Al-Quran Studies went inside prison to engage in a debate and counter the ideology of former inmates. The objective was to prove that it is the jihadists' ideas that need to be corrected. De-radicalization programs inside Prison continued in 2013 when BNPT collaborated with Yayasan Pancasila to create a program named Klinik Pancasila (Pancasila Clinic). They called it 'clinic' because they created a role-play where the facilitators are the patients and the inmates the doctors, with the idea of giving inmates a better understanding about Pancasila (national ideology) through regular consultation. The consultation is executed through dialogue, lectures, and interactive games related to Pancasila and nation-building character by putting assumption that if terrorists started to embrace Pancasila their radicalism and engagement to violence has decreased (Idris & Taufiqurrohman and Bin Ali 2015:82). Moreover, BNPT in 2013 implemented de-radicalization strategy by inviting former Muslim Brotherhood and Salafi Ulama" Dr. Najih Ibrahim, Hasan al Halabi, and Hisyam al Najjar who had already disengaged from their previous violent ideology to make dialogue and persuading with inmates in several prisons where the hard-liners of JI incarcerated.

International Development Agencies have continued to increase their funding of the local NGO which works on de-radicalization and disengagement of VEP. VEP rehabilitation has become a global issue for many countries hence they collaborate through political and security cooperation towards non-governmental organization in Indonesia. Most of the donors such as Foreign and Commonwealth Office UK (FCO UK), United States Government, The Asia Security Fund New Zealand (ASF-NZ), and Australia Indonesia Partnership in Justice (AIPJ), seek for law and security improvement for combatting violent extremism through institutionalization and governance reform (AIPJ II:2017 & Seniwati & Alimudin 2016:92). Search for Common Ground (SFCG) is an INGO that has conducted conflict management training for prison inmates inside since 2010. SFCG worked with Indonesian DGC to build capacity of high-risk inmates on how to deal with conflict without violence as a broader goal to reduce the rate of recidivism. However, since 2012 it started to incorporate terrorist inmates for Conflict Management Training (CMT) up to in 17 prisons in Indonesia. Both direct and indirect engagement to de-radicalize VEP later is also shown by many International Organizations such as New South Wales, UNICRI, UNODC as well as local NGO like LPPMI, INSEP and Yayasan Prasasti Perdamaian (YPP). Firmania was also a beneficiary of the Violent Extremists Risk Assessment (VERA) Training, New South Wales (NSW) program. The complete list of the Government and INGOs' activities in conducting intervention-contributed efforts at de-radicalization and disengagement of VEP can be seen in **Appendix 1**.

That appendix explains that the de-radicalization programs inside prison, mostly emphasized the psychological profiling, capacity building for prison staff related to prison safety and security also developing rehabilitation programs to either counter Salafi-jihadist ideology or reducing their risk of re-engaging in violence. Therefore, VEP were still assumed by both national governments and NGOs to be security threats with a wrong understanding of Islam, which needs to be defused with a bigger understanding of their profiles, using psychological assessment to reduce their risk, then finding suitable intervention as their cure through de-radicalization program. Adhe Bakti complemented the substance by emphasizing man-to-man approach. For example, he illustrated his idea by saying that prison authorities should have one log book for one VEP which aimed to monitor what treatment has been given (Interview with Adhe Bakti, Jakarta 10 August 2018). From this table we can conclude that the typology of de-radicalization model of Indonesian-based NGO and International Organizations is different with the government as they can be categorized as Type-E of de-radicalization model. It is similar with Type-D as it also seeks governmentality but Type E is less ideological, but still actively engages with inmates through inmate placement, technical assistance program, and focus on so-called man to man company. This trending de-radicalization program and its methods thus created discourse regarding what is the problem represented regarding VEP rehabilitation inside Indonesian prison as shown in WPR analysis table (see Appendix 2). These problems of representation indicate that the discourses which have manifested into policies and programs have circulated around local stakeholders of VEP rehabilitation, and therefore hence it built dominant discourses of de-radicalization inside Indonesian prisons. Thus, this dominant and powerful discourse produces certain frame which influence the perspectives and views towards VEP as synthesized on the following table below:

Table 3.2 Government and INGO/NGOs Frame on VEP

Actors	Frame in dealing Violent Extremists Prisoners	Solution to De-radicalization inside Prison.
BNPT	Terrorist ideology and its dissemination are creating instability hence is the source of violent conflict and security threat for Indonesia. These violent extremists have a wrong interpretation of Islam and religiously misunderstood about how nation is built. Most of them were following the wrong Imams. It is the reason why they commit 'terrorism' although the majority of population are Muslim but they don't propagating 'terrors'. BNPT has a special mandate to gather all the resources and conduct de-radicalization program inside prison. All the radical mindset should be changed by moderate interpretation of Islam	Religious Education Nation and Civic Education Entrepreneurial Assistance
DGC	Violent extremist also has wrong interpretation of Islam and jihad. VEP also have the potential to recruit other inmates and helplessly dealing with prison situation. They are excluding themselves from the prison community and. DGC they has no regulation or special mandate to design and conduct de-radicalization program.	Regular rehabilitation: Vocational work inside prison Sports (e.t through Skateboard)
NGO & INGOs	Violent extremist offenders were creating violence and instability, they have certain risk of recidivism and recruitment towards other inmates as they encourage social disharmony not only in societies but also in the prison. There should be an adequate classification, treatment, rehabilitation program, and impact measurement that ensure in order to reduce their level of engagement to violence and back to society normally. However, in approaching those inmates we need trust from them	Capacity building for Staff related to security aspects, violent extremists prisoners management. Inmate Placements Workshop Psychological Measurement Religious Debate and Dialogue Conflict Management Training Entrepreneurial Skills and Financial Aid.

From the table, we can see that the perceptions among the States and International Organizations towards VEP have disseminated the dominant discourse of de-radicalization through implementation of Type-D and Type-E model. The similarities are both of the models seek to defeat violent behaviour and ideology of violent extremism through governmentality. They see VEP ideology and acts as security threats inside prison that have to be tackled through psychological assessment (risk assessment) and religious guidance, something that is also defended by many scholars and the International Forum for counter terrorism. This dominant discourse symbolizes the hegemonic security dimension in understanding who is VEP in Indonesian context. The process of manufacturing of consent can be seen in the conformity of perception and de-radicalization programs towards VEP also indicates that the securitization of Salafi-jihadist movement is well distributed by the government and powerful countries with security interest towards Indonesia in which they channelled their fund through IGO and NGOs. As the donors, those countries openly stated their interest in countering-terrorism, security reform, and law enforcement capacity building inside their term of reference whenever they opened call for proposal (personal communication with AIPJ II 2017 & ASF 2013). This call for proposal has attracted many NGOs to apply hence creating many hands to work towards VEP as they look this as security issue.

3.4 Plans Meeting Realities: Refusal, Rejection, and Resistance by Prisoners

One of the challenges in implementing de-radicalization is the refusal from VEP to participate the program. It also means they do not apply for parole as they refuse to pledge allegiance to Indonesian Government. One of the cases of rejection happened in September 2013 when SFCG was holding Conflict Management Training dedicated for all-type prisoners in Tangerang Prison, Banten Province. Six VEP who were about to join the training suddenly did not show up on the day of training due to religious statement (fatwa) from their leader inside prison who said the activity is less beneficial comparing their religious sermon. Similar rejections also occurred in Cirebon Prison on the following month, seven VEP refused to follow the program as they said this activity was affiliated towards BNPT de-radicalization (SFCG 2013). In fact, it was not completely different actor. On this part, three former inmates Razak, Amar, and Zulkarnaen (pseudonym) explain why government or NGO de-radicalization program sometimes or even most of the time may not work.

Razak, former VEP from Pasir Putih Prison during 2012-2017, told that living as a terrorist inmates inside prison means that you live together with your fellows from with the same criminal charges (terrorism). The social structure consisted of a leader and their followers in which whereand you had to follow your certain religious instruction (fatwa) from your Amir (leader) or Ustadz (teacher) inside prison. Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, the father of modern Indonesian jihad, was Razak's Ustadz and Amir inside prison. Razak was appointed to be his bodyguard and follow whatever he was doing inside prison. Razak mentioned that Ustadz Ba'asyir would like to uphold and purify the teachings of *Tauhid* (divinity) by creating strategy where the VEP could live independently away from prison assistance. He was responsible in taking care of the needs of his fellow jihadists related to food, money, and other needs. It creates social structure and relations of around forty VEP inside prison are depended and centralized on Ba'asyir. According to Razak, Ba'asyir wanted his fellow jihadists not to follow any de-radicalization program because it made them fall into Indonesian government ideology, which was bending away from his concept of being a Muslim.

Refusal to cooperate not only because of the hatred towards police or law enforcement agency, but it is also because the concept of *Al wala a wal Bara* (loyalty and disavowal)

towards the *Tauhid*. Abu Bakar Ba'asyir used the concept of *Tauhid Hakimiyah*⁶ which set up worldview⁷ that explain that Pancasila, national constitution, and democratic regime are the man-made law which does not refer to the acknowledgement of Islamic Law as 'the God's law'. In this concept, when you believe in Allah and his law, you do not believe the man-made system such as democracy, nation-state, pancasila etc. If someone followed it, he believed that the inmates are already left from Islamic values. Therefore, this infidel system hence it should be changed through jihad. However, Ba'asyir preached his teachings calmly and he was always welcoming and friendly to meet, speaking with everyone who met him inside prison. Therefore, Razak did not want to participate any of de-radicalization program from BNPT because he had relationship and solidarity towards Ba'asyir as he pledged loyalty towards the movement by declaring to support ISIS in 2014. As he mentioned:

“Ba'asyir is like a father of us. Even there are still some of inmates were participating the program but Ba'asyir was not angry and kept running his responsibility in taking care of them”

Amar and Zulkarnaen also expressed same situation related to social structure. Both were former terrorist inmates who dwelled at Cipinang Prison during 2009-2014. Amar mentioned that government could not de-radicalize VEP easily because of the social structure and relation between VEP as he stated:

“When I was at detention camp, some policeman from Special Detachment 88 came to me and gave advice for not committing jihad again. He visited me once in a month, meanwhile Abu Husna, our fellow inmates and everyday teacher was preaching us to refuse to cooperate with government. Of course, this detachment 88 effort was a total non-sense”.

Meanwhile, Zulkarnaen also told that his Ustadz named Ubaid believed that BNPT presence through the de-radicalization program obviously represented a government tool that tried to undermine our spirit towards Jihad as Amar affirmed that inside prison we still perceived government agencies and BNPT as the enemy, explaining why his seniors were not willing to join. Moreover, Zulkarnaen believed that there is no need to do so-called de-radicalization to correct his beliefs. He believed that there was nothing wrong with jihadist understanding of Islam based on his worldview as he said:

“Unlike other criminal offender such as murder or theft who knew that they were guilty, when we entered prison it means we did something right. When we waged Jihad we already knew the risk, either you are jailed, killed, and torture, we already knew what will happen to us and we should be ready”.

However, unlike Razak, Amar and Zulkarnaen decided to participate in the de-radicalization program because there was shifting conditions inside prison. Suddenly their leaders and Ustadz such as Abu Dujana gave a religious statement (fatwa) that Jihad was no

⁶ **Hakimiyah** in this context refers to “the obligation to rule only by what Allah has revealed, and associating no other forms of legislation with it. Adoption of rulings, or the adoption of divine laws as dictated by the Quran and Sunnah” (Barclay 2010)

⁷ **Worldview** in this context means “Islam provides knowledge about everything Muslims find in the world. The formation of a (secular) state separated from the influence of religious dogmas, is unthinkable. This leads not only to the rejection of the secular state of Indonesia, but also to the rejection of democracy, human rights, and pluralism” (Hiariej 2009:2)

longer urgent in peaceful country such as Indonesia and now inmates could have self-determination in following government program. Nevertheless, it was not that simple for inmates to have their final decision about government or NGO de-radicalization program. Amar added that motives to keep rejecting program are various, some people wanted to be seen expressing solidarity with fellow inmates, or to be seen as a proper Jihadist. Amar and Zulkarnaen decided to participate conflict management training held by SFCC because they saw their fellow joined the program and carrying snacks and lunch box. “We joined the program because we look to our fellow what are they doing”.

These interviews suggest that Salafi-jihadist group works their ‘holy mission’ inside prison within social movement theory. It not only has the elements such as hierarchical interaction, ideological goals, and worldview about how they perceive their enemy; the government but also the elements of collective action such as agency to resist, solidarity value or brotherhood, and identity-construction. Abu Bakar Ba’asyir as the leader in Pasir Putih Prison had decision to established autonomous system of being independent from prison authority. Meanwhile at different prison, Abu Husna and Ubaid preached motivation and encouragement towards their followers not to follow government. Their experience shows traits of social movement which allows the existence of intellectual organic, their symbolic acts; the refusal to cooperate thus creating autonomous system, and creating the construction of “we-ness” and “our enemy”. The rejection is manifested as the logic of social movement to build collective identity and sense of solidarity in order to resist the oppression (See Melucci in Hiariej 2009:24). It challenges the dominant worldview of government and de-radicalization practitioners that came to govern their thoughts about Islamic ideology. Moreover, we also saw evidence that among VEP are firm with their principle in order to construct ideal perception of being jihadist thus we can also conclude that Salafi-jihadism is also identity struggle. It fits with Hiariej’s argument that said that Islamic fundamentalism is not just the waging of war but it is a response from day to day oppression from globalization (Hiariej 2009:22).

The willingness of inmates to reject de-radicalization program or to eventually renounce from violence was heavily dependent on their interaction and relation with peers, leaders, and social network as part of the social movement inside prison. In the case of Razak, Ba’asyir pledge of allegiance towards Islamic State in 2014 made him in difficult position to participate any de-radicalization program because of the social structure and sense of solidarity under pro-ISIS inmate environment, as in fact that more pro-ISIS is still labelled as non-cooperative towards officers (Category IV). Meanwhile, the case of Amar and Zulkarnaen shows the dynamics and changes within social networks that were rooted in JI current leadership. JI leaders’ fatwa which did not regard Indonesia as an urgent place to do Jihad and therefore allowed the members to follow the de-radicalization program based on their own cost-benefit analysis, strengthened Julie Chernov Hwang’s argument that rational assessment and relationship became one of four major factors on explaining why VEP slowly disengaged from violent ideology (Hwang 2017:50).

3.5 Conclusion

The dominant discourse of the rehabilitation of Salafi-Jihadist inside Indonesian prison is shaped through internal security habitus and global discourse among powerful actors. The internal discourse is shaped through habitus that is strongly rooted in the history of Indonesian government, which forced past Islamist rebellions to accept a national ideology before they were granted amnesty. De-radicalization now has moved the location of counter-terrorism between State and Salafi-Jihadists movement to the inside prison. Meanwhile, the global discourse of terrorist rehabilitation have influenced the work IGO

and NGO to represent Salafi-Jihadism as the source of threat and instability as their International donors securitized the movement through political cooperation with Indonesian Government.

However, the current de-radicalization model (with its policy assumption) still has created hostile power-relation inside prison hence de-radicalization program finds its rejection from the VEP. The resistance was explained due to rejection to be ruled by the ideology of national government expressed in the rehabilitation program's curriculum according to prison staffs and several VEP in Cipinang Prison. Indonesian de-radicalization model which sought governmentality to subjugate VEP towards moderation of Islamic teaching, national ideology, and psychological assessment is proven that Type D opens more risks that can prevent VEP from participating in the rehabilitation program.

These former VEP testimonials opened the fact that there is tense conflict between VEP and National Government or even IGO/NGO, which manifested through securitization program under 'CVE Project' versus VEP movements. The presence of state and IGOs with its interest to rule VEP through injection of national ideology and establishment of high standard of 'security' are regarded as the source of the rejection. It makes VEP mobilised themselves by building independent system and channelling their grievances towards 'alien power' through rejection. Social movement goes against the program. This conflict created stalemate conditions meaning that there is no dialogue related to rehabilitation progress. This condition also revealed that the current production of knowledge which is being taken by decision-makers in de-radicalization program still has not captured the root causes of rejection, the existence of social-relations of power among VEP inside prisons, and the social movement dimension and identity of being-Salafi-jihadist, although it is still useful for understanding the prior condition to disengagement. The next chapter we will discover the silences and absences on de-radicalization programs within discursive practice inside Indonesian prisons.

Chapter 4

Absences & Silences in Current Discursive Practices

4.1 Introduction

In this chapter, we will discuss the absences and silences in the current de-radicalization model that is being implemented. In revealing this issue, the discussions will be divided into two parts: micro and macro-level. The micro level will discuss the technical aspects of de-radicalization as it consists of inmate placements, trust building, alternative approaches to measuring and identification as the government has difficulty due to power-relations and positionality under security bureaucracy. The macro level contains the knowledge regarding how to design de-radicalization content, strategy, and governance which enable the role of strategic actors and collaboration which help to shift the paradigm of rehabilitation from securitization and governmentality towards constructive dialogue by upholding political rights principle in the age of identity politics.

4.2 Problematic Aspects of De-radicalization: Micro Level

Learning from the findings on the previous chapter, the Indonesian Government and NGO's de-radicalization efforts should realize that intense conflicts involve social-relations of power, social structures in social movements, and the embedded identity of being salafi-jihadist are proven factors that damage the rehabilitation goal. There are technical issues that need to be carefully addressed, which can contribute to the further rejection towards de-radicalization program if it is not taken problematically. Following are findings according to interviews with several former inmates, prison staffs, and CVE practitioners from several NGO regarding absences and silences in two technical areas knowledge production that should be considered to minimize the possibility of rejection towards de-radicalization program.

4.2.1 When Technical Meets Political: Inmate Placements & Trust-Building Issues

Sloppy planning and inaccurate strategy for placing inmates in inside prisons will bring counter-productive impacts for rehabilitation programs. During the interview, Yudhistira explained about one inmate named Junaedi who had been transferred from Palembang Prison to Cipinang Prison in Jakarta. He was a deportee from Syria as he had wanted to join ISIS. He was already cooperative with the officer before arriving in Jakarta. Nevertheless, in Cipinang Prison, Junaedi was placed with Ali Zaenal, one of the leaders of IS group inside prison. Yudhistira said how that Ali Zaenal invited Junaedi to become an ISIS Star by encourage him to tell other IS inmates about his experiences living in ISIS territory in Syria. This action increased Junaedi's jihadism under Ali's influence. Since then Junaedi seemed to keep a distance from prison officers and BNPT as he was no longer interested in following any intervention from the government. However, BNPT blamed the prison authorities for this situation, despite the fact it was BNPT's decision to transfer Junaedi for investigative purposes to Jakarta. Ali Zaenal also provoked other VEP through his fatwa to finally stop participating in prison skateboard activities as the program provided by Yudhistira to create new space for interaction between inmates in Cipinang Prison. "There was already a fluid and good communication between different inmates

before Ali did that" Said Yudhistira. IPAC also confirmed about how inmate placement created problems towards the radicalization of other inmates outside terrorism cases.

Moreover, the BNPT's establishment of de-radicalization centre has sparked big question as it decided to put cooperative inmates instead of those 'hard-liners'. The de-radicalization centre was supposed to be for inmates that were uncooperative or hard to rehabilitate. According to IPAC, this policy raised question from DGC officer on why BNPT decided to transfer 55 inmates who are labelled as "cooperative" to that centre. The officer complained that if they are already cooperative, why they are put in de-radicalization centre, meanwhile the 'hard-liners' was still in regular prison where they have the potential to recruit other new inmates (IPAC 2016). Amar mentioned that BNPT offers money towards inmates who wanted to move to that de-radicalization centre. If that is the case the de-radicalization program ultimately just pouring money without evaluative tools instead of engaging in a meaningful dialogue for winning hearts and minds (also discussed in Pettinger 2017:17). This evidence strengthen the statement from head of the de-radicalization unit from BNPT as he told Idham that de-radicalization program applied when inmates starting to cooperate with government. In fact, according de-radicalization blueprint, de-radicalization program should cover all category of VEP, including the uncooperative.

In other issue, trust and the manners of rapport building did not seem to be discussed a lot, and were silent in the problem representation. In fact, these technical issues also created problem related to the manner of prison staff or BNPT in building rapport and trust building towards the inmates. Adhe Bakti mentioned that government (BNPT or correction) had issues in building rapport that could back-fire its program such as by asking directly the inmates about what his case was on the first encounter instead of making them feel comfortable first. In other cases, when prison staffs called an inmate through prison public speaker by saying "Mr.Sofyan Tsauri, there is a guest from BNPT wanted to see you" They mentioned "BNPT" as everybody inside prison could listen the announcements. This lack of privacy surely created disharmony and damaged the relationships between inmates, as it could break solidarity among jihadists when one member was willing to meet the government. Yudhistira emphasized when BNPT created program it considered less with humanist side and just want to do their jobs in formality fashion as Zulkarnaen also noted. In fact, aside from ideological difference, Yudhistira mentioned sometime VEP needs a friend to share and talk to. Amar also added the importance of building conversation with prison staff by saying "Although they (Government) are our enemy, we had a manner to communicate politely with officer". Although BNPT posed powerful jargon "Winning hearts and minds to de-radicalize terrorists" but only few local NGOs who had concern to address the 'know-how' of this issue as part of de-radicalization program (**see Appendix 1**). Thus, they less likely appear in the discourse. These two findings show us that these technical problems are influenced by political issues. As we look the evidences, we can conclude that securitization created tension within two political entities; BNPT, as the product of securitizing agent and Salafi-Jihadist group. It manifested on the failure of BNPT staffs to building rapport and trust towards VEP. The failure in understanding VEP is influenced by the dominant security discourse of de-radicalization and their position as state bureau. Thus, BNPT politically tried to claim the success of de-radicalization program through inmate placements where they miscalculated the risk. They ignored the knowledge of relations within social movement as it mentioned in previous chapter.

4.2.2 Looking for Alternative Knowledge

Adhe Bakti stated that the current de-radicalization program has no clear parameters to assess whether an inmate is transformed or not by the program. Although BNPT already hired psychologists to assess the profile of inmates and set-up indicators to monitor behaviour change, the accuracy of such assessments remained contentious. Assessment results are influenced by inmates' social structures, their relations with the assessor, and their short-term goals as inmates. One of the directors at DGC mentioned that VEP behaviour would likely change to become more cooperative in cases where they wish to apply for parole. Therefore, if de-radicalization impact is measured during that period, it is likely to capture behavioural changes. Moreover, as previously mentioned, there is no de-radicalization program for uncooperative VEP. This surely leaves questions about the long-term rehabilitation outcomes of the program. To measure changes by putting indicators under psychological regime sometimes is not sufficient as Taufik Andrie emphasized to consider anthropological sense⁸ in understanding how particular Jihadists regroup and make sense of their existence and piety like in the case of Jihadists Group of Bima.

Another problematic issue is that the term 'de-radicalization', used by most scholars and practitioners, and even inmates themselves, may not help us in the end. De-radicalization is politically harmful not only as an act and but also the term itself (Pettinger 2016:32). This is because it is very difficult to change someone mindset from one form of Islam, for example from Salafi-jihadism, to more moderate forms of belief. This may especially be the case when the approach implies that rejecting violent tenets in Salafi-Jihadism means supporting Pancasila. For example, in interviews, both Amar and Zulkarnaen, activists that still adhere to Islamist beliefs, suggest that democracy is the wrong system to aim for. Therefore, they rejected Pancasila. In the case based on the interview, I found evidence that de-radicalization from Government cannot come up against fixed beliefs. Razak still thought jihad needed to be waged as long as oppression towards Palestine and Muslim people all over the world continued. He stated that he would continue to fight as Ba'asyir inside the prison. He even explained that: "I am easily radicalized when I heard about [how] Muslims all over the world [are]... oppressed". Three of those interviewed had accepted a compromise situation, where they believed they could co-exist with Pancasila democracy, but not completely. Zulkarnaen said that the most visible thing to do was to disengage from violence as means to attain one's political or religious goals. Zulkarnaen explained: "Irfan (BNPT de-radicalization director) should stop claiming that they actually succeed conducting de-radicalization, while the truth was merely performing disengagement." Zulkarnaen's argument was affirmed in Zora Sukabdi research on 'Reviewing Deradicalization and Disengagement program which one of its former VEP during Focus Group Discussion said "Changing our heart and love for Allah and jihad is impossible, but changing our behavior so we stop bombing is possible, in fact we can" (Sukabdi 2015:43). One of the alternative discourses to disengagement that may reduce the opposition or rejection as well as to channel VEP grievances and their identity politics is by giving them skills to address radical thoughts within democratic government. This disengagement idea will embrace their perspective by perceiving VEP and other Islamist activists under social movement dimension instead replacing their ideology with Pancasila which is proven harmful. However, it needs further advocacy to replace the current de-radicalization model with any alternative discourse as Andrie added:

⁸ Acquiring the knowledge by understanding variety of culture in the making of jihadists group and how it operates.

“It is difficult to change the paradigm and discourse on seeing terrorism as it really depends on powerful actor who played inside such as police, military, and religious organization. They can capitalize the issue and created the discourse regarding terrorism in Indonesia”.

Andrie’s testimonials affirmed our findings, which were mentioned in the previous chapter that securitization has made security actors and elite level decision-makers define the discourse of VEP and terrorism. It hampers people from developing the discourse of terrorist rehabilitation under different knowledge and perspective than security discourse. Therefore, securitization regime indirectly has narrowed our understanding towards VEP as their act may lead epistemicide⁹ to certain discourse in understanding VEP.

4.3 Problematic Aspects of De-radicalization: Macro-Level

The problematic aspects of de-radicalization program inside prison also appear in the macro level of policy. Below are the findings regarding the absences and silences in discursive practices within macro-level. In this respect it consists of two things: 1) the design program, structure, and curriculum of de-radicalization which is interpreted based on the blueprint and 2) the inequality of power distribution among government stakeholders due to the trajectory of power within the securitization of terrorism. At the end of this part, we are going look and analyze whether the problematic aspects in this level actually correspond with the problems in the micro-level.

4.3.1 Designing Systematic and Effective Content

Programmatic structure, methods, and content are the fundamental aspects to start engaging with inmates. Amar, Zulkarnaen, and Razak agreed that government could not just go to prison and say their religious interpretation of Islam is incorrect because they have encountered and decided to believe in that specific variant of Islam for many years. Amar and Zulkarnaen stated:”

“During Klinik Pancasila (program), we are told that we had to display Pancasila logo and national flag in our room, if we would like to be assisted in parole process First, it was surely contrary to our belief, second it was useless if they wanted to change our paradigm in that way”.

Joko Purwanto, the former VEP from Cipinang Prison revealed his experience in having de-radicalization by saying: “BNPT preached at us as if we did not know anything about Islam or Indonesia” (Personal conversation with Joko Purwanto, Semarang, November 2015). All inmates also questioned why BNPT invited ulama” from Middle East to renounce inmates from jihadism inside Indonesian prisons. “We already knew that this ulama’ was flawed among jihadists hence surely that we did not want to listen to him” Amar Said. Purwanto, who received their visit in Cipinang Prison at that time, said that some of the inmates objected to these visits from those they viewed as foreigners, and they refused to take part, feeling these activities were a waste of money and effort. Joko explained that since those people were outsiders, their visits did not seem relevant to them. Razak also stated that he refused to join the program because it consisted of dancing games that

⁹ This term is originally referred to the elimination of local knowledge systems (Santos 2014:1). I use this term to describe current understanding about Salafi-Jihadism within global securitization regime will be always linked to the terrorism discourse rather than other knowledge.

were prohibited in his belief system. Idham Eka admitted that the counter ideology and religious debate programs were not working in 2009. Although those inmates lost the debate but at the end they said “I have opinion and you have opinion, I will respect your perspective and so you will”. Taufik Andrie from YPP mentioned that changing the salafi-jihadist ideology in the mind-set of inmates could not be forced through Islamic understanding that come from *Ahlusunnah wal Jamaah* tradition *ala* the majority of Indonesian Muslims like NU or Muhammadiyah. He added “It should transcend beyond the discourse of where the ideology was rooted; a post-Qutbian or post-Azzam” in which it more sound to the Salafi-jihadist logic, habitus, and values. People should start thinking of how notion of non-violent Jihad is created through Qutb and Azzam perspective to encourage dialogue with VEP. Moreover, Zora Sukabdi during her FGD with VEP also found similar statements as follows:

“The government tries to change us, change our spirit of jihad, using de-radicalization program, they actually don’t understand us and how to improve us” (Sukabdi 2015:43).

From the evidence above we learned that de-radicalizing VEP in Indonesian context is difficult to directly addressing the ideology since it is part of the existence and identity. Hence is likely to face rejection and hostility. Moreover, using pedagogic, religious teachings, and repeating same de-radicalization pattern for every case is proven failed to create transformation. Learning the disengagement process from Amar and Zulkarnaen, formulating rehabilitation content should acquire specific research related to context and methods which involves someone who come from equal positionality with VEP and share similar identity, worldview, and social-structure within small-scale intervention. Taufik Andrie also added

“It is ok to create big umbrellas of movements regarding de-radicalization program but the scale of program should be designed as small as it possible to make it more thematic and specific according to the needs”

Andrie’s argument was responded by Firmana (BNPT) who mentioned that the current trends of de-radicalization policy now is that they will localize the action by using local resources that is adjacent to prison instead of appointing and invite people from Jakarta. The goal is to create systematic, intensive, and local tailored to de-radicalization, which it is claimed are cheaper and more effective. However, prior to this new initiative, Yudhistira already admitted that BNPT as far he observed did not have the comprehensive structure of de-radicalization program. He said that “BNPT at that time only came once in a month came, make a dialogue with inmates about nationality, religion, and entrepreneurship then asking their needs”. However, a few months later, different resource people from BNPT came and asked the same thing about their needs. VEP felt that government was not serious enough in following-up their needs. When they are released in parole, BNPT only gave us amount of money through cash without giving proper training related to their needs and the businesses that they wanted to develop. Government and NGOs should be very careful in planning, designing, executing, and measuring the program unless they would like to leave a bad impression or image with inmates or even worse, lose their trust and exacerbate the conflict.

4.3.2 Enabling Governance Reform

Another fundamental aspect that is absent under current de-radicalization policy lies on the distribution of institutionalized regulation and cooperation among stakeholders. The existence of National Anti-Terrorism Law No.15/2003 have created mandate to not only Police

but also National Army, to hunt, arrests, and suspects Islamist movement related to act of terror. As the need for creating comprehensive system to counter-terrorism immense, the establishment of BNPT as coordinating body is intended to work with any government related to countering-terrorism, including de-radicalization inside prison. BNPT directors consisted of four elements: police, army, Islamic scholars, and Ministry of Foreign Affairs. National Police and National Army to associate terrorism as high-security issues, scholar represents improvements of religious understanding and social empowerment, and Ministry of Foreign Affairs who understand terrorism as a global issue requiring cooperation from many actors worldwide. Eventually, BNPT de-radicalization unit become a big body with the responsibility of conducting de-radicalization by themselves.

However, in the midst of establishment of BNPT and government efforts to make progressive counter-terrorism policy, the governance reform and financial support to rehabilitating VEP did not pay much attention towards the improvements of Directorate General of Correction (DGC). In fact, DGC is the existing body that has the highest authority to conduct all correctional business and rehabilitation towards all of prisoners in Indonesia, including VEP since they are incarcerated in the prison under DGC authorization. The DGC is now overwhelmed with problems such as prison overcapacity, high ratio between prison staffs and prisoners (1:50), and also corrupted cultures inside prison (ICG 2007 & IPAC 2014). However, Government has given privilege to BNPT to conduct counter-terrorism effort inside prison neglecting the fact that they only come for occasionally inside prison, while prison staffs deals with VEP everyday as DGC was still lacking of reform in addressing VEP issues as Yudhistira mentioned below:

“When rehabilitating terrorist inmates, until now DGC do not have special regulations or institutionalized training related regarding this problem, we only rely on current regulations such as PP No.31, UU No:12 on regular correctional business”.

The privileged mandate of BNPT and Special Detachment 88, which gained bigger financial support, sometimes trespasses DGC authority in conducting their task thus it created habitus of unequal relationship among actors regarding rehabilitation of inmates inside prison. The BNPT special role is potentially to overlap the role and responsibility of DGC. This overlapping role created competition and inter-sectoral confrontation, as shown by the warning Adhe Bakti received from a DGC staff while he was trying to obtain data from DGC “Sir, if you get this information please do not give this to BNPT”. Below is the summary of the tasks between DGC and BNPT in rehabilitating VEP, which is vulnerable to be overlapped:

Table 4.1 Potential Overlapping Tasks between BNPT and Parole Service

Tasks	BNPT	DGC
Identification	Profiling/Identification (Identifikasi)	Correctional Research (Penelitian Pemasyarakatan / LITMAS)
Rehabilitation	De-radicalization through Religious Understanding / Re-education / Resocialization	Prisoners' Personal Empowerment and Productive Skills. Vocational training
Post-Release Monitoring	Grant Assistance	Correctional guidance, consultation, and monitoring

DGC role is undermined by the superiority of BNPT and Special Detachment 88 in terms of resources and funding, instead of being executing its mandate as coordinating body that supposed to only provide supporting role Prison authorities. Rakyat Adibrata from International Association for Counterterrorism and Security Professional Indonesia mentioned “the Police seemed to have bigger ‘ego’ because this institution has higher chain of command comparing since it is directed under the coordination of President” Taufik Andrie told of the problem of governance that hampered the collaboration between law enforcement actors happened due to the government’s natural, reactionary response, which only looked at the power-contestation between actors rather than a planned response. They therefore neglected the potential position, actual role, and capacity of each actor or stakeholder. Andrie continued that the law enforcement mechanism for rehabilitating VEP should start laying the foundation of rehabilitation on DGC to encourage prison-based de-radicalization, which is more routine and sustainable instead of occasional BNPT-based de-radicalization program.

This challenge is responded through BNPT current policy trends as they started to recruit people from DGC to bridge the tense relations with DGC. More progress occurred when BNPT started to involve prison staff that, known as ‘*pamong*’ (gatekeeper) who have maintained trust and good relationships with terrorist inmates. *Pamong* would become important actors for BNPT to involve for coordination and training for capacity building regarding identification since many NGOs that also support their work. BNPT and NGOs believe that *pamong* are the only people that can keep maintaining trust and relations with inmates and sustain rehabilitation process. Amar affirmed this by his experience when he said “We saw Samsun (*pamong* prior to Yudhistira), was a good man, he has done so many things to help our concerns inside prison, without hoping any bargain”. Nevertheless, *pamong* themselves are now faced with the confusion related to the previously mentioned sectoral disputes within the Department around BNPT. Yudhistira, who is also *pamong* in Cipinang Prison, mentioned

“The confusion that I am having is that two deputies I (de-radicalization) and II (prosecution) are giving us different set of assessment for inmate identification. It should have been just one assessment, it happened because each one of them wanted to compete and so the consultants eager to hunt a new project.”

Ultimately, instead working according to political contestation, power-relations and assumptive discourse, BNPT can work on de-radicalization according to the research and the needs from the field by considering findings from research institution.

4.4 Conclusion

In this chapter we discovered that the discursive practices behind the type-D and Type-E de-radicalization models have left several silences and absences of knowledge production in current Indonesian de-radicalization programs. These absences and silences consisted of three main big issues: 1) Technical knowledge in related to politicized de-radicalization, which created harmful impacts for the current program 2) To re-discover new knowledge which aimed to re-formulate the structure and content of de-radicalization program 3) To enable governance reform and collaboration. We can now complete the missing puzzle on what is left unproblematic from Indonesian de-radicalization program that has been conducted (**See Appendix 2**).

The absences on the governance of de-radicalization are caused by the excess of securitization projects to Salafi-Jihadism. The anti-terrorism law and president regulations are

the securitization products that have given mandate to the Police and BNPT to execute counter-terrorism tasks. However, DGC is under-represented in this securitization project. Hence, BNPT overlapped some of DGC responsibility related to VEP management. This creates conflict such as the sectoral-ego among them. Governance reform in de-radicalizing VEP should look carefully on power-contestation and ensure that the possession of the authority and resources are evenly distributed between government stakeholders based on each division of labour. It helps to create better cooperation and work efficiency between stakeholders as they can tackle the overwhelming work of BNPT, which has been the sole actor in the national de-radicalization plan. This stakeholder collaboration will navigate the trajectory power of securitization. It may solve BNPT's technical problems at the micro-level, such as miscalculated inmate placements, trust-building issues, and unsystematic or counter-productive efforts within the de-radicalization program. It is therefore important to analyse how the micro and macro-levels of the problematic issues of de-radicalization are connected.

Revealing these absences and silences actually may contribute to an endeavour to the alternative on how de-radicalization approach should be thought differently. The production of new knowledge should create transformation towards constructive dialogues conducted in egalitarian manner as example shows by the interaction between VEP with the prison gatekeeper (*pamong*). Hence it creates policies that favour a peace-building paradigm rather than securitization. However, to transform such a paradigm is a very challenging task, as the discourse of VEP is rooted in terrorism and is controlled by security actors such as the national police and army. In the Indonesian political context, they are the most powerful actors, which not only possess the vestige of power from the past authoritarian regime, but also control which discourses are suitable for their interests and past habits in security issues.

Chapter 5

Conclusion

The current government policies of de-radicalization inside Indonesian prisons are based on the evolution of the securitization policy under GWoT regime which Indonesian government adopted it gradually. At first, the national anti-terrorism law have made national police became powerful actor who pioneered in covering most issues in counter-terrorism including the de-radicalization and rehabilitation VEP. Later, Presidential Regulations developed the idea of counter-terrorism and de-radicalization through establishment of BNPT which added the elements of national army, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Islamic Scholars. This regulation gave legal framework for BNPT to replace police in conducting de-radicalization inside prison despite the fact that the rehabilitation of prisoners are still under responsibility of DGC. The discursive practices of de-radicalization has developed through two things: 1) the genealogy of Indonesian security actors in dealing with the past security threat related to Islamist Group Insurgency 2) the discourse that developed around intellectual inside security actors such as National Police, Military, BNPT, and its web of interaction with Islamic scholars and psychologists. These interaction developed policy assumption that VEP does not understand about national ideology and Islam. They also need psychological assessment and its instrument to measure the success for transforming VEP behaviour. Hence VEP needs to be educated about Pancasila, peaceful and moderate teaching of Islam, and entrepreneurial coaching or assistance. This idea is manifested to rehabilitation program inside de-radicalization blueprint and implementation of government regulation (PP No.99/2012) which required VEP subjugation under national ideology as parole requirements. The current policy discourse and discursive practices of Indonesian government tends to lead the implementation of hybrid models (type-D and type-E) of de-radicalization as it acquires governmentality, active engagement through profiling and engagement through social-economic mentoring, but at the same time acquire greater amount of ideological components in addressing the program.

From the global perspective, the dominant discourse on de-radicalization in Indonesia has influenced the perception of key decision maker, prison staffs, and de-radicalization practitioners to affirm governmentality as it manifested in the blueprint, regulations, and manuals as an institutionalized policy. The post 9/11 world and within ISIS popularity have made many developed countries have labelled Salafi-Jihadists organizations as the 'terrorists' as they increased the development assistance related to counter-terrorism and violent extremism to many Muslim-populated countries. It carries along with how discourse of Salafi-Jihadists and de-radicalization is framed and defended by the notable scholars and International Organizations through activities like seminars, workshop, publication, project development proposal (as it opened the opportunity for local NGOs) and establishment of think-tank institution. One of this cases when ICG frames Indonesia is vulnerable to the violent extremism as it has written its reports. It influentially produces knowledge and discourse to counter-terrorism which its trajectory of power has contributed to perceive the Salafi-Jihadists movement as the security threat rather than political or social issues. Therefore, the discourse legitimate the hybrid models as it represents problems with following activities: religious mentoring, civic education, security training, profiling workshop, psychological measurement, risk assessment, and prison security procedure.

However, the challenges comes as VEP rejected. The rejection is motivated by the relationship, identities, manner, and asymmetric power-relations between de-radicalization actors and VEP. VEP seemed to understand what government and other actor are going to

do towards them as they enable to create social-structure and social movement to resist de-radicalization program inside prison. From the story of Razak and Junaedi we can conclude that rejection was resulted from their relationship towards ideologist such as Ba'asyir and Ali Zaenal under social structure of Salafi-Jihadist movements, whom they assumed that any program will try to defy them from jihad ideology by submission to Pancasila. This social movement regard 'rejection' as the collective action to maintain what Melucci called as solidarity and conflict to be recognized as social movements' orientation. In Amar case, rejection also symbolize identity struggle of being a good jihadist. Although de-radicalization is soft approach, it has made prisons has been the battlefield of counter-terrorism with both sides still try to defeat and repels. As long as the prison allow situation where Salafi-Jihadist organization can create existing structure and relation it will be less likely to accept the Type E even more D models. Therefore, alternative discourse of de-radicalization is needed to deal with various context, situation, and structures of prisons.

The current de-radicalization model has left absences and silences on the production of knowledge and practices in micro-macro connection which is rooted from the power trajectory in government securitization project. The anti-terrorism policy which is derived from the national law is given excessive power and authority towards national police and BNPT thus ignoring the bureaucratic reform inside DGC as the legitimate actor in dealing with VEP in correction business. It has created unequal distribution of power and resources as BNPT seemed can overlap DGC work in identification and rehabilitation program inside prison. It created sectoral-ego among the government actors. BNPT sole intervention as the implementers in rehabilitating VEP inside prison system has created problems which reflected on the manner of how they design program curriculum. It neglected the structure, power-relations, and positionality to the VEP. This problem has spilled-over to the basic technical problem such as trust-building as they keep motivated to force ideological moderation under their discourse. This trust-building later is exacerbated by the miscalculated placements and made them to cover the failure by putting cooperative inmates inside de-radicalization centre then claiming that de-radicalization program is successful. This neglects the true rehabilitation program; to also work together with the uncooperative inmates.

Thus, these current discursive practices failed to acknowledge constructive dialogue that expose the narratives of Salafi-jihadists group who wage struggle due to political injustice and grievances. This is prevented due to forceful securitization by keeping them as the enemy of the state. With the abundant resources that National Police and BNPT have and the fact that DGC has a limited infrastructure in incarcerated VEP, both security actor should provide resources towards DGC prison staffs but in order to mitigate power-structure and positionality as well as to collaborate with many de-radicalization actors from different discourse and approaches to improve de-radicalization content (to be less or non-ideological) in dealing with various types of VEP. As long as BNPT does not transform these four things: 1) their policy assumption, 2) dominant discourses of de-radicalization inside securitization regime, 3) the social-structure of de-radicalization actors and social-relations of power in handling VEP (ignore social-movement elements; solidarity, and positionality), 4) remains to directly put ideological components under governmentality (ignoring content and stakeholder collaboration), the de-radicalization will likely to face rejection and meet its stagnancy. Therefore, this study answers its main research question.

Overall, this research confirms that current de-radicalization efforts in the Indonesian context still face difficulties in directly removing the radical mind-set of VEP. As the main problem is the theory of change behind de-radicalization. This conclusion validates Hwang, Horgan, and Pettinger who mention that rehabilitation cannot be done through de-radicalization involving a top-down security project of the state, associated by many VEPs

with harmful ideological subjugation to government. It should be understood that confusing rehabilitation with de-radicalisation may even prolong ‘terrorist’ violence in Indonesia’s context, rather than reducing it. Disengagement and renouncing violence might best be encouraged through peer to peer relationships. It is suggested this concrete shift in paradigm might work better in future. Although RAND or BNPT keep claiming that de-radicalization has worked well through a grand strategy of rehabilitation, it is suggested that re-pluralization and removal of ideology may only be valid when used to transform or moderate VEP views after prison, in a stage of what can be called ‘post-fundamentalism’, rather than inside prisons themselves. Until former VEP are detached from their organizations and network structure, and their imams, they are unlikely to completely renounce or stop propagating violence in the name of Islam. Their new life experiences and meeting different people outside prison, can work well as was the case with Amar and Zulkarnaen in this study. However, as long as material conditions inside prison continue to support the ideas of Salafi-Jihadism (and so long as global political injustices, repression and violence continue in Palestine, and the Muslim world), de-radicalization remains a counter-productive and problematic strategy. When facing a social movement whose members are driven by grievances, and led by aspiring organic intellectuals, this research urges international development practitioner and government experts to challenge the globally accepted security-development narratives and instead engage more critically with “rehabilitation” or “de-radicalization” concepts. In particular there is a need to 1) apply more transformative approaches that integrate perspectives of VEPs and thereby foster new narratives and 2) shift power relations by investing in capacity building of prison staff as gatekeeper to VEPs, and potential trust-builders. These are feasible things to do, and could potentially open up room for greater dialogue, possibly leading eventually to conflict transformation and peace-building. The elusive quest now is how to change the paradigm of security actors to work according to the evidence and therefore solve the problem of rejection.

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Appendices

Appendix 1 Overview of Government and NGO Intervention 2009 - 2017

Actors	Program Content	Paradigm regarding de-radicalization
BNPT in collaboration with Yayasan Pancasila and Lembaga Pendidikan dan Pemberdayaan Masyarakat Islam (LPPMI)	<p>De-radicalization program inside prison consisted of:</p> <p>Profiling and Identification with Psychologists.</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Interactive Dialogue regarding Pancasila as National Ideology, Religious Correction and Guidance, and Entrepreneurship Assistance. 2. Klinik Pancasila as the method to introduce and resocialize about the national ideology, Pancasila towards the inmates. 3. "Religious Guidance, Psychological counselling, and vocational skills training" (Idris & Taufiqurrohman in Gunaratna & Bin Ali 2015:81) 4. Inviting Dr. Najih Ibrahim and his team Middle Eastern Ulama' which affiliated with Ikhwanul Muslimin (IM) 5. Establishing De-radicalization Centre in Sentul 	<p>Profiling is important to understand inmates' network, database, and needs of rehabilitation program.</p> <p>Terrorist inmates are lack of understanding about Pancasila as the national ideology that correspond with Islamic values and thoughts. Ulama' with moderate views, or former combatants can deradicalize or make the inmates leave the violent group.</p> <p>Violent Extremists Prisoners (VEP) can change their ideology from violent to non-violent, from extreme to behaviour one.</p>
Directorate General of Correction (Prison Authorities)	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Vocational training: Sewing, making handicraft for all inmates, mentoring for productive work, entrepreneurship. 2. Thematic program based on the request and needs for Inmates such as: 3. Skateboard game / football competition 	<p>Inmates can have productive skills that can empower themselves in the future.</p> <p>Inmates can have better space to communicate and transform the relationship among inmates.</p>
Search for Common Ground	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Conflict Management Training/Life Skills Training (CMT/LST) inside prison 2. Training of Trainers for DGC and Prison Staffs in conducting CMT. 3. Profiling training for prison staffs to understand the network, behavior, and development of prisoners. 	<p>If terrorist inmates experienced how to deal with conflict without violence, then they will solve the conflict without act of terror.</p> <p>Profiling is important to understand inmates' network, database, needs of rehabilitation program, and inmates' placement inside prison.</p>
NSW (New South Wales Australia)	Violent Extremists Risk Assessment (VERA) towards DGC and Prison Staffs. Yudhistira and Firmana were also fellow from this training.	To profile terrorist inmates, understand their background, ideology hence their risk to possibly recruit and create instability inside prison.

ICITAP (International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance)	Training for prison staff related to safety and security inside prison where contain many VEP. The program was	Safety and security of prison is important from the danger of violent extremism.
JCLEC (Jakarta Centre for Law Enforcement cooperation)	Education for prison staff related to prison management, violent extremism as well as on how to create prevention, security, and global understanding related to terrorism.	Strong and professional law enforcement helps the supremacy of law in handling security issues such as handling terrorist inmates and their jihad ideology.
UNICRI (United Nations for Interegional Crime and Research Institute)	Designing correctional research instruments for Parole Officer to assess the risk of prisoners including terrorist inmates.	Strong and professional parole officers in doing correctional research on risk assessment help better rehabilitation program
UNODC (United Nations Office for Drugs and Crime)	Training for prison staff regarding Violent Extremists Prisoners' Management. To reduce the risk of inmates recruitment to violent extremism, prison safety, and ensuring inmate rights services according to Nelson Mandela and Bangkok Rules.	Proper prisoners' management especially the Violent Extremists Prisoners ensure the safety and conducive situation for rehabilitation inside prison.
YPP (Yayasan Prasasti Perdamaian)	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Providing grant assistance for former inmates or who are released on parole. 2. Providing technical assistance for parole officer to monitor the progress for former inmates regarding recidivism prevention. 	<p>Former inmates who received funds and started their business after parole eventually reduce their commitment to Jihad and violent ideology and more focusing their time to making wealth.</p> <p>John Horgan Ideas about psychological cognitive and discourse in understanding why people renounce from extremism. (Interview with Taufik Andrie)</p> <p>Government should be working as well to monitor the progress of disengagement of VEP</p>
INSEP (Institute for Social Empowermen t)	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Assisting in creating profiling module and assessment for inmates for preparing rehabilitation program. 2. Preparing thematic vocational school for inmates to prepare their activity upon release (Hwang). 	Proper model of psychological profiling will ensure the suitable type of rehabilitation hence help the inmates faster to renounce from violent jihadi ideology. Psychological Instrument is tool to find a cure of radicalization.
PRIK & Daya Makara UI	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Going inside prison to counter narratives and ideology head to head with the inmates 2. Using the former militant of Jama'ah 	Islamic interpretation of those inmates is wrong, therefore it needs to be challenged by other narratives to make

	<p>Islamiyah such as Nasir Abbas to go inside prison and talk with inmates, the goal is to make them renounced from violent ideology and behavior.</p> <p>3. Providing better dialogue for kindness and positive minds. To channel their positive vibe instead of doing violence.</p> <p>4. Designing de-radicalization program by using Mother approaches as Daniel Koehler did it in Germany.</p>	<p>them understand the correct one.</p> <p>Using senior Islamist activists or former combatants would help the follower to renounce from organization and committed violence.</p> <p>Psychological theory on to talk about positive things, they will do positive things. Replicated program from Daniel Koehler about the importance of mother to de-radicalize people. Mother is someone who makes person can subjugate (Interview with Idham Eka, August 10 2018).</p>
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Appendix 2 Problem Represented in handling VEP in Indonesia Context

What's the problem represented to be?	<p>Government</p> <p>The government has concern with the terrorist ideology hence classification and different type of interventions or rehabilitations aim to change and shift radical Islamic ideology of inmates to lean on national ideology. The government believes that extremist ideology or Salafi-Jihadi of inmates should be changed towards moderate understanding of Islam which accepts value of Indonesian people, democracy, and constitutions.</p> <p>Terrorist inmates are the victim hence having psychological problem their grievances and skills to sustain life after prison. Therefore they need psychological guidance and capacity building to increase their life skill for better life after prison.</p>
	<p>IGO/INGO/NGO</p> <p>The problem of handling violent extremist prisoners hugely consisted of building the prison capacity and its staff competencies to handle VEP. Therefore, the most problem they address is how to empower prison staff ability to manage VEP properly so the risk of safety and recidivism can be minimized. The activity consists of identification, profiling, psychological concern, and also intervention tools to reduce their engagement with jihadi ideology. To ensure that Inmates are well-'rehabilitate' according to Human Rights Principles but still within under security measures.</p>
What assumptions underlie this representation of the problem?	<p>Government</p> <p>Terrorist movement or Salafi-jihadi movement is both ideological and security threat towards Indonesian people. It creates tension, increases grievances, and social disharmony within society. Security measure should take place to prevent further instability towards development and prosperity of Indonesian people. Anything should be done to defeat terrorism ideology through rehabilitation inside prison.</p> <p>The terrorist inmates have the problem in understanding different perspective as they followed wrong Imam who misguided them in understanding religion and Islam. Terrorist inmate needs skill to work after prison and to reintegrate in the society without rejoining and recommitting their act. Jobless and unskilled will fail the transformation of inmates as they will regroup with their previous network.</p>

	<p>INGO/NGO</p> <p>Violent extremist prisoners (VEP) are the security threat as they have ability to radicalize other inmates, building network, and creating hazardous situations inside prison. Moreover, and has the risk to worse inside prison and commit the act of recidivism. At the other hand, VEP is very vulnerable to return to his network so new interaction space is needed to divert and channel their life desire to becoming more productive. Unmonitored and unassisted former inmates will likely increase their chance to commit recidivism.</p>
How has the representation of the problem come about?	<p>Government</p> <p>The problem of national security threat that comes from past national insurgency which amalgam with global jihad movements. It also comes because of the past-relations experience between national government and remnants of NII e.g Abu Bakar Baasyir & Abdullah Sungkar. The representation comes also according to police and military investigation towards suspected terrorists and their interrogation towards the jihadist ideology and its impact for the society.</p>
	<p>INGO/NGO</p> <p>The problem of recidivism, identifications, security, social-reintegration, and de-radicalization program is written in call for proposals from donor institutions which serves big countries interests such as US, Australia, and New Zealand in security and terrorism issues. Those big countries played huge role in funding the research towards scholars to understand the motives, as in shaping the discourse on how Salafi-Jihadism is being securitized post 9/11.</p>
How is this representation of the problem produced, disseminated and defended?	<p>Government</p> <p>National Seminar, workshops within law enforcement actors such as National Police, Army, BNPT, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and DGC officers for example like JCLEC or ICITAP. In which they also involved national intelligence and recruited intellectuals from different background such as psychologists, religious scholars from state Islamic University, research institution, religious teacher, NGOs, and also security analysts with the funding from both national and international agency. RAND Corporations, Arie W Kruganski, and Sidney Jones.</p>
	<p>IGO/NGOs</p> <p>ICG Report, Global Forum on Counter-Terrorism, global security, international forum of counter-terrorism and de-radicalization. Seminars on the de-radicalization, workshop, training, from many institutions strategy. Came from notable scholars such as Rohan Gunaratna (Terrorists Rehabilitation: A New Frontier on Counter Terrorism 2015), Kruganski (The Psychology of Radicalization and Deradicalization: How Significance Quest Impacts Violent Extremism, 2014) John Horgan (Leaving Terrorism Behind: Individual and Collective Disengagement, 2019) and RAND corporation (De-radicalization of Islamists Extremists, 2010).</p>
What is left unproblematic in this problem representation? Where are the silences? Can the problem be 'thought' differently?	<p>What if the inmates reject and refuse to participate the program? Why they rejected de-radicalization program? In this particular question The government de-radicalization program may seem to ignore the positionalities and power-relations inside inmates to ensure constructive relation inside prison. The current discourses of deradicalization does not design to understand the structural causes on why they committed violence and decided to exclude inside prison or recruit person. It hampers officer to persuade inmates, talking to inmates in constructive manners as they keep face the rejection to interact, henceforth winning hearts and minds is not available.</p> <p>Therefore it needs and effort to see VEP in the different dimension rather than security e.g as the social movement dimension. It is aimed to understand the structural ideas and cause of motives of Salafi-jihadism movement which may be based on the grievances regarding social issues in democratic or authoritarian states, such as injustice in Middle East Conflict, US Interventions etc. Opening space for dialogue and interactions to build rapport and trust related to</p>

	the rehabilitation towards inmates.
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Appendix 3 Key Informant Interview Profile on the Research

No	Name	Institution
1.	Yudhistira	Prison Staff in Cipinang Prison, the biggest prison in Jakarta. He is the Gatekeeper among VEPs in the prison. He received training from JCLEC and VERA.
2.	Firmana	Head Section of De-radicalization inside Prison of BNPT after serving 5 years in DGC.
3.	Amar	Former VEP in Cipinang Prison
4.	Razak	Former VEP in Pasir Putih Super Maximum Security Prison, Nusakambangan, Central Java
5.	Zulkarnaen	Former VEP in Cipinang Prison
6.	Idham Eka Putra	Executive Director of Daya Makara, Division of Applied Psychology.
7.	Taufik Andrie	Executive Director of YPP
8.	Adhe Bakti	Director of Center of Radicalism Studies (PAKAR) who sometime also work closely with BNPT.
9.	Rakyan Adibrata	Deputy Director of International Association for Counterterrorism and Security Professional Indonesia
10.	Imam Malik	CVE practitioners and consultants who previously work in several BNPT de-radicalization campaign
11.	Deka Anwar	Researchers at IPAC Jakarta.
12.	Joko Purwanto als. Handzolah	Former VEP, previously received military trainings in Mindanao, Southern Phillipines. He died in 2016.

Appendix 4 Interview Guide

Interview Guide for Former VEP (Interview estimated time 60-90 min)

Ask Basic Information: Age, Education, cases, duration in prison, involvement with terrorism.

1. When you listen that there will be rehabilitation program towards you and your fellow inmates, what are your thoughts? What was the first thing come to your mind?
2. What were factors which made inmates involved the program? What factors they did not want? And why did it happen according to your experience?
3. Could you explain the program that you received and experience from the government (National Counter Terrorism Agency, Directorate General of Correction or INGO and NGO) since you are from prison until you achieved parole?

4. Could you describe the benefits of following the rehabilitation program and what were their problems? Please explain from specific actors you knew, met, and activities experienced
5. Do you know how government wants you to be after released and what do you think about that?
6. Could you explain the challenges that you are facing after released (in family, society, and work-life)?
7. Until now, how do you define the notion of being Islam and obligation for Jihad? Has there any changed before you went to prison and after released? If it is changing, what are those factors? If it is not why do you think is hard or may be never changes?

Interview Guide for Government Officials (National Counter Terrorism Agency and Directorate General of Correction). (Estimated 50 minutes)

Group I

1. How do you think regarding the rise of Islamist violent extremism in Indonesia? How and why do you think it is becoming a national threat comparing to other security problems? Why terrorism do you think became a big issue in Indonesia nowadays?
2. How do you understand radicalization and deradicalization? What are the expected resulted from deradicalization program that is conducted inside prison?
3. What do you think about female terrorist inmates? What are the approaches do you think is necessary to tackle this issue?

Group II

4. Which research / academic sources / government regulations / do you refer as your main idea in formulating de-radicalization policy?

Group III

5. What are the programs or intervention conducted to rehabilitate or so-called “de-radicalization” inside prison and outside prison? What are the dimensions and approaches being taken so far?
6. How do you define changes or transformation of former terrorist inmates? What are actions do you think to make it sustainable after their release?

Group IV

7. What are the challenges in rehabilitating convicted terrorists inside prison? And do you think what are the root causes of the challenges?
8. Why some inmates reject the rehabilitation program inside prison? Why they refuse to take on parole program?
9. So far with your experience in dealing with violent extremists or terrorists what are their needs and what are the actions being done to tackle their needs?

Interview Guide for Expertise and NGOs on prison issues

1. Why do you think Islamic fundamentalism became a problem?

2. How do you understand radicalization and deradicalizations? Which academic sources / ideas / concepts are you using in conducting or formulating action plan to fight Islamic radicalizations and de-radicalization in Indonesia?
3. What does your NGO do in addressing problems of violent extremism and terrorism inside prison and what is the theory of change you believe in implementing these actions?
4. How do you think Indonesian government implement de-radicalization policy for rehabilitating convicted terrorists? What should government do in provide better de-radicalization policy?
5. What are important elements in addressing problems of radicalization and terrorism in Indonesia?
6. How important is gender / intersectionality in addressing problems of deradicalization?
7. According to your experience, why certain inmates or former inmates refused to participate in deradicalization program?
8. What are the gaps (if there is any) in rehabilitating convicted terrorists inside prison according to your experiences in observing the whole processes?
9. Therefore, what are things to consider in rehabilitating convicted terrorists inside prison?