

**THE INTERGENERATIONAL DIMENSIONS OF  
LAND TRANSFER AMONG SMALLHOLDER  
FARM HOUSEHOLDS IN INDONESIA**

A Research Paper presented by:

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in partial fulfilment of the requirements for obtaining the degree of  
MASTER OF ARTS IN DEVELOPMENT STUDIES

Major:

**Social Policy for Development (SPD)**  
SPD

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The Hague, The Netherlands  
November 2019

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## **List of Acronyms**

ISS	Institute of Social Studies
BYF	Becoming a Young farmer (Project)

## Acknowledgement

This research paper will not be finished without support from many people.

Highly appreciation to Mom, *Kak* Ima and *Kak* Fifa. This family is far from perfect, far from harmony, and never complete. Yet, this is the best combination I got. Thank you for the unconditional support to me.

I feel grateful for Roy and Jun. As my supervisor, Roy has provided valuable guidance to develop the paper from the scratch and gave encouragement to do my best. Jun acted as my second reader with his constructive inputs to shape the paper.

*Bengak* Lia, for rechecking the materials and sharing her insight on the fieldnotes, especially when I am in doubt. Hanny, for all the fruitful discussions and advice through the process.

*Pak* Ben, for constantly reminding me that this is a precious learning process. For his patience and support, I feel very grateful.

Home is not only a place, but people (and a dog). For 137 gank (*Bu* Ratna, *Mbak* Yani, *Pak* Jerry, Ezio, and Elvis), thank you for the warmth and kindness.

Fadli, for his moral support all the time.

Thank you to all my peer discussants for the useful inputs, and for my ISS best friends for giving me happiness through the process. Almas, for her advice on my language limitations. Friends at AKATIGA, with their support and jokes during the writing process. And Colum, who once shared his thought about this paper.

Thank you for Indonesia Endowment Fund for Education, for giving me the opportunity to study in The Hague.

Lastly, I truly appreciate to all the respondents who shared their stories with me. I hope this work can provide a glimpse of "truth" from their life experiences.

## **Abstract**

Combining agrarian studies and youth - generation studies, I explore various dynamics on land transfer process between generations among smallholders in five villages in Indonesia. I emphasize on the empirical analysis to problematize intergenerational land transfer process. First, focus on multiple and competing institutions that shapes the intergenerational land transfer. Second, seek how the tension arises between generations, especially how young people situated themselves and exercising their limited agency through the land transfer process. Using semi structure interview, survey, and observation, I found that the land transfer is never work out in a uniform manner as they unfold through the relations of generation (birth order relations between siblings, and parent-child relations), gender, and class.

## **Relevance to Development Studies**

Land is one of the most crucial resources to navigate the young people's pathway into agriculture. Rural youth were raised affected with particular discourses and cultural processes, for example as the future generation of agriculture. It is crucial for development studies to emphasizes the importance of temporalities (Ansell 2017: 8), means it is important to have deep understanding about young people's present lives, then only focus on the future or becoming farmer.

## **Keywords**

generation, social institution, Indonesia, young farmers, gender, land transfer, smallholders

# Chapter 1 Situating Young People in the Inter-generational Transfer of Agrarian Resources

This research paper starts from one important question found in the Agrarian Studies pertaining to the resilience of small holder farming: who will continue to farm in the next generation? Some argue that small holder farming is destined to disappear in a global and competitive environment (for example see Jouili 2009). Others, however argue (Rigg et al., 2016, 2019) that to understand the persistence of small holder farming and the ageing farmers, we need to elaborate critically and understand the bigger context, such as changing household livelihoods. White (2011, 2012) concludes that the wider context of the agriculture sector, such as increasing global prices, the pattern of corporate land grabbing and land concentration in many areas, needs to be linked with the reason why young people are ‘turning away’ from farming. The role of youth has long been absent from these classic agrarian questions as the focus of the analysis was typically on accumulation and differentiation, global prices of agrarian products, and land grabbing. Yet, White has made case that youth as the (potential) next generation of farmers is central to both positions on the question of the future of small holder farming. Youth’s apparent disinterest in farming may contribute to its disappearance, while at the same time overcoming the well-known hurdles in becoming a young farmer is key for the persistence of small holder farming.

In the debate over the future of farming, it is crucial to ask how young, aspiring farmers get access to the main resource needed to build a farming future: land. First, land is the most important means of production in agriculture. This means, access to land (or its absence) contributes to young people becoming (or not becoming) farmers. This is a global issue. Lack of land access is explicitly addressed as the main problem experienced by (rural) youth and a main reason for their disinterest in farming (Bezu and Holden, 2014; FAO, 2014; IFAD, 2019; Tadele and Gella, 2012). However, policy recommendations hoping to address the ‘young farmer’ problem usually focus on improved education and skills training, such as youth agripreneur training or digital smart farming, and enhancing non-farm employment opportunities (IFAD, 2019). These measures are also important, but they do not address the fundamental issue of land access.

Second, most young people do not have the means to buy land, nor the collateral required to obtain a loan in order to buy or lease land. As such, they are typically dependent on their parents for access to land. Those who were born into families who have land, at one time will get access to land through inheritance. They will have a good starting point to accumulate capital for farming in the future. But for some others, like those who were born into landless families, it doesn't work that way. In other words, researching how young people can access land, either with inheritance or in other ways, also aims to better understand how both individual households and also larger level, class, are reproduced in agrarian communities.

The study of inter-generational agrarian resource transfers is not new. Goody et al. (1971, 1976) have examined how property is transferred in families and how variables such as marriage and household categories play crucial roles in determining the inheritance system in Europe and Africa. Furthermore, there are also studies of how unequal gender relations work in various layers such as household, community and state, and how women struggle to obtain land rights (Agarwal, 1994). There is also a study on how landless and young farmers access land through land contracts such as sharing, sharecropping and rental, both in family's and government land (Belay et al., 2017). From the studies above, it is concluded that land access is embedded in multiple human relations, such as interests, needs, and power.

The term land transfer is often used in at least two ways. The first is specifically about legal study on how land can be transferred and tends to demonstrate a form of ownership (Sánchez Jordan and Gambaro, 2002). Second in Agrarian Studies, the term of land transfer is partially used to show how the state distributes the degrees of land rights (not limited to ownership) to its citizens and vice versa, for example in the case of China (Ye, 2015; Kong et.al, 2018) and the Philippines (Berner, 1998).

However, in this study, I focus on the intergenerational dimension of land transfer, meaning I want to capture particularly how land is transferred (or not) from one generation to another. For example, it is not limited only to land as inheritance, that is land given to the children when the parents have died, but also how *inter vivos* (between the living) transfers work, when parents (or other members of the older generation) are still alive and control the land. In short, transfer does not mean the giving of physical things only, but also the transfer of various relations related to land, such as the responsibility for taking care of the land, access to work on the land, rights to control farming decisions, to gain benefits from the land and eventually to own the land.

This includes both how parents and extended families transfer the land to their children, and also in some community's with broader levels how communal and customary land is being allocated to younger generations. Who gets the land and who does not? Why do some young people get land while some others do not? What do young people do when they are waiting for the land, and how do they work to achieve that? What do they do with the land once they have obtained it? In addition, if parents are unwilling or unable to give land to children, what can young people do? We know little about how these processes actually work in everyday life, especially from the perspective of young people on how they experience and understand their own position in the process of land transfer.

To illustrate the position of young people in land transfer, it is important to look at the various structural barriers that shape this process, as well as how young people exercise agency within these structural constraints. For instance, young people's lives are situated within institutions such as state law, custom, religion, and other social norms that affect their path in accessing land. Lastly, I also will analyse how gender, birth order, class influenced how older generations transfer or do not transfer the land to younger generations.

## 1.1 Research Questions

As explained above, my objective is to empirically analyse the process and mechanisms of land transfer between generations from the perspective of young people. My main research question is: how do land transfers take place and how the tension is rising between generations through the process? Also, how do young farmers experience these processes in the selected smallholder farming communities?

Furthermore, to help answer the main research question, the study will address the following sub-questions:

1. What are the institutions and other norms that shaped land transfers, and what tensions arise between generation during this ongoing process?
2. How do young people understand their position and how do they exercise their (limited) agency to access land?

## 1.2 Why We Need to Understand Land Transfers?

This study tries to make a small contribution on at least two aspects of the interface between Youth-Generation Studies and Agrarian Studies. First, if we agree that agriculture is still a pivotal sector for employment, it is very important to understand the position, expectation, and experiences of young people in relation to the resources that support them as future farmers. Although I believe that there are still other factors that influence young people's aspirations, access to land is a precondition for any aspiration of young men and women for possible farming futures.

Second, development policy towards youth and towards agriculture often fails to discuss the regeneration issue in the agricultural sector critically, especially from the relational approach and structural obstacles. For example, the idea that Indonesian young people have no interest in farming, has been assumed by policy makers, media, and academia as an absolute truth and used as the basis for promoting agricultural mechanization policy, increasing non-farm opportunities or pushing young people into business roles without addressing the land issue (see Indonesian Ministry of Agriculture, 2013).

## 1.3 Methodology, Positionality, and Ethic

This study is part of a bigger research project: "Becoming a young farmer: Young people's pathways into farming in India, Canada, Indonesia, and China" (hereafter: the BYF Project)<sup>1</sup>. The BYF Project's objective is to combine Critical Agrarian Studies and Youth Studies to provide a deeper understanding of young farmers' position in agricultural practices, such as roles in adopting and developing innovative farming practices, barriers in accessing land and other resources, clarifying the role of policies, institutions and young people's efforts in overcoming these barriers (Srinivasan, 2015: 1).

This research paper was designed after primary data (or at least some parts of the data) were already available. The research locations are five villages from two districts in Central Java (Kebumen), Yogyakarta (Kulonprogo) and two villages from East Nusa Tenggara (West Manggarai). The primary data collection in these villages was conducted by myself together with two other female researchers<sup>2</sup>.

The field data collection in Kebumen and Kulonprogo was conducted from February – April 2017 and August – September 2017 in West Manggarai. In several villages, we contacted the village government and local NGO to consult the potential respondents. For Kulonprogo, one of the field researchers has been doing research in the village for a long time, so we were aware of the context beforehand.

Nevertheless, we relied mostly on snowball sampling techniques, with the initial respondents helping us identify further respondents. This helped us to find interesting cases in the village and to go beyond the circle of choices that might have been recommended by NGOs and village officials. In addition, we also tried to interview respondents from various geographical locations in the village.

The average research period in each village took 14 – 20 days, with the researchers staying in the villager's homes. This not only enabled us to complement the interview-based

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<sup>1</sup> The BYF Project has been funded mainly by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada.

<sup>2</sup> Data collection in Kebumen and West Manggarai was mostly done by me and Aprilia Ambawati. While Hanny Wijaya, Aprilia, and I collaboratively collected data from Kulonprogo.

methods, survey, informal group discussions, and participant observation by part-taking in everyday activities, but also staying in the village was important for generating rapport, which allowed the research team to discuss delicate topics such as inheritance.

As the purpose of this study is to seek out how young people access land, the respondents we interviewed were the ones who had obtained some degree of land access. We conducted interviews using a life history approach: we traced their stories about childhood experiences helping parents in farm work, education, interacting with peers and family members, migratory experiences, marriage, how they finally return to the village, how they accessed land, whether from their parents or from other sources, their experience as farmers, and how they see the future. It should be noted that the three research locations in Java are dominated by high degrees of landlessness, extremely small farm sizes, and high tenancy rates (see chapter three).

Although this study is mainly intended to give a voice to young people on their experiences in the process of agrarian resource transfers, I have also used materials from interviews with several parents of the young-farmer respondents, to have a more solid picture on land transfer.

Furthermore, our attempt was to include young women farmers in the research. Their role is often considered important, yet their voice is rarely heard. This is sometimes difficult because they were often accompanied by husband or brother who is considered understand farming better (even though women do a lot of farm stages). However, we tried to find another time, so the interview can be done more informally.

I am a woman who was born and raised in the city with no experience in farming. This has at times been a limitation but has also been useful in allowing me to share stories and build connection with respondents. Asking inheritance and land access is a delicate issue, sometimes the respondents questioning us back and we had to explain again that our purpose was to understand the process of land transfer. If they did not want to continue to talk about inheritance, we stopped and turned into another topic. For instance, in West Manggarai where women don't have land ownership, sometimes they feel hesitant when talking about husbands and parents-in-law.

As already explained, this was a collaborative research project, and therefore sometimes I will use the term "I" and sometimes "we" when presenting the cases, depending on how we collected data at the time. However, all the analysis and selection of information in this research paper is my own responsibility. In addition, all names of villages and respondents mentioned are pseudonyms.

Finally, I agree with Rose (1997: 319) that this particular study cannot aim to give absolute truth, we cannot know everything and both the researcher and the researched have situated knowledge in the research process. Whilst studying at university about youth, rural livelihood, and inequality, I experienced some inner conflict while interacting with the respondents. For example, I have seen the respondents enjoying compensation for customary land sales, keeping the hope for the promises of new livelihood, but on the other hand, I also wondered how fuzzy and uncertain their future will be (see chapter 4).

## 1.4 Organization of the Paper

Chapter 2 will explain the theoretical approaches and some key concepts that have guided my empirical study on the process of land transfer. Thereafter, Chapter 3 will discuss the agrarian context and provide a general overview of young farmers in the five villages. The fourth chapter will analyse the institutional dynamics that shape who can access the land and who does not, and why. The fifth chapter is a continuation of fourth chapter but focus on

young people's agency in the process of becoming a young farmer. Especially on how they navigate these various overlapping and intersecting institutions, while pursuing their own aspirations. All the chapters will engage with gender, generation, and also class. I will close with conclusions in chapter six.

# Chapter 2 Theoretical Framework and Key Concepts

This chapter provides theoretical frameworks which navigates me to understand the intergenerational dimensions on land transfer. I aimed to combine critical agrarian studies and youth-generation studies. First, I will use agrarian questions from Bernstein (2010) and White et al. (2012), which I will link to Ribot and Peluso's idea about access. From this, I will tease the importance of institutions, both formal and informal that shaped the degree of land access. Second, because of the paper tried to understand young people's lives, I will use three key approaches recommended by Hopkins and Pain (2003) on researching young people, age, and generation: intergenerational, intersectionality, and life course.

## 2.1 Agrarian Questions

Land is the means of production that needs to be reproduced due to constantly producing the conditions of farming (Bernstein, 2010). This is not only about the condition and technical problems of soil, but the relationship between people; the landowner and tenant or the older generation into the future farmers. Bernstein said to do reproduction, farmers need various kinds of funds, one of which is generational reproduction, how farmers are also capable of producing the next generation (Bernstein, 2010: 19). Therefore, transferring the land as main resources to farm, is important to be analysed to produce future farmers.

I will use agrarian questions: (1) who owns what? (2) who does what? (3) who gets what? (4) what do they do with it? (Bernstein, 2010: 22-24), and (5) what do they do to each other? (White et al., 2012: 621). I tried to apply these questions with the generational dimension, for example how the relationship between children who work on their parents' land or how young people can access the village owned land. Next, theory of access from Ribot and Peluso will enhance the various and dynamic relationships regarding land transfer.

## 2.2 Access to Land and Social Institutions

From chapter 1, I mentioned that land is a key resource for young and aspiring people becoming farmer, and this cannot be limited to ownership. For instance, parents may give land access to their children but not as property.

Access is "the ability to benefit from things—including material objects, persons, institutions, and symbols" (Ribot and Peluso, 2003: 153). Both property and access are equally emphasizing the relation to people (for example see Ferguson, 1985: 652–3), especially in human's pursuit for profit, distribution, and also accumulation. However, the differences between property and access, is that property focused on rights, and access give vital aspects on the ability (Ribot and Peluso, 2003: 154). Therefore, property as an analytical lens has been criticized as too narrow, because there are multiple mechanisms that hinder or render someone to access resources (Sikor and Lund, 2009: 4).

When talking about access, it means also focus on ability to conduct multiplicity of ways to benefits from resources (Ribot and Peluso, 2003: 154). Therefore, using access will allow this study to go beyond from legal and formal rights on land transfer, but to understand a various range of social relationships that can be support or barriers for young people to

benefit from land, even when some certain young people do not own the land, or vice versa (see chapter 4).

Ribot and Peluso (2003: 173) has tried to go beyond from “bundle of rights” to a “bundle of powers”. They put emphasize that people are situated with axes of power and within the social and political-economic contexts that shape people’s abilities to benefit from resources (2003: 173). From this, many scholars adopt the theory of access and see the importance of how institutions operate (both explicitly and implicitly), such as a set of formal written and unwritten rules, norms, mechanisms, habits, and so on. Hence, these web of power influenced the pathways of people to access and control resources, such as social institutions (Berry, 1989, 1992), the interplay of forms and mechanisms in resources control (McKay, 2017), or how institutions shaped livelihood (Scoones, 2009, 2015)

Furthermore, Scoones argued that institutions is not simple because works in multiple ways, sometimes the formal institutions may apply, but other institutions are more informal, indeed this is all governed by multiple actors (Scoones, 2015: 46). Using this, I put that the land transfer process is governed by intertwined institutions that run in multiple levels and affected why some young people get the land and some does not. And this will be analysed briefly in chapter three and more in chapter four as the institutional dimension on intergenerational land transfer.

However, the term of *ability*, brings us to how Peluso and Ribot try to engage between structure and agency in social science (Myers and Hansen, 2019: 2). I emphasize this, that the actions and minds of young people are strongly influenced by interrelated institutions at multiple levels, and this can be a limitation or an enabling for them to access the land. However, I am not saying that young people are the passive actor. My attention is seeing young people as capable social actors who works and engage to access the land under certain structural context. Even though I argue that this very embedded with age, gender, birth order, ability, and also the relationship between generations (both in household and community level). And to get a better understand of the young people’s perspective, it can be seen from the next subsection.

## 2.3 Youth and Generation Studies

Focusing youth and their social relation on land transfer, I will use three key concepts that has proposed by Hopkins and Pain (2007): intergenerationality, intersectionality, and lifecourse (2007).

Hopkins and Pain argued that age is social produced in the interactions between different people, thus they emphasize to think about age relationally (Hopkins and Pain, 2007: 288). Even so, Hopkins and Pain did not clearly explained how age and generation are conceptually distinct (Huijsmans, 2016: 8).

Furthermore, Huijsmans (2016: 17) concluded that there are differences to interpret generation, at least into three ways, namely kinship descent, life-phase, and cohort. In this study, I will focus more on how the relations and interactions between generational groups in kinship and life-phase, than in the context of cohort.

In kinship, generation is widely used in parent-child relations or generational dimensions of intra-household relations (Ansell, 2016; Punch and Vanderbeck, 2017). One that I will use for this paper is intergenerational contract (Ansell, 2016; Kabeer, 2000). Kabeer said that intergenerational contract is usually implicit, that parents invest to the children and expect to be looked after by them in their old age, both material and emotional support, especially when the parents become dependent (Kabeer, 2000: 465). Thus, in chapter five, I will analyse

how this implicit contract between parents and children or between siblings is very gendered and brings tension between the generations. This leads to the who owns the land, but who works on that land, and who is taking benefits from that land?

While, the intersectionality comes from Crenshaw (1993) who define intersectionality as multi makers of social differences such as gender, age, sexuality, race, (dis) abilities, and so on, which affect black women's experiences on discrimination. Intersectionality is used not only for feminist studies, but also in agrarian studies such as differentiation in Transnational Agrarian Movements (Edelman and Borras, 2016), land rights for women in India (Agarwal, 1994), 'chain of exploitation' in Burkina Faso cotton sector (Luna, 2019). I will apply the concept of intersectionality as a social marker embedded in young farmers and shaped their pathways on access the land.

Lastly, lifecourse (or it similar with life phase from Huijsmans (2016: 12)) means that "recognition that, rather than following fixed and predictable life stages, young people live in dynamic and varied lifecourses which have, themselves, different situated meaning" (Hopkins and Pain, 2007: 290). I put that to understand young people experiences on land transfer from helping parents on the land until they can obtain the land ownership. We must acknowledge that people live in dynamic with various pathways rather than see these transition running in a linear and predictable life stages.


# Chapter 3 Context and Agrarian Structure

This chapter has two objectives, in the first section, I describe the agrarian context in the five research sites: the geographical conditions, livelihoods, agricultural division of labor, and land tenure. In the second section, I give an overview of the sample of young farmers who were interviewed.

## 3.1 Agrarian Structure, Livelihoods, and Land Tenure

The primary data was collected from three villages in Central Java and Yogyakarta, and two villages in East Nusa Tenggara, as shown in the map below:

**Figure 1 Research Locations**



Source: Indonesian maps from [www.cia.gov](http://www.cia.gov), (n.d) (with edit).

### 3.1.1. Sidomuncul, Panjen, and Kaliloro (Java)

The three villages have typical Central Java and Yogyakarta village characteristics: very small farm sizes, widespread landlessness, many complex levels of sharecropping and land rental, multiple household income sources, out-migration (especially for young people), and in two of the villages relatively low levels of education.

Sidomuncul is located 9 km from the district capital Kebumen City and has a population of 2,018 people (BPS, 2018), while Panjen is located 13 km from Kebumen and about 4 km from Java's southern coast, with a population of 2,396 (BPS, 2018). Meanwhile, Kaliloro is 30 km to the northwest of the city of Yogyakarta, with a population of 10,500 people in 2017 (BPS 2017). Kaliloro is a large village and has better educational facilities compared to Panjen and Sidomuncul. In all three villages, Islam is the dominant religion.

Agriculture in Kaliloro and Sidomuncul is dominated by irrigated paddy land farming. The farmers are able to harvest twice a year with an additional horticultural crop for the third season. Panjen, in contrast, is dominated by rain-fed rice fields and horticulture, but a lot of farmers we interviewed managed paddy farms in neighbouring villages.

Many of the respondents in the three villages, besides managing their own fields obtained from inheritance or given by living family members, also work as wage laborers or farm on other people's land in sharecrop relations (mainly in Kaliloro), cash rental (mainly in Sidomuncul and Panjen), and land pawning. Wage labor in all three villages is carried out by both men and women at different stages. Usually, the women work in planting, weeding, and harvesting, while men work in hoeing, applying fertilizers and pesticide, and harvesting. However, in Kaliloro, more women work as wage laborers. In Sidomuncul and Panjen, land cultivation uses much more male labor with hoes and tractors. While women work in *nandur* (planting) with both daily wage and *borongan* (contract) system.

In rice harvesting, we still find hand-threshing of rice (especially in Kaliloro), with a contract system, that every 1 quintal of wet grain, the labor can get 15 kg of wet grain. However, the use of the *thresher* machine with cash payments has increased. For example, in Sidomuncul and Panjen, farmers who do not have this machine, can rent it by paying 5 kg of wet grain per day for traditional thresher machines and 10 kg of wet grain per day for a modern thresher machine. Especially in Panjen, the remaining *damen* (paddy stem) is usually divided between the owner and laborers, to feed cattle and buffalo. However, in Panjen, horticultural work is always paid with cash; men are paid IDR 50,000 - 70,000 (EUR 3,2 – 4,5) per day with additional food and cigarettes, while many women work as chili pickers with a wage of IDR 40,000 - 60,000 (2,5 – 3,8 EUR) per day with food.

In three villages, farmers usually sell the yield to middlemen. If farmers have debt, then they have to sell to certain middleman who have loaned them money. For example, in Panjen, fruits and chili require higher production costs than paddy, so many farmers borrow initial capital from middlemen and sell the yield to the same person. Middleman is one of the richest person in each village.

For non-farming income, all households in Sidomuncul, Panjen and Kaliloro have livestock such as chickens, goats and cows, by buying or through the *gaduh*<sup>3</sup> system. Sidomuncul is famous for *caping*<sup>4</sup> production, a home-based craft done by both women and men, young and old. *Caping* are sold to middlemen in the village at a price of IDR 5,300 or 0,34 EUR each. In addition, both young and old men and women also work as laborers in the clay rooftile home industry around the village. Several of the paddy fields in the village are sometimes also used as sources of clay to make tiles.

Due to its closeness to the sea, men in Panjen also work as fisherman and women sell fish at the nearest market. In addition, many young men work as sand miners and motorcycle taxi drivers. Meanwhile, young and old women make doormats and chips to sell to middlemen. Working outside the village, even outside Java, is common among young people and the majority work in the informal sector. Women work as shop or household assistants in the city and men work as shop keepers, oil palm plantation workers in Kalimantan or in sugar mills in Sumatra.

While those who come from rich families in all three villages, have non-farm income as office workers in the city, as government officials, or as kiosk or shop owners. In Kaliloro, another avenue of accumulation is the purchase of residential land in their own neighborhoods, for rental or re-sale as its value rapidly rises (White and Wijaya, 2019).

We also found *arisan*<sup>5</sup> in all villages. In Sidomuncul there is a rice *arisan* with both men and women members, but most of the members are those who own rice fields. Tenants who

<sup>3</sup> *Gaduh* is a sharecropping relationship in livestock but varies in practice. Usually, the owner gives the cow to a tenant to be mated and raised. The first calf will be given to the tenant and the second will be given to the owners, and so on.

<sup>4</sup> Traditional bamboo farmers' hat.

<sup>5</sup> *Arisan*: rotating credit associations. Small groups attend regular social gatherings, at which the members will provide money or rice to be saved and distributed to each member in turn by lottery.

manage small farms sometimes do not dare to join the *arisan* because they feel insecure about the land availability and cannot guarantee to provide the money or rice.

### **3.1.2 Village – owned Land in Java**

All three villages in Central Java and Yogyakarta, have two systems of village land. The first is the so-called “prosperity land” (*tanah kemakmuran*) and “salary land” (*tanah bengkok*). Prosperity land is village-owned land that can be rented to villagers with a temporary use-right, to provide a source of income for the village government budget. Prosperity land is usually leased to farmers every year by a lottery system.

Meanwhile, salary land is a pre-colonial, colonial and New Order legacy as a salary to village government officials (Kano, 1984). Salary land could be parcelled out to other farmers with sharecropping systems, or cash rental, or managed by the official using wage labor. The village land in the three villages is planted with rice and horticultural crops.

### **3.1.3 Nagara and Langgan (West Manggarai)**

West Manggarai lies in Flores Island, Eastern Indonesia and is known as an important agricultural region, both for staple food, horticultural and forest products. The dominant religion in both Nagara and Langgan is Catholic, but in Langgan there is a small number of Muslims. Nagara is one of the rice producers in West Manggarai (on both irrigated and dry land), and also produces coffee, candlenut, and fruits from its dry land. The total village population of Nagara is 1.874, (BPS 2018). The village consists of four hamlets, with eight *kampung* (neighbourhoods).

Nagara has a unique settlement pattern (between upland and lowland neighbourhoods) which is related to gender and generation. In the late 1970s - 1980s, as one of the Green Revolution programs, the government built a massive irrigation system in West Manggarai. At that time, young and old men were asked to help as workers, and combined with traditional customs, most of the workers got a portion of the new rice fields after the irrigation system was in place. Since then, lowland settlements have been formed (only one hamlet, near the rice fields). Meanwhile, parents and the elderly are mostly found in the upland settlements (three hamlets), taking care of children who attend school up to elementary level, where the Nagara State Primary School is located. Children, then, move down when they are going to junior high school which is only available in the lowland part of the village.

This generational pattern has changed somewhat in recent years. Now, the government has also built an elementary school in the lowland area and the current generation increasingly spend their entire childhood there. However, there are still many families who live in the hills most of the year, moving down to the lowland areas only in the seasons of peak activity in irrigated rice cultivation (usually several days or a month). They return to the hills for the dry land harvest season. Since a few years ago, families that have motorcycles move back and forth between the upland and lowland part of the village on a daily basis. However, the paved part of the road does not extend to all the upland hamlets, and the unpaved roads are not easy to navigate.

In contrast, Langgan relies mainly on tree crops such as coconut, coffee, cacao and candlenuts. Langgan has a population of 1105 (BPS 2018) with three hamlets. Langgan is only

1,5 – 2 hours by car from the district capital Labuan Bajo<sup>6</sup> and is famous as a tourist destination due to its upland scenery and traditional cultural performances. Some of our respondents have part-time jobs as traditional *caci* dance performers for tourists.

One major contrast with the Javanese villages, is that in both villages in West Manggarai, women generally cannot inherit land from their parents, even though women are much more engaged in farm work than men. Next to their involvement in tending the fields, young women also bear the main responsibility for household management, animal husbandry, and the care of dependent household members (grandparents, parents and/or younger siblings). The established practice is that upon marriage women leave their natal household and move into their husband's house where they work the husband's land or that of his parents. This will be analysed further in the chapter four and five.

In addition, there is labor exchange by women in both villages, known as '*dodo*' (Nagara) or '*julu*' (Langgan). This is done mainly in planting, weeding and harvesting in rice fields and dry land. For other stages, women wage laborers are paid IDR 40,000-60,000 (2,5 – 3,8 EUR) per day. Conversely, men work more with daily wages around IDR 50,000 - 70,000 (3,2 – 4,5 EUR) per day. Livestock, such as cows, pigs, goats and chickens, is important for both villages.

Debt to middlemen or rice mill owners is very common in both villages. The price of rice from the mill owners will be lower, and loans are used not only for production costs, but also for daily needs and customary rituals such as marriage parties, death rituals, first holy communion events, and parties to collect money for sending children to college.

For non-agricultural income, men often work as motorcycle taxi drivers, migrate as plantation workers to Kalimantan, or those who are rich will migrate to schools in Bali or Sulawesi. Children who are still in school, are increasingly starting to continue to vocational schools in hospitality management, established to prepare the workforce for the increasing number of resorts, hotels, and tourist attractions in Labuan Bajo. Young and old women also weave traditional textiles for sale at the nearest market. Some households also open small kiosks or food stalls.

### 3.1.4 Customary Land in West Manggarai

Both Nagara and Langgan in West Manggarai have customary lands (*tanah adat*), including irrigated rice field, dry land, and land for settlement. But in contrast to the research villages in Java, where village-owned land is distributed in the form of temporary use-rights, customary land in Nagara and Langgan, is assigned to individuals in the form of ownership rights. Each hamlet (*kampung*) in both villages has its own customary leader and autonomy in distributing customary land. Both villages have no written records of customary land. This will be discussed further in the fourth chapter.

## 3.2 Who Are the Young Farmers?

Almost all our young farmer respondents are ‘continuers’, young people both male and female who grow up in farming households, have experience of helping with the farm in their childhood, take over the farming activities and resources from the older generation (both

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<sup>6</sup> Labuan Bajo is the starting-place for tourists visiting the famous Komodo ‘dragons’ (giant lizard) on the nearby Komodo Islands.

directly and some have a history of non-farm activity first) (Monllor, 2012: 3; White, 2018: 708). The definition of smallholding farming that we used is not only from the size of land, but also the farming system where owners or tenants manage and work on the farm, often with the help of family members but not ruling out the use of hired workers, and the farms will normally be passed on through intra-family mechanisms (Cassidy, Srinivasan and White, 2019: 222).

From the five villages, we interviewed a total of 109 young farmers with the following characteristics:

**Table 1 Respondent Status**

(total sample n=109, 60 male 49 female)

Sex	Average age	Marital status (%)		Migration Experience (%)	
		Married	Not married	Ex-migrant	Never migrated
Male	34	75	25	59	41
Female	31	89,8	10,2	31	69

Source: Analysed by research team from primary data.

From the table above, it can be seen that the average age of young farmers we interviewed is 31 years old for women and 34 years old for men, and the majority of them were married (especially women). This is because the purpose of this study is to see how young people experience land transfer, therefore we had chosen young farmers who have managed to access land to various degrees. In addition, marriage is one of the important life events that affect how parents and villagers distribute land to the younger generation.

Thereafter, more than half of the total of male respondents have experienced out-migration. Most of the men migrated to the informal sector, to jobs such as shopkeepers and plantation workers. Mostly women respondents did not migrate. However, if we disaggregated by region, the women from West Manggarai did not migrate due to several reasons, (1) geographical conditions which were difficult and poor access, (2) most of them married at a younger age, and marriage determines that a woman will live in the village where her husband lives. The women respondents who did migrate, worked as housemaids and shop assistants. In addition, very few of them had migrated for school, this is only experienced by those who came from wealthy families. Women migrants from the Javanese villages have worked in a variety of jobs, such as shop assistants or working in foodstalls/restaurants.

Lastly, most of the respondent's formal education level is low, for instance mostly upper secondary school in Kulonprogo and lower secondary school in Kebumen. But, the majority of respondents from West Manggarai only finished formal education until primary and lower secondary school.

For agricultural land size (not only own but also rent and sharecrop) in the sample are varies, as shown below:

**Table 2 Farm size range in the sample (hectare)**

Site	Smallest	Largest	Average	Median
Kulonprogo	0,04	1,30	0,30	0,23
Kebumen	0,04	0,66	0,28	0,21
West Manggarai	0,06	2,40	0,70	0,56

Source: Analysed by research team from primary data.

The table above shows the farm size from the sample. Farm size here is the total land area managed by themselves (by inherit, given by parents, rent in, and share tenant). From the sample, all research villages have a high gap of farm size. Both the average and median of our sample in Java are the very smallholders or *gurem* farmer, means a land holder with held less than 0.5 hectares (BPS 2018). Then, the average and median land managed by the sample households in West Manggarai is just slightly bigger than research villages in Java. Although, the land size is not as big as we predicted before, that there will be large landholding outside Java Island.

In addition to above, the next table will show the general pattern of farmland ownership and access from the sample:

**Table 3 General patterns of farmland ownership and access in the sample (percentage)**

Site	Pure owner operator	Pure share tenant	Part own and share-ten-ant/rent	Pure rent	Combination rent/share tenant
Kaliloro	23	13	53	3	7
Kebumen	21	0	66	10	3
West Manggarai	81	7	12	0	0

Source: Analysed by research team from primary data.

From the table above it can be seen that there are differences between the research villages in Java and West Manggarai. On the green box, more than half of our respondents from Kaliloro and Kebumen are combining between manage the land from the parents and share tenancy (Kaliloro) or rent system (Kebumen). Differing from the research villages in Java, the majority of sample households in West Manggarai site own land through inheritance or from customary land (orange box).

### **3.3 Conclusion**

This chapter has provided an overview of agrarian contexts such as geographical conditions, multiple livelihoods, agrarian divisions of labor and a glimpse of the overview of young farmers, that mostly intersect with class and gender. It is important to note that the majority of young people grew up landless (mostly in Java site) and in small farm households (mostly in West Manggarai site). Therefore, the younger generation have almost no prospect of inheriting land and through tenancy relations or by saving money to buy land (very uncommon but we have a case). In the next chapter, I discuss young farmers in more depth, specifically on how formal and informal institutions shaped inter-generational land transfers.

# Chapter 4 Institutional Dimensions of Inter-generational Land Transfer

In chapter three, I provided an overview of the agrarian context in the research locations. This chapter will show how institutions related to access to land work for young people. The importance of this chapter is to understand that young people are born and raised in a structural context that is inherent in their socio-economic attributes, such as age, gender, and class. This affects the possibilities for them to access land and again, this is important because it is a key foundation for young people's trajectories becoming independent farmers.

In this chapter I explore both formal and informal institutions. Institution is very varied, but I limited myself to explain formal institution such as state law related to land and inheritance and the relation between village officials and young farmers to access village-owned land in Java. As well, the informal institutions that will be analysed is how customary law and customary land governed in West Manggarai. Even though I explain the institutions in separate sections, in practice, all institutions below overlap and intertwined, also the runs intersecting with gender, class, ethnicity, birth order, and generation.

## 4.1 State Law on Land and Inheritance

The 1945 State Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia (UUD 1945) has acknowledged land as a form of wealth that is used to achieve the greatest prosperity for people. One of the relevant state laws is Law No.5/1960 regarding the Basic Rules of Agrarian Principles (UUPA). Although it does not clearly mention young people, but UUPA explicitly recognizes the same rights and opportunities between men and women to obtain land rights and to get benefits for both themselves and their families (clause 9 article 2).

For inheritance (and land included in it), Indonesian government does not set one absolute rule that applies nationally. Indonesian government recognizes several rules that can be used by individuals and communities, namely (1) customary inheritance law, (2) Islamic Inheritance Law as a majority religion in Indonesia, (3) and the Civil Code or *Burgerlijk Wetboek* (Barlanti, 2013: 24). In other words, a person or certain communities do not get coerced to use certain rules regarding inheritance.

However, I found that laws above has not being applied strictly, and other norms has influenced more on the land transfer. For instance, the Islamic inheritance law regulates the portion for children's inheritance after the parent died. If there are male and female siblings, then the share of male sibling is two to one with female sibling. However, in research locations that are dominated by Islam in Java, this law is not really influencing parents to distribute the land. The division of land is based more on relationships that occurred in the household, gender, birth order, and the availability of land that could be distributed. This will be discussed further in another section.

Last, it is worth to see how Indonesian government seeing young people as the future generation of agriculture. In 2013, Indonesian Minister of Agriculture signed regulation No. 7/2013 about the details of Guidelines on Agricultural Youth Generation Development. One of the interesting points is how the regulation also acknowledges young people in relation to the household:

“the Agricultural Youth Generation as a **family member** acts as the next generation that is able to **ensure the family welfare by developing farming as a livelihood**. For this reason,

the Agricultural Youth Generation needs to be prepared as well as possible as the **main actors of the next generation and as future agricultural entrepreneurs who have the knowledge, skills and, abilities in developing various agribusiness ventures**" (page 7, article II).

This regulation never mentions the issue of land. This is important to make a point that Indonesian government positions young people in agriculture and employment opportunities, once again, without addressing the lack of land access as one of the main obstacles for them.

## 4.2 Land Relation in Micro Politics: Village-owned Land in Java Sites

This study also shows that parts of available agricultural land are governed in other statuses than private or heritable, such as village-owned land (like I explained in the chapter three). In Sidomuncul and Panjen (Central Java), land relation is also a part of micro politics at the village level. The winning candidate for village head in Sidomuncul gave a campaign promise to the villagers that he will give 1,406 M2 of his salary land to be distributed to each *rukun tetangga* or neighbourhood and 1,054 M2 for each hamlet. When he won, the hamlets and neighbourhoods' unit each have their own autonomy to distribute the land among their members, and which was usually done using the rent mechanism.

Similarly, in Panjen, to access salary land, young farmers must support and vote for one particular village head. This was experienced by Isal (35 years old, male, married, Panjen) who said he could rent a salary land of 700 m2 of village head since he was 32 years old. He paid the landowner IDR 500,000 or EUR 32 per year. Isal said, "*it is a struggle to get that land, I must support Lurah (Village Head) Najib*". During Najib's first period as village head, Isal claimed he did not want to be involved in village politics. However, he saw that Najib could win by a thin margin and he started to think once again about getting access to land. Thereafter, Isal started to support Najib publicly. When Najib won again for the second time, several village officials came to Isal's house to inform him that he got the right to lease Najib's land for six years (until the second period ended). However, Isal did not want to share what support he gave to Najib. From some informal conversations with other people, the support can be done in various ways – by openly supporting and spreading good information about Najib or contributing money to the campaign.

Furthermore, young farmers access to salary land is also closely related with the generation dimension, it often starts from the parent's right and the right goes to the successor after the parent dies.

Jiung (26 years old, male, Panjen, single) is the last child of three male siblings. As the last son, when he was 15 years old, Jiung's father had asked him to left school and help with farming. But Jiung declined because he wanted to study at *pesantren* (an Islamic boarding school). After his father fell sick, all his older brothers and his mother asked Jiung to left *pesantren* and help his father. Felt pushed, Jiung started to farm with his father. One of the plots is owned by a village official named Kasiran, of 700 M2. Jiung's father has rented this land for 20 years with IDR 500,000 (EUR 32) per year. Since Jiung's father died, several other farmers came to Kasiran asking to rent on the land, and some wanted to pay more than the regular price. Jiung said, "*Kasiran told other farmers, if yesterday they had to ask permission from my father, now the permit had fallen to me (jatuh ke saya). So, some farmers came to me asking for the land, but I refused because I still needed it to farm. My mother also agreed with my decision*". Jiung felt now he was seen as his father's successor and not just as a child who helped parents on the land.

Sidomuncul (Central Java) had a lottery (rent) for seven hectares of prosperity land. The requirements to be able to enter the lottery are (1) men and women who have a Family ID Card or are married, and (2) one household can only put one name. This proves that marital status is considered as an important turning point in distributing land to the younger generation, both at the family level and at the village level. The rental price of prosperity land is determined through meetings and is always lower than the usual market price.

However, although the village prosperity land contributes to young farmers' pathways into independent farming, young farmers feel insecure about this land, as perceived by Tasih (female, married, 32 years old, Sidomuncul).

Tasih said, "*My parents are keluarga pas-pasan (not a rich family, but still can survive), so they cannot help by giving me money or land, because they also need to eat. What helped me the most is the prosperity land*". Tasih is a migrant and now lives in her husband's house. Because she is married and lives in Sidomuncul, she has been able to obtain prosperity land through the lottery system. She used her husband's name to participate on the prosperity land lottery. Tasih was renting 604 M2 of prosperity land for IDR 387,000 (EUR 24 – 25) per year. The location of the land is not too far from the road, but difficult to get water. However, there are no security to rent this land in a long period. This land can only be rented out for one year. Many people registered their names, both men and women, young and old. In contrast, the prosperity land is limited. So, if someone has won the lottery this year, it is not possible to get it again next year. Tasih had to wait for years without knowing when she could get the prosperity land again.

Similar with Tasih, Atun (female, 30 years old, Kaliloro) obtained prosperity land for one year. Even though the location is not good, Atun still feels that this is a good opportunity for her because hundreds of families register in each lottery, but not all are fortunate enough to be allocated land, and land availability cannot provide for the needs of all. Her hope is simple, one day she would like to rent land for a long period "*If (only) each year, we have to think quickly whether we want to continue to rent or not, are the yields enough to pay the rent again? If a tenant thinks too long, it will be taken by others. However, if the lease is up to five years, my mind will be dizzy because the rent fee must be very expensive, and it must be paid in advance*".

### 4.3 Customary Law and Customary Land in West Manggarai

As I explained above that state law explicitly acknowledge the equality between female and male to obtain land rights and get benefits from it. However, in practice, the institutions that determine land transfer in the research sites are very gendered and in contrast to what is written in law, especially in customary law in West Manggarai.

The customary leader is a powerful actor to govern the distribution of customary land. The customary leader is always male and has been chosen based on descent. The customary land measure is often called a *lingko*, i.e. one 'circle' of land. The size of the *lingko* depends on how many people will share it, but usually one *lingko*'s size is between 15 – 20 Ha. The *lingko* is then divided into *lodok* (a form shaped like slices of a round cake). The *adat* leader is granted the right to choose the first *lodok* for himself, and usually takes a biggest part or the best location. After that, the remaining land is distributed to others one by one, depending on the position and the closeness to the *adat* leader. The individual portions are called *kope* and one *kope* is usually about  $\frac{1}{4}$  -  $\frac{1}{2}$  Ha.

Customary land in both villages, generally can only be distributed by insiders (*orang asli*) as ownership, but in practice this always depends on negotiation and we found cases of

outsiders being granted either use or ownership rights, for example a teacher from outside who has served in Langgan for years. Jeri is Langgan's village head and he is a second-generation in the village. He said that his father was an outsider but a teacher in Langgan. At first, his father was assigned a five-year, non-heritable use-right to one *kope* (about  $\frac{1}{4}$  ha) of dry land. But since the 1970s, such land can be given to migrants on a more permanent basis, but only with the permission of the *adat* (customary) leaders, and now that land has shifted to ownership rights, allowing his father to pass on this land to Jeri. Cases above show how customary land is governed by an intersection with class.

There are differences between Nagara and Langgan, which are visible when deciding who has rights to access customary land. Norms on how customary land is distributed in both villages tend to exclude young people, especially young women. Nagara's customary land can be distributed only to married and local men, and particularly in one *kampung*, the man must have completed his *belis* (dowry from groom's family to the bride's family) payment in order to qualify for access to customary land.

However, in Langgan, besides married men (as household head), customary land can also be distributed to widows (as female household heads) and to young unmarried men. But this works only with a recommendation by the father of the young man. Young men are usually seen as ready to manage land, even when not yet married.

According to Eman (male, 65 years old, Langgan), in the past, customary lands that were allocated to unmarried men, were usually located in the most remote and least strategic areas. This was to teach young men to be more independent and work hard. Consequently, if they are successful and are considered capable of working on the land, then their father can find a wife for the son. However, this customary practice has increasingly vanished with the decreasing of land availability, and young people nowadays prefer to get married by eloping. Eman's explanation, again concluded, that relations between generations within the household are crucial for young men to access customary land. Agustinus (29, male, Langgan, married) told me his experience:

Agustinus is one of the young farmers who received customary land. After Agustinus graduated from junior high school (aged 15 years), his father asked him if he would postpone schooling for farming. He agreed and even his younger brother went to high school earlier than him. For Agustinus, this is most likely the point where his father felt he was able to work, help his parents, and farm. Agustinus was given a piece of customary land when he was 19 years old. He remembered that during the distribution of customary land, he did not participate in the discussion. But he knew that his father asked the customary leader to include him and his big brother as eligible for land. When it was decided, Agustinus remembered that his father asked Agustinus to clear the forest with other men, while some women cooked. Children can come along to help the parents. Clearing the forest can be done for 3 months by staying alternately in the forest and village.

Young women can access these lands indirectly through their relationship with a male family member. For example, if the father is the one who gets the customary land as a private property, after that, the land could be inherited by his daughter, if the parents asked the daughter to stay in the village after marriage. Therefore, there are some costs to access land for young women, that are discussed in the fifth chapter.

## 4.4 Becoming Farmers Without Land

In the future, capitalist penetration will lead to agrarian transition which works against the needs of young people, even closing off their opportunity to become independent farmers. Bernstein mentioned that private property in land usually linked to the agrarian inequalities in at least two ways: first, because it makes possible internal class differentiation through the ‘cumulation of advantages and disadvantages’, and second because it opens the way to speculation by non-producers in land (Bernstein et al., 2018: 708–9). The change in customary land mechanisms in the research villages in West Manggarai is the best example of this.

Both in Langgan and Nagara, many customary lands have been turned into private property and are now owned by urban absentees and foreigners. In Langgan, we found that unassigned customary land is still available but only in one hamlet. In the past, customary land was distributed to individuals in the form of use-rights every two years, after which it was returned to the *adat* for use by another family. However, due to an increasing population and daily needs, the customary lands have shifted into the form of individual ownership.

According to informal discussion with several respondents, the land sale market in Langgan started in 2009, due to the widespread promotion of tourism in Flores. According to the village head, customary lands in Langgan were never sold collectively. What happens is that after customary land is distributed to individuals, the recipient can sell it to anyone. He himself once sold more than 1 ha of rainfed candlenut land. He sold it in 2011 to a broker from a resort company for IDR 500,000,000 or EUR 32.231. The village officials and some of the respondents we interviewed, expressed the same expectations: that if many hotels and resorts were built in the future, they hoped that local people would get new jobs and income.

In Nagara, which is located farther from the city, we learned that there were 25 ha of customary land in the upland hamlet (with no access to public transport) that are in the process of being sold to a company. That land is dry land and has never been used by local people, however the land is located around 1 km from a water source used by the people.

According to several people we interviewed informally, the investor promised to make a small resort and develop a fruit and vegetable plantation to supply the hotels in Labuan Bajo, and of course to employ local people. They were also happy with the promises to build roads and better access in the *kampung*. In addition, each household was given IDR 25,000,000 or EUR 1,611 as the first step in the agreement. However, there was news circulating that it is the customary leader who determines how the customary land is governed and even talked to villagers mentioning that people who disagreed with the sale, would not be employed on the new plantation.

Young people also have their own perspective regarding these changes. Dalis (male, single, 25 years old) is returning from migrating as a palm oil plantation worker in East Kalimantan. In the village, he helps his parents on their land, works as a wage laborer, and sometimes he works as a motorcycle taxi driver. He told us his version of the case.

Dalis actually did not know the details about who is the investor. All the decisions were in the hands of the customary leader and village elders. What he knows is that all the land was sold for a total price of IDR 75 million or EUR 4,834 per ha. He and his friends actually did not want the customary land to be sold, but on the other hand he agreed that if the customary land of that size were to be distributed to 72 families, each family would only get a very small amount. For this reason, the customary leader decided to sell the land.

In addition, Dalis already used the money IDR 500,000 or EUR 32 that was given individually to villagers as first compensation for the land sale. Dalis used the money for clothes and gasoline for his motorcycle. Dalis expects more money will come after the land sale is complete.

He explained many costs needed to be taken care of for his family. His father has to pay for his sister's tuition fees of IDR 2,500,000 or EUR 161 per year, dormitory fees of IDR 300,000 or EUR 19 per year and pay 25 kg of rice per month. That is only a small part of his family's expenses. Therefore, he plans to migrate again to East Kalimantan as a palm oil worker.

He said that he was quite sure he would inherit land, because he is a son, not a daughter. However, he is the fourth of six siblings. Thus, he imagines how his parents' two hectares of dry land will be divided among four boys. Therefore, he decided to work outside the village. He said "*With work like this now, (I) will not be able to buy a land. Working in the village is like being half dead (setengah mati). You can work for a day, (and then) you cannot find work in two weeks*".

On my last day in Nagara, I met several people to say goodbye and I had a chance to ask one old man about the land sale. He said at that time, many local people finally agreed because they would get money, even though at that time there were no details on how the money would be distributed. However, he also said something conflicting for me, that "*our land has vanished, especially for young families, what more is left? Now (they) are depend on inheritance or go outside the village (translated from: sudah habis tanah kami, apalagi untuk keluarga muda, tinggal apa lagi yang ada? tergantung dari warisan atau pergi ke luar desa saja)*".

The case above shows how the encounter with capitalist penetration in land relations has been interpreted in ambiguous way, yet brings more uncertainty for young people in the future. On one side, this village is in an uphill location without good access to public transport. Desperate due to the lack of employment, young people are willing to sell their land. At the time, this land sale was a sensitive issue, as young people like Dalis also have to provide for their families and themselves. No job means no cash for him and he survives by selling his labor in Kalimantan. The promise of "new jobs" means they hope for new sources of livelihood with the new market.

I agree with Li (2014: 5) that livelihoods are shaped by social relations, and I conclude that the penetration of capitalist relations in this small *kampung* will definitely close the opportunity for young people who aspire to be farmers in the future. The younger generation will become *proletarian* and will no longer have control over the means of production to farm.

This chapter reminds us not only of the importance of land to farm, but also about the tension between the young and old generation regarding customary land, which young people do not have a space to raise their concerns. At the same time, the promise of new livelihoods also presents a dilemma for them. Land sales to outsiders not only offers a short-term promise of cash and possible jobs, but also closes off the possibility to become independent farmers in the future.

## 4.5. Conclusion

This chapter provided insight into how institutions work in distributing land to young people. First, the state law tends not to exclude women and men in land distribution. However, in practice, other institutions like custom and household relations affect the distribution of land between generations. Second, how the distribution of village owned land (both in Java and West Manggarai) intersect with class, gender, and generation. Third, capitalist relation influenced the land transfer and closes the opportunity for young people to become farmer. Inequalities in gender and along generational lines still shape how land is transferred. The next chapter continues to explore young people's experiences in accessing land with their constraint agency: how they imagine, predict, negotiate, work, to access land, and how this supports their pathways becoming farmers.

# Chapter 5 Young People's Experiences of Land Transfer

The previous chapter has shown how institutions shape the ways in which land is distributed, especially at village level. This chapter is a continuation of previous chapter but focuses on young people's agency in the process of becoming a young farmer. I will show their experiences on accessing land, how they navigate various overlapping and intersecting institutions especially in household relation, while pursuing their own aspirations. This includes how they understand their position on land transfer and how they exercise their (limited) agency. As mentioned in chapter 1, land transfer is a complex and multi-level process, covering, not only ownership of property, but also mechanisms of access to labor, the right to take decisions on land use, and the access to benefits or control of yields from the land.

## 5.1 Marriage: Gendered Pathways into and out of Farming

Marriage is an important life event for young men and women to determine where, how, and with whom they will live. However, for women, especially in West Manggarai, marriage is a key moment for them to stay in the village and farm. While men will still continue work in the non-agricultural sector and women do mostly agricultural activities.

In Java, both daughter and son can get a relatively a fair division of land inheritance. However, these are often influenced by migration, birth orders, and gender. For example, the youngest daughter tends to have an obligation to look after her parents (even though she is married), live with parents and get a home as inheritance, while other siblings can go migrate.

We also found that birth orders sometimes affect who will help parents to farm. Often the last child must return to the village to look after the parents and work on the land. This is because usually the oldest child (especially boys) tends to go outside villages and look for money. The last child has access to land (means work and manage, but the benefits also for the parents) at certain times when their siblings are still migrating. However, when parents die, the land will still be divided relative evenly.

Different with Java, In West Manggarai, daughter do not have right to inheritance and land generally. However, we found there are several exceptions that daughter can obtain inherited land with some cost for them. For example, father asked a daughter to marry a cousin to keep their tribe sustain. With this, the husband usually will live at wife's house, and parents will give piece of land to daughter as compensation. This norm has been minimized since church and health officials does not support this kind of marriage, due to health issue of the baby.

Because of not inherit the land, young women in West Manggarai feels that it is important for them to find a husband with secure rights to land. When we met Verona (female, 21 years old, single), she had received a marriage proposal from a man in another village and was planning to marry him a few months later. As a woman, Verona knows she will not inherit land, it will go to her brother. She accepted her fiancée's proposal because he will inherit some rainfed land. The brother or parent will check whether the prospective groom's family has land, but the women would be ashamed to ask directly.

After she marries, Verona knows she will be expected to help her parents-in-law on the farm, although she still dreams of finding a job that pays better in Labuan Bajo. She said 'If

*I'm not yet married, I want to work and earn money in Labuan Bajo. But if I'm married, what can I do? I have to follow my husband. I will be the one who has to help on the in-law's farm".*

Women in West Manggarai generally do not inherit land from their parents, but in contrast, women do the majority of farming activities. The daughter is expected to marry and settle in her husband's family.

Many of the female respondents felt this custom was normal. Even so, there were several of them who feel that in the future, they want both sons and daughters to inherit land in a more equal way than the previous generation. For example, Jeni (female, 31 years old, Langgan) mentioned "*I already have one daughter. And I want to have another child, but if another girl is born, the land will be divided equally. If I have a son, the land is given to him. Later women can have land from their husband, like me, in other people's land (while laughing). But this is not my land, it's up to my husband because this is his land*". Thus, just like Jeni, usually women's expectations in West Manggarai are shaped with the reality that their husband who will decide, because it is husband's land, not theirs.

## 5.2 Intergenerational Contract Between Siblings

Daughters in the two research villages in West Manggarai are expected to work more often than continuing their education. In fact, sometimes they are also expected to support the education of male siblings.

Pat (Nagara, male, 28 years old) is a young farmer who also works as a village government official. Pat is the fourth of five siblings and is the only son. All his sisters are married and live with their husband's families except Iba (female, 30-year-old, Nagara). Iba is Pat's older sister who is married but lives in Nagara. When Pat was 20 years old, he left for Sulawesi Island for work in restaurants, as a construction worker, guarding furniture stores, and then continue to study at university. After that, his father asked him back to the village because, as a son, he will inherit the land.

Different with Pat's life, Iba has never migrated outside the village. Since graduating from middle school at the age of 15 years old, Iba has helped her parents on the land. Almost all of Iba's work in agriculture is used to pay for Pat's education. Iba was married when she was 17 years old and her husband came from Bajawa (a different district but still in Flores). Because her husband had a long experience of migration outside Bajawa, the parental land was given to his brother who lived in the village and took care of the parents, so Iba's husband did not own any land.

Pat and his father felt that Iba's condition was quite difficult and they had an idea to give a piece of land to Iba. Pat said, "*I gave my sister a piece of land for the house and small garden for vegetables, and I have given a certificate in her name. I have already invited my uncles and talked with them that this land should not be 'disturbed' (or taken back later). I was afraid that when Juan (Pat's one-year old son) grows up later, my uncles could provoke him to feel that he has the rights on that land. I also gave my sister the use of 1/4 hectares of rainfed land to work on. But I will not give this to her, she can use the land because I don't need it yet. I did this because I remember when I migrated to Makassar a long time ago, she backed me up a lot*".

Iba felt that she did not have the right to inherit land, so she never asked for land from her father or Pat. According to her "*Where is a woman here who dared to ask for land? I didn't ask for this, but it was given by Pat, the correct term is loan for work only. When it's time for Pat to take it, he will take it*".

From the above case, we can see how the intra-generational dimension has shaped land transfer (both access and ownership), how Iba like older daughters in general in this research

locations, are expected to help with household work and farming, while Pat as a son is expected to continue his education and gets land through inheritance. Besides that, not only land access is affected by the relationship between siblings in the nuclear family, it is also influenced by the relationship with extended family and it is gendered. Pat's extra effort to secure the land for Iba is due to other male family members are still being able to reclaim the land ownership and land rights from female family members. This also means there is a shifting of the degree of land transfer for Iba, from access into ownership, due to securing the land.

### 5.3 Race to Pick the Yield

Land transfer occurs in various degrees and with varying conditions, for instance access as labor and those who take (partial) benefit from the land. As witnessed in the case of Munah:

Munah (female, 26 years old, Panjen) currently lives with her husband Muz (male, 33 years old, Panjen) and her son Maulana (male, 6 years). Now, Munah and Muz manage land given by the latter's parents, with the following details:

One plot is a 50-tiles of paddy field (700 m<sup>2</sup>) which was given by Muz's mother. This rice field is planted with spinach, chili and chai-sin. This land is still in the name of Muz's late father, but Muz has been asked to work on it since Muz's father's death. When I commented that Munah was fortunate enough to inherit some land, she replied "*But, this land is still divided in half with mom (in-law). It's divided like this: the farm input costs and labour are from me and my husband, but my mother-in-law of course can join at harvest time. I also do the harvest, and then we sell the yields by ourselves. And yes, she (mother in-law) can take it freely, because she owns the land, so I must pick more than her (while laughing)*".

From a glimpse of how Munah is taking benefits from the land, it can be seen that family relations are unlikely to be either completely amicable or conflictual, but rather characterized by both cooperation and competition (Punch and Vanderbeck, 2018: 12). I feel this is interesting that how young farmers get the access to work on land, has the obligation to pay production costs, and in the end, Munah cannot get all the results from the land, because Munah is not the owner. What Munah did (racing to picking or harvesting more than her mother-in-law) was an individual agency form in the mundane way and lies in between co-operation and competition.

Another plot is Muz's mother's land, about 1400 m<sup>2</sup> planted with paddy. All the production cost comes from Muz and Munah. However, all the yield is brought to Muz's mother's house, so all the family also can eat from that. Munah and Muz cannot sell this rice but can take the grain at any time only for their own consumption. Munah said that "*If we need money, mother must give the permission first [to sell some rice], but it is only 1-2 sacks (1 sack = 40-50 kg). However, my husband is the one who always asks permission, not me. If we want to sell it, mother will ask what for, and if she says no, then it won't be sold*".

When I asked how will the land be divided in the future, Munah said that she heard that her mother-in-law had talked to Muz, and said that all the rice fields had to be shared equally among all his younger siblings, because all of them were male. At that time, Muz only kept quiet and agreed with his mother's opinion. According to Munah, her mother in-law is more open now because her father-in-law died and needs a *pengganti* (successor) urgently.

While on the side of Munah's family, her parents are still alive and well. Her parents are still working on their own 1.400 m<sup>2</sup> land. Her mother had said that later, the land must be divided

equally for Munah and her younger siblings. Munah does not want to ask whether she will get the biggest size of land, because she is the first child and could not continue to high school while all of her younger siblings have formal education well above her level. She also added, *"I have never talked about the land. I don't want to ask questions like that (about inheritance). I just will follow my parents, if they told me to continue to plant, I will. If not, so I can't".*

In addition, parents are giving land on the occasion of important life-cycle events, such as the rice field from Munah's father which was given to her when Munah had her first child. So, they have more responsibilities in the family. Second, the rice fields from Muz's mother were given when her husband died, and she needed a successor to continue farming.

We found many stories like that of Munah and Muz in the research locations, that young couples are working land that is still owned by their parents. They are able to determine (partially or fully) production and post-harvest decisions. However, at the same time, when talking about what happens to the yield after harvest, they have not been able to access the full benefits from the land given. Munah and Muz still have the obligation to provide a portion of yield to the landowner, Munah's mother-in-law. The sharing, however, does not follow the common sharecropping division between the tenant and landowner (portion for the landowner and 2 portions for the tenant, or 1 portion to the landowner and 3 portions for the tenant).

However, we also find cases where children can access parent's land with the usual system between landowner and tenants in general (paying rent at market price or paying the normal in-kind rent of share tenants). This means that the aspect of moral obligation relationship between families that characterised by reciprocal and give-and-take between generations (like Munah's family) is not occurred on this case.

Emmi (female, married, 25 years old, Sidomuncul) and her husband Karto, rented 560 M2 of rice fields from Kasmin (father of Karto) from 2016 to 2018. When asked about the rental price, Kasmin answered *"yes I used the general rental rate and asked for the rent in advance. I also need money, so I asked my son to rent the land"*. Emmi felt that land rent prices are increasing every year, while the yields have become more uncertain, mainly due to pests and unstable prices. She thinks if in the following year, the rent from his father in law goes up, she will stop first.

## 5.4 Migration and Pluriactivity: Various Path Becoming Independent Young Farmer

Here I present the case of Masdi, a landless young man who could eventually buy land by paying in installments from his non-agriculture income. We found that migration is not permanent and at some time later in their lives, many migrants return to the village to farm, because of (1) marriage, (2) elderly family members are sick and they have a responsibility to care for them, (3) parents have asked them to take care of the land, meaning they can access land.

Masdi (37 years old, Sidomuncul), was born in a landless family. He has 3 younger siblings (2 sisters and 1 brother). After graduating from junior high school, he did not want to continue school. He worked odd jobs in the village to help his parents. He said, *"School is not where you learn farming skills"*. At the age of 17, Masdi went to Riau (in Sumatra) to work in a sago flour and wood factory for one year and then returned to the village to rest. Then, he returned to Riau with his friends and crossed over to Malaysia as an undocumented oil palm plantation worker. He stayed two years without being caught and then he decided to go home because he felt he had enough savings.

After he returned home, he was invited by his brother to Lampung (Sumatra Island) to work in a coffee plantation. He joined, but only stayed seven months. He said, *"at that time, I didn't like it, when I was young, I wanted to be free. If you go to your family's house, it's not free"*. After that, he returned to Riau again to work in a wood factory for three years. Then he migrated again to Bangka (Sumatra Island) to sell women's accessories for 10 months. Finally, he returned to the village and met his wife. After marriage, Masdi chose to stay in the village for good because her wife will inherit some land from her parents.

His father-in-law was the first person to teach him rice farming routinely. Although he had experiences working in a plantation, he felt there is a big difference working in the rice field as a farmer and being an oil palm worker. He explained *"In the plantation, I only poked the palm, weighed the palm, moved the palm, or moved the bananas. But now, I have to learn to hoe, sow the seeds, learn *dawut* (take rice seeds after 20 days to another plot), it's very different. My father-in-law also corrected me if I was wrong, one of the most difficult was to flatten the galengan (a bund that can be used to direct the flow of water). It had to be really flat, neat and sturdy (kokoh). I am grateful to be taught directly and can help in the land"*.

Masdi currently lives in his parent-in-laws' house. Masdi manages his parent-in-law's paddy field (1680 m<sup>2</sup>). He has been working on this land since he was married in 2008, but he felt that he had only been released to work alone after two years. Masdi said *"at that time my father-in-law told me, he was sick and not strong enough to go to the farm by himself, so I thought it meant I could start working properly."* Since then, his father-in-law gives him reminders such as, when it is the time to spray the plants or to *matun* (weed). However, all the yield is given to his father-in-law.

Then, only when Masdi was 35 years old, he did feel truly got the opportunity to manage the rice fields without his father-in-law checking or reminding him, and even the income from the harvest was now held by his wife. When I asked how this happened, Masdi had difficulty answering. He said, *"There was no discussion at all, my father-in-law just told me to find a middleman to sell the grain. So, I was looking for a middleman, I sold it, but I gave the money to my wife, not to my father anymore. Just like that"*. But, since then, all the needs of both parents-in-law were provided by Masdi and his wife, as well as household expenses such as fixing the house.

The transfer process of land access also means the responsibility shifting between generations. The case above shows the shift of Masdi's responsibility from working in his father-in-law's land to taking care of the yield, and managing the income from the harvest with his wife. These changes are gradual and less dramatic. However, for Masdi (and his wife), this is a turning point with major implications, because he is gaining more income, even though not in his land. On the other hand, this is also means a new responsibility for Masdi and his wife to take care of all the needs of the house and the dependents.

However, Masdi's wife has siblings, as a result, there is an uncertainty whether the land will all be given to his wife or be divided among the siblings. He also knew he will not get inheritance from his landless parent. Finally, he managed to buy a piece of land in various ways, including: (1) borrowing money from his brother-in-law, (2) saving money from the harvest in his father-in-law's land, (3) and partly from his savings during his migration, (4) money from his wife's livelihood making *caping* (farmer's hat). Because his brother-in-law paid in cash for all the land, as long as Masdi cannot pay off all of his debt, the land will still be managed by his brother-in-law. He has to pay the land at a total price of IDR 10.000.000 (644 EUR) for 1400 M<sup>2</sup>.

Masdi's case shows what White argue that "young people's lack of independent access to agrarian resources, has long been one main factor in their out-migration and apparent aversion to farming, while at the same time not precluding their later return to the village and

to farming when resources become available through savings or inheritance" (White, n.d.: 4). Masdi was a landless who has no means of production, yet with a life course perspective approach, we can trace that in one moment, he could accumulate his capital through migration, saving, and debts, to obtain land ownership or as property.

However, it is important to note, that buying land is very rare in the research villages. And still, Masdi's trajectory is very different from young people who were born with a lot of land inheritance. For instance, Kaling (female, 39 years old, Kaliloro) was born from a family of landowner, she finished school until university. She and her husband have other income in the village such as laundry, kiosk owner, catering, and salary as village government official. She plans to buy land and feels very optimistic about being able to buy larger paddy field. Moreover, Kaling also wants her son to be seed seller or middleman because she said, "*never be a farmer (producer) only, but it is important to hold crucial points (in agricultural chain)*".

From Kaling's case, this is what Ribot and Peluso argued that access to capital can be used for resources access control, through the purchase of rights. When Kaling buys more land, she also has the power to control land access. Coupled with her dream to enter into access to market, therefore the privileged ones like Kaling, can shape access to benefits from things at different scales, in other words in more subtle and indirect ways (Ribot and Peluso, 2003: 166).

## 5.5 Youthful Lifestyles: Unpaid Labor versus Wage Labor

Migration and earning money were present in the narratives of many young farmers; this is strongly linked to the idea of 'feeling free' and the aspirational lifestyles of male youth. Becoming a farmer offered the prospect of earning some money, but when working on their parents' land their involvement in farming gets in the way of earning the money needed to finance youthful masculine lifestyles.

Fisan (19 years old, Nagara) stopped school after Primary Class 5. He immediately started to earn money as a casual worker on rice farms. His elder stepbrother was the one who first invited him to join in on farm work. "*The first thing to learn farming for a young man is hoeing. The first time, I was paid by my uncle, IDR 30,000 per day because the land was very stony*". After that, landowner came to recruit Fisan to help them hoeing or weeding in the rice-fields.

Then, when he was 12 years old, an elder cousin invited him to work delivering drinking water in Makassar (South Sulawesi). He needed at least Rp. 300,000 (EUR 19) to pay for the boat ticket and food on the journey. He felt he couldn't ask his mother for this, and finally was able to save enough money by working on a rice-farm for two weeks. In Makassar he only earned Rp. 500.000 (EUR 32) per month.

We could see that from a young age, our respondents have experienced working on their parent's land and being farm wage laborer. Fisan's story shows that farm work enabled him to exercise his choice to migrate and to be able to gain some freedom.

Fisan enjoyed the free atmosphere in Makassar, but he went home after two years because some incident. And he remembered that the daily wages he earned in the village were just the same as what he earned in Makassar. Now, his daily activities are casual wage laborer on others' land, helping on his mother's farm, and occasionally doing construction work. But his biggest daily earnings are from casual farm labour.

When young unmarried men return to the village to do farm work, inter-generational tensions can arise around working for wages versus helping on their parents' land. As the case

of Fisan and his mother Desiana illustrates this easily leads to tensions, adding some frustration to the process of becoming an independent young farmer:

Desiana owns half a hectare of inherited irrigated paddy land, in two blocks. One 1/4-hectare block is worked by her sons, while the other block is rented out to one of her relatives for 32 EUR per season. Fisan said “*it's only been rented out for one season, I don't know if it will be rented out next or not. It's my mother who will decide*”. Actually, Fisan feels that if he could farm his mother's land it would bring more income than the rent obtains. He and his brother do unpaid work for all the various stages of production, yet the harvest is all in his mother's hands. Fisan told us: “*Mom said there was no one to help her, she said I was always busy earning wages on other farms. So that's why she rented the land out to a relative. It's true, I prefer to work outside, I get EUR 3,80 and a pack of cigarettes for a day's work hoeing on other's land. And I also get asked to help applying pesticides or fertilizers. But I would also like to work on my mom's land, if I did that, I could earn much more than what we get from the rent. But my brother and I are just helping our mother. If we need to buy fertilizer or pesticides, I'm the one who goes to the market because I know what to buy. But when taking paddy to the rice mills or going to the rice miller for a loan, it's always mother. If it's about money, she doesn't trust us (laughing)*”.

In Fisan's case above, the parent is the one who owns the land and the young people are the ones who do almost all the farm work, yet it is the parent who controls the benefits. This is in accordance with a common feature of intergenerational contracts, that certain generations are expected to have responsibilities in the household, for example the children will help a parent when they need them (Ansell, 2017: 112) in certain times. As seen above, his mother expects him to perform unpaid labor on her land. It can be seen, that households are not harmonious units, the household members do not share similar interest (Huijsmans, 2014; Razavi, 2009). Thus, this leads intergenerational tension regarding land transfers and divisions of labour.

Fisan also experienced the tensions between 'being young' and 'becoming an adult' in his choices about farm work. He likes to socialize with his peers, such as go to parties with his friends but that requires money. And that's why earning is important, to be able to fulfill his consumption needs as a young man. Fisan also dreams of becoming a share tenant on another's land but share tenancies on rice land are very rare and most landowners prefer to rent out their land. “*If it's rental, how can I get the money to pay in advance? As a share tenant [paying the rent as a share of the harvest] I think I could manage. But for the moment its best to work for a daily wage.*”

## 5.6 Conclusion

As the presentation of the data above illustrates, land transfers never work out in a uniform manner as they unfold through relations of generation (birth order relations between siblings, and parent-child relations), gender, and class. This ongoing process is also a form of struggle that occurs in everyday life, runs gradually instead of through one-time decisions, and takes the form of conflict/contestation at sometimes, and cooperation/negotiation, at others. I also seek that youth agency which has arisen from the tension between generations, mostly in the individual level.

Hence, this chapter also shows that migration cannot be seen as a final decision. Conversely, with a life course approach, young farmers usually back to the village and attain land access. Last, I showed case how multiple livelihood also support the landless to obtain land access (or land ownership) gradually. On the other hand, multiple livelihood also supports the ones who comes from high class to accumulate capital instantly.

## Chapter 6 Conclusion

Combining the agrarian studies and youth-generation studies, this paper seeks to answer at least two questions in the land transfer process between generations. First is, what are the norms and institutions that interplays and shaped the process of land transfer, and how does the tension occur between generations? Second, how do young people situated themselves in certain norms and institutions and are exercising their agency to access the land?

First, I argue that there is intergenerational and intra-generational tension related to mobilizing the agrarian resources: land. This tension is influenced by various axes of power such as generation, gender, class, birth order, etc. However, the tension occurred in the process of land transfer between generations which lies in everyday experience, mundane, and less dramatic. Yet this navigate young farmers becoming (or not) independent farmers. In short, land transfer (inheritance and community land) is a delicate issue to talk for younger generation.

In chapter three, it can be seen that young farmers in five research locations were mostly born and raised in the very small farm households (even landless in Java sites). And these make them have a very small chance to be able to get land inheritance as main resources to farm. Yet, we still can see their constraints agency to access the land (chapters four and five).

Land as being subject to multiple interests and dynamic of social relations between generations. In consequence, it is worth seeing how these multiple social relations such as norms and institutions are intertwined in the process of land transfer. In chapter four, I concluded that state law regarding land and inheritance explicitly recognizes the rights equality between women and men in obtaining land rights and access.

However, in practice, custom, norms, household relations gave more role on how land is distributed. I argue that inequalities in gender and along generational lines still shape how land is transferred. The case presented shows that customary law in West Manggarai generally excludes women from having the same rights as men regarding access to land. However, in practice, they still have multiple ways to access working and taking benefits in the sibling's or husband's land.

In the same chapter, I also showed how capitalist relation on land has influenced community land (for instance, customary land in Manggarai) is governed and will greatly affects the opportunities for young people to become independent farmers. Even though there are promises of new livelihood, the land sales will be threat for the younger generations to control the main resources to farm.

In chapter five, the land transfers never work out in a uniform manner as they unfold through the relations of generation (birth order relations between siblings, and parent-child relations), gender, and class. That is why, we need to understand the process from transfer of ownership, transfer of access, transfer of management decisions or transfer of control of the product. This ongoing process runs gradually instead of through one-time decisions and takes the form of both contestation and co-operation. In addition, it is worth to see migration and multiple livelihoods also support young people to obtain some degrees of accessing land, even to own the land.

Lastly, by looking at agrarian questions from chapter two, I concluded that young people's agency more operationalised in the individual level in silent ways. For example, how young people attempted to harvest more before the owner of the land also picking the yield. This is a constraint agency that that works in both competition and cooperation between generations (chapter 5).

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