Thin or Thick Collective Securitization?

European Integration through the 2015-2016 Migration Policy Crisis

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Summary

The interaction between crisis and integration in the context of the European Union has been a topic of interest since the early beginning of its existence. By drawing on both integration and securitization theory, this research aims to study the link between integration and through collective securitization processes. Collective securitization poses an interesting concept as it includes the possibility of an international organization functioning as an autonomous securitizing actor. Within the model of collective securitization, two variants of collective securitization are differentiated. Within the thin variant the EU does not act as a securitizing actor in its own right, but is rather seen as the securitizing voice of its members, whereas in the thick variant the EU enjoys its own right of actorness in the securitization process. In a new conceptual framework, these variants are linked through the level of autonomy of supranational institutions. The thick variant presupposes a higher level of autonomy for the supranational institutions leading to enhanced integration. Contrarily, the thin variant presupposes a low level of autonomy, leading to weakened integration.

To effectively study the link between integration and crisis through securitization the case of the migration policy crisis of 2015-2016 is analysed. Migration is often subject to securitization processes. Moreover, integration has been hard in migration policy, especially in the internal dimension. In a process tracing analysis of four policy cases the variants of collective securitization are identified. A special emphasis is put on the voting mechanism, the influence of Member States and the involvement of the supranational institutions. Moreover, the policy cases are differentiated for the internal and external dimension of migration policy.

The analysis illustrates that the thick variant is found in the case of the Relocation Scheme and the establishment of the European Border and Coast Guard, whereas the thin variant is found in the case of the revision of the Schengen Borders Code and the EU-Turkey Deal. Key findings suggest that the thick variant requires voting under QMV, an observation-based approach by Member States and an active involvement of supranational institutions in the process. The thin variant is found in cases where no voting occurred, the Member States took a participation-based approach and the supranational institutions were not actively involved. Although the thin variant was expected to be found in the internal dimension and the thick variant in the external dimension of migration policy, this was not supported by the cases.

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List of Abbreviations

Abbreviation	Meaning
CEAS	Common European Asylum System
CS	Copenhagen School
CPT	Causal process tracing
EAM	European Agenda on Migration
EASO	European Asylum Support Office
EBCG	European Border and Coast Guard
EC	European Commission
ECC	European Economic Community
ECJ	European Court of Justice
ECSC	European Coal and Steel Community
EU	European Union
EP	European Parliament
GAMM	Global Approach on Migration and Mobility
HSOG	Heads of State or Government
JAP	EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan
MEP	Member of the European Parliament
OLP	Ordinary Legislative Procedure
SBC	Schengen Borders Code
SEA	Single European Act
TFEU	Treaty on the Functioning of the EU
VHAS	Voluntary Humanitarian Action Scheme
QMV	Qualified Majority Voting
UN	United Nations

Introduction

European integration has been a topic of interest since the early beginning of the cooperation between European states. Schimmelfennig defines integration as “a decrease or increase in the level of centralization or membership of EU policy regimes” (2018, p. 970). This definition suggests that integration is not only the enhancement of cooperation on a specific issue, but also leaves room for the possibility of less cooperation. Many scholars have concerned themselves with the development of the EU to come to an understanding on how a cooperation initiative between a few states was able to grow out to an influential international organization of 27 member states. The EU as it is known today was created under the Maastricht Treaty of 1993, which enhanced integration beyond economic purposes. A unified foreign and security policy, common citizen rights and advanced cooperation in the fields of asylum and immigration were established in this framework. This study aims to analyse how European integration is affected by crises. It will do so through the process of securitization. The area of migration policy is often subject to securitization processes and therefore highly suitable for this research. Hence, this study will examine the migration policy crisis of 2015-2016.

Integration theories

In an attempt to interpret the process of European integration, scholars developed corresponding theories. The two most important theories of integration are neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism. Neofunctionalism explains integration as a result of prior integration in the form of spillovers, or through path dependence (Haas, 1958). Intergovernmentalism emphasizes the power of states and their national interest. Accordingly, states will only enhance integration if this lies within their preferences and bargaining power (Hoffmann, 1960; Moravcsik, 1991, 1993, 2002; Putnam, 1988; Pierson, 1996).

Integration can be influenced through a variety of developments. A crisis acts as one of these developments and poses an interesting timeframe to analyse integration. Since a crisis is defined as an “open decision-making situation” (Schimmelfennig, 2018b, p. 969), a crisis could either enhance or weaken integration. The theories of integration explain the effect of crisis on integration differently. Firstly, intergovernmentalism does not explicitly mention the influence of crisis but explains the outcome through state preferences. A crisis can trigger change in the national interest, evoke a higher degree of interdependence and influence a state's bargaining position, which all affect the outcome for integration. Neofunctionalism however does include the internal shock of crisis referring to it as "an integral part of the integration dynamic" (Schimmelfennig, 2018b, p. 974). Neofunctionalists suggest that crises will often enhance integration as transnational linkages and interdependences are deepened through spillovers and path dependence. Although the theories differ in their explanations, both acknowledge that crises reinforce the possibility of policy change.

Linking integration and securitization

The academic debate on the effects of crises on integration is still ongoing. This study will add on existing literature by linking integration and securitization. Although most research focusses on the link between integration and crises, the link between integration and securitization has been overlooked. Firstly, crisis and securitization are strongly connected through the notion of threat; when the recognition is given to a possible threat, this may spark a crisis which in turn accelerates policy-making in the EU to mitigate the proposed threat (Sperling & Webber, 2019). Securitization theory, as developed by the Copenhagen School, sees securitization as a social construct which is ushered through speech acts (Weaver, 1995). An issue becomes securitized if the securitizing actor poses something as an existential threat, and this securitizing move is thereafter accepted by an audience (Buzan et al., 1998). The Paris School broadens the scope of securitization by not solemnly focusing on speech acts. but also on securitizing practices, such as the development of policies, bureaucracies and the implementation of procedures (Bigo, 2000).

A more recent developed concept in securitization theory is the concept of collective securitization and the corresponding six stage model (Sperling & Webber, 2019). This concept presupposes that an international organization, such as the EU, can become an autonomous securitizing actor. Two variants, thin and thick collective securitization, can be differentiated within this. The thin variant is present if the organization does not function as a securitizing actor in its own right, but is rather seen as the securitizing voice of its members. If however the organization enjoys its own right of actorness regarding the securitization process, it can be defined as thick collective securitization.

In a conceptual framework developed in this thesis, the variants of collective securitization are linked to European integration. Within the thin variant, the members of the organization, in this case the 27 Member States of the EU, have the most influence in the securitization process. This would mean that the European Council and the Council of the EU, the two intergovernmental institutions of the EU in which Member States enjoy more power, were the dominant securitizing actors. The thick variant however presupposes a high level of autonomy for the organization, which in the case of the EU would result in the supranational institutions, the European Commission and the European Parliament, acting as the securitizing actors. By identifying the dominant variant in the collective securitization process of the migration crisis, one can draw conclusions on the role of the EU as an actor of securitization. This can then be linked to integration; the more autonomous the supranational institutions of the EU become, the more integration is enhanced. The thick variant therefore presupposes an enhancement of European integration, whereas the thin variant presupposes a weakening of European integration.

Migration policy crisis

This research will study the link between integration and securitization by analysing the migration policy crisis of 2015-2016. Although the events in 2015-2016 are often referred to as the *migration crisis*, this research follows in the footsteps of many scholars critically assessing the use of this term (Castelli Gattinara & Zamponi, 2020; McAdam, 2014, Menjívar et al, 2019; Attina, 2016). Not only does the use of the term crisis "both constitute and drive responses to it", it also highlights the wrong aspects of the events (McAdam, 2014, p.31). Despite the fact that the numbers of migrants did rise during this period according to the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and Eurostat (IOM, 2015; Eurostat, 2015), this did not trigger the crisis (Menjívar et al., 2019). The EU has been familiar with large inflows of migrants and the situation of 2015 was not unexpected. However, the EU was unprepared "to provide humanitarian intervention" as it still lacked a functioning migration policy (Castelli Gattinara & Zamponi, 2020, p. 626). Consequently, scholars regard the crisis as the result of lacking policies rather than the influx of migrants (Castelli Gattinara & Zamponi, 2020). As this thesis focusses on the lack of existing migration policy, and to apply a more nuanced view on the crisis, it will be referred to as the migration *policy* crisis.

This case was chosen for two reasons. Firstly, migration is known to be an area in which integration has been hard and cooperation can still be enhanced substantially (Scipioni, 2018; Alink et al., 2001; Schierup et al., 2004). The incremental steps that were taken in this area were mostly regarding the external dimension of migration policy; border management. Cooperation on the internal dimension proved far more difficult. In an effort to enhance cooperation on both internal and external migration policy, the newly installed European Commission introduced the European Agenda on Migration (EAM) in May 2015. The Agenda laid out a new discourse to unite the Member States in the tackling of this humanitarian crisis. Secondly, migration has increasingly been defined as a security matter in the EU (Bigo, 2002; Huysmans 2006; Gabrielli, 2014), making it an interesting case for collective securitization.

To analyse the link between integration and crisis through securitization, the research question that is proposed in this study is: *Which variant of collective securitization, thick or thin, can be found in the internal and external migration policies of the EU during the migration policy crisis of 2015-2016?* A process tracing analysis of four policy cases which fall under the overarching EAM is done. These cases are; the Relocation Scheme, the EU-Turkey Deal, the revision of the Schengen Borders Code (SBC) and the establishment of the European Border and Coast Guard (EBCG). As highlighted in the above, integration has developed differently between the internal and external dimension of migration policy. To take this difference into account, two of the policy cases in the internal (Relocation Scheme, SBC) and two in the external (EU-Turkey Deal, EBCG) dimension have been chosen. For each of the four policy cases the variant of collective securitization (thin or thick) is determined, uncovering the way in which integration was affected during this crisis. This analysis not only illustrates the context in which these policies were adopted, but also identifies the influence and involvement of EU institutions and Member States.

Relevance

The relevance of this thesis lies in two aspects, a theoretical and a societal aspect. Firstly, it aims to contribute to the European integration as well as the securitization discourse by developing a new framework which links the two. Through this, the empirical understanding of the theories will be enhanced. Developing theories is important as "it advances the collective dialogue between theory and data beyond the current state of discipline". (Gschwend & Schimmelfennig, 2007 p.3). As the concept of collective securitization is rather new, and not many research has focussed on the differences in the variances, this study contributes to the understanding of the interaction between Member State preferences and supranational institutions of the EU and how this influences the policy process. In a time in which disintegration is a plausible option, as Brexit has affirmed, the understanding of this interaction is necessary to avoid more such cases.

Secondly, the societal relevance of this thesis lies in the understanding of the way in which crises affect integration. Integration will remain an important process considering the future role of the EU, not only on the national, but also on the international level, especially with the changing power structures between the U.S. and China. Moreover, the EU will likely be dealing with more crises in the near future, such as the climate crisis, which makes it valuable to uncover how crisis affects integration. Lessons drawn from the migration crisis can therefore provide guidance for future crises and prevent disintegration in such an event. Many of these future crises will be referred to in a securitization framework, highlighting the necessity of the inclusion of this process regarding integration. Furthermore, the process tracing analysis reveals the vulnerabilities in European migration policy. With this knowledge, improvements can be made that are in interest of both European citizens as well as migrants.

The presented research is divided in several chapters. The first chapter will give a thorough review of the existing literature on integration theory and the role securitization plays on this. Moreover, it will discuss why migration policy is an interesting case to demonstrate this link. In the following chapter, the theoretical framework will be presented. The framework first draws on securitization theory as developed by the Copenhagen School and the Paris school. The chapter goes on to introduce the concept and model of collective securitization by Sperling and Webber (2019), which will be used to evaluate the securitization process in the case. Furthermore, it offers a new framework linking collective securitization and integration. The following chapter, chapter 3, describes the research design and method. In chapter 4, the four policy cases are analysed and the variants of collective securitization exposed, after which key findings are presented. This chapter is then followed by a discussion in which the findings are linked to existing theory and contributions to these are made.

Chapter 1 - Literature review

1.1 European integration

After the two world wars, there was hope for a "United States of Europe" to emerge, which main function would be preventing any individual states from falling back in nationalist politics (Geddes, 2003, p. 49). Although such a federal system did not emerge, important steps to enhance integration were taken in the aftermath of the war, starting with the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). The ECSC was ratified in 1951 under the Treaty of Paris by 6 members; Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and West Germany. Other important treaty's in the expansion of the EU were the Treaty of Rome (1957) (establishment of Euratom), the Single European Act of 1987, the Maastricht Treaty (1993)(establishment of the Single Market), Amsterdam Treaty (1999)(establishment of Eurozone) and the Treaty of Lisbon (2009). The development of the ECSC to the European Union (EU) has been of great interest to many political scientists. This "extraordinary political experiment", in which member states have delegated powers to supranational institutions, fascinate scholars to this day (Pierson, 1996, p. 123). With the Treaty of Lisbon the institutional consolidation of the EU seems to have been achieved. The institutions of the EU can be divided in supranational and intergovernmental institutions, the first mentioned consisting of the European Commission, the European Parliament and the European Court of Justice (ECJ), and the latter consisting of the European Council and the Council of Ministers (Tsebelis & Garrett, 2001).

As the process of European integration fascinated many scholars, different theories were proposed to make sense of the development. Within European integration theory two approaches have become dominant; neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism. Both will be discussed in the following paragraphs.

1.1.1 Neofunctionalism

In the early years of integration scholars mainly aimed to explain the successes of the development of the EU. Deriving from theories of regional integration, Ernst Haas already outlined what European integration could look like in the 1950s. His interest in European integration was shared by other scholars, such as Hoffmann and Deutsch, and developed into an approach called neofunctionalism. Although these scholars all added different aspects to the approach, the aim of the theory remained the same; "how to conceive, design and guide the process of regional integration so that it would transform the European state system in such a way as to make war between its sovereign units impossible" (Schmitter, 2005, p. 256).

In the highly influential work *The Uniting of Europe* Haas (1958) developed the framework for the neofunctionalist approach. Political integration is defined by him as "the process whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to lift their loyalties, expectations and political activities toward a new centre, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing national states" (Haas, 1958, p.16).

Although national interests remain an integral aspect of neofunctionalism, according to Haas cooperation is possible when competing sub-national and non-state interests meet (Schmitter, 2005). The interplay between these interests is captured in his concept of 'spillover' (Haas, 2004). This concept suggests that, when the preferences of the national level, the sub-national level and the non-state interests have become entangled in a specific policy area, this will in turn create the conditions and incentives for integration in other related policy areas, thus creating a spillover. This spillover can happen both in the *expansive* sense; expanding to new sectors, or in the *deepening* sense; more integration within the same area (Rosamond, 2000). Haas explicitly mentions crisis as a time in which change is possible. (Schmitter, 2005, p. 258). It is important to note that Haas does not mention a specific timeframe in which a spillover can occur, to the great distress of many scholars (Schmitter, 2005).

Another important concept of neofunctionalism is the concept of path-dependence which finds its origin in historical institutionalism (Schimmelfennig, 2018a). This concept puts emphasis on the historical aspect and explains the stability of integration. Path dependence suggests that the path chosen in the past, influences the path in the future (Pierson, 1996). Mahoney (2000, p. 508) adds to this, that the historical sequence can "set into motion institutional patterns". In the context of the EU this would lead to the conclusion that, once integration has developed in a specific area, it is not likely to be disregarded. Underlying causes for this are the cost implications and the reluctance to commit to change (Pierson, 1996).

1.1.2 Intergovernmentalism

Although neofunctionalism could explain integration, it could not so much explain the difficulties that European integration faced over the years (Pierson, 1996). As Member States put up protectionist initiatives which limited integration, it opened a window for a theory which included the possibility of weakened integration. This is when the focus shifted towards intergovernmentalism (Schmitter, 2005).

Contrary to neofunctionalism, the main focus within this approach are states and their national interest (Hoffmann, 1960; Moravcsik, 2002). According to intergovernmentalists, the nation state still plays a central role in EU decision-making and decides the course and pace of integration (Hoffmann, 1960; Moravcsik, 2002). Hoffmann criticized neofunctionalism and claimed the causes for integration were linked to the *logic of diversity*, which suggests that, "in areas of key importance to the national interest, nations prefer the certainty {…} of national self-reliance (Hoffmann, 1966, p. 882). Hoffmann goes on to make a distinction between high politics, which compromises areas such as security and defence and foreign policy, and low politics, focussing on welfare and economic policies. The first mentioned are policy areas on which states are reluctant to delegate power, whereas the latter can more easily be regulated by a supranational body. This distinction illustrates how intergovernmentalism explains the instances in which supranational institutions can emerge. Nevertheless, this will only occur if it is in the national interest of Member States.

According to Pierson (1996) the three core features of intergovernmentalism are; the centrality of sovereignty, the use of institutions as instruments and bargaining between member states. As already illustrated in the above, intergovernmentalism focusses on the preferences of states. However, these preferences are "strongly weighted towards preserving sovereignty" (Pierson, 1996, p.129). Integration is only acceptable to national governments "insofar as it strengthens, rather than weakens, their control over domestic affairs" (Moravcsik, 1993, p. 507). To understand the second and third core feature, it is important to recognize that intergovernmentalism regards the EU as an international regime. An international regime is defined as “ a set of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge” (Krasner, 1983, p. 1). Within this regime institutions play a key role in facilitating the *bargaining* between states (Moravcsik, 1993, p. 507). Institutions are able to overcome the problems that arise from information asymmetries, as they can take away uncertainties relating to preferences, intentions and the reliability of other actors. Therefore, institutions bring a sense of security and help states tackle collective action problems. The third core feature further addresses the (intergovernmental) bargaining process, which take place in the arena of the institution. Regarding the bargaining power of a state, states with a high interest regarding a specific issue, have a weaker bargaining position as they have more to lose. Contrarily, states with lower incentives have stronger positions and can ask for more as they do not necessarily seek to change the status quo. Intergovernmentalism takes bargaining powers into account when discussing the outcomes of integration processes.

More valuable contributions to intergovernmentalism were made by Andrew Moravcsik. Moravcsik explains the willingness of Member States for the enlargement of the EU and the development of supranational institutions, as the gain of security. According to him, this security is derived from the fact that one can anticipate how states will act in such an arena (Moravcsik, 2002). It does not come as a surprise to Moravcsik, that issues of high politics remain being solved within the realm of intergovernmental institutions. Although much of intergovernmentalist theory is based on the idea of the preferences of national governments, Moravcsik also recognizes the influence of the domestic public opinion on national governments (Moravcsik, 1994). The inclusion of the domestic level was further developed by Hooghe and Marks in a new “postfunctionalist” approach on integration (2009; 2019).

1.1.3 Autonomy of supranational institutions

Both theories emphasize that integration in a policy area is largely dependent on the level of autonomy of the supranational institutions (Pierson 1996). The more autonomy a supranational institution has, the larger the possibility for integration. In the context of the EU, there are three ways in which the autonomy of the Commission and EP is influenced.

The first way in which the level of autonomy of the supranational institutions is influenced through the voting mechanism (Pollack, 1997). The two dominant voting systems in the EU are voting under Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) and voting under unanimity. Whereas voting under QMV enhances the power of supranational institutions and therefore decreases the level of influence an individual Member State has, voting under unanimity does the opposite as it gives Member States a veto-power.

The second way in which the level of autonomy of the supranational institutions is influenced, is through the position of Member States in the process (Pollack, 1997). This position can either be participation-based or observation-based (Tallberg, 2000). The participation-based approach suggests that Member States participate in the process and "actively intervene in the execution of an action". Contrarily, observation-based monitoring suggests a situation in which a Member States observes the action without actively participating.

Drawing on the approach of Tallberg (2000), not only the position of Member States, but also the involvement of the supranational institutions themselves influence their level of autonomy. If they are able to pursue an active role in the process, their level of autonomy is high. If however they cannot be actively involved in the process, their level of autonomy is weakened.

In summary, the voting mechanism, the position of Member States and the involvement of supranational institutions in the policy process will be identified in the policy cases to measure the level of autonomy of the Commission and the EP.

1.1.4 Crises and integration

The bridge between integration and securitization can be made through crisis. It is therefore necessary to illustrate how integration theories relate to crisis.The literature on the link between crisis and integration has expanded greatly in recent years. Schimmelfennig defines crises as "open decision-making situation" (2018, p. 969). Such a crisis could, in the context of integration, both weaken well as enhance integration (Lefkofridi & Schmitter, 2015). The academic debate on crises its effect on integration, is still ongoing.

Firstly, intergovernmentalism does not specifically mention the handling of crises. Member State preferences remain the most important point of reference, crisis or not, and agreements still reflect the relative bargain powers of states. However, crises usually evoke a higher degree of interdependence, which would enhance the incentives for policy cooperation (Moravscik 1993, p. 485). It is also important to note that crises affect some states harder than others, which can lead to asymmetrical interdependence systems. States which are more affected by a crisis, enjoy weaker bargaining positions and are more open to compromise. Contrarily, states which are less affected by a crisis, have less incentive to change the status quo. A crisis also often triggers changes in the national interest and domestic public opinion, which can lead to changing preferences. As state preferences remain the vocal point in intergovernmentalism, integration will only be enhanced through crises if it is in the national interest.

Secondly, neofunctionalism does include the internal shock of crisis in its theory. According to Schimmelfennig it is even "an integral part of the integration dynamic" (2018b, p. 974) that often strengthens integration as a result of institutionalization and path-dependence. Prior integration will in this context promote the enhancement of integration during crises. Through spillovers and path dependence a "progressive integration dynamic" can be developed that deepens interdependence and transnational linkages (Schimmelfennig, 2018b, p. 973). In crises these transnational linkages become even more significant and in some instances can lead to more integration. For path-dependence to work in favour of integration, it is crucial that disintegration becomes less attractive (Schimmelfennig, 2018b). According to Pierson (1996) a few factors contribute to path-dependence in the integration process; high sunk and exit costs, endogenous interdependence, the autonomy of supranational actors and decision-making hurdles, such as voting by unanimity. All of these factors make disintegration harder or less attractive.

Summarizing the above, intergovernmentalism explains different integration outcomes in crises as the outcomes of changing preferences and bargaining powers, whereas neofunctionalism explains it through deepened interdependence and transnational linkages. However, both theories acknowledge that crises can serve as times in which policy change is possible (Tosun et al., 2014).

1.1.5 Integration in migration policy

As both theories of integration regard crises as the time in which policy change is possible, the migration policy crisis of 2015-2016 poses an interesting case to study integration during crises. Although European integration as a whole is regarded rather positively, integration has not been as successful in every policy area. Only incremental steps of integration are seen in the migration policy area as “migration matters have been perceived as a field where State sovereignty should not be surrendered {..} and the common approach has been undesirable” (Weinar, 2011, p. 1). Within the incremental development a difference in pace can be identified with regards to the external and the internal dimension of migration policy. Moreover, the area of migration policy has been subject to securitization processes.

In the early years of European integration migration obstacles were mainly solved through intergovernmental initiatives which focussed on intra-EU migration and crime and terrorism. This “purely securitarian approach” set the stage for the way the issue would be handled in the years to follow (Weinar, 2011, p. 2). During the 1990’s, incremental steps were taken to lift the issue to the European level and enhance the powers of the supranational institutions. These steps became visible after the ratification of the Treaty of Amsterdam and Lisbon, as the European Commission and the European Parliament gained competences in the policy area of migration. Under the Treaty of Amsterdam the EU agreed on “a detailed list of goals for EU asylum and immigration policies” named the Tampere Programme (Brady, 2008, p. 20). Moreover, under the Treaty of Lisbon the voting mechanism was changed to QMV instead of unanimity, with an exception of legal migration, also enhancing the position of the EC and the EP slightly.

However, within this incremental development a difference is identified in the internal and external dimension of migration policy. The developments of migration policy mostly focused on the external dimension (Malmström, 2014). According to Weinar (2011), the main reason for this is its development under the Pillar of Justice and Home Affairs, which disregards its factor in labour economics. External migration policy is seen as “the policy aimed at managing the migratory flows beyond the borders of the EU as well as managing the influx of migration in the EU” (Attina, 2016, p. 21). Contrarily, internal migration policy refers to the managing of migration within EU borders.

Although even in external migration policy only small steps were taken, several institutions were established to manage EU external borders (FRONTEX, EASO, EUROSUR). In 2011 the Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM) was introduced as the overarching framework for external migration policy of the EU (Malmström, 2014). Although this initiative proposed an interesting opening for integration on other dimensions of migration policies, Member States have remained hesitant to pursue these actively (Weinar, 2011). The lack of cooperation becomes evident in the case of the Common European and Asylum System (CEAS). This initiative was proposed to function as the GAMM counterpart with regards to the internal dimension. Although this policy was already proposed in 1999, it took until 2015 for Member States to agree upon it (Malmström, 2014). The case of the CEAS illustrates that many years were necessary before agreeing upon internal migration policies.

The difference in integration between internal and external migration policy will be included in the research. The findings in the above would suggest that integration in external migration policies is more easily reached than in internal migration policies. This expectation is analysed in the four policy cases, which will also differentiate between the internal and external dimension.

Another development which has affected migration policy are the securitization process it is subject to. Migration is an issue which is frequently securitized in the EU (Huysmans, 2000). Whereas views on migrants were relatively positive in the 80's and 90's, this view changed over the years (Léonard & Kaunert, 2019). As the number of migrants grew, so did the number of critics. According to Attina (2016, p. 19) Europeans increasingly saw migrants as those wo:

> "alter the job market, overburden the national welfare system, bring troubles to the education system, and cause security problems like the growth of crime in the streets, the infiltration of organised crime networks, and the intrusion of terrorist groups."

National governments have not argued with their citizens on this and have even aided in the process of securitization (Attina, 2016). Moreover, Léonard and Kaunert have argued that, in the aftermath of 11 September 2001 and after multiple terrorist attacks in the EU, migrants have been increasingly securitized through the association with terrorism. The issue of migration therefore sets an interesting framework to analyse securitization processes.

Chapter 2 - Theoretical Framework

As migration is so closely linked to securitization, the following chapter, will introduce the theoretical framework for securitization theory. First, the relevant literature on securitization theory will be discussed, whereafter the concept of collective securitization is illustrated. The model to uncover collective securitization process in the migration policy crisis of 2015-2016, is the recently developed model of Sperling and Webber (2019). Within the model of collective securitization, the difference between the thin and the thick variant will be highlighted. Lastly, the link between these variants and the integration theories is established in a new conceptual framework.

2.1 Securitization theory

The theoretical framework of this study is based on the contributions of the Copenhagen school and the Paris school. The Copenhagen school appears very promising for this study as it introduces the concept of securitization and holds a prominent place within the field of security studies. Securitization is defined as the way in which an issue is constructed as a security issue. However, the concept of security of the Copenhagen school is rather narrow, focussing mainly on a military understanding of security. Moreover, the Copenhagen school emphasizes the ushering of speech acts through which a security situation is brought into life. It overlooks the possibility of security practices which trigger the process. For this reason the contributions of the Paris school are also included. The ideas of the Paris school are based on a broader definition of security and stress the importance of security practices, especially in the field of migration and the context of the EU. To make the bridge to the collective securitization framework, the importance of the audience is discussed. Both the Copenhagen and the Paris school put too little emphasis on the audience, which receives the securitizing move and has to accept it as such. However, the audience plays a crucial role in collective securitization and it is therefore explicitly mentioned in the context of securitization theory.

2.1.1 The Copenhagen School

Securitization theory, as first developed by the Copenhagen School, finds its origin in a linguistic approach of international relations theory. The main authors of this approach, Ole

Weaver and Barry Buzan, made crucial contributions to the security discourse since the 1990s. In the centre of their theoretical framework lies the concept of securitization. Securitization is based on the idea that security is a social construct, which is uttered through *speech acts* (Weaver, 1995). A speech act is not just the referring to a security situation, much more it defines as situation as a security situation and calls it into life. The actor performing this speech act is identified as the so called *securitizing actor*. The *referent object* is defined as entities which are "seen to be existentially threatened and have a legitimate claim to survival" (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 36). The referent object is not necessarily just one individual, but can also represent a group of people or an entity, such as a state or humanity as a whole. The most important feature of the referent object is that it enjoys political legitimacy (Sperling & Webber, 2019).

When all these aspects mentioned in the above are combined, Buzan et al. define securitization as (1998, p.26):

"the staging of existential issues in politics to lift them above politics. In security discourse, an issue is dramatized and presented as an issue of supreme priority; thus, by labelling it as *security*, an agent claims a need for and a right to treat it with extraordinary means."

As can be seen from the definition above, another important aspect, according to Weaver and Buzan, is the framing of an issue as an *existential threat*. This enables the securitizing actor to take *extraordinary measures* that would normally be not deemed legitimate. Extraordinary measures in these terms are identified as "measures justifying actions outside the normal bounds of political procedure" (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 24-25). However in recent literature on securitization theory in the EU it has been acknowledged that an existential threat is not necessary for an issue to become securitized. Buzan and Weaver themselves have acknowledged that in some instances there is a logic of security at play, even though a concrete security discourse in the public sphere was not found (1998, p. 28). This widens the definition of security greatly.

In addition to the existential threat, the literature illustrates that speech acts are not always as clear as presupposed by the Copenhagen School. More often, a speech act can be regarded in more general terms as a *securitizing move*. This concept takes away the preposition that the securitizing move is necessarily a speech act, but rather can take multiple forms. The Paris School, another approach on securitization, has highlighted the importance of such forms for empirical research and the importance of a broader understanding of the concept of security.

2.1.2 The Paris School

As Léonard and Kaunert (2019, p. 21) and many other scholars have argued (Balzacq, 2005; Behnke, 2000; MacKenzie, 2009; Taureck, 2006; Williams, 2003), the securitization framework of the Copenhagen School in its original form is not suitable for empirical application, as it is based on a rather narrow understanding of security. It is mostly focused on a military understanding of security, in which surviving a threat is the main objective. To correctly analyse securitization processes in more practical cases, like the case of migration, a broader definition of security is needed. The main author of the Paris School, Didier Bigo, incorporates this broader idea of security by stressing the importance of *practices*. According to Bigo (2000) securitization does not necessarily need speech acts to be successful. Other securitizing practices, such as the development of polices, bureaucracies and implementation of procedures can also trigger securitization processes (Léonard & Kaunert, 2019, p. 25). Interestingly, Bigo himself already linked practises to the issue of migration (2002, p. 65-66):

> "the securitization of immigration (…) emerges from the correlation between some successful speech acts of political leaders, the mobilization they create for and against some groups of people, and the specific field of security professionals (…). It comes also from a range of administrative practices such as population profiling, risk assessment, statistical calculation, category creation, proactive preparation, and what may be termed a specific habitus of the 'security professional' with its ethos of secrecy and concern for the management of fear or unease."

It becomes clear from this definition, that in the securitization process of migration not just speech acts, but rather the combination of speech acts and securitizing practices are deemed important. Léonard and Kaunert continue with the inclusion of practices but put forward the idea that practices not necessarily have to be 'extraordinary' (2019, p.29). They do not understand extraordinary solemnly as 'out of the ordinary' but rather as practices that have not been used in the same framework before. Moreover, Léonard and Kaunert (2019) especially stress the importance of including securitising practices in studies on the securitization of migration, as the policy instruments installed in this context contribute greatly to the security discourse. They go on to highlight the discrepancy that exists between the speech acts and the securitization practices regarding migration policy in the EU. Whereas the speech acts of the EU often frame migration as a humanitarian discourse, the practices show a very different discourse (Léonard & Kaunert, 2019).

As the additions of Bigo and Léonard and Kaunert open interesting doors for empirical research, the practices of securitization, as well as speech acts will be included in the framework under the general term of *securitizing moves*. In sum, the Copenhagen School regards the process of securitization as a social construct, which is uttered through speech acts. The Paris School builds up on this but highlights the importance of practices and maintains a wider definition of security.

2.1.3. Audience

A last important aspect for the framework of securitization is the response of the audience. A speech act, or *securitizing move,* is not the only requirement to successfully securitize an issue. In more recent literature the importance of the *audience* has been stressed (Cótê, 2016). The audience is defined as the entity who receives the securitizing move and consequently the one who has to accept it as such. If the social construct is not accepted by the audience, the process of securitization is blocked. According to Léonard and Kaunert (2019, p. 17) there are both internal and external conditions a speech act has to fulfil in order for the audience to accept it as such. The internal condition relates to the linguistic part of the act, in which a plot should clarify the existential threat. The external condition relates more to contextual and social aspects. The securitizing actor should not only enjoy a certain degree of authority, but should also have persuasive powers. Once these conditions are met, the securitizing actor can successfully mobilise the audience. In the coming paragraphs it will become evident that the audience plays a significant role in the model of collective securitization.

2.1.4 Politicization and desecuritzation

When considering securitization theory, one cannot disregard the concepts of *politicization* and *desecuritization*. The concept of securitization should not be confused with the concept of politicization. According to Buzan et al (1998), politicization is the step that comes prior to securitization. The framing of an issue as an existential threat, and the implications this has on "extraordinary" measures that can be taken are missing in the process of politicization. A politicized issue therefore can best be explained as an issue that is high on the political agenda and "is part of public policy, requiring government decision and resource allocations, more rarely, some other form of communal governance" (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 24-25). This definition highlights the absence of any mentioning of an extraordinary situation, which would legitimize the use of extraordinary measures.

The concept of desecuritization has become increasingly popular as critics of securitization have questioned the advantages of framing an issue as a security threat.

Desecuritization describes the opposite process of securitization, in which an issue is no longer framed as a security issue and moves back into the realm of “normal politics”. Weaver and Buzan have acknowledged this problems themselves and have highlighted possible side effects of securitization, such as the militarization of non-military issues or the reinforcement of a “us versus them” logic (Léonard & Kaunert, 2019, p. 18). The concept of desecuritization was developed in this framework as a counterpart of securitization to avoid “excessive and irrational securitization in this legitimate social, political and economic objective of considerable importance” (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 208). It does leave one to wonder when the limit of the excessiveness and irrationality is reached.

2.2 Collective Securitization

As securitization theory focusses mainly on securitization process which are activated by states, the concept of collective securitization also takes the possibility into account of an international organization pursuing the role of securitizing actor. The concept of collective securitization was originally developed to explain securitizing discourses in international organizations like the United Nations (UN) or NATO. However, as the EU integrated further, it became an increasingly interesting actor of collective securitization. In 2019 the *Journal of EU Public Policy* published a special issue on this concept and how it relates to important issues in the EU such as energy policies, terrorism and the eurozone crisis.

Sperling and Webber define collective securitization as following (2019, p. 236);

> “Collective securitisation requires that the actor in question acts on behalf of other empowered actors who themselves may have individual securitising imperatives. It entails aggregating these multiple securitisations and giving them authoritative articulation, and so is most obviously undertaken by formal international organisations.”

It becomes clear from the definition that a certain level of autonomy of the international organisation is presupposed, which enables the organisation to step up as the securitizing actor. This aspect is however highlighted by the authors in the distinction between the thick and thin variant of collective securitization. On the one hand, thin securitization suggests that the international organization does not enjoy actorness over the securitization process but only acts as the voice of its members that wish to securitize an issue. Usually, a member, or a small group of members, express their security concerns and the organization respects these preferences. The organization would, in this context, only enjoy a superficial level of actorness (Sperling & Webber, 2019). There is not enough autonomy for the organization to act as a unified securitizing actor. On the other hand, the thick variant of collective securitization suggests that an international organization can step up as an autonomous security actor that has an agency in its own right (Sperling & Webber, 2019). Although the preferences of members are taken into account, the ultimate power in the securitizing process lies with the organization itself.

The two variants also make the importance of the audience very clear. Within an organization, audiences can vary from international public opinion, national politics, other international organisations or political elites etc. (Sperling & Webber, 2019). The most important audience however are the members of the organization, in the case of the EU, the group of 27 Member States. These form the organization and have influence on the (security) course its taking. Moreover, they have the power to initiate policies and reject these. The audience therefore has a far more active role than in "regular" securitization. Sperling and Webber define the process between the organisation and its members in securitization processes as "recursive interaction", as it can be understood as "repeated bargaining procedures and substantive exchanges {…} over the content and form of threats as well as the policy responses appropriate to mitigating them" (Sperling & Webber, 2019, p. 243).

Until now, the thin variant has been more prominent in research, as most international organizations are ruled heavily by their members. The EU however presents an interesting case for the thick variant, as this organisation not only consists of intergovernmental institutions (European Council and the Council of the EU), but also of supranational institutions to which Member States have delegated their powers (European Commission and the European Parliament). These supranational institutions enjoy more autonomy than most international organisations and could therefore be able to act as an autonomous securitizing actor. The EU is therefore an interesting context to study the possibility of thick collective securitization. In their research Sperling and Webber have adopted the assumption that the EU is an agent of thick collective securitization. This research however does not adopt this assumption, especially in the case of migration policy, as Member States maintain most competences in this area and therefore the thin variant remains relevant.

2.3 A conceptual framework - Linking collective securitization and integration

The two variants of collective securitization can be linked to the integration theories through a conceptual framework (**Figure 1**). The variant of collective securitization will expose the level of autonomy enjoyed by the supranational institutions of the EU. Through the level of autonomy of the Commission and the EP, conclusions can be drawn on integration in the EU, answering the research question. Linking the two in a conceptual framework opens the possibility of the application in other security fields and adds onto the literature of security theory.

Within the thin variant of collective securitization, the Member States still hold the initial power over the securitization process. Member States submit their security concerns to the institutions of the EU, highlighting their national preferences, upon which the supranational institution acts as the voice of their concerns. The international organization is the puppet of the Member States in this context and only functions as the bargaining platform. This overlaps greatly with the theory of intergovernmentalism, where state preferences remain central and cooperation and integration only takes place if it is in the state's best interest. If a Member State deems the securitization on an issue necessary and it wants a cohesive policy to be made on a higher level, it can use the EU as its platform to do so. Through the use of their bargaining powers, the Member State can seek allies on the specific issue and push through preferences in bargaining situations. In the European context this would mean that the bargaining and securitization process will have mainly taken place through active involvement of the European Council and the Council of the EU, as these are the intergovernmental institutions. Through the thin variant the level of autonomy of supranational institutions remains low, weakening integration.

The thick variant of collective securitization suggests that the EU is able to act as an autonomous securitizing actor. To achieve this, the supranational institutions of the EU must enjoy a certain amount of autonomy through the delegated powers by its Member States. In recent years, the European Commission and European Parliament have gained competences in multiple areas as Member States have increasingly delegated sovereignty to these supranational institutions. An example of this is the adjusted voting mechanism; under the Treaty of Lisbon voting on multiple areas was changed from unanimity to QMV. The thick variant therefore overlaps greatly with the concepts of spillovers and path dependence; the extensive integration in the economic area has led to integration in other areas. This has enhanced the autonomy of the supranational institutions, making it easier for them to act as the securitizing actor. The active involvement of the supranational institutions, the European Commission and/or the European Parliament, in the securitization process is therefore expected to be found in the thick variant. Through the thick variant the level of autonomy of supranational institutions is higher, enhancing integration.

Figure 1. A conceptual framework of collective securitization and integration



2.4 The model of collective securitization

To examine whether the collective securitization of a specific issue has taken place, Sperling and Webber (2019) have created a circular model consisting of six stages (**Figure 2**). As will become evident, the model fits very well within this framework and incorporates the most important concepts from securitization theory outlined in the above.

The model is based on six stages. The first stage of the collective securitization process represents the status quo of the security discourse prior to the perceived notion of threat. This includes policies that are already in place in the specific area, and the way in which these policies developed over time. For the context of this study this first stage will illustrate the security discourse in migration policy up to 2015.

The second stage is identified as an event or series of events with the power to disrupt the status quo mentioned above and trigger the start of the securitization process. This event does not only convince the securitizing actor, but also the audience, that “the qualitative character of the internal and external security environment has worsened” (Sperling & Webber, 2019, p. 245). More often these precipitating events are followed by other reinforcing events. If the securitizing actor perceives this deterioration as a security threat, the third and fourth stages of the model are set in motion.

The securitizing move is the third stage, which represents a crucial part of the process as it establishes a threat to the referent object. As already mentioned in the above, a securitizing move does not necessarily have to be a speech act, as securitizing practices can also be relevant. For the securitizing move to be accepted, the audience response is crucial. Not only does the audience need to accept the securitizing move, it also needs to acknowledge the threat it is posing to the referent object which legitimizes the implementation of policies needed to mitigate the threat. The audience response is closely intertwined with the securitizing move through the process of recursive interaction. In the context of the EU, the securitizing move is most likely to be made by the supranational institutions such as the Commission or the Parliament. In this situation the Member States function as the audience. It is however possible, in the case of the thin variant, that the Member States influence the securitizing move which is however made by the supranational institutions. This changes the dynamic of the recursive interaction and leaves even more power for the Member States (audience).

The fifth stage represents is the way in which the security threat is implemented through appropriate policies. The policy outputs are meant to mitigate the proposed threat. Although most policies are situated at the EU level, the domestic implementation of these policies can vary greatly. The model however assumes that national policies will reflect the decision made on the EU level (Sperling & Webber, 2019). In this research four policy cases will be analysed which represent the policy outputs of the securitizing move mitigating the constructed threat of migration. The cases all fall under the overarching European Agenda on Migration.

A last important step to collective securitization, and therefore the last stage of the model, is the development of the newly adopted policies in becoming the new status quo. According to Sperling and Webber this new status quo consists of a “new strategic vocabulary, agenda and practice", which has to be reached to become "the initial condition of a future collective securitization process" (2019, p. 247).

Figure 2. The model of collective securitization



Source: Sperling & Webber, 2019, p. 246

It is important to highlight that the steps of the model should not be seen as distinct, but rather as overlapping stages. The securitizing move can be felt long after is has taken place and can affect future events. Sometimes the move is even made prior to the existing threat, such as the threat of terrorism in Europe, which was institutionalised after the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 in the United States. In this case, a threat that was already known became confirmed and started the securitization process. This example shows that stages overlap and can exist parallel to one another.

The concluding article in the special issue, in which an overview of the findings in different policy areas is given, makes a few adjustments to the model presented in the above (Lucarelli, 2019). Firstly, the precipitating event is more than often a cascading of events. The last of these series of events is often the tipping point, which "changes the underlying character of the policy domain" (Lucarelli, 2019, p. 427). This is when securitization occurs. Secondly, an *existential* threat is not deemed necessary to trigger the securitization process. A threat to the institutional process, especially in the context of the EU, is also sufficient to activate the process. The third finding suggests that the policy output need not to be exceptional, but, as Léonard and Kaunert (2019) had already argued, can be classified as "enhanced ordinary policy" (Lucarelli, 2019, p. 428). Moreover, the policy outputs can be a part of the securitizing move. Lastly, the success of securitization depends even more on the cohesiveness of the audience than was initially suspected. In the context of the EU, the referent object has to be perceived as a collective good for the audience to legitimise its securitization. Lucarelli concludes with the assumption that securitization "empowers collective institutions and leads to the creation of new institutions" (2019, p. 428). These adjustments will be taken into account and reflected upon in the discussion of the findings.

Summarizing the above, securitization theory presents an interesting base for the theoretical framework. Whereas the main concepts of securitization theory of the Copenhagen school are used, the inclusion of securitizing practises by the Paris school provide an interesting addition for empirical research. By emphasizing the role of the audience, the bridge to collective securitization is made. This theory is particularly interesting for the context of the EU as it suggests the possibility of the EU acting as a unified securitizing actor. The two variants (thin and thick) of collective securitization however differentiate between this possibility. A conceptual framework was developed to link the two variants to integration. The thin variants suggests a low level of autonomy for supranational institutions, leaving the Member States as the securitizing actor and thereby weakening possible integration. Contrarily, the thick variant suggests a high level of autonomy for supranational institutions, which can in turn step up as securitizing actor enhancing integration.

Chapter 3. - Research Design

3.1 Research Question

To get a better understanding on the link between integration and securitization, the research question that is proposed is;

Which variant of collective securitization, thick or thin, can be found in the internal and external migration policies of the EU during the migration policy crisis of 2015-2016?

To successfully answer the research question above, the methodological approach will be as followed. Firstly, the collective securitization process is analysed for the migration policy crisis. The collective securitization process will be explored by drawing on the six stages of collective securitization of Sperling and Webber. Sub questions include; what was the security discourse prior to 2015?, what was the precipitating event?, what was the securitizing move and who made it? Secondly, the fifth and fourth stage of the model, the audience response and the policy outputs, are analysed together in a process tracing analysis of four policy cases which fall under the European Agenda on Migration. Through the in-depth analysis of the policy cases, the variant of collective securitization can be determined. To do so, the securitizing actor, the voting mechanism, the role of Member States and the involvement of the Commission and the EP are established. Once these factors have been disclosed, conclusions can be drawn on the effects they have on integration. Moreover, because the four policy cases are divided in the internal and external dimension of migration policy, conclusions can be drawn on this as well.

3.2 Research method

The conducted research will be a small-N case study of four policy cases. The primary advantage of a case study design is that it takes the context into account and is therefore "better able to achieve concept validity" (Blatter & Haverland, 2012, p. 34). Through such a context-sensitive approach not only the *why* question but also the *how* question can be answered more convincingly. Disadvantages of case studies are the possibility of biased views and unsystematic practices by the researcher. Blatter and Blume (2008) differentiate three case study designs, the co-variational, causal process tracing and the congruence analysis.

This research will use casual process tracing as the preferred research method. The approach will be discussed in the following, highlighting the strengths and weaknesses on the issues of internal and external validity. The internal validity relates to causality, whereas the external validity is related to the generalization.

3.2.1. Causal Process Tracing (CPT)

Causal process tracing, as the name already suggests, takes the process into account. Although there has been an academic debate whether CPT is an approach on its own, in recent year this approach has won influence and most scholars have identified the importance of the process (Hall, 2004). George and Bennet define CPT as "an operational procedure for attempting to identify and verify the observable within case implications of causal mechanisms" (2005, p. 138). This highlights the fact that not just the *why* but also the *how* plays an important role in this design. The researcher is not solemnly interested in the effects of a specific cause, as is the aim of a co-variational approach (Blatter & Blume, 2008), but rather he is interested in the causes of an outcome. The focus on the process is crucial in a research in which not only the policy itself, but more importantly the policy process is analysed.

Three further aspects are important for CPT. Firstly, the research should present a "comprehensive storyline" in which the development of the process and critical moments become clear (Blatter & Haverland, 2012, p. 110). Secondly, the critical moments should be analysed further as these often attribute heavily to the outcome. Lastly, motivations, perceptions and anticipations of major actors should be taken into account. However, one should be aware of the context in which actors give this type of information, as perceptions might shift over time.

According to Blatter and Blume, and based on the ideas of George and Bennett (2005), the temporal dimension of this approach is its core aspect (2012, p. 321). By taking the temporal and contextual aspects into account, this design strongly enhances the internal validity of the research. For this research, the design does not only allow various aspects of the European context to be taken into account, it also allows for the inclusion of state preferences.

Generalization to a population or similar case is more difficult, however, according to Haverland and Blatter the limitations of generalization are not problematic as the outcomes can “contribute to the debate on which casual pathways and configuration make a certain kind of outcome possible” (2012, p. 64). Contrarily, a co-variational approach would enhance the external validity at the cost of the internal validity as the direction of a causality is often hard to conclude (Johnson et al., 2013). Since the internal validity is more important for the aims of this research, causal process tracing seems the preferred research design.

To summarize, this research design will use CPT to evaluate the variant of collective securitization processes in four EU policy cases. By taking the temporal aspect and the context into account, the internal validity of the research is enhanced.

3.3 Case selection

As mentioned above, this research will analyse four migration policy cases to determine the variant of collective securitization. These policy cases were adopted during the migration policy crisis 2015-2016. All four policy documents find their foundation in the European Agenda on Migration (EAM) for 2015-2020, which was presented by the European Commission on 13 May 2015. The agenda “intends to address immediate challenges and equip the EU with the tools to better manage migration in the medium and long term in the areas of irregular migration, borders, asylum and legal migration” (European Commission, 2015a). In the analysis, the four policy cases can be divided equally in internal and external migration policies. For the first mentioned this will be the Relocation Scheme and the revision of the Schengen Borders Code, for the latter this will be the EU-Turkey Deal and the establishment of the European Border and Coast Guard (EBCG).

The case selection in a case study research is crucial. A case should not be selected randomly, but should follow from a range of coherent and systematic arguments. The choice for these four policy documents is based on a number of arguments. Firstly, they all fall under the EAM and were adopted in the timeframe of the migration policy crisis. Secondly, to be able to successfully research the difference in internal and external migration policy, it is important that not just one comparison, but two comparisons are used to make for a more credible conclusion. Thirdly, different EU institutions were active in the adoption of these policies, and as this is expected to play a crucial role in the variant of collective securitization, this will provide an interesting comparison.

The chosen timeframe for this research starts with the introduction of the EAM on 13 May 2015 and ends with the adoption of the EBCG in the summer of 2016. In November 2014 the new European Commission, led by Jean Claude Juncker, took office, joined by the new High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Federica Mogherini and the new President of the European Council Donald Tusk. These new appointments came with new political agendas, resulting in the introduction of the EAM. As the thesis only researches the securitization processes leading up to the policy, the implementation of the policies will not be analysed. Concluding, according to Haverland and Blatter (2012) a short timeframe is preferable as other variables are more likely to stay stable.

3.4 Operationalisation

The thin and thick variant are differentiated by the level of autonomy of the supranational institutions. Firstly, it has become clear from the literature review that there are three ways in which the level of autonomy of the Commission the EP is influenced; through the voting mechanism, the position of the Member States and the involvement of the supranational institutions in the process. These factors are operationalised as followed.

The voting mechanism influences the autonomy as followed. The two dominant voting systems in the EU are voting under QMV. Voting under unanimity weakens the level of autonomy of the Commission and the EP, whereas voting under QMV enhances it. It is therefore expected that voting by unanimity can only be accompanied by the thin variant of collective securitization as the EU cannot act as an independent securitizing actor when Member States have veto-power. The influence of a member state on policy proposals would be too significant for the organization to operate independently. However, voting under QMV can be present in both the thin and the thick variant. In the thick variant it takes a qualified majority to pass a proposal. The influence a single Member State has on the outcome is much smaller in this case, which enhances the level of autonomy of the supranational institutions and facilitates the option of acting as securitizing actor. Nevertheless, the possibility of a blocking minority also exists under QMV. This blocking minority, consisting of at least four Member States that represent 35% of the EU population, enhances the influence of States with larger populations, which could threaten the Commissions or EP's position as securitizing actor. For this reason, QMV is not only attributed to the thick, but also to the thin variant of collective securitization.

The position the Member States take in the policy process influence the level of autonomy as well. As discussed in the literature review, this position is differentiated by the participation- and the observation-based approach. When a Member State takes a participation-based approach, the MS actively intervenes in the process, weakening the autonomy of the Commission and the EP. This would lead to the expectation that the these will not be able to step up as securitizing actor, which would motivate the thin variant of collective securitization. Contrarily, the observation-based approach suggests the MS only observes and does not intervene in the process, leaving the possibility for the Commission or EP to act as securitizing actor.

The involvement of the institutions will be measured by the way in which they have influenced the policy process. Questions like, who was the initiator of the policy, who was most active in pursuing the policy and how often were the institutions included in the process will be answered to reveal this involvement. This will be differentiated in active or inactive involvement.

Table 1 shows the expectations for voting mechanism, the position of the MS, the involvement of the institution and the dimension of migration policy on the variant of collective securitization. As was already explained in the literature review, the difference in dimension is expected to influence the variant since integration has been more successful in the external than the internal dimension. It is therefore also included in the expectations table.

Table 1. Expectations of the thin and thick variant

Collective Securitization	Voting Mechanism	Influence of MS	Involvement of EC & EP	Dimension of migration policy	Securitizing Actor
Thin Variant	Unanimity, QMV (blocking minority)	Participation-based	Inactive involvement	Internal migration policy • Relocation Scheme • Revision of Schengen Borders Code	Member States as securitizing actors *Council*
Thick Variant	QMV	Observation-based	Active involvement	External migration policy • EU-Turkey Deal • European Border and Coast Guard	Supranational institutions as securitizing actor *Commission, EP*

3. 5 Data collection

To coherently present the process tracing analysis, the research will draw on both primary and secondary sources. The operationalisation of the six stages of the model of Sperling and Webber are illustrated in **Table 2.** The most important primary sources are the policy documents related to the four policy cases. To trace the process, an array of different policy documents of EU institutions, such as press releases, Council conclusions, statements, factsheets and legislative trains, will be analysed. The secondary sources of research will also include various other EU documents, existing scholarly literature, newspaper articles (Euractiv), NGO reports and reports of the MEDAM (Mercator Dialogue on Asylum and Migration). For the numbers on the resettlement of migrants Eurostat, Statista and the IOM will be used. Voting results and other voting information will be analysed through the official website of the EU; EURlex, and through Votewatch.eu. It has to be acknowledged at this point that not the entire process can be traced as some institutions, mainly the European Council, keep meetings behind closed doors. To partially overcome this problem, articles which include information based on interviews with EU officials are included in the research.

According to Yin (2003), a problem that can arise whilst conducting a case study research is the problem of measurement validity. To deal with this problem he suggests using the method of data triangulation. This method includes a large variety of sources, to ensure that data measurement error can be eliminated. As shown in the above, this thesis will include multiple sources to tackle this problem.

Table 2. Operationalisation of the model of collective securitization

Model of collective securitization (Sperling and Webber)	Definitions	Operational definitions	Data sources
1. Status quo	The existing security discourse prior to the perceived notion of threat	Security discourse of the EU's migration policy prior to 2015	Policy documents, scholarly articles, legislative train of the EP
2. Precipitating event	An event or series of events with the power to disrupt the status quo and trigger the securitization process	Inadequacy of existing migration policy to process an inflow of migrants	Eurostat and Statista data, data of the IOM, newspaper articles
3. Securitizing move	The move that establishes a threat to a referent object	European Agenda on Migration (EAM)	Policy documents, articles, EU press releases
4. Audience response	The response of the audience to the securitizing move. The audience has to accept the securitizing move for the securitization process to continue	Member State responses to each of the 4 policy cases which fall under the EMA	Voting results, policy documents, scholarly articles, newspaper articles (Euractiv), Official statements, Council conclusions, EU press releases
5. Policy outputs	Appropriate policies which are implemented to mitigate the threat	Relocation Scheme, EU-Turkey Deal, Revision of SBC, EBCG	Policy documents, press releases, legislative train, scholarly articles, official statements
6. (New) Status quo	New security discourse after the implementation of the policy outputs.	New security discourse in European migration policy	Policy documents, press releases, legislative train, articles, official statements

Chapter 4. - Observations and analysis

As described in the research design, the link between integration and securitization will be carried out by evaluating the variant of collective securitization in four policy cases of internal and external migration policy; the Relocation Scheme (internal), the EU-Turkey Deal (external), the revision of the SBC (internal) and the European Border and Coast Guard (external). These policies all find their foundation in the European Agenda on Migration.

Throughout the process tracing of the four policy cases, the six stages of the model of collective securitization by Sperling and Webber will be identified. These six stages of collective securitization were, as thoroughly explained in the theoretical framework, the status quo/security discourse in migration policy before 2015, the precipitating event which triggered the securitizing move, the response of the audience and the policy outputs which ultimately lead to a new security discourse. It is important to recognize that these six stages overlap and influence one another, which becomes apparent in the concept of recursive interaction between the securitizing actor and the audience. In the policy cases this interaction mainly takes place between the Commission and the Member States.

4.1 Status quo

The first stage, the existing security discourse on migration policy before 2015, is characterised by slow integration and a focus on external migration policies (Weinar, 2011) Under the Maastricht treaty of 1992 the EU was established in the form we know today, endorsing a common security and foreign policy agenda. This was the first step towards enhanced cooperation beyond economic purposes. Under the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997) important issues in the area of migration policy, such as border controls, asylum and immigration, were introduced on a European level. These policies focused on VISA processes, inter-EU movement of third-country nationals and the strengthening of border controls (Weinar, 2011). Although it was a step in the right direction for a cohesive migration policy, competences in this area remained primarily with Member States. As was shown in the literature review, integration has been easier in external migration policies. This is reflected in the establishment of a few initiatives to strengthen EU external borders but the inability to agree on internal migration policies, such as the CEAS.

To conclude, it can be said that integration in migration policy was slow compared to economic area's and competences remained primarily with Member States. Although incremental steps were taken in recent years, these steps did not lead to a coherent and overarching migration policy. Moreover, the initiatives that were established focused more on the external dimension, such as border management.

4.2 Precipitating event

The precipitating event in the context of the migration policy crisis can be seen as the policy failure of the European Union to handle the inflows of migrants. This confirms the assumption of Lucarelli (2019) that not just one, but rather a series of events initiated the securitization process. As was already mentioned in the literature review, the inflow of migrants was not new and not unexpected (Castelli Gattinara & Zamponi, 2020). However, Member States were never able to establish a coherent migration policy, as they did not want to give up sovereignty on this issue (Weinar, 2011). This ultimately lead to the inadequacies in migration policy, setting off the migration policy crisis. Moreover, because of the newly found migratory routes into Europe (Balkan route) other Member States than the Mediterranean States were confronted with the inflow (Hungary, Austria, Germany). In many cases this changed Member States' preferences and highlighted the inadequacies in policies (Ceccorulli, 2020).

After a series of tragic boat accidents, the boat accident of 20 April 2015 might have acted as the trigger event. An estimated number of 800 migrants had lost their lives whilst crossing the sea to Europe. Only a couple days after the news was brought to light, a special meeting of the European Council was held to discuss the inflow of migrants. A small month later, on May 13th, the Commission finally presented the European Agenda on Migration.

4.3 Securitizing move

Since Sperling and Webber (2020, p. 238) define the securitizing move as "a political choice by which a threat is selected and then presented to the audience", the introduction of the EAM to the Member States (audience) can be seen as the first securitizing move in the process of the collective securitization of migration. The EAM focusses on four main themes: 1) reducing the incentives for irregular migration, (2) border management, (3) a common asylum policy and (4) a new policy on legal migration (European Commission, 2015a). The EAM was implemented through three packages that were spread out over the year (May, September and December). The first package focused mainly on the managing of migrant smuggling and regulating external borders. The second package undertakes the relocation and returns of asylum seekers. Moreover, it included a proposal for a Trust Fund for Africa, which would allocate €1.8 Billion from the EU-budget. The last package centred around the establishment of the European Border and Coast Guard (EBCG) and the revision of the Schengen Borders Code (SBC).

In the EAM two security discourses are present, the first being the humanitarian discourse and the second being the border management discourse (European Commission, 2015a). Originally, it seems as though this first discourse is the Commissions primary focus in the document. Sentences like “the immediate imperative is the duty to protect those in need” and “notably to avert further loss of like” in the beginning of the Agenda illustrate this (p. 2). Moreover, there is an emphasis on the migrant as referent object through the existential threat of being exploited by criminal smuggling networks (p. 3). The document creates the impression that the safety of the migrant is the main priority. Only after the chapter on immediate action, the Agenda introduces border management as one of four pillars to “manage migration better” in the near future (p. 10). In this part one can already feel the focus of the security discourse shifting as most of the proposals are targeted towards the relocation and returns of migrants. When border management is introduced, this shift becomes even more evident. Not only will external borders be strengthened and will the budget be upped, “Smart Borders” are introduced to simplify the information sharing- and administration of asylum (p. 11). In this second part the EU becomes the referent object of an existential threat that is the large influx of migrants.

The shift in security discourse will also become evident in the process of the four policy cases. Whereas the relocation scheme to some extent still follows the humanitarian discourse, the EU-Turkey Deal, the reintroduction of internal borders and the EBCG leave this discourse aside and follow the border management discourse. It becomes clear that the primary strategy of migration policy did not focus on the protection and assistance of migrants, but rather focussed on not letting them in at all.

Although the Commission was the one to present the Agenda and therefore initiating the securitizing move, it was not necessarily the securitizing actor as the policies introduced in the Agenda still had to be adopted. Furthermore, the EAM can be regarded as a speech act, as it is presents a new security discourse. The securitization itself however is mostly established through securitization practices, which confirms the observation of Léonard and Kaunert (2019) that securitization practices are more relevant than speech acts in the securitization processes of the EU.

4.4 Audience response and policy outputs

For the securitizing move to succeed, it is necessary that the audience, the Member States (and in some cases the EP), accept the securitizing move. The audience response and the recursive interaction that follows will now be analysed in the context of each separate case. All cases end with a certain policy output, which reflects the collective securitization process. Whilst analysing the process, there will be an extra focus on the influence of Member States through the voting mechanism and their role in the process. It is important to mention that many of the decisions adopted by the European Council in this timeframe were regarded as emergency measures and therefore did not follow 'normal' procedures. These measures made it possible to take action without a lot of parliamentary and judicial oversight (Guiraudon, 2018, p.157). To come to a full understanding of the context in which these policy cases were developed, a comprehensive timeline of the most important steps has been made (see **Appendix A**).

4.4.1. Relocation Scheme

Process

On 22 September 2015 the Council of the EU held an informal meeting to discuss the implications of the second package of the EAM, which was announced by President Juncker in his State of the Union Speech on 9 September. As new migratory routes were established, the need for hasty decisions were deemed necessary. In this informal meeting a number of 'immediate priorities' were decided upon, the most important being the relocation of 120.000 migrants from Italy, Greece and Hungary over 2 years (Council of the EU, 2015a). The relocation would be based on a quota system that considers GDP, size of population, unemployment rate and the amount of refugees already taken in between 2010-2014

(European Commission, 2015b). The Commissions relocation plan was backed by Northern states, including German, even though the factors for the quota made relocation to these states more likely. This positive attitude towards the scheme mainly came from the notion that the relocation mechanism would also include the enhancement for national authorities to register new migrants through fingerprinting (Tauner, 2016, p. 320). It must be noted, that although the reactions on the scheme were positive, by 2018 not a single country had taken on as much migrants as obliged (European Commission, 2017).

The Relocation Scheme was approved after 'many discussion and disagreement' on 14 September 2015. Interestingly, although the Council normally seeks consensus, this Relocation Scheme was approved under QMV, with 23 members for, 1 abstention (Finland), and four countries voting against; Hungary, Poland, Czech Republic and Romania (Votewatch.eu, 2015a). These four countries are often referred to as the Visegrad Countries (V4) and have a reputation for blocking policy which enhances the delegation of power on the issues of migration. On this topic the V4 'lack commitment to the principle of solidarity and burden sharing' (Tabosa, 2018, p. 11). Czech Republic emphasised the scheme to be "a hasty move", pointing out the legal and technical issues of the relocation procedure (Votewatch, 2015a).

The use of QMV in such a 'sovereignty-sensitive issue' can be seen as exceptional as it weakens the power of the Member States (Tauner, 2016, p. 320). Moreover, the scheme was adopted through the Ordinary Legislative Procedure (OLP), which ensures that legislative powers are shared between the Council of the EU and the European Parliament through a first (and second or third) reading. Both QMV and the OLP enhance the supranational aspects of the EU; the strengthened competences of the EP and the removal of veto power of Member States. After being outvoted, Hungary and Slovakia initiated a formal complaint to the ECJ, claiming the relocation system was unlawful. The case was dismissed by the ECJ in September 2017 (ECJ, 2017). Since the adoption of the scheme, Member States, and especially the V4 countries, have not met their responsibilities (Statista, 2020).

Conclusion

The policy process illustrated in the above leads to the conclusion that the securitization processes in the Relocation Scheme can be identified as the thick variant of collective securitization. Member States took an observation-based approach, leaving room for a coherent cooperation between the European Commission, which proposed the scheme, the Council of the EU and the European Parliament (through the OLP). The EU acted as a unified actor of securitization and therefore the thick variant can be identified. This does not match the expected outcome for a policy initiative within the internal migration policy area. However this policy, and more specifically its voting process, can be regarded as exceptional, as consensus was not sought within the Council. Not only the voting under QMV, but also the swift adaption of this policy (as it was only proposed by the Commission a few months prior), is exceptional for a policy in the area of migration, where decision-making and integration is known to be difficult.

4.4.2 EU-Turkey Deal

Process

The EU-Turkey Deal consists of two policy initiatives; the Joint Action Plan (JAP) and the EU-Turkey Statement. This deal was not only constructed to enhance the cooperation between Turkey and the EU, but also to stem the flow of migrants across the Aegan Sea (Syrian migrants). The most important elements of the final agreement include the one-for-one resettlement plan, the activation of the VHAS, visa liberations for Turkish citizens by the end of June 2016, the re-energising of the accession process and the allocation of 2x €3 Billion under the Facility for Refugees (European Parliament, 2016a). As will be shown in the coming paragraph, a small group of actors were proactive in establishing this deal. Key players in the European Commission and the European Council worked together on the deal with Turkey without including other Council members or the European Parliament. Member States which took the lead during the process were Germany (Chancellor Merkel) and the Netherlands (Prime Minister Rutte), especially in the additional resettlement plan.

To arrive at the adoption of the Deal in March 2016 a number of official- as well as unofficial meetings were held between officials of the European Commission, Turkey, Germany and the Netherlands. In addition, three EU-Turkey summits were organised. The first Summit, the EU Summit on Refugees, was organised on 15 October 2015. The invitation letter to Council President Donald Tusk emphasized the agreement made by the Council in September, which agreed to focus on the strengthening of the external borders (European Council, 2015b). Just a day prior to the summit the EU Commission members Frans Timmermans, Johannes Hahn and Dimitris Avramopoulos visited Turkey to discuss the Deal.

President Erdogan showed interest in the proposal and together they negotiated on the Joint Action Plan. The European Council agreed to the Joint Action Plan as presented by the Commission at the first Summit. In the Council Conclusions on the Summit the Council refers to the JAP "as a part of a comprehensive cooperation agenda based on shared responsibility, mutual commitments and delivery" (European Council, 2015c). In the JAP the strengthened cooperation between the EU and Turkey on multiple issues, including migration, was promised (European Commission, 2015e).

In their research on the EU-Turkey Deal Smeets and Beach highlight that the Commission "had been very careful in the explanations to the European Council", but that the deal seemed set in stone to the outside world (2020, p. 140). This was the beginning of a process in which hasty decisions would become the norm. The pressure and crisis atmosphere additionally made the nature of the arena rather informal (Smeets & Beach, 2020). Moreover, it became evident that the deal was not at all set in stone and most Member States raised objections in the Coreper meetings the following month (Smeets and Beach, 2020). The European Commission was scrutinized for having planned the deal without prior consultation with the European Council (Gotev, 14 October 2015). Although Member States tried to become increasingly involved, the process remained primarily driven by the Commission in this period. One actor within the Council however became more and more involved in the plan. From November onwards Merkel organised multiple "mini-summits" and bilateral meetings with Turkey. Her contribution to the plan was focused on the development of an additional resettlement plan through a voluntary humanitarian admission scheme (VHAS). This resettlement plan can be seen as a securitizing move by Germany.

The second Summit, which took place on 29 November, was a meeting between the Heads of State or Government (HSOG) and Turkey. The JAP was activated to formalise the deals made in October. Moreover, the allocation of €3 Billion to Turkey was discussed further to manage the flow of migrants. In the following Mini Summit of 17 December the Coreper was tasked by Merkel to "rapidly" conclude how the €3 Billion was going to be made available (Smeets and Beach, 2020, p. 157). In addition to this, Merkel had secured her VHAS with the European Commission, after it being rejected by the Coreper. The European Council Conclusions of 17-18 December show that these meetings mainly focused on the funding and operationalising the JAP. It was agreed that the funding would be allocated to a newly established Facility for Refugees (European Council, 2015d).

The period between the second and the last summit resembles the first period (European, Parliament, 2021a). Many meetings between EU-officials and Turkey took place without the inclusion of others. The window of opportunity began to close with Turkey and Merkel felt the pressure to get the Deal done (Smeets and Beach, 2020). By 3 March 2016 President Tusk and Vice-President Timmermans had succeeded to reach an agreement with Prime Minister Davutoglu. Although this agreement did include the resettlement of migrants, it did not explicitly mention Syrian refugees (Smeets & Beach, 2020). Merkel was not satisfied with this and organised informal meetings with Turkish officials once more to discuss the one-for-one resettlement. This would encompass a system in which for every Syrian refugee taken back from the Greek Island by Turkey, another Syrian refugee would be relocated from Turkey to the EU. The idea was picked up upon by the Turkish Prime Minister who thereafter invited Merkel and Rutte to the Turkish embassy in Brussels on 6 March 2016 (Reiners & Tekin, 2020, p. 119). According to interviews with EU officials conducted by Smeets and Beach, Prime Minister Davotglu "presented them with a 12-point piece of paper, which contained the one-for-one scheme along with other Turkish demands" (2020, p. 142). From the same interviews it becomes clear that the other Member States were kept "at arm's length'' and were only informed and involved at a very late stage. Decisions always had to be made in short time frame which made amending the Deal difficult. Moreover, the Coreper was left with little time to inform political leaders on the issue (Smeets & Beach, 2020). On 7 March the HSOG had a meeting with Turkey once more in which the idea of Merkel and Rutte (one-for-one resettlement) was presented. The text was heavily redrafted before the European Commission and Corperer came with the actual proposal of the EU-Turkey Statement on 16 March.

As the Member States had not been able to influence the deal much, the third Summit on 17/18 March became an important window of opportunity to do so. Member States expressed their discontent about the way the deal had been created, more specifically the German-Dutch "*Alleingang*" in the process (Ludlow, 2016, p. 60). In the end, it remained difficult for the Member States to really make adjustments as President Tusk had "a very strong steer" at the Summit negotiations (Smeets & Beach, 2020, p. 142). Apart from this, bilateral negotiations with Turkey were not allowed and only comments could be made on the Statement, not amendments. Leaving the Council Members with little choice, an agreement was reached between Turkey and the European Council in the form of the EU-Turkey Statement on 18 March 2016 (Council of the EU, 2016a).

Not only the Member States, but also the European Parliament became critical about the Deal and the process thereof. The EU did not follow regular EU procedures for international agreements with third countries as suggested under Article 218 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU)(EU, 2008). Although this article describes that the OLP should have been applied in the field of asylum and migration and the EP should have been "immediately and fully informed at all stages of the procedure" (Article 218(10)TFEU). However, the EP was not consulted during the entire process. This lead to the EP questioning the legal and binding nature of the document, asking whether the document should still be regarded as an international agreement (Treaty), and, if not, if Turkey is aware of its unbinding nature (European Parliament, 2016).

Conclusions

The exclusion of the European Parliament in the process, the informal nature of the process, the close involvement of Germany (and to some extent the Netherlands), the blocking of amending opportunities and the absence of any form of voting, makes it clear that the thin variant of securitization can be identified in this process. Firstly, the influence Germany had on the process leaves the impression that the European Council did not act a single actor. Not only did Germany organise many (unofficial and official) meetings with Ankara, it was the Dutch and German *Alleingang* that fought for the one-for-one resettlement scheme. Germany took a participation-based approach in the process. According to Reiners and Tekin, even the countries who did agree on the Deal (Austria, Sweden and the Netherlands) have admitted that other Member States and EU institutions were "temporarily side-lined as a result of the extraordinary time pressure" (2020, p. 125). The bargaining powers of Germany resulted in a Deal that might have not been possible otherwise.

Secondly, although the Commission was actively involved in the process, it did not function as a whole. Rather, it were key actors such as Timmermans, Hahn and Avramopoulos who were mainly involved. Smeets and Beach go as far as to name the Commission President as 'overeager' and 'political' (2020, p. 130). Still the role of the Commission was subordinate to Germany in the negotiations with Turkey (Smeets & Bach, 2020). The Commission can therefore not be regarded as the securitizing actor.

Thirdly, the European Parliament was completely left out of the process. Although the EP did send letters questioning the process of the Deal already in November 2015, they were disregarded and no voting took place, not within the European Council nor in the European

Parliament. This exclusion disregards the OLP which should have been applied in this case and therefore reverses intergovernmental progress in this policy area.

These three lines of argumentation conclude that the EU has not acted as an unified actor in the securitization of the EU-Turkey Deal and therefore the thin variant of collective securitization is found. Although some key players within the Commission were important for the Deal, Germany acted as the securitizing actor. This outcome runs counter to the expectation that for external migration policy that the thick variant would have been present. However, the (time) pressure of the crisis resulted in informal decision-making procedures, which on its turn led to the exclusion of the EP and other Member States in the process. As with the Relocation Scheme, the nature of this Deal has an exceptional character as ‘normal’ procedures were not followed.

4.4.3. Revision of SBC

Process

The Schengen Borders Code (SBC) is seen as the greatest achievement of European integration consolidating its internal market. However, in the context of the migration crisis, this achievement was on the verge of collapsing as multiple Member States decided to temporarily reintroduce some of their internal borders (Ceccorulli, 2020). The revision of the SBC as a result of the reintroduction of internal borders is the second analysed policy case that falls under the internal migration policy. In the SBC, Article 25 manages the possibility of the reintroduction of internal border control *in exceptional situations* (European Parliament & the Council, 2006). The duration of the reinstalment of the borders is set at 30 days up to a maximum of 6 months, if the situation remains, but should always be used as a *last resort*. Furthermore, Article 26 allows the Member States to prolong the internal border control no more than three times “in the event of a serious threat to their public policy or internal security” (European Parliament & the Council, 2006, p.2). The Commission and the Member State in question have to inform both the European Parliament and the Council of the application of Article 25. In 2015 multiple member states decided that the inflow of migrants could be categorized as a threat to internal security and therefore accelerating the securitization process.

On 13 September 2015 Germany was the first country to reintroduce internal border controls at the borders with Austria. This securitizing move was framed as the result of the newly found Balkan route through Hungary, that led to an inflow of migrants to Austria and Germany. Germany was not able to manage the inflow, which was the result of their "open-arms policy", and therefore reintroduced the borders with Austria. Moreover, the reintroduction was a response to the perception that Greece was not able to manage the EU's external border during this crisis (Ceccorulli, 2020).

From September onwards the Commission tried on multiple occasions to stop Member States from reintroducing internal borders and thereby risking the fall of Schengen. The Commission additionally stressed the importance of cooperation on this front and aiding Greece with the inflow of migrants. The Relocation Scheme, which was proposed by the Commission shortly after the reintroduction of border controls by Germany, is a good example of efforts to assist Greece. In the Communication of 29 September the Commission stressed the "normalization of the Schengen Area and the lifting of temporary internal border controls" (European Commission, 2015f).

The case of the Commission was however complicated further by the Paris attacks in November 2015. As a security response to the attacks, France followed in Germany's footstep and reintroduced internal borders. Their motive however was not the inflow of migrants but rather the threat of terrorism (Schacht, 2019). Not only did the attacks enforce internal borders, it also strengthened the association of migrants with the threat of terrorism, intensifying the ongoing securitization process (Léonard & Kaunert, 2019).

After this the Commission became even more aware of the threat the reintroduction could cause to the Schengen area. At the summit in December, the Commission introduced the third implementation package of the EAM and again stressed the fact that these measures would "manage the EU's external borders and protect our Schengen area without internal borders" (European Commission, 2015d). This however did not produce the desired effect as by December Austria, Slovenia, Hungary, Sweden and Norway all put up internal borders. The reason was the same as Germany's; the security threat posed by the inflow of migrants (Ceccorulli, 2020).

As the situation in Greece only deteriorated further, Member States started to become more critical on the failure of Greece to meet up to it's obligations. In this context, the Commission introduced the Back to Schengen – a Roadmap on 4 March 2016. This roadmap set out the return to the Schengen situation without internal border controls by the end of the year (European Commission, 2016a). To do so Greece would have to strengthen its external border. Moreover a coordinated framework would have to be introduced to lead the 'patchwork of unilateral decisions' of Member States regarding internal border controls on a straight path (Ceccorulli, 2020, p. 314). The Commission, aware of the delicate situation the EU was in, proposed the activation of Article 29 (formerly Article 26) of the Schengen Borders Code to the Council on 4 May (European Commission, 2016b). Rather than seeing the Schengen Area fall apart completely, it chose the second best option; regulating the prolongment clause. Although the prolongment of internal borders became actively institutionalised through this clause, the Commission still urged the abolishment of the internal borders of the five states within six months. The recommendation was adopted by the Council a week later, with Greece and Slovenia voting against the recommendation (Council of the EU, 2016b). According to Slovenia internal borders were deemed an unnecessary measure to the suggested threat (Council of the EU, 2016c).

Many of the internal border controls would still be in place by 2019, even after the third prolongment. The legislative train of the European Parliament currently marks the roadmap as "on hold", since another revision of the SBC has not yet been adopted and internal borders continue to be introduced (European Parliament, 2021b). In 2018 the Commission has last expressed its intention to follow up on the roadmap as intended in 2016. Moreover, in the light of the COVID-19 crisis, an enormous influx of the reintroduction internal borders can be seen (European Commission, 2020). One can assume from the above that internal borders will not be abolished any time soon.

Conclusions

As was illustrated in the above, a handful of Member States "consciously chose the uncoordinated reintroduction of national border controls" as a response to the worsening situation at the Greek external border(Ceccorulli, 2020, p. 311). By doing so these Member States securitized the inflow of migrants, regarding it as an immediate threat to their internal security and taking on a participation-based approach. Although the Commission was much involved in the process, they were not able to put a stop to the upsurge of internal borders. As a last resort, the Commission activated the prolongment clause in Article 29 of the SBC. This however did not have the desired effect as many Member States still maintained their internal borders after two years.

Member State took a participation-based approach in the process. It was a few Member States pushing through their own preferences and disregarding the Commissions appeal. They willingly agreed to phase out the internal borders after 6 months, but did not comply with this. As we have seen, the European Parliament was hardly involved in the whole process. Neither the Commission, nor the European Parliament, was able to act as the unified securitizing actor and could only institutionalise the prolongments as a last managerial resort. Other Member States did have the chance to vote against this prolongment, but only Greece and Slovenia ultimately did. This could lead to the assumption that Member States prefer having control over internal borders in the case of an "exceptional situation" and want the power do decide when something can be deemed a threat. A handful of Member States acted as securitizing actors and side-lined both the Commission and the EP. For all of the reasons mentioned in the above, it can be concluded that the thin variant of collective securitization was present in the process of the revision of the SBC.

4.4.4. European Boarder and Coast Guard

The second policy case that falls under external migration policy is the establishment of the European Border and Coast Guard (EBCG). This case is closely linked to the reintroduction of internal border controls as they are both a response to the inability of Greece to sufficiently protect the external border. The reintroduction of internal borders is the internal response to this, whereas the establishment of the EBCG is the external response. The external border management prior to the EBCG was mostly Member State driven. Although FRONTEX was already operative, this institution mostly focussed on managing and coordinating the deployment of additional experts and technical equipment's to border areas in need. During the migration policy crisis the limitations of FRONTEX became increasingly clear, as it was up to the commitment of Member States to provide assistance to the agency.

The EBCG was created to fill the gaps left by FORNTEX and would monitor, supervise and implement the Integrated Border Management (IBM). Furthermore, the Agency would have a stronger role in the returns of migrants under the European Return Office, reinforcing the new security discourse of border management. Contrarily to FRONTEX, the

EBCG has a large mandate and is not so much dependent on Member States. The EBCG could therefore be seen as a step toward integration in the migration policy area.

In the State of the Union Speech of 9 September 2015 the establishment of the EBCG was first-mentioned (European Commission, 2015g). The establishment finds its basis in the EAM which calls for the strengthening of EU coordination of coast guard functions (European Commission, 2015a, p. 12). During this time, Member States began condemning Greece for its inability to take action, as it was supposed to under the Schengen Agreement (Ceccorulli, 2020). In November, only a short period after Juncker's speech, the bi-annual report of the European Commission on the functioning of the Schengen Area was published. Although Greece did receive support in both operational and financial terms during this period, the report indicated the further deterioration of the situation (European Commission, 2015h). In the light of this report and the influx of countries reinstalling internal borders, the Commission decided to speed up the establishment of the ECBG, which led to the presentation of the official proposal by the European Commission on 15 December (European Commission, 2015i).

The proposal was positively received by the Council as they had been wanting a solution for the Greek situation for a while now. On 16-18 February 2016 the European Council urged the European Parliament and the Council to come to an agreement by July (European Parliament, 2021). This would be done under the OLP, giving the EP the opportunity to amend the proposal. The EP had been closely involved in the process from the start (Niemann & Speyer, 2018). The main amendments by the EP focussed on who would be responsible for the decision to intervene if a Member State does not act upon the binding measures. In the Commission's proposal this decision was left with the Commission itself, whereas the EP suggested this should be up to Member States, voting under QMV. This amendment was however not accepted by the Council in the final proposal as it "encroaches substantially upon Member States' sovereignty" (Niemann & Speyer, 2018, p. 27). Further amendments included more power for the EP regarding the appointment of the Agency's Executive Director and more accountability and transparency towards the EP. These amendments were accepted in the trilogues that followed. A political agreement was reached end of June, whereafter, on the 6th of July (European Parliament, 2016b), the EP endorsed the proposal with 438 votes for, 181 votes against and 48 abstentions (Gotev, 7 July 2016). The Greens were opposed to the Agency as it would transform Frontex "into a border defence and deportation agency" and put security above human rights and refugee protection (Gotev, 7

July 2016). The Greens took a clear stance criticizing the new security discourse, which emphasised the border management discourse.

The safeguarding of Schengen was directly linked to the strengthening of the external border through the EBCG. Consequently, there was not a lot of resistance from Member States to enhance integration on this issue. Even the Ministers of the Visegrad countries, who mostly opt for less integration, were strongly opposed to the idea of limiting Schengen and even suggested it to be “not acceptable” as it would “endanger the major achievements of European integration” (as cited in Niemann & Speyer, 2018, p. 31). The final proposal was ultimately adopted by the Council on 14 September 2016, less then a year after the proposal of the Commission (European Parliament and the Council, 2016) .

Conclusions

As can be seen from the above, the establishment of the EBCG proceeded seemingly swift and resolute. Member States took an observation-based approach in the process, leaving much room for interplay between the three institutions. Moreover, the supranational institutions were actively involved in the establishment of the policy. The voting mechanism used in the process was the OLP, which enhances the role of the EP as it can amend the Commissions proposal. Moreover, the readings and trilogues during the process ensured the ongoing communication between the EP , the Council and Commission. With regards to the ECBG, the EP is the one who appoints the Agency’s executive director (Article 69). Furthermore, the ECBG is accountable to the EP and will be kept informed through reports and accessible information for MEPs (Article 7). All of the findings above lead to the conclusion that the EU acted as a unified securitizing actor and therefore the thick variant of collective securitization is found, as was expected for a case of external migration policy. The three institutions worked close together without interference of Member States. The supranational institutions were not just the voice of the Member States but were actively involved in the securitization process. The policy has enhanced integration on external migration policy.

4.5 Summary of the analysis - a new security discourse

In **Table 3** an overview is given of the outcomes of the policy cases regarding the variants of collective securitization, consequently answering the research question. The table also includes the variants that were expected to be found; thick for the external migration policies and thin for the internal migration policies. The thick variant of securitization was found in the policy cases of the Relocation Scheme and the EBCG. In the EU-Turkey Deal and the revision of the SBC the thin variant was present. As can be seen from the table the policy cases of the Relocation Scheme and the EU-Turkey Deal differ from the expected variant. This can be mainly explained by the exceptional nature of these cases. Both cases followed procedures out of the ordinary and had unprecedented outcomes. This will be explained further in the discussion. Moreover, it has become clear from the cases that a new security discourse was installed, which mainly focused on border management and less on the humanitarian aspects of migration. This discourse became the new status quo after implementation, establishing the sixth and last stage of collective securitization.

Table 3. Key findings

Migration policy	Internal		External	
Policy case	Relocation Scheme	Revision of SBC	EU-Turkey Deal	EBCG
Active Involvement of institution	Commission + European Council	Commission to some extent	Key actors of Commission	Commission + European Council + EP
Participation-based influence of MS	None	Sweden, Denmark, Belgium, Germany, France, Austria	Germany and Netherlands	None
Voting system	QMV	No voting on reintroduction, voting on prolongment clause under OLP	No voting, EP bypassed	QMV, OLP
Expected variant of securitization	Thin	Thin	Thick	Thick
Found variant of securitization	Thick	Thin	Thin	Thick

The key findings that can be concluded from the cases follow along a few lines. Firstly, regarding the voting mechanism, it can be concluded that the way in which is voted has an effect on the outcome of the variant. If no voting has taken place, (individual) Member States are most influential in the securitization process, leading to the thin variant. Both in the cases of the SBC and the EU-Turkey Deal no voting took place, which enforced the bypassing of the EP and other Member States. Contrarily, voting under QMV weakens the influence of a Member State, giving the supranational institutions more room to act as securitizing actor. Therefore, voting under QMV leads to the thick variant. Both in the case of the EBCG and the Relocation Scheme there was voting under QMV, for the Relocation Scheme only in the European Council, for the EBCG both in the Council and the EP.

Secondly, the involvement of EU-institutions in the securitization process influence the variant of collective securitization. It can be concluded that the European Commission is the crucial institution for the thick variant to be found. In the case of the Relocation Scheme as well as the EBCG, the European Commission was actively involved in the initiation and the pursuit of the policy. Although the Commission was also an active player in the EU-Turkey Deal, it did not do so as a coherent actor. Rather, it was a few key players which acted on behalf of the institution. Because of this, the conclusion on the involvement of the Commission is still upheld.

The involvement of the European Parliament is also deemed important for securitization processes. In both cases where the thin variant was found, the European Parliament was hardly involved in the securitization process. This would lead to the conclusion that the EP should also be involved for the thick variant to be found. However, in the case of the Relocation Scheme this assumption is not upheld. The EP did not play an active role in this policy process. This could be explained by the fact that this policy was adopted in a very short time period, leaving no room for readings in the European Parliament. Voting did take place, just not within the Parliament. This would suggest that the voting mechanism is more influential in determining the variant of collective securitization than the involvement of the institution

The influence of a Member State consequentially has a lot of effect on the variant of collective securitization. As was illustrated in the cases of the SBC and the EU-Turkey Deal, Member State preferences were the driving force behind these policies. In the case of the EU-Turkey Deal, Germany and the Netherlands played an active role in the adoption of the policy and were criticized by other Member States for their "*Alleingang*". Additionally, in the case of the SBC, it was a group of Member States regarding the migration crisis as a threat to their national security and consequently installing internal borders. The conclusion can be made that if Member States take a participation-based approach and actively pursue national interest, the thick variant is not found. If however Member States take an observation-based approach it enhances the possibility of the thick variant.

To conclude, the policy cases have shown that the EU can act as a unified security actor. This is however very much dependent on the voting mechanism, the involvement of certain institutions and the participation of member states.

Chapter 5 - Discussion

In this chapter the implications of the findings on the theories are discussed. Moreover, the implications of the exceptional cases are disentangled to provide revisions on existing theories.

As acknowledged by both intergovernmentalism and neofunctionalism, crises can serve as a time in which policy change is possible The most important finding is that crises can both enhance and weaken integration through securitization.

Firstly, in the cases where the thick variant was found, integration was enhanced through crisis. This fits well with the ideas of neofunctionalism, which suggest that integration is enhanced through path-dependency and spillovers. Moreover, according to Pierson (1996), the level of autonomy of supranational institutions contributes greatly to the possibility of integration through path dependence. Within the cases where the thick variant was found, the level of autonomy of supranational institutions was high, leaving little room for Member State interference. Both in the case of the Relocation Scheme and the EBCG, the Commission (and for the EBCG also the EP) was actively involved in the process. Moreover, new mechanisms were installed which enhanced integration. In the Relocation Scheme the regular procedure of deciding under consensus was traded for voting under QMV. The establishment of the ECBG did not just introduce a new mechanism, but a whole new agency to deal with migration. Moreover, the role of the EP and the Commission was enhanced through the agency. Thus, in both cases the level of autonomy for the Commission and EP was enhanced. The concept of a spillover was difficult to identify in this research, as the timeframe was short and focused on one policy area.

Secondly, in the cases in which the thin variant was found, integration was weakened. The level of autonomy of the supranational institutions in these cases were low, leaving room for Member States to influence the process. This corresponds with the idea of intergovernmentalism that integration is influenced during a crisis because of (changing) Member States preferences. This became evident in the case of the EU-Turkey Deal and the Revision of the SBC, where Member States actively pursued national preferences. In the first mentioned case this was highlighted by Germany and the Netherlands pushing through the one-for-one resettlement plan. In the Revision of the SBC a small group of Member States constructed the inflow of migrants as a “national security threat”, legitimizing the introduction of internal borders. Both cases reflect the influence of national preferences on integration, in this context, the weakening of it. These cases also highlight the importance of the audience for the success of securitization processes, as suggested by Lucarelli (2019).

Although the findings on the link between crisis and integration to a large extent correspond with the theories of integration, the findings regarding the internal and external dimension of migration policy have proved partly different from the expectations. It was expected that integration in the external dimension would be easier than in internal dimension, resulting in the finding of the thick variant in external migration policy and the thin variant in internal migration policy. This was however not found in the cases of the Relocation Scheme and the EU-Turkey Deal. The conclusions that can be drawn from this provide interesting additions to existing theories.

In the case of the Relocation Scheme the thin variant of collective securitization was expected to be found as it is part of internal migration policy. However, as was illustrated in the policy case, the close interaction between the Commission and the Council, and the voting under QMV in the Council, resulted in the finding of the thick variant. A few factors can explain the exceptional character of this policy. Firstly, the Council normally tries to find consensus in migration related issues. If this would have also been done regarding the Relocation Scheme, the policy probably would not have been adopted. The four Visegrad countries who voted against the Scheme would have most likely blocked the proposal. However, in this instance the vote was taken under QMV, weakening the influence of these countries. Secondly, the temporal context plays an important part here as it was the first policy to be adopted after the presentation of the EMA. As the Union had the incentive to change the lack of integration on migration policy, this was the first opportunity to pursue it. Moreover, the situation in Greece and Italy was deteriorating fast, which created a sense of urgency and increased the time pressure on the adoption of the proposal. These two factors opened a window of opportunity for supranational institutions to push through their proposal and act as securitizing actor. The conclusion that follows from this case is that integration in unlikely cases, such as internal migration policy, can be enhanced if a sense of urgency creates a window of opportunity for the emerging of new practices (QMV). This corresponds with the assumption of Lucarelli (2019) that securitization processes enhance the creation of new institutions.

In the case of the EU-Turkey Deal, the thick variant of collective securitization was expected to be found, as it regards external migration policy. However, because of the active role played by Germany in the process and the violation of regular procedures, the thin variant of collective securitization was found. The exceptional character of this Deal can be explained by the surpassing of mechanisms that are set in place in the EU to enhance integration. As was illustrated in the process tracing analysis of this case, Germany and the Netherlands had an active role in the process. Moreover, only a few actors within the Commission were really involved. There was no voting whatsoever and (other) Member States were not included during the many unofficial meetings between the EU and Turkey. Many Member States had criticized the informal character of the process and felt like being unable to influence it. The European Parliament felt similarly, being bypassed completely. Regular procedures for international agreements were not followed resulting in many questions on the legal nature of the Deal. The conclusion that can be drawn from this case is that integration in more likely cases, such as external migration policy, can be weakened during crises as a sense of urgency creates the possibility of violating regular procedures.

This leads to the implication on exiting theory that integration in unlikely cases can be enhanced through the sense of urgency a crisis creates which allows new institutions and practices to be established. Contrarily, in likely cases, integration is weakened through the sense of urgency a crisis creates which allows the violation of regular procedures. This addition to theory is important as it presupposes a distinction between the way crisis affects the integration in different policy areas.

In conclusion, although integration was enhanced through securitization in some cases, the process has led to more policies of self-protection rather than self-reliance. The security discourse of the EU mainly focused on the strengthening of borders, not on the humanitarian side of migration. Despite the fact that integration was enhanced, it has strengthened this new discourse. Integration on migration policy in the European context has not enhanced the position of the migrant, but rather the position of the Member States. For integration to be in the best interest of the migrant, thus Europe pursuing a humanitarian discourse, the issue will presumably have to be desecuritized.

Conclusion

The aim of this research was to identify the link between integration and crises in the EU through collective securitization processes. The research has shown that crisis can enhance as well as weaken integration through securitization. To measure integration, the thick and thin variant of collective securitization were linked to the level of autonomy of supranational institutions in a new conceptual framework. The central research question of this study therefore was; *Which variant of collective securitization, thick or thin, can be found in the internal and external migration policies of the EU during the migration policy crisis of 2015-2016?* A process tracing analysis of four policy cases made clear that the thick variant of collective securitization was found in the cases of the EBCG and the Relocation Scheme, whereas the thin variant was found in the cases of the Revision of the SBC and the EU-Turkey Deal. The empirical analysis confirmed the propositions that the thick variant is linked to a higher level of autonomy for supranational institutions and thus enhancing integration. Contrarily, the thin variant is linked to a lower level of autonomy for the supranational institutions, thus weaking integration. However, the findings did not confirm the expectations that were set for the internal and external dimension of migration policy; the thick variant was also found for internal migration policies and the thin variant for external migration policy. These findings have made interesting contributions to theory as was shown in the discussion.

However, limitations of the research have to be acknowledged. Firstly, the process tracing analysis is largely based on the interpretation of empirical information. Moreover, some parts of the process took place behind closed doors, leaving some information uncovered. Although secondary literature was used to fill these gaps, this was not possible for all cases leaving some cases fully reliant on documentation. Secondly, this thesis has focussed solemnly on the adoption of policies. The implementation of these policies on a domestic level is a different part of the process. However, this part could still affect integration even though the thick variant was found. If national governments do not implement policies accordingly, it could threaten the autonomy of the supranational institutions which in turn could weaken integration.

Through the development of a new theoretical framework, this research has attempted to contribute both to integration and securitization theory. Future research should apply the framework in different policy areas, such as climate policy. Migration posed an interesting case because it is closely linked to securitization processes. However, integration is known to be hard in this area and therefore other results could be found in different areas. Further recommendations include studying the effect of implementation on the variant of collective securitization and therefore on integration, as mentioned in the above. This would require to focus on a single policy case rather than a comparative case study.

In conclusion, this research has shown that the EU has much potential to enhance integration further, even in policy areas where it is least expected. This is however only possible if the Commission and EP are granted a certain level of autonomy. Unless Member States grant them this autonomy, the EU will not be able to rise up to its full potential as a unified actor.

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Appendix A: Contextual timeline of the policy cases