

International
Institute of
Social Studies

The logo for the International Institute of Social Studies, featuring the word 'Erasmus' in a stylized, cursive script.

Post-Conflict Corruption and Peacebuilding: The Case of the UN Peacebuilding Fund in Sierra Leone

A Research Paper presented by:

Hajaratu Sama

(Sierra Leone)

in partial fulfilment of the requirements for obtaining the
degree of

MASTER OF ARTS IN DEVELOPMENT STUDIES

Major:

**Human Rights, Gender and Conflict: Social Justice
Perspectives (SJP)**

Supervisor:

Shyamika Jayasundara-Smits

Second Reader:

Helen Hintjens

The Hague, The Netherlands

December 2021

Disclaimer:

This document represents part of the author's study programme while at the International Institute of Social Studies. The views stated therein are those of the author and not necessarily those of the Institute.

Inquiries:

International Institute of Social Studies
P.O. Box 29776
2502 LT The Hague
The Netherlands

t: +31 70 426 0460
e: info@iss.nl
w: www.iss.nl
fb: <http://www.facebook.com/iss.nl>
twitter: [@issnl](https://twitter.com/issnl)

Location:

Kortenaerkade 12
2518 AX The Hague
The Netherlands

Contents

Chapter 1: Introduction	1
1.1 Nature of the problem	1
1.2 Background of the study	4
1.2 Justification and relevance of this research	5
1.3 Research questions	6
Chapter 2: Conceptual Framework	8
2.1 Conceptualizing corruption in post-conflict nations	8
2.1.1 Defining corruption	8
2.1.2 Corruption as a contributor to conflict	10
2.1.3 Fragility of post-conflict situations to corruption	12
2.2 Liberal peacebuilding and corruption in post-conflict nations	14
2.2.1 Corruption of peacebuilding aid	15
2.2.2 Effects of corruption on peacebuilding projects	16
Chapter 3: Research Methodology	19
3.1 Introduction	19
3.2 Sampling, community entry and working with a gatekeeper	19
3.3 Data collection tools and processes	20
3.3.1 UN Peacebuilding fund beneficiaries	21
3.3.2 Project implementing officers	21
3.3.3 Local leaders	21
3.4 Data analysis	22
3.5 Limitations	22
Chapter 4: Identifying and Explaining Corruption	24
4.1 Introduction	24
4.2 Institutional corruption in UNPBF projects	24
4.2.1 Ineffective law enforcement	24
4.2.2 Corruption in Judicial Institutions	25
4.3 Formal mechanisms and practices	26
4.3.1 Irregularities in beneficiary recruitment and registration	27
4.3.2 Corruption through Bribery	29
4.3.3 Poor decision making	30
4.4 Influence of social factors	31
4.4.1. Tribalism	31
4.4.2 Nepotism and favouritism	32

4.5 Conclusion	33
Chapter 5: Beyond normalisation of corruption in peacebuilding	34
5.1 Forms of Denial of Corruption	34
Chapter 6: Conclusion	40
References	42

List of Acronyms

FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization
ISS	International Institute of Social Studies
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNPBF	United Nations Peacebuilding Fund

Acknowledgement

I would like to thank God almighty for His grace and strength throughout this journey, as well as my supervisor Shyamika Jayasundara-Smiths and second reader Helen Hintjens for their unwavering professional support, guidance, and encouragement throughout the MA Research process. Their feedback and comments were invaluable in shaping my ideas.

Due to the epidemiological situation of Covid-19, I was unable to collect data on my own. I would like to express my gratitude to the UNDP office in Sierra Leone, as well as the Anti-Corruption Commission in Sierra Leone, for their assistance in obtaining the necessary documents and respondents for my research.

I am grateful to my husband, Akie William Browne, for his invaluable input and support; this journey would not have been possible without his support. I am also grateful to my colleagues, Ann Marie Cline-Cole, and Clifford Mugoto, whose constructive criticism during the Seminar allowed me to consider new approaches to answering my research questions.

Above all, I dedicate my research to my parents and the people of Sierra Leone, as well as the UNPBF beneficiaries, whose experiences and knowledge have influenced this research.

Because of the Covid-19, the entire Master has been difficult. I want to express my gratitude to the entire ISS community, Nuffic, and my friends and family for their optimism, encouragement, and emotional support provided during the entire MA Course

Abstract

This study is an investigation into how corruption influences peacebuilding projects in Sierra Leone, with specific reference to the UNPBF (UN Peacebuilding Fund). Looking at this case study makes it possible to understand how more than \$50 million of peacebuilding money was used. One of UNPBF's goals was to address corruption, it is evident that the funds have not been able to address this issue. New versions of corruption have instead arisen as a result of the distribution of budgets allocated under UNPBF. To consider this complex matter, I consider two community-based projects that focus on youth and violence, funded by UNPBF. On the basis of interviews with UNDP staff, community leaders (men and women) and beneficiaries, in some cases it was admitted that corruption was continuing at different levels. Interestingly whilst beneficiaries acknowledged a great deal of corruption was continuing, higher level officials tended to be confident that measures were in place to handle corruption and prevent it from happening. The findings revealed that corruption in the UNPBF projects was attributed to social factors such as normalization of corruption in the community, poverty because people saw opportunities of getting money from the UN projects, and the culture of nepotism and favouritism in Sierra Leonean society. The main findings of the study were that corruption seems to have been normalised in post-war peacebuilding projects funded by the UNPBF. A first step towards tackling this systemic problem would be acceptance that there is a problem, rather than continued denial. Dealing with corruption and the denial of its existence should be handled through various strategies which include: proper investigation into the allegations made about the officials involved in the UNPBF and the local leaders who helped in selecting the beneficiaries, creating adequate safeguards that can protect peacebuilding funds from being mismanaged through corruption. Other strategies include the peacebuilding fund architectures and mechanisms for monitoring performance, the promotion of peace building fund transparency common standards for those keeping records and by raising the problem at the level of the fund partnership.

Relevance to Development Studies

Structural and institutional factors influence corruption in post-war UNPBF peacebuilding projects in various ways. The findings indicate that corruption happens through irregularities in beneficiary recruitment and registration by the removal of the names of certain beneficiaries from the list of beneficiaries which created opportunities for the corrupt individuals to replace them with other names of either their relatives or ghost beneficiaries. Another form of corruption was bribery. Those found guilty of mismanaging the money meant for poor unemployed youth were found to have bribed law enforcement officers so that they could avoid being arrested. Lastly, poor decision making also facilitated corruption. Officials manning the fund were found to have abused their positions in a way that diverted the purpose of the peacebuilding fund to other purposes. The problem of corruption appears systemic, even if the manner in which it happens varies between societies. Most implementers of these projects have principles and procedures laid down by the UN and other organisations. The problem has international and national as well as local dimensions. Corruption poses a clear danger to peacebuilding goals and this indicates the need to tackle the root causes of corruption in liberal peacebuilding initiatives. The present study investigates interactions between social and structural factors in influencing corrupt practices in post-war peacebuilding efforts.

Keywords

Peacebuilding, corruption, Sierra Leone, post-conflict, liberal peace, UN PeaceBuilding Fund (UNPBF)

Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1 Nature of the problem

Liberal peacebuilding has emerged as a specific and ideological driven approach of peacebuilding resulting from the collaboration between development and those involved in security matters from both realism and liberalism arenas (Peterson, 2014). Under the liberal peacebuilding model actors are led by a definitely liberal framework that supports liberal democratic systems of government, free and unrestricted markets and personal human rights. Richmond (2007) notes that this model is presently viewed as the fundamental, if not the sole model for reconstructing states after war, with players as varied as homegrown NGOs and influential world-wide organisations accepting what some people consider to be a ‘peacebuilding consensus’.

Following the popularity of liberal peacebuilding approaches in the international community, most conflict-prevention and peace-building activities in global south nations are based on outside funds from international institutions like the United Nations. However, such aid in terms of direct funding for humanitarian purposes such as peacebuilding is particularly vulnerable to corruption and has been criticized for this inherent vulnerability (Cooksey, 2002). Furthermore, nations emerging from conflict generally are known for feeble institutions and an abundance of funds from outside. These conditions according to Rose-Ackerman (2008) create enticements for administrators and leaders to engage in corruption activities for individual gain from foreign aid. This may be seen to be the case for Sierra Leone’s post-conflict transformation efforts and peacebuilding aid funding these efforts.

The history of the corruption and war in Sierra Leone led to the wearying of local government structures and malfunctioning institutions which had built un-transparent and unaccountable working procedures with the country (UN Peacebuilding Commission, 2013). Following the role of corruption in Sierra Leone’s conflict and being a liberal-based peacebuilding institution, the UN Peacebuilding Fund (UNPBF) has focused on reducing endemic corruption as one of its chief goals (Iro, 2009). However, it seems that corruption is difficult to address in post-war Sierra Leone. Transparency International, states that it is problematic within the peacebuilding process to change public government organisations that were initially not founded on qualification but on sponsorship which is a significant hallmark of corruption in Sierra Leone (Zaum and Cheng, 2011). Furthermore, peacebuilding initiatives

such as the UN Peacebuilding Fund projects in Sierra Leone have not been immune to the endemic corruption pervasive in all sectors of the country.

Although not widely and openly reported or studied, the UN funded peacebuilding initiatives in Sierra Leone and how they are implemented in Sierra Leone are also seen to breed newer forms of corruption that include nepotism, patronage and kick-backs that present a greater risk in achieving peace. For instance, Bangura (2016) notes that the corrupt systems that operate in Sierra Leone also makes it mandatory for government officials involved in post-conflict activities of the UN to give contracts to friends, supporters and relations who have no capacity and cannot deliver services. Similarly, Lawrence (2014) found that leadership in Peacebuilding from the government and the United Nations is unreliable especially within the atmosphere of patronage, fraud, and disuniting partisanism. Furthermore, Pyman et al. (2014) find that by supporting political settlements, the UNPBF activities have brought elite individuals who maintain their power using the assistance of rent from dishonest ventures into decision-making processes of peacebuilding projects.

A study by Lawrence (2014) asserts that the vertically-integrated peacebuilding approach adopted by the UNPBF which focuses on state bodies creates shallow organizations floating on the society but they exclude the people in places affected by the war from peace-building activities. As a result, the superficial institutions in the UNPBF approach fuel corruption activities in the form of nepotism and patronage. Lawrence (2014) found that there exists an extensive understanding among Civil Society Organizations that various oral rules need to be compulsorily adhered to if they will obtain peacebuilding monies from governments or if they will influence law. Civil Society Organizations for example are required to obey such laws as extending favours to state officers for peacebuilding-awarded contracts received by them. Those refusing to obey the moral rules are normally left out, punished and subjected to threats.

Prior professional knowledge of widespread corruption activities from my career and preliminary research of corruption and the UN peacebuilding fund led me to conduct a discussion with Ms Catherine Waliaula. Ms Waliaula is the Programme Coordinator and Head of the Liberia Multi-Partner Trust Fund/Peace Building Fund Secretariat who participates in leading a project to empower the youth in both the Kenema and Tonkolili districts in the country. The project targets youth at risk who operate at the margins of cliques and gangs or those who are engaged in some mixed illegal activities as well as those who are the service providers of the more consolidated gangs (UNPBF, 2019). In the discussion, she

mentioned that the project is being affected by issues of corruption in the form of nepotism. In particular, she recounted that in one community in Kenema, social work in a civil society organization tasked with the responsibility of registering prospective beneficiaries was found to have registered his relatives and children whom he purported to be Commercial Sex Workers at risk of being involved in gang activities. She also cited instances in Tonkolili District where chiefs and 'mammy queen'¹ nominated their relatives, most when asked they said they were nurses and some from other professions. The chiefs and community leaders completely ignored the profile of the project.

The presence of corruption in UNPBF activities in Sierra Leone poses a danger to the achievement of long-lasting peace. Recognizing the implications for corruption on peacebuilding initiatives, Margolies (2009) notes that it reduces the capacity of peacebuilding organizations to attain this goal. In addition, corruption systems on their own can strengthen the factions based on ethnicity, religious beliefs or social class that strengthen the conflict progression. Without tackling the issue of fraud, the possibility of that lasting resolution which is enduring peace are limited (Margolies, 2009). Corruption may also jeopardize peacebuilding activities that seek to deal with major causal factors of the battle not related to activities of fraud. Correspondingly Le Billon (2008) argues that unrestricted peacebuilding can increase and change corruption, to a level of fighting its goals of democratizing and liberalizing the economy. Following the threats of corruption in liberal peacebuilding measures and eventually the long-lasting peace, it becomes significant to understand the implications of corruption in UNPBF activities in Sierra Leone.

It seems that the proneness of conflict-ridden nations to corruption acts both pre and post conflict influence the existence and spread of corruption in peacebuilding projects funded through external aid. The question that arises is therefore whether foreign aid for peacebuilding projects advances are prone to corruption therefore further undermining the goal of long-lasting peace sought by the aid in the first place. Numerous studies have discussed and explored corruption as one of the major contributory factors to conflict in Sierra Leone and also as a major problem aimed to be tackled by peacebuilding efforts. However, few studies have critically investigated how corruption is manifested in and influences peacebuilding efforts as well as how corruption is affecting these efforts in achieving sustainable peace in the Sierra Leonean context. Using the case of the UN

¹ A women leader who is elected by the community to represent women in community-related matters

Peacebuilding Fund, this study investigates how corruption manifests itself in UNPBF activities and what social, institutional and factors influence such corruption activities.

1.2 Background of the study

Several studies cite endemic greed, corruption and nepotism within government as well as plundering of national assets by elites as the origin of the war in Sierra Leone (Jang, 2015; Lucey and Kumalo, 2018). Corruption is still prevalent in Sierra Leone, according to the UN Peacebuilding Commission (2013), and it remains a key barrier to development. Sierra Leone's rating of corruption which assesses perceived levels of public sector corruption has improved marginally in recent years. Sierra Leone was rated 134th out of 183 nations and regions in 2011, 123rd out of 178 nations and regions in 2012, and 119th out of 175 countries and territories in 2013 (Lucey and Kumalo, 2018). Fraud is consistently mentioned in the Secretary-General's reports on the UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone as being among the three key hazards to peace (Iro, 2009).

The study's scope focuses on the UNPBF and particularly two of its projects being implemented in Sierra Leone. The UNPBF has spent approximately \$57 million in Sierra Leone since 2007. The PBF supported a wide range of peacebuilding programs through a succession of Security Council-mandated missions and joint efforts with the UN Country Team (UNCT) (UN Peacebuilding Commission, 2020). According to a 2014 review of UNPBF support in Sierra Leone, the Fund assisted the nation in strengthening its recovery and rebuilding its institutional structure, which helped the nations avoid relapsing into war.

One of the UNPBF projects sampled for use in this study is the "Mitigating Localized Resource-Based Conflicts and increasing community resilience in Moyamba and Pujehun districts of Sierra Leone." Project from now on referred to as the UNPBF in Moyamba and Pujehun districts. The intervention is a UNDP and WFP jointly implemented two-year United Nations PeaceBuilding Fund funded project meant to mitigate localized resource-based conflicts and increasing community resilience. The PBF Funded project was to contribute to the government of Sierra Leone's efforts to alleviate home battles between societies, the state and private organizations by creating the abilities and inclusivity of institutions and dialogue platforms that promote peaceful relations and supporting affected communities to establish sustainable agricultural and alternative livelihoods (Dimant and Tosato, 2017).

The second UNPBF project sampled for the study is the “Empowering youth at risk as resources for sustaining peace and community resilience in Tonkolili and Kenema districts in Sierra Leone” from now on referred to as the UNPBF in Tonkolili and Kenema districts. The purpose of the \$3,000,000 project funded by UNPBF was to alleviate local conflicts and enhance community resilience by improving regulatory environment and investment, creating dialogues and reinforcing communities to create alternative livelihoods and build the capacity of local governments and security institutions together with private companies to increase their accountability and responsiveness (Bangura, 2016). The fund targeted 2,500 women and youths and it was implemented in three chiefdoms in Moyamba and Pujehun districts. These two districts were affected by social unrest and many violent conflicts as a result of deteriorating relationships between various communities and international investment companies, as well as with local institutions and leaders (Voors et al., 2017). Through the fund the targeted communities were expected to realize social cohesion, sustained peace, and different livelihood opportunities including linking farmers with markets, increasing development initiatives led by the community, and incorporating the youth and women in decision making.

1.2 Justification and relevance of this research

Sierra Leone has made significant progress over the years in the post-conflict period, even investing in the Sustainable Development Goals, and progression toward combining stability and peace; with the country aspiring to be a middle-income country by 2035 (UN, 2020). Timothy Donais, a leader of the Collaborative Research Project proposes that free building of peace, as is common in catastrophe, and building of peace projects in regions as diverse as Afghanistan, Haiti, Bosnian and Sierra Leone risk getting into great failure. He points to the need for rethinking liberal peacebuilding activities and identified corruption as one of the derailing factors of liberal peacebuilding activities that are inspired and modelled on Liberal peacebuilding approaches.

Furthermore, the studies of Le Billon (2008) and Pyman et al. (2014) discuss the dangers that corruption poses for peacebuilding goals and indicate the need to further interrogate the sources and implications of corruption in liberal peacebuilding initiatives. The present study will investigate the interactions between social and structural factors in influencing practices of corruption in liberal post-war peacebuilding efforts. Despite the said dangers of corruption to peacebuilding, not many studies have been done in the context of Sierra Leone.

Among many African countries, Sierra Leone was one of the beneficiaries with the largest allocation from the UNPBF. This study hopes to fill in this gap by contributing to the literature on the dynamics of corruption in peacebuilding initiatives in the country. It is hoped that the findings of the study may contribute towards an enhanced understanding of the spread and influence of corruption in liberal peacebuilding UN-sponsored projects in Sierra Leone, and similar contexts.

1.3 Research questions

Main question:

How and why does corruption arise in post-war peacebuilding projects funded by UNPBF in Sierra Leone?

Sub questions:

How is corruption manifested and spread within social and political institutions in UNPBF peacebuilding projects?

Which social mechanisms and attitudes influence corruption in post-war UNPBF peacebuilding projects?

How can the normalisation of corruption be challenged in UNPBF projects in future?

1.4 Outline

This study is structured into five chapters. Chapter one is the introduction which contains the context and nature of the problem, a brief examination of the United Nations peacebuilding fund in Sierra Leone, justification and relevance of the research, research questions and objectives and the outline. Next is chapter two which contains the background of the study. In chapter two there is the review of literature which contains a discussion of the conceptualization of corruption and transparency, corruption and transparency in post-conflict situations, drivers of corruption in post-conflict situations, conceptualizing peacebuilding, and finally the conclusion of the chapter. Chapter three discusses the methodology used to conduct the study. It covers the introduction, research philosophy and design, collection of data and data analysis as well as the limitations. Chapter four which contains the findings and discussion. It begins with the description of respondents, different views on corruption in peacebuilding, corruption in registration protocols, institutionalized corruption, formal mechanisms and informal practices and the social factors in externally-

funded peacebuilding. Chapter five summarizes the conclusions drawn from the analysis of the study's findings.

Chapter 2: Conceptual Framework

2.1 Conceptualizing corruption in post-conflict nations

There are many definitions and categorisations of corruption. Corruption may be defined as supply-side corruption which describes the action where a person or group of people offer an illegal payment or unjustifiable advantage (Rose-Ackmern, 2008). On the other hand, demand-side corruption is the receipt or soliciting of this kind of advantage or payment. Corruption may also be defined in terms of being active or passive. These two terms are often applied synonymously with demand and supply corruption (Looney, 2008). Systematic corruption occurs when corruption is universal and entrenched in society. Corruption acts may be done by commission or omission. A public official may desist from or act to perform their duties in return for gaining something from a business or person (Harvey, 2012). These factors together with the level of coercion that the public official engages in and the kind of benefit received are necessary because they affect the making of decisions and rationalization by those who are corrupt.

2.1.1 Defining corruption

Another form of corruption is conventional corruption which is perpetrated by people in government when they unlawfully and selfishly get or accumulate an unwarranted advantage for an individual benefit at the expense of the public (Le Billon, 2003). In conventional corruption, there is a component of reciprocity because both asking for and accepting bribes are also categorized as types of conventional corruption. Unconventional corruption takes place when an official of the government ignores public interest and acts to attain personal gain (Le Billon, 2008). Nevertheless, an important element is that there is no reciprocation because there is no clear transaction between those involved. This form of corruption is inclusive of actions such as stealing, misappropriation, breaching trust and embezzling public resources (Dimant and Tosato, 2017). Petty and grand corruption are subsections of conventional corruption. Petty corruption is occasionally likened to “bureaucratic corruption,” which means that both non-elected and public administration officials are involved.

Grand corruption implicates high profile elected and government officials taking advantage of opportunities available via government work (Goodhand, 2008). Mostly it results from the bribes given in connection to large scale projects run by governments such as infrastructural development and construction. Political corruption is categorized as grand corruption especially because of the level of seriousness it has and the high-ranking government officials involved (Le Billon, 2008). It happens when politicians and representatives of the government charged with law enforcement engage in corruption. This happens at the high offices in government. Grand corruption may also happen in the form of state capture which is a form or organization involved in shaping and influencing laws and policies of the government in the whole sector using payments (Looney, 2008). It is also possible to have the opposite effect when public officers are manipulating people within the private sector for their selfish gain and this can be described as reverse state capture. Another equivalent of state capture is influence corruption because in these two the goals and actors are similar (Rose-Ackmern, 2008). The difference is that there is no payment made, transaction done or advantage gained. In such a case, the influence wielded is based on the ability of the organization to affect policy due to its size, ownership, and connections and associations with government officials.

Corruption may also be described based on its being private or public (Dimant and Tosato, 2017). The difference is created by the sectors in which the participants of the illegal activity are operating. In public corruption, a public official is implicated as being party to the corrupt practice. On the other hand, private corruption only implicates people in the private sector (Le Billon, 2003). Descriptions of public corruption normally emphasize the idea of the relationships between society and the state. However, as stated by Dimant and Tosato (2017), corruption takes place inside and between private businesses and people in different forms with no government agencies and officials taking part. Corruption activities within the private sector may include bribery, mafia methods and swindling (Looney, 2008). The intertwining of the private and public sectors due to outsourcing, increase in privatization, quick private sector growth in certain countries and the increasing influence of international companies and government enterprises causes lines between private and public resources to become blurry leading to these forms of corruption.

Corruption remains one of the problems that curtail the development of most countries, especially the developing world. Empirical evidence has shown that most developing countries have continued to lag behind their developed counterparts due to endemic

corruption (Myint, 2000). Although there are many causes of corruption, one area that has received increased attention in the war against corruption is the role of patronage, which has been cited as a major factor driving corruption. Godfrey and Yu (20015) discovered that patronage is one of the factors responsible for the high level of corruption in Uganda. The researchers noted that despite having a strong anti-corruption framework, the level of corruption continues to remain high in what the researchers attribute to the patronage that dates back to the British Colonial rule in Uganda. Kristoff (2006) adds that to provide evidence of the role of patronage in advancing corruption in Uganda citing the many incidences of corruption involving high-ranking government officials who are yet to be prosecuted. Godfrey and Yu (2005) note that in Uganda, patronage plays a major role in fuelling corruption as evidenced by massive theft of state funds by powerful government officials who are not charged. Besides, since 2007, several high-profile scandals involving powerful government officials have been reported. Unfortunately, despite the availability of compelling evidence linking the ruling party officials and ministers to the scandals, none has been charged because of political interference from the powerful elite in office (Mwenda and Tangiri, 2005). Resultantly, the failure of the institutions responsible to charge corrupt officials citing political interference suggests that patronage plays a big role in advancing corruption in Uganda.

Patronage also advances corruption in the society by promoting political mobilization and distribution of resources based on ethnic and patronage lines (Myint, 2000; Tabane, 2010). The role of patronage in advancing corruption has been exemplified in Kenya through the Goldenberg Scandal (Cherotich, 2010). The Goldenberg Scandal is an election-related corruption that occurred due to patronage with the government circles (Cherotich, 2010). The scandal arose out of the need for the government to get the resources to use to influence the electorates and retain power. Resultantly, this saw billions of shillings syphoned by the corrupt government officials most of whom are yet to be convicted because of political interference from powerful government officials who benefited from the loot.

2.1.2 Corruption as a contributor to conflict

Sustainable development goal (SDG) 16 envisions a peaceful, just and including society. However, achieving peace has been a daunting task in many parts of the world (Baev, 2018). Although the United Nations has been working around the world alongside other organizations in promoting peace, achieving sustainable peace has not been easy in some

countries. Therefore, in an effort to find a solution to conflicts and war, some researchers have investigated the role of corruption in fuelling war or conflicts (Spagnol, 2019). The majority of the studies have shown a direct relationship between corruption and conflict/war. According to Gillanders, and van der Werff (2021), empirically demonstrate the existence of a significant positive relationship between corruption and violence. Relying on Afrobarometer data, Gillanders, and van der Werff (2021) observed that there was a significant and substantial relationship between bribery and their attitude towards interpersonal, political and domestic violence. The researchers also noted that corruption was significantly associated with violence even after controlling the perceived legitimacy of the legal system. Similarly, Le Billon's (2003) study found that corruption increases an individual's attitude to violence.

Previous studies have demonstrated that corruption contributes to violence by acting as a connivance link between criminal organizations and the state officers who contribute money and resources to fuel conflict (Andvig, 2007; Baev, 2018). A case example of this has been observed in Mexico which is a country controlled by drug cartels that use the money received from the drug deals to fuel conflict. Mexico is a country that has been engaged in war against drug cartels since 2006, resulting in more than 80,000 lives lost in the war. However, researchers have discovered that the drug trafficking and the conflicts witnessed in Mexico is directly linked to corruption. Morris (2012) paints the picture of the matters behind the scenes, noting that there are corrupt civil servants that are working closely with the drug cartels to fuel the security crisis, which has denied Mexicans the peace they so need.

The Mexican Secretary of Public Security did declare in 2010 that close to \$1 billion is spent by drug cartels each year to bribe the country's municipal police (Morris, 2012). In a related study that looked at the extent of corruption with the Mexican police force and the role of this in insecurity discovered that about 93.6% of local police officers seek monthly bribes to supplement their low salaries (Morris, 2012). The corruption is not limited to junior police officers alone; rather even the high-ranking police officers accept bribes from drug cartels in return for protection. For instance, according to Morris (2012), in 2008, a former Mexican anti-drug Chief, Noe Ramirez Mandujano was charged for receiving a \$450,000 bribe to facilitate transmission of information to drug traffickers.

Apart from fuelling violence and wars by enabling drug traffickers to violate the law and evade arrest and curtailing the government's efforts in war against drugs, corruption also fuels war and instability by curtailing all attempts of civil society (MacLachlan, 2018). As

literature indicates, the more corrupted a power is, the less the willingness of the population to collaborate. For instance, a 2010 study conducted in Mexico found that 90% believed that both the state and federal agents are very corrupt (Morris, 2012). Consequently, only a few were willing to share information with the authorities that could help in identifying and arresting criminals in their midst (Le Billon, 2003). The implication of this is that it has led to increasing incidences of violence in Mexico because no one is willing to report the criminals for fear that they could become targets of these criminals who are corrupt the police and government officials to provide them with information that could be of help to them in invading justice.

Transparency International notes that corruption and conflict are interrelated, such that one can cause the other. According to Transparency International (2019), in nations where there is peace, high corruption levels can trigger instability. The World Bank that found that violent conflict is likely to increase when governments fail to adequately combat corruption or promote justice echoes the view. This is attributed to the fact that corruption and impunity undermines the legitimacy of government institutions, which also affects job opportunities and social cohesion, which consequently lead to instability (Spagnol, 2019). Transparency International adds that corruption increases grievances, which can lead to violence. On the other hand, conflicts or war can create fertile ground for corruption. During war or conflicts, the warring parties are forced to seek weapons at all costs to enable them win the war (Bratton, 2008). Resultantly, this promotes corruption as the warring parties may end up bribing to get the weapons. However, as Transparency International (2019) discovered, such a pattern of corruption might remain in place for a long time after the war is over, which might curtail peacebuilding and reconstruction.

2.1.3 Fragility of post-conflict situations to corruption

Post-conflict situations tend to have weakened societal structures. This manifests mainly through a weak civil society and the absence of independent mass media (Rose-Ackmern, 2008). When a country goes through years of violence, the mass media is robbed of its capacity for mobilization, organization and education of citizens, effectively overseeing the government and advocating for or pressurizing for reforms (Le Billon, 2008). An active civil society is necessary for the maintenance and creation of accountability and transparency and therefore, in controlling corruption. Furthermore, conflicts also undermine and reduce the social capital needed for transparency in governance (Looney, 2008). The failure of trust in

other people and institutions of government create situations where people can use their access to government offices to cater for their personal needs and through that, they encourage more corrupt behaviour.

Normally, post-war governments are transitional in nature, are weak and can have varied levels of legitimacy and efficiency (Cheng and Zaum, 2008). If a government is considered illegitimate following a war, then corruption can become endemic. This is major because after the conflict there may be groups that are not willing to agree to the peace settlement. Societal structures in post-conflict situations are characterized by low political will. When there is no political will, the adoption and implementation of anti-corruption measures become difficult for administrators (Lewis and Sagnayeva, 2020). These are normally combatants and opposing factions that do not support the terms of peace and refuse to accept the government's legitimacy. Such groups can portray their lack of satisfaction via corrupt and illegal acts and challenge and weaken the post-conflict government.

Another issue is that governments formed after conflicts are normally known for poor transparency and lack of accountability. In most cases, the government lacks the institutional identity that has autonomy from the people occupying key positions (Cheng and Zaum, 2008). This further weakens legitimacy and corruption spreads even more. Internal corruption also affects postwar governments because there is a high threat for dismissal and the chances of short-term posting and electoral loss are high (Dimant and Tosato, 2017). This increases the incentives for corruption for people in government. The political chaos, inefficiency in economic sectors, collapse of the rule of law and the inefficiency of government creates opportunities for corruption.

In post-conflict situations, different forms of corruption may take place. In countries that are coming from civil wars and where there are unstable governments demands for bribery can be made opportunistically by public officers working under undefined rules that make it possible to devise offences or to engage in funds extortion from ordinary people (Cheng and Zamu, 2008). More so, those involving themselves in illicit activities may need to be protected by public authorities. Co-opting public officials is easier than evading them. If the infrastructure of a country is destroyed through conflict, there is a need for governments to contract in order to implement key construction projects and that creates motivation for self-dealing (Le Billon, 2008). During the allocation of aid to war victims, those managing it should select only those applicants who are in dire need. Nevertheless, it is difficult to effectively monitor their discretion exercise and therefore, their corrupted

motives can negatively affect allocations (Looney, 2008). For them to achieve further exploitation of corrupt opportunities the officials can delay or threaten to delay certain processes to extract bribes.

Officials can demand payoffs so that they refrain from arresting people on made-up charges. In countries that are emerging from conflict, where officials are interested in attracting investment capital all these types of low-level corruption may hinder these efforts which further derails the economic recovery process (Cheng and Zaum, 2008). Corruption in top levels of government in privatization, procurement and contracting can be detrimental for the operations of the government. In post-conflict countries, it is easy for the elite to capture the economic and political advantages of reconstruction (Rose-Ackmern, 2008). If the elite can keep their power base in the whole of the post-conflict time, they are positioned to benefit since no other reliable power sources exist and institutional restraints are weakened. The funds meant for peacebuilding may be diverted into private bank accounts belonging to business people and politicians which makes the process of reconstruction very expensive if at all it is done.

2.2 Liberal peacebuilding and corruption in post-conflict nations

The modern peacebuilding projects mirror the notion that sustaining peace in post-conflict areas needs a multidimensional approach, with a focus on broader economic, social, and institutional aspects, which reflects a liberal-democratic approach (Newman, Paris and Richmond, 2009). The idea of liberal peace has boosted the political economies of countries with war into a system of world-wide meeting towards " market liberalization. From existing practice in different situations, and from suggested restructurings to peacebuilding and development, the reply appeared to be the liberal peace method that in its economic faces requires alignment towards market liberalization. The symbol of liberal peacebuilding is lending support for development to delicate countries and places affected by conflict areas can be a fundamental element of peacebuilding, giving funding for restoring the operations of government, provision of primary services, the rule of law, and revitalizing the economy through projects such as those funded by the UN peacebuilding. Carnahan et al. (2006) mention that the liberal global system of peacebuilding creates unpredicted difficulties. In

some nasty cases, peace-building missions have the "stubborn outcome" of restricting the very peace that they were required to support.

2.2.1 Corruption of peacebuilding aid

The market- and development-oriented nature of liberal peacebuilding approaches has however been criticized for not eventually addressing the major causes of conflict. For instance, according to Boulton (2014), the main problem with the prevailing peace-building models is the fascination with liberal market-oriented economic development that commonly fails to resolve the root causes of conflict, and especially, how this can intensify socio-economic and political inequalities and tensions through corruption. Pyman (2013) propose that peacebuilding efforts involving aid are particularly vulnerable to corruption. Conflict zones are difficult to work in, and the fact that chaos is typically present within such zones hinders the work of the UN and other peacebuilding organizations significantly. Ignoring corruption deepens its roots and undermines the credibility of important peacebuilding institutions, jeopardizing the long-term viability of international liberal peacebuilding efforts.

Carnahan et al. (2006) narrate that outside of United Nations procurement offices, there is a widespread belief that local business partners are more prone to fraud. The conventional view is that the unregulated local economic environment is replete with fraud, and that by conducting peacekeeping operations there, the UN risks helping to the creation of local mafia. Indeed, each UN peacebuilding mission contains examples of local procurement contracts that have been tainted by crime, corruption, or fraud. These claims vary from small charges of drivers siphoning UN fuel to more significant allegations of bribes and kickbacks. Gyimah-Brempong (2002) state that since various countries in Africa are major beneficiaries of foreign aid and they have the challenge of frail and fragile institutions, there are all tendencies that aid will be stolen because of excessive corruption in the continent. In most cases these funds meant to be distributed to beneficiaries of peacebuilding projects can be diverted into the bank accounts of the influential people with part of it filtering out to the public as a way of keeping them silent (Jarvis, 2020). Rose-Ackerman (2008) proposes that allocating aid to those affected by the conflict, leaders are expected to choose needy people. Nevertheless, their practice of selection may not be flawlessly scrutinised hence unethical motivations can ruin the allocation of peacebuilding aid.

Furthermore, peacebuilding aid lends itself to the politics of patronage which may consequently influence corrupt dealings. Patronage, a common hallmark of politics of Africa may not essentially infer corruption. Nevertheless, in practice, the patronage cannot easily be distinguished from corruption (Cooksey, 2002). For instance, a senior government official can utilize influence to have his or her home region selected as a pilot candidate for a peacebuilding projects that provides funding to individuals. Such a move may be employed to impress the local people and also in strengthening relations with local elites. While the government official may or may not influence the misuses of funds for the project, the aid for the project creates an opportunity for patronage, including project location, consultancy, training opportunities, hiring employees for the project from the community and selection of beneficiaries of a project (Cooksey, 2002). Additionally, Cooksey (2002) mentions that in order to promote peacebuilding, or to recompense those backing the development-security industry for the purpose of installing a liberal peace approach, local leaders benefit from the peacebuilding programs, at times at the expense of broader goals of peacebuilding and development. As stated by Pankhurst (1999), lobbying and sponsorship takes place as those who implement peacebuilding initiatives aim on pacifying those people who can destroy the much-needed liberal peace, side-lining more peaceable and advanced people in society.

2.2.2 Effects of corruption on peacebuilding projects

The effects of conflict are destructive and cruel to the physical infrastructures of the population and countries, and also to the psychological status of the affected populations. Conflict pushes millions of individuals away from their homes, depriving them of normal lives, and their countries of development (Rose-Ackerman, 2008; Bangura, n.d). Sierra Leone experienced close to twelve years of suffering from intra-state conflict, which left over 200, 000 of its population dead, hundreds of thousands displaced, and a large population abused and violated (Bangura, n.d). Post-war development of affected areas tends to attract a range of actors, including relief agencies, human rights bodies, and development agencies focused on economic development (Kluyskens and Clark, 2014). This includes the UN Peacebuilding Fund that was formed to support nations in building sustainable peace and avoid reverting to extreme conflict.

Studies suggest that corruption is a hurdle to the post-conflict progress in the affected countries (Freeman, 2008; Le Billon, 2008; Jonas and Camilla, 2014; Jarvis, 2020). As expressed earlier, such countries operate in environments that have incentives for corruption

(Rose-Ackerman, 2008). For instance, the persistent fraud in Bosnia and Herzegovina is largely regarded as a significant influence on the country's economic and political holdups for years. To this effect, the United Nations report on peace processes recognizes 'help for the war on fraud as a 'key factor in the primary complements to the proper development of peace (Le Billon, 2008). Corruption has increasingly been recognized as a key hurdle to good governance, to the extent that (good) governance and (anti-) corruption became closely synonymous with development.

However, some literature challenges the liberal assumptions that corruption has an automatic destabilizing effect on budding peace in post-conflict transitions, arguing instead that there are cases where corruption can contribute towards budding peace (Jarvis, 2020). For instance, in his study of post-conflict transition in Nepal, Jarvis (2020) shows how corruption can have a stabilizing impact in such a transitioning process. This is inclusive of the application of patronage systems as platforms through that government having little capability to mix rivals, and also the use of underground trade as channels through which communities adapt to instability. Moreover, the last decade has seen the international community struggling massively with the challenges of establishing the foundation of sustainable peace while losing focus on the fact that countries transitioning from conflicts do so within varying and distinct conditions. While addressing such challenges, most aid agencies tend to compare the successful experiences of rebuilding Europe the post-Second World War period with the experienced failure in Africa (Bangura, n.d) Bangura suggests that countries emerging from conflict face challenges differently; with African countries (such as Sierra Leone) completely differing from those in Europe in the post Second World War period.

For instance, Cavalcante (2014) argues that the approach adopted by the UN, together with other international entities in the peacebuilding process in Guinea-Bissau, failed to secure sustainable peace because of the strong focus of the UN approach on the liberal peace model. However, some evidence tends to suggest that in fact, Sierra Leone could be an indication of how successful the liberal approach could be (Boulton, 2014; UN, 2020). Part of such achievements can be attributed to support from international organizations such as the UN through the Peacebuilding Fund investments, amounting to \$65 million, which have buttressed the nationwide endeavours for rebuilding its government organizations, enhance safety, encourage autonomous rulership, and form platforms for reconciliation and dialogue. An instance is the helping in establishing the country's National Human Rights Commission

(UN, 2020). Most of the country's institutions that could serve as checks and balances had been dismantled and damaged skilfully and systematically (Bangura, n.d; Roberts, 2020). Therefore, despite the expressed progress in curbing corruption, as expressed earlier, the realized gains could potentially be eroded.

Another issue in addressing corruption within liberal peacebuilding is the narrow conceptualization of corruption, which seems to be largely based on the centralized measurements operationalized by foreign aid urgencies including the World Bank (Polzer, 2001; Koechlin, 2013). Polzer (2001) criticizes the approach of defining corruption from a narrow scope. Therefore, this study will contribute to the debates on corruption in peacebuilding in post-war contexts, through the focus on Sierra Leone's context. This will especially focus on corruption effects on the peacebuilding programs, operationalized with the government (and its bodies), and other actors (such as international aid bodies).

Against the anticipations of liberal peacemakers, many post-conflict political arrangements at the end of the twentieth and beginning of the twenty-first century are symbolized by a pattern of clientelistic order-creation, whereby the forced relocation of possessions has had a key part to play (Goodhand, 2008). These consequences represent a major trial to philosophies of liberal peace-making, that took the assumption that party-political and monetary freedom, together with 'effective governance', can become effective in the achievement of lasting peace following the struggle. According to Lewis and Sagnayeva (2020) and Lewis et al, (2018), recent research on political realignments and 'rigid' or 'dictatorial' types of battle resolution provide new hypothetical understandings as to why rulership that comes after wars normally oppose liberal peace-making remedies and, in its place, depend on tiered and exclusionary party-political and economic structures for the production of relatively steady types of political arrangement.

Chapter 3: Research Methodology

3.1 Introduction

This chapter presents the research methodology which details the procedures and methods used to undertake the study. It will discuss the data collection and analysis, which includes sampling, followed by the limitations of the study.

3.2 Sampling, community entry and working with a gatekeeper

The sampling technique employed in this study is critical case sampling. The head of the project titled “Mitigating Localized Resource-Based Conflicts and increasing community resilience in Moyamba and Pujehun districts of Sierra Leone”, Ms Catherine Walialula acted as my gatekeeper and introduced me to some of the project officers and beneficiaries involved in this project.

Ms Catherine also introduced me to a UNDP programmes specialist involved in leading the “Empowering youth at risk as resources for sustaining peace and community resilience in Tonkolili and Kenema districts in Sierra Leone” project. Ms Catherine also acts as one of my key informants and my other key informants include

1. A programme specialist from the “Empowering youth at risk as resources for sustaining peace and community resilience in Tonkolili and Kenema districts in Sierra Leone” project
2. Two project community-level implementing officers from UNDP.
3. Two project implementing community-level officers (One from the “Mitigating Localized Resource-Based Conflicts and the Increasing community resilience in Moyamba and Pujehun districts of Sierra Leone” project and the other from “Empowering youth at risk as resources for sustaining peace and community resilience in Tonkolili and Kenema districts in Sierra Leone” project)

At the community level. I interviewed three groups of beneficiaries who included:

1. One mammy queen involved in the UNPBF project in Tonkolili and Kenema districts.

2. One mammy queen involved in the UNPBF project in Moyamba and Pujehun districts
3. One chief from the UNPBF project in Tonkolili and Kenema districts project
4. One chief involved in the UNPBF project in Moyamba and Pujehun districts project
5. Two beneficiaries of the UNPBF project in Tonkolili and Kenema districts project
6. Two beneficiaries of the UNPBF project in Moyamba and Pujehun districts project

Due to the restrictions of the Covid-19 pandemic, it was not possible to go to Sierra Leone and interview people face to face. Therefore, I employed the services of a research assistant who made first contact with the prospective respondents and asked them for their consent to participate in the study voluntarily on my behalf. After their acceptance to join the study, the research assistant then obtained the phone numbers of the interviewees and handed them to me for interviewing. I called the respondents and interviewed them in person.

In cases where a respondent could not be found, my research assistant on the ground helped me regain contact with them. The research assistant ensured that the respondents were furnished with all the necessary information about the study before they could accept to take part.

3.3 Data collection tools and processes

Data collection was done through both online and phone interviews. The respondents were video called to facilitate the interviews. The interviews were done based on an interview guide which contained semi-structured questions. Before asking the questions, the interviewer asked the interviewees to look for quiet places where they could answer the questions without interruption. The interviewer then explained the purpose of the interview, and addressed issues of confidentiality with the respondents in order to allay their fears about the information they were to provide being leaked out. The respondents were told how the data would be analysed. The researcher then explained the format of the interview to the respondents and specified how long the interview would take. Before asking the questions, the respondents were then given an opportunity to ask their own questions. Each interview took approximately 30 minutes. In asking the questions an interview guide was strictly followed to help avoid going into unnecessary and unplanned questions.

3.3.1 UN Peacebuilding fund beneficiaries

Respondents	Gender	Project	Age
R1	Male	Tonkolili and Kenema districts project	34
R2	Female	Moyamba and Pujehun districts project	24
R3	female	Tonkolili and Kenema districts project	23
R4	Male	Moyamba and Pujehun districts project	28

3.3.2 Project implementing officers

Implementing officer	Gender	Project	Age
R6	Male	Tonkolili and Kenema districts project	45
R7	Female	Moyamba and Pujehun districts project	40
R8	Female	Tonkolili and Kenema districts project	50
R9	Male	Moyamba and Pujehun districts project	35
R10	Female	Tonkolili and Kenema districts project	38

3.3.3 Local leaders

Local leader	Gender	Project	Age in years
First Chief (R11)	Male	Tonkolili and Kenema districts project	50
Second Chief (R12)	Male	Moyamba and Pujehun districts project	44
First Mammy queen (R13)	Female	Tonkolili and Kenema districts project	55
Second Mammy queen (R14)	Female	Moyamba and Pujehun districts project	65

3.4 Data analysis

Thematic analysis was necessary for the researcher's desire to move the analysis process from generally reading the data to discovering themes and patterns in the same data. The analysis process was undertaken through several steps beginning with familiarization with the data. As stated by Silverman (2016), the researcher read through the data more than once in order to become familiar with it. After familiarization, the next step was to code it and this was done by generating succinct labels that could define the key features of the data that were required in answering the research questions. State three involved theme identification and to do this the researcher examined the data to obtain comparatively broader patterns known as themes (Alhojailan, 2012). The relevant data to every theme was then collected to be analysed and reviewed for the viability of each candidate theme. In the fourth step there was the reviewing of the themes and the researcher checked potential themes using the data set to determine if they are reflecting the data and answering the research questions. At this stage the researcher may refine the themes further but reject others and still combine or split others.

In the fifth step, the themes were christened and the researcher established a comprehensive of every theme (Vaismoradi et al., 2013). In this stage the researcher decided on an informative name to give the themes. The last stage was that of writing up the paper. The researcher weaved together the extracts from the data and analysed and contextualized the data based on current literature. Based on what Kohlbacher (2006) states, the researcher generated the phrases and codes that became labels to data sections. Using the questionnaires certain patterns were recorded. Similar code names obtained from every paradigm were put together for further analysis and the researcher established laws based on their relationships. Later they were named categories. Based on the statement of Onwuegbuzie (2010) the categories were put together to be analysed further with the aim of determining any complicated relations in the information obtained from all of the paradigm components, and the instructions developed based on their interrelationships. They were then named “themes”.

3.5 Limitations

This study was limited because the researcher was forced to conduct online and phone interviews as opposed to face to face interviews. Due to the Covid-19 protocols, it was not

possible to hold face to face interviews and therefore, the interviews were subjected to technological challenges and network failure which affected the online and phone interviews respectively. However, I addressed this challenge by conducting interviews regularly at the convenience of the respondents and also allowing respondents to send in texts of their responses to their questions. In some cases, some respondents could not be found at the time they were needed, forcing the research assistant to delay the interviews until the respondents could be found. The results could have been affected by the bias of the researcher because of the personal views being incorporated in the study. This problem was solved by triangulating the primary data collected in the study with secondary studies on subjects that are similar to the current study's topic.

Chapter 4: Identifying and Explaining Corruption

4.1 Introduction

The study examined post-conflict corruption and peace-building in Sierra Leone with a particular focus on the UN peacebuilding fund. The research questions were answered using data collected through interviews, which were performed via online platforms and phones. The analysis of data was based on the research sub-questions investigating how corruption is manifested in liberal peacebuilding efforts in post-war Sierra Leone, the institutionalization and spread of corruption in liberal reconstruction and peacebuilding initiatives in Sierra Leone, local mechanisms and practices influencing corruption in liberal external-aided post-war peacebuilding efforts and the structural factors and practices influence corruption in liberal external-aided post-war peacebuilding efforts.

4.2 Institutional corruption in UNPBF projects

Although information about corruption was not given by all respondents, some other respondents had full information on how it happened and they even gave examples of how corruption manifested in the UNPBF. Some respondents had an idea of the methods used to perpetrate corruption in the post-war liberal peacebuilding efforts. They blamed those in charge such as chiefs for totally refusing to stick to the required protocols of the project. Corruption in the Sierra Leone peacebuilding fund was institutionalized in various forms such as the removal of beneficiaries' names from the list, bribery and wrong decision making.

4.2.1 Ineffective law enforcement

Within the law enforcement system there are constraints that create predisposing factors for corruption to happen. The practices of law enforcers, mostly the police, are described as abuse of power such as the soliciting and accepting bribes from crime suspects so that they can execute the law with leniency. They also execute their duties with bias and other inessential influences. These shortcomings have been linked to low levels of education, lacking professional ethics and standards, low pay and very low morale among police officers. The police have also been politicized in the past. Of the four respondents, two of them cited ineffective law enforcement as having a negative influence on the success of the UNPBF. One 23-year-old female respondent said:

“The problem with this peace building fund was that those responsible for law enforcement, especially the police, did not play their role well. Some of them were extorting bribes from those seeking justice through them.” (R3, 2021).

Two project implementers also expressed frustration as a result of the poor services rendered by the police department.

“One 40-year-old female project implementer said: Even if corruption was happening in the UNPBF we have no sure way of dealing with it because the police officers often collude with wrong doers” (R7, 2021).

The police were blamed for their corrupt acts because even their promises to investigate cases of corruption were either too slow or never kept. The role played by law enforcers in post conflict situations is very important in ensuring that the peace building process succeeds. Law enforcement helps to combat crimes that can derail the peace building process (Looney, 2008). In the findings in this study, the police officers failed on their duty because they took part in corruption by siding with wrong doers. Evidence for police inefficiency in countries coming out of conflict exists. In many post conflict situations, law enforcement is inefficient or corrupt leading to challenges that can derail peace building programmes. An example of such a situation is South Sudan where the police instead of arresting suspects of crime, help them by soliciting for favours from them in exchange for their freedom (Mukadam, 2012). This inability to promote justice by the police affected the peace building process because some of the crimes they refused to stop were related to the embezzlement of peace building funds given by donors. As stated by Lewis, and Sagnayeva, (2020) corruption among law enforcers was also found to deter the effective use of foreign aid in Kyrgyzstan to bring people out of poverty because the police were part of the system of corruption in the country.

4.2.2 Corruption in Judicial Institutions

Judicial institutions are operating at a low capacity and this allows for corrupt practices to take place. The mechanisms of operation in the judiciary are not very supportive to the quick execution of justice in the country. The low capacity of the judiciary results in cases taking too long before they are decided. Issues of corruption involving external-aided post-war peacebuilding efforts can take a long to be decided and that may hamper progress in peace building processes. Of the 5 project implementors 2 of them said they had no faith in the country’s judiciary. One 35-year-old project implementor said:

“Some people tried to tamper with the UNPBF process and we filed a case in court against them but since then we have not heard from the courts about the progress of that case. The judiciary works very slowly here” (R9, 2021).

The failure of the courts to work on cases in good time results in the offenders having time to commit more crimes. The UNPBF has suffered from this problem because some of the cases taken to court implicating those involved crimes during peace building did not end in the punishment for the offenders (Roberts, 2020). Of the two mammy queens interviewed, one of them said that she believed the judiciary has failed in its role of maintaining justice and that may also have contributed to the problems that faced the UNPBF. One mammy queen said:

“It is true that our country is suffering from corruption in its institutions and the judiciary has failed in ruling on important cases that could have ensured that justice is served. I am convinced that if the UNPBF took any case to court it could not have received a timely ruling and that is why cases of corruption were not reported” (R14, 2021).

The mammy queen was of the idea that the police failed to take cases to court because they knew such cases could not be concluded in good time to help solve the corruption issues affecting the UNPBF. The findings show that the inability of the judiciary to rule on cases quickly and the presence of a backlog of cases that need ruling stood in the way of justice being served for those who engaged in corruption during the implementation of the UNPBF. In other post-conflict states such as Guatemala, the judiciary was the most corrupt institution and a World Bank report linked the corruption culture to the thirty-six-year conflict. The country’s judicial system was non-functional and impunity was the order of the day. This inefficiency in the justice system led to challenges in the implementation of the UN Secretary-General’s Peacebuilding Fund (Rose-Ackerman, 2008) in the country. In fact, the current PBF support to Guatemala focuses on addressing major peacebuilding needs and concerns about the rule of law, predominantly transitional justice.

4.3 Formal mechanisms and practices

There were different formal mechanisms and practices in Sierra Leone that were cited by respondents as having an influence on corruption in the post war peace building efforts.

4.3.1 Irregularities in beneficiary recruitment and registration

The removal of the names of certain beneficiaries created opportunities for the corrupt individual to replace them with other names of either their relatives or ghost beneficiaries.

To explain this, one female beneficiary said:

“During the process I noticed the names of people who actually should have benefited from this program were not included. I cannot tell whether the fault is with UNDP or the people who were asked to identify beneficiaries” (R2, 2021)

The response given by R2, 2021 provides some evidence that the implementors of the UN projects may have been in the dark about the malpractices introduced into the project. No respondent placed blame squarely on those implementing but the local leaders have been implicated. While explaining how corruption was done, a certain male beneficiary said:

“In Tonkolili District the chiefs and mammy queen nominated their relatives, most when asked they said they were nurses and some from other professions. The chiefs and community leaders completely ignore the profile of the project” (R4, 2021).

Project implementors tried their best to work by the integrity standards of UN peace building projects whereby corruption and other malpractices are strictly prohibited. In certain communities where the project was implemented there were questions on how the beneficiaries of the project were selected. From the interviews the selection was done unfairly because no clear criteria were followed to arrive at the list of beneficiaries. Normally it was expected that only those youths who had no jobs were supposed to benefit from the project but this was not strictly adhered to as people who did not fall in this category also benefited from the fund. For example, in some regions the study found that some chiefs and social workers introduced their own people, especially their own children, into the project under the name of commercial sex workers who were supposed to be assisted to adopt a descent livelihood. Some of those who were irregularly put on the list of beneficiaries were people with gainful employment. While responding to this issue, one female beneficiary stated that:

“There was a discrepancy in the selection of project beneficiaries in one community in Kenema. The beneficiaries were not selected as per the project description. Only youth who are unemployed were to benefit from the project but during the verification, in March it emerged that the social worker went ahead and brought his own people and also children which he purported that they are Commercial Sex Workers. After the verification process only four (4)

out of 30 were accepted as the rest were not eligible, and for the boys there most of them were gainfully employed” (R3, 2021).

Social workers hired to recruit beneficiaries also wanted to benefit from their project in the wrong way. However, the efforts of project implementors to verify true beneficiaries bore some fruit as some suggested names were rejected. This is an indication of the high level of integrity that the UNPBF tried to inject in the Sierra Leone society. It made efforts to resist the influence of corruption on its implementation.

Some officials who were in charge of the fund were accused of pocketing some of the money so that they could benefit from it as well. The money was used for making personal investments. On this issue, a certain female project implementer had this to say:

“The UN peacebuilding fund was effective. We did not allow any money to be diverted by leaders into other purposes not originally part of the project. We hear it is said that some of the money was channelled into private accounts of relatives but that is mere propaganda” (R7, 2021).

Although the implementors of the project were not directly to blame, they were keen to present a clean image of the project because they did not want to take blame for any failures involving the project. Bad reports about the project would invite investigations that could end in a bad report about the implementation of the project which means the implementors risk losing their jobs.

The findings on the influence of corruption on the Sierra Leone UN peacebuilding fund were supported by Bangura (2016) who investigated the challenges of peace building in the post-war period. The author states that corrupt systems can be found in the country and they try to influence the external peace building project implementors. In the literature such as (Dimant and Tosato, 2017) the issue of inappropriate selection of beneficiaries of government or foreign funded projects has been discussed in countries where corruption is a major problem. For example, in Guatemala after the civil war in 1996, during the allocation of aid to victims of the war, officials failed to select only the needy applicants. It is reported by Rose-Ackerman (2008) that corrupt motives distorted allocations. The misuse of power where the undeserving people are selected to benefit from government or foreign funded projects is among the strategies used by the implementation personnel.

4.3.2 Corruption through Bribery

Corruption was also institutionalized through bribery. Those who were guilty of misusing the money meant for poor unemployed youth were found to have bribed law enforcement officers so that they could not be arrested. Three of the beneficiaries interviewed gave evidence of these findings. A certain male beneficiary said this:

“The officials are masters of bribery. They use the money to meet their private needs and then they use part of it to shield themselves from apprehension by the law. If we had responsible and uncorrupted people many young people would have been helped. Bribery puts those who have no bribes at a disadvantage as well.” (R4, 2021)

Normally, everyone who was eligible to receive help was supposed to register in their area of residence. One male beneficiary complained about this by saying:

“The implementation of this fund was not done strictly by the rules. Initially we were told that only those living in a particular area were eligible to get the help provided through the fund in that area. Unfortunately, we discovered that some people came from other areas to register here and that resulted in some of our young people being left out” (R4, 2021).

On the issue of double registration, one female beneficiary said:

“It is true that some people benefitted twice or even more because through corruption they managed to register in two or more places. This was wrong and unacceptable because as they got twice the benefit, others went totally without because it was later announced that the money was not enough for everyone who had hoped to get it. The organizers and those concerned with the implementation of the project ought to ensure they avoid such malpractices” (R3, 2021).

From the above findings, bribery was a major vice that became an impediment in the smooth implementation of the Sierra Leone UNPBF. Bribery is one of the most common forms of corruption affecting peace building initiatives in post conflict situations (Zaum and Cheng, 2011). The findings in this study show that bribery was used as a way of perverting justice so that those involved in crimes during the implementation of the UNPBF were not arraigned in court. Elsewhere in Africa, corruption through the giving and receiving of bribes was found to have affected post conflict peace building efforts in South Sudan (Transparency International, 2013). A study by The Sentry (2015) shows that government institutions such

as the police and the judiciary require bribes from people in order to provide services to them. Corruption through bribery has been cited as a major hindrance in the country's journey to lasting peace.

4.3.3 Poor decision making

One important concern which bordered on institutional corruption was poor or wrong decision-making which affected the outcome of the peacebuilding fund. Officials manning the fund were found to have abused their positions in a way that diverted the purpose of the peacebuilding fund to other purposes. In Tonkolili District some community members complained of the money meant for them having been used elsewhere. However, these claims did not get support from the project implementors. The hopes of many youth of being pulled out of poverty through the fund were dashed by the actions of corrupt officials. Nevertheless, the chief did not share the sentiments of the beneficiaries as he sought to paint the “real picture” of the situation. He said:

“Currently, there is peace in this country that has been brought about by the success of the peace building efforts we have been making. Therefore, claiming that the UN peacebuilding fund was not effective due to corruption is a lie” (R11, 2021).

Although evidence of corruption being institutionalized was found from the interviews, still other respondents did not agree with such claims. They insisted on the effective management of the UNPBF in Moyamba and Pujehun districts and claimed that it was implemented well to the benefit of the citizens. The Mammy queen said:

“The UNDP internal control systems are robust to enable value for money to be delivered in every intervention. I do not think these control systems failed to function so that the fund became useless to those it was intended to help” (R13, 2021).

However, not all beneficiaries shared this position; many were unhappy with the way the UN fund was implemented, especially in the Tonkolili and Kenema districts. Due to institutional corruption, it was found that the fund did not create lasting peace as it was intended. The beneficiaries claimed that so many young people are still not gainfully employed and they are living in poverty. This creates a situation where the fragile peace that exists is still under threat. Freeman (2008) looked at the failures of peace building efforts after war in Sierra Leone and found that most of them never achieve their objectives

especially due to bad leadership and corruption. According to Thompson (2018) an institution is tainted by unimportant influences which twist its decision-making process and through that weaken its ability to operate based on its vital values. The findings of this study find support in previous literature (e.g. Fotaki, 2020) who state that the institutionalization and perpetration of corruption takes place through strategic and systematic influence which is ethical or legal and that weakens the effectiveness of institutions by removing them from their purpose or reducing their ability to attain their purpose.

In such a way, public trust in those institutions is greatly compromised (Aluko, 2002). The various manifestations of corruption that happened in the UN peacebuilding fund as described by the respondents are in line with the above statement by Aluko (2002) because as a result of the rampant corruption, many people who were supposed to be beneficiaries lost trust in the fund. In the Niger Delta in Nigeria, peace building efforts have been hampered by corruption that happens through unwise decisions. For example, poultry empowerment programmes targeting former insurgents were mismanaged and the would-be beneficiaries left helpless (Okoi, 2020).

4.4 Influence of social factors

4.4.1. Tribalism

One of the practices that had influence on corruption in Sierra Leone was tribalism. The politics in Sierra Leone are organized based on regional and tribal lines. The issues of tribalism have created a base upon which corruption grows. People with political ties rely on that influence to gain undue advantage over others in peace building processes. In the selection of beneficiaries in the UN peacebuilding fund, beneficiaries were selected based on how they are connected to politicians of their communities and community leaders. This is a common practice in various parts of the country and it interferes with the proper implementation of projects. While reacting on this issue, one female beneficiary said:

“Since most projects to enhance peacebuilding focus more on communities, already existing political structures within these communities can influence corruption on a project implemented e.g. Community members will select beneficiaries based on their political ties or affiliations. This was evident in one of the projects I was implementing where beneficiaries were asked to give their names to their political representatives in the communities” (R2, 2021).

Political and community leaders are often implicated in corrupt practices because they have power to influence the distribution of resources (Imran, 2016). A study by Bangura (2016) in Sierra Leone found that ties to politicians and other leaders are commonly used in countries where corruption is high to benefit those who have those connections. A female beneficiary said:

“Connections to politicians are used by many people to get what they want and that means that those without such ties are left without anybody to fight for them so that they can also benefit from peace building projects being implemented” (R3, 2021).

Tribalism in Sierra Leone is a long-standing problem that has been there since independence and even to date, the politics of Sierra Leone is organized based on tribes, ethnic groupings and regions (Okogu and Umudjere, 2016). Although tribalism did not play a major role in fuelling the Sierra Leone conflict, it was exploited by some people to interfere with peace building efforts and that was evident in the UN peacebuilding fund. People in the country prefer to align with leaders of their tribes and regions (Boulton, 2014). Tribalism is a problem that affects most African states. As in the case of the peace building process in South Sudan, tribal leaders prefer to help those of their tribes because they consider them closer to them than other people in the country. Therefore, favours such as opportunities to benefit from external aid are extended by those politicians to some members of their own tribes (Mukadam, 2012).

4.4.2 Nepotism and favouritism

Some respondents blamed favouritism for the unfair treatment they received from those conducting the UN post war peacebuilding fund. Favouritism from leaders gives an unfair advantage to those receiving the favours as those without favours are forced to miss out on positions and benefits that would have been theirs (Duri, 2020). Out of the four beneficiaries interviewed, two of them said the local leaders practiced nepotism. A 24-year-old male beneficiary said:

“Although I was chosen as a beneficiary because I was qualified, I know of some beneficiaries whose names were put on the list because they had close ties to those tasked with selecting the beneficiaries” (R4, 2021).

However, the issue of local leaders failing to provide the right leadership that would ensure the peacebuilding fund optimally achieved its goals was refuted by the Second Mammy queen. She said:

“Nobody gets an advantage just because they are known to the leaders in this district or elsewhere. I have lived in this place for more than 60 years and I have not seen that happen. I believe everyone must work hard and only receive what they deserve” (R14, 2021).

The mammy queen, having been implicated in the malpractices associated with the UNPBF, was not sincere because corruption is a major problem in every part of Sierra Leone. Studies such as Imran (2016) found that corruption sometimes thrives on the foundation of “who is known to who” because people favour those that are close to them. In peace building programs, positions and opportunities are sometimes awarded to friends and relatives.

The issue of structural practices and factors has been discussed in previous literature and a good example is Cheng and Zaum (2008). They argue that proper peace building cannot be achieved with weak or compromised structures. Nepotism and favouritism were partly caused by the inability of the UNPBF to stick to the required structures during the implementation process. The foundation of proper peacebuilding is stable structures with people who are willing to make them work. Harvey (2012) also blames corruption in post conflict situations on the absence of stable working systems, structures and regulations that do not provide loopholes that can be exploited by corrupt systems and individuals.

4.5 Conclusion

According to the findings, institutional corruption in UNPBF projects is undertaken through ineffective law enforcement and corruption in judicial institutions. The practices of law enforcers, mostly the police, such as the soliciting and accepting bribes from crime suspects so that they can execute the law with leniency are described as abuse of power. Formal forms of corruption in peace building include irregularities in beneficiary recruitment and registration, bribery and poor decision making through both deliberate and inadvertent actions. Corruption in Sierra Leone also came under the influence of social factors such as tribalism and nepotism and favouritism. These social factors were responsible for the unfair treatment some people received from those conducting the UN post war peacebuilding fund.

Chapter 5: Beyond normalisation of corruption in peacebuilding

5.1 Forms of Denial of Corruption

From the interviews current study found evidence on the existence of corruption but some of the interviewees claimed not to know about it. Corruption is a major problem in Sierra Leone affecting the post-war peace building efforts and the UN peacebuilding fund projects have not been spared based on the findings of this study. As some genuinely did not know about it, others were afraid of talking about it for fear of being victimized. This happened in this study even after the researcher had assured them of maintaining confidentiality about the information collected.

Respondents gave different responses about the issue, with some denying knowledge of such acts (especially the chief, project implementers and the Mammy queen) while others (beneficiaries) confirmed the existence of corruption. When asked whether they had heard of or even taken part in corruption some of them gave the below responses. As one project implementing officer said:

“No, I did not witness either participate in any corruption in the Tonkolili and Kenema districts project. The way the fund is managed does not allow for any corrupt practices to happen. Furthermore, none of my friends ever told me that such things existed” (R6, 2021)

One chief said:

“No. I haven’t and have not witnessed such actions in the implementation of the fund. As far as I am concerned the team has been doing a great job. We did not engage in any dirty business. Furthermore, my office did not receive any reports of such things happening” (R11, 2021).

The second mammy queen said:

“As much as it is said there is corruption, those claiming so have not come out clearly with compelling evidence on how it happened. Therefore, I don’t think their claims should be taken seriously” (R 14).

Based on these responses, it was deduced that since corruption is prevalent in other institutions in the country, evidence about its existence in the UNPBF is being concealed.

However, this is highly suspicious because the UN project was being implemented in the same corrupt environment and the project implementors also worked hand in hand with other institutions to achieve their goals. However, there were some other respondents who agreed to have heard something about corruption although they claimed that they did not participate in it. One 29-year-old male beneficiary said:

“Well personally I didn't witness it, but I heard from others who took part in the Moyamba and Pujehun districts project that there was a lot of corruption taking place. Although the chief tried to hide it, some people managed to discover what was being done under cover” (R1, 2021).

A 24-year-old female beneficiary said:

“My own brother was supposed to be among the beneficiaries but unfortunately his position was stolen. When he tried following up the issue, he was told to talk to those concerned but he was later turned away” (R2 2021).

From the above responses, it appears that those involved in corruption tried to conceal it so that not many people could understand what was happening. The vice is rampant in the country and this has been a major hindrance in the peace building efforts after the war. The failure of the genuine beneficiaries to benefit from the UN peacebuilding fund could threaten the fragile peace that exists because idle and unemployed youth can form or join militia groups.

Although the responses from the beneficiaries indicated the presence of corruption in the UNPBF in Sierra Leone, there could be chances that those who complained of corruption are some of those who were disgruntled for not being selected to join the list of beneficiaries. Nevertheless, some members who also benefited from the fund also cited corruption as having affected the UNPBF. Given the history of corruption that led to the conflict in the first place, people in Sierra Leone may be hypersensitive to the issue of corruption.

To support these findings about the practice of corruption in the UN peace building process, Lucey and Kumalo (2018) state that the problem overflows from the inability of the government of Sierra Leone to prosecute corruption, so that offenders take funds originating from within the country and donor nations from projects that would be beneficial to the people as the UN peace building project and they use them to serve the needs of government of officials and the supporters of the government.

Some respondents lamented that the culture of corruption in the country has permeated important structures and therefore, any foreign institution such as the UN operating in the country cannot find a suitable environment to operate in. Transparency International (2021) corroborates these findings when it states that the level of corruption in Sierra Leone is very high. Another social factor is at the level of the institution because the UN peacebuilding fund works with local authorities to identify the appropriate beneficiaries and to determine what benefit they were entitled to depending on how needy they were. However, due to the normalization of corruption in the country the process was interfered with. One male beneficiary said:

“Peace building funds by the UN are funded from outside the country but they cannot be run completely by foreigners. They need the input of local leaders who understand the challenges and issues in their communities. Unfortunately, these leaders have a culture of corruption entrenched in their character” (R1, 2021).

The formation and functioning of the structures at the fund is strongly influenced by cultural and social factors at the grassroots. Chiefs and community leaders who are incorporated in such projects do not provide proper guidance on how locals can get the benefits but instead they seek some personal benefit from it. A female beneficiary enrolled in the peacebuilding project said:

“Overtime peacebuilding projects have faced a lot of challenges especially at the pilot stage where we need to identify the right beneficiaries like I initially mentioned. However, since many of us consider corruption to be a way of life, we do little to ensure that things are done in the right manner” (R2, 2021).

It was a challenge for the fund to rely on local leadership for its execution because many of those leaders either saw opportunities for personal gain or they were not competent enough to help the staff running the project to achieve their intended purpose. Zaum and Cheng (2011) insist on the competency and suitability of those involved in running community projects in whatever capacity so that the proper implementation of such projects is not hampered by mismanagement. The normalization of corruption in Sierra Leone is an obstacle in some projects both government and externally funded. For example, Bangura (2007) describes a situation where corruption has reduced the ability of USAID to empower locals in the country through various educational and economic projects. In Liberia, billions of US dollars donated by USAID and other foreign donors for investment in education and

health have failed to help the poor and the health and education sectors in the country are still in dire need of money (Lucey and Kumalo, 2018).

5.2 Eliminating Denial of Corruption and Corruption in Peacebuilding

Denial of corruption can be eliminated through proper and thorough investigation into the allegations made about the officials involved in the UNPBF and the local leaders who helped in selecting the beneficiaries. Investigations help to reveal the truth about shoddy dealings and it also avails evidence for any legal actions that may require to be taken (Thompson, 2018). For them to carry weight, investigations should be based on the testimonies of witnesses. However, investigations can only succeed if there is transparency on the side of those who are supposed to report the crimes and those who are witnesses to the crimes (Spagnol, 2019). To have strong backing, investigations should be done based on audit reports that reveal discrepancies in the expenditure of peacebuilding aid or any processes that pertain to the UNPBF. Proper investigations should be done with the cooperation of local security agencies but this may present another hurdle because such agencies may also be prone to corruption.

Measures to deal with the denial of corruption should be implemented in conjunction with other measures that help to eliminate corruption. The elimination of corruption in the UNPBF may be achieved by creating adequate safeguards that can protect peacebuilding funds from being misused through corruption. This involves making control stronger and preventing corruption in the implementation of peace building aid projects (Jarvis, 2020). There should be the creation and monitoring of compliance by use of internal controls. Proper guidelines and policies can give officers involved in UNPBF implementation a way of reducing the risks of corruption. Regulatory corruption investigations have shown that such internal controls and procedures for record keeping should be fine-tuned through processes such as the employment of senior staff that is qualified, having controls over travel, logistics and other expenses (Spagnol, 2019). Employees of the UN should be well trained in the context of the country they are going to work in as well as the policies and principles governing peacebuilding fund implementation.

The performance of rigorous due diligence is also necessary for corruption prevention and elimination. The UNPBF may have internal controls in use but have challenges in scrutinizing other activities that involve third parties or members of the public who are stakeholders in the implementation of the peace process (Thompson, 2018). There should

be success in both the use of internal controls and the cooperation undertaken with third parties. The due-diligence techniques that are useful for the reduction of corruption may include the undertaking of thorough background checks on third parties to ensure that they are well qualified and that their reputations are solid, getting revelations from third parties about the relationships they may be having with government officials in the country where the peacebuilding fund is being implemented and communicating to the third parties and local stakeholders the UN's zero tolerance policy to corruption of any form (Spagnol, 2019).

Officials of the UNPBF should always be on the lookout for red flags. Due diligence and internal controls are effective tools of detecting any red flags. The red flags may include rumours of dissatisfaction in the projects implemented by the locals, unusually close relationships between the third parties, local leaders and local officials with the foreign officials, large payments for the preparation and translation of tender documents, the desire of a third part to keep their transactions with the UNPBF representatives secret (Jarvis, 2020). Another red flag may be too much or unusual payment requests given to third parties and others transacting with the officials of the UNPBF such as foreign banks. Refusal of third parties to commit in writing that they will stick by the anti-corruption laws is another red flag (Dimant and Tosato, 2017). Payments to third parties should be properly monitored to ensure that no cash payments are made, there are reasonable commission percentages that are based on the work done and that there are receipts available for every requested reimbursement.

Peace building fund architectures and mechanisms for monitoring performance are valuable for corruption elimination in UN peace building initiatives. In recent years peacebuilding fund architecture and performance-monitoring mechanisms have been devised to encourage those organizations involved to co-ordinate dialogue, monitoring and the delivery of required funds to conflict-affected countries and to minimise disruption to the flow of the money (Spagnol, 2019). Formally and informally providers of peace building funds have increasingly ensured that, when they need to respond bilaterally to domestic demands for accountability or corporate policy on managing fiduciary risk, they minimise the risk of a “domino effect” on others’ fund disbursements. It remains to be seen whether this pattern prevails in the context of deepening concerns for fiduciary risk during the global economic downturn. However, the architectures and mechanisms have not fared on well in the past due to unique challenges associated with different post-conflict situations (Jarvis, 2020).

The promotion of peace building fund transparency common standards for those keeping records of how they spend the money is a crucial aspect of the efforts of combating corruption in UNPBF with initiatives such as the International Aid Transparency Initiative (Dimant and Tosato, 2017). Transparency is a key requirement for fighting corruption in foreign funded peace initiatives. IATI is a world-wide initiative for improving the transparency of development as well as humanitarian resources and their outcomes for addressing poverty and crises (Spagnol, 2019). It unites civil society organisations, governments, private sector, multilateral institutions and others to promote the transparency of funds going into developing countries. All these organizations and entities in one way or another influence the activities of peace building project organizers and implementors. The UN should publish information about their peace building initiatives on the basis of IATI's data standard. This is a collection of rules and guidance to make information more accessible, understandable and useful (Thompson, 2018).

The UN can eliminate corruption in the post-conflict countries where it runs its programmes and peacebuilding projects by raising the problem at the level of the fund partnership (Spagnol, 2019). In these situations, where there are leakages being reported in the budget of UNPBFs there should be flexible response mechanisms through which the disbursement of the fund money can be varied in a pre-agreed and signalled way to respond to corruption while protecting spending on fundamental projects and making sure that predictability is achieved (Zaum and Cheng, 2011). Funds disbursement can be varied based on the performance of projects and the number of reports of corruption and mismanagement of the funds. Where the funds and the process is not properly managed, the UN can reduce its investment and increase it where there is proper management of funds and other activities and processes that relate to peace building (Dimant and Tosato, 2017).

Chapter 6: Conclusion

This study sought to examine the topic of post-conflict corruption and peacebuilding with a specific focus on the UN Peacebuilding Fund in Sierra Leone. The key objective of the study was to investigate how the social and institutional factors and mechanisms interact to influence practices of corruption in liberal post-war peace-building efforts, taking the case study of the UN peace-building fund in Sierra-Leone. The study sought to answer the following main question: Which local mechanisms and practices influence corruption in liberal external-aided post-war peacebuilding efforts? To arrive at the answer to the main research question, it was broken down into sub-questions that aided in the collection of data. Specifically, the study sought to find out how corruption manifested and spread within social and political institutions in UNPBF peacebuilding projects, which social mechanisms and attitudes influence corruption in post-war UNPBF peacebuilding projects and how normalisation of corruption be challenged in UNPBF projects in the future.

The main findings from the study are that the UNPBF was meant to help in restoring peace in Sierra Leone but it was implemented in a country that was riddled with corruption. And this trickled and influenced acts of corruption in the peacebuilding projects. The findings of the study revealed that there were several forms of corruption inherent in the activities of both the UNPB funded projects. These forms of corruption included the removal of the names of legitimate beneficiaries from the list of beneficiaries of the fund, bribery and irregularities in registration.

Corruption in the UNPBF projects was also attributed to social factors such as normalization of corruption in the community and poverty because people saw opportunities of getting money from the UN projects. The culture of nepotism and favouritism in Sierra Leonean society also influenced the corrupt dealings in the projects. Nepotism was evident because some officials brought in their relatives as beneficiaries to take the places of young poor youth.

Apart from the social factors, formal factors also promoted corruption in the UNPBF projects. Some of the formal factors discovered through the study included tribalism, law enforcement and corruption in judicial institutions.

The goal of restoring peace through the UNPBF was to ensure that Sierra Leone will never revert to war again by mitigating the conflict and increasing community resilience in Moyamba and Pujehun districts as well as helping youth at risk in Tonkolili and Kenema

districts. The implication of the findings is that the foundation of the peace in Sierra Leone is not very strong and due to that fragility, it remains to be a threat for peace in the future. That means the conflicts can recur if the country continues to condone the vice. Corruption has been entrenched further by the existence of the UNPBF in Sierra Leone and therefore, the problems (corruption) that led to the war (grievances about the mismanagement of the proceeds obtained from the sale of diamonds) are still present in Sierra Leone.

In post war countries, the success of liberal peacebuilding strongly depends on how effectively the country is able to eliminate corruption from its institutions and population. Corruption undermines liberal peacebuilding in post conflict situations and its presence may mean unfruitfulness in peacebuilding. However, such corruption cannot be eradicated without acknowledgement of its existence and deeper explanations on how it occurs by those tasked with implementing the project and those involved in the project. As such there is a need to not only mitigate the corrupt acts in peacebuilding projects but also address the denial of corruption among leaders and other actors involved in these projects.

References

- Aluko, M. (2002). The institutionalization of corruption and its impact on political culture and behaviour in Nigeria. *Nordic Journal of African Studies*, 11(3), 393-402.
- Baev, P. K. (2018). Civil wars in Georgia: Corruption breeds violence. In J. Koehler and C. Zürcher (Eds.), *Potentials of disorder*. Manchester University Press.
- Bangura, A. K. (2007). Understanding and fighting corruption in Sierra Leone: A metaphorical linguistic approach. *Journal of Third World Studies*, 24(1), 59-71.
- Bangura, Z. (2016). Addressing Corruption and Implementing Reconstruction in Post-War Sierra Leone: Institutional and Procedural Dimensions. Retrieved from <http://www.anti-corruption.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/Sierra-leone-Corruption-in-post-war-reconstruction-Institutional-and-procedural-dimensions-TIRI-bangura.pdf>
- Bangura, Z.H. (n.d). *Addressing Corruption and Implementing Reconstruction in Post-War Sierra Leone: Institutional and Procedural Dimensions* [Online] Available at: <http://www.anti-corruption.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/Sierra-leone-Corruption-in-post-war-reconstruction-Institutional-and-procedural-dimensions-TIRI-bangura.pdf> [Accessed 19th March, 2021]
- Barnett, M., Kim, H., O'Donnell, M., and Sitea, L. (2007). Peacebuilding: What is in a name. *Global governance*, 13, 35.
- Beyerle, S. (2011). Civil resistance and the corruption-violence nexus. *J. Soc. and Soc. Welfare*, 38, 53.
- Boulton, F. (2014). When war ends: building peace in divided communities.
- Bratton, M. (2008). Vote buying and violence in Nigerian election campaigns. *Electoral studies*, 27(4), 621– 632.
- Bryman, A. (2012). Chapter 3: Research design. *Social Research Methods. 4th ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press*.
- Carnahan, M., Durch, W., and Gilmore, S. (2006). Economic Impact of Peacekeeping: Final Report. *Ottawa and New York: Peace Dividend Trust*.

- Cavalcante, F. (2014). The influence of the Liberal Peace Framework on the United Nations approach to peacebuilding in Guinea-Bissau. *RCCS Annual Review. A selection from the Portuguese journal Revista Crítica de Ciências Sociais*, (6).
- Cheng, C. and Zaum, D. (2008). Introduction – Key Themes in Peacebuilding and Corruption’, *International Peacekeeping*, 15 (3), 301-309.
- Cherotich, L. (2010) *The influence of patronage networks on Kenya’s experience of corruption*. [Online] Available at: <https://www.icgg.org/downloads/2010/Cherotich.pdf> [Accessed 22 Oct 2021]
- Conforti, S. (2019). Education for Peace What Building Peace Means. *Budapest International Research and Critics in Linguistics and Education (BirLE) Journal*, 2(4), 20-26.
- Cooksey, B. (2002, December). Can aid agencies really help combat corruption? In *Forum on Crime and Society* (Vol. 2, No. 1, pp. 45-56).
- Dimant, E. and Tosato, G. (2017). Causes and Effects of Corruption: What has Past Decade's Empirical Research Taught us? A Survey. *Journal of Economic Surveys*, 32(2), 1-18. DOI:10.1111/joes.12198
- Doyle, M. W. (1983). Kant, liberal legacies, and foreign affairs. *Philosophy and public affairs*, 205-235.
- Doyle, M. W., and Sambanis, N. (2000). International peacebuilding: A theoretical and quantitative analysis. *American political science review*, 94(4), 779-801.
- Duri J. (2020). Sub-Saharan Africa: Overview of corruption and anti-corruption. Retrieved from <https://www.u4.no/publications/sub-saharan-africa-overview-of-corruption-and-anti-corruption>
- Fotaki, M. (2020). Why We Must Talk About Institutional Corruption to Understand Wrongdoing in the Health Sector. *Int J Health Policy Manag.*, 9(5), 206–208.
- Freeman, C. (2008). The Failures of Post-Conflict Reconstruction in Sierra Leone and The Threat to Peace. Retrieved from <https://www.beyondintractability.org/casestudy/freeman-failures>
- Fukuyama, F. (2006). *The end of history and the last man*. Simon and Schuster.

- Gillanders, R., and van der Werff, L. (2021). Corruption experiences and attitudes to political, interpersonal, and domestic violence. *An International Journal of Policy, Administration and Institution*, 1, 1-12. <https://doi.org/10.1111/gove.12570>
- Godfrey, M., and Yu, P. J. (2015) Patronage driven corruption undermining the fight against poverty in Uganda. *African Social Science Review*, 7(1), <http://digitalscholarship.tsu.edu/assr/vol7/iss1/4> [Accessed 22 Oct 2021]
- Goodhand, J. (2008). Corrupting or Consolidating the Peace? The Drugs Economy and Post-conflict Peacebuilding in Afghanistan. *International Peacekeeping*, 15 (3), pp. 405-423.
- Harvey, K. (2012). What makes post-conflict situations particularly susceptible to corruption. *Obtenido de E-International Relations Students: http://www.eir.info/2012/10/09/what-makes-post-conflict-situations-particularly-susceptible-to-corruption.*
- Hayner, P. (2007). Negotiating peace in Sierra Leone: Confronting the justice challenge. Retrieved from https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/3DC88BA696363FD3C12573AE00324BF2-Full_Report.pdf
- Imran, K. (2016). The Fight against Corruption in Sierra Leone: Challenges and Opportunities in the Jurisprudence (December 1, 2016). *African Journal of International Criminal Justice*, (2) 1-2 DOI: 10.5553/AJ/2352068X2016002001002. <https://ssrn.com/abstract=3438031>
- Iro, A. (2009). *The UN Peacebuilding Commission: Lessons from Sierra Leone* (Vol. 6). Universitätsverlag Potsdam.
- Jang, S. Y. (2015). The causes of the Sierra Leone civil war. *E-International Relations Students*. Retrieved from <https://www.e-ir.info/2012/10/25/the-causes-of-the-sierra-leone-civil-war-underlying-grievances-and-the-role-of-the-revolutionary-united-front>.
- Jarvis, T. (2020). The stabilising impacts of corruption in Nepal's post-conflict transition. *Conflict, Security and Development*, 20(1), 165-189.
- Kluyskens, J., and Clark, L. (2014). Review of the United Nations Peacebuilding Fund. *UN Peacebuilding Fund*.
- Koechlin, L. (2013). *Corruption as an empty signifier: Politics and political order in Africa*. Brill.

- Kristoff, T. (2006) Political patronage and political values: The developmental role of political patronage and its impacts on shaping political values in rural Uganda. *Afika Focus* 19, Nr 1-2, pp. 43-67.
- Lawrence, M. (2014). United Nations Peace Building in Sierra Leone—Toward Vertical Integration?
- Le Billon, P. (2003). Buying Peace or Fuelling War: The Role of Corruption in Armed Conflicts. *Journal of International Development*, 15, 413-426.
- Le Billon, P. (2003). Buying Peace or Fuelling War: The Role of Corruption in Armed Conflicts. *Journal of International Development*, 15, 413-426.
- Le Billon, P. (2008). Corrupting Peace? Peacebuilding and Post-conflict Corruption. *International Peacekeeping*, 15 (3), 344-361.
- Lewis, D. G., and Sagnayeva, S. (2020). Corruption, patronage and illiberal peace: forging political settlement in post-conflict Kyrgyzstan. *Third World Quarterly*, 41(1), 77-95.
- Lewis, D., Heathershaw, J., and Megoran, N. (2018). Illiberal peace? Authoritarian modes of conflict management. *Cooperation and Conflict*, 53(4), 486-506.
- Liu, X. (2016). A Literature Review on the Definition of Corruption and Factors Affecting the Risk of Corruption. *Open Journal of social sciences*, 4(6), 1-7.
- Looney, R. E. (2008). Reconstruction and Peacebuilding under Extreme Adversity: The Problem of Pervasive Corruption in Iraq. *International Peacekeeping*, 15 (3), 424-440.
- Lucey, A., and Kumalo, L. (2018). Sustaining Peace in Practice: Liberia and Sierra Leone. Retrieved from <https://www.africaportal.org/publications/sustaining-peace-practice-liberia-and-sierra-leone/>
- MacLachlan, K. (2018) *Corruption and conflict: hand in glove* [Online] Available at: <https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2018/12/06/corruption-and-conflict-hand-in-glove/index.html> [Accessed 22 Oct 2021]
- Majeedullah, A. (2015). Greed and Grievance: A Tug of War between Discourses.
- Mansaray, B. (2000) 'Women against Weapons: A Leading Role for Women in Disarmament', in Ayissi, A. and Poulton, R.E. (ed.) *Bound to Cooperate: Conflict*,

- Peace and People in Sierra Leone (Geneva, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research).
- Margolies, A. (2009). Pilfering the peace: The nexus between corruption and peacebuilding. Retrieved from <https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/media/documents/publication/New%20Routes%20Interview.pdf>
- Martin, L. L., and Simmons, B. A. (1998). Theories and empirical studies of international institutions. *International organization*, 729-757.
- Morris S. D. (2012) Corruption, drug trafficking, and violence in Mexico”, *The Brown Journal of World Affairs*, 18(2), pp. 29-43.
- Mukadam, S. (2012). *How corruption may hamper peacebuilding: The case of South Sudan*. Institute for security studies. Retrieved <https://issafrica.org/iss-today/how-corruption-may-hamper-peacebuilding-the-case-of-south-sudan>
- Mwenda, A. M., and Tangiri, R. (2005) Patronage politics, donor reforms, and regime consolidation in Uganda. *African Affairs* 104(416), pp. 449-467. doi: 10.1093/afraf/adi030.
- Myint, U. (2000) Corruption: Causes, consequences and cures. *Asia-Pacific Development Journal*, 7(2), pp. 33-58.
- Naderifar, M., Goli, H., and Ghaljaie, F. (2017). Snowball sampling: A purposeful method of sampling in qualitative research. *Strides in Development of Medical Education*, 14(3), 1-6.
- Newman, E., Paris, R., and Richmond, O. P. (Eds). (2009). *New perspectives on liberal peacebuilding*. United Nations University Press.
- Park JD. (2019) Assessing the Role of Foreign Aid, Donors and Recipients. In: Re-Inventing Africa's Development. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-03946-2_2
- Peterson, J. H. (2014). *Building a peace economy? Liberal peacebuilding and the development-security industry*. Manchester University Press.
- Phellas, C. N., Bloch, A., and Seale, C. (2011). Structured methods: interviews, questionnaires and observation. *Researching society and culture*, 3, 181-205.

- Polzer, T. (2001). Corruption: deconstructing the World Bank discourse. *Development Studies Institute (DESTIN) Working Paper, 1*(18).
- Porter, B. (2006). Liberalism and War: The Victors and the Vanquished.
- Potter, Gary W. and Thompson, B. (1997). Governmental Corruption in Africa: Sierra Leone as a Case Study. Justice Studies Faculty and Staff Research. Paper 4.
http://encompass.eku.edu/cjps_fsresearch/4
- PROJECT DOCUMENT TEMPLATE. Retrieved from
[https://info.undp.org/docs/pdc/Documents/H71/PBF%20%20PROJECT%20DOCUMENT%20\(signed%20PBSO\)%20\(002\).pdf](https://info.undp.org/docs/pdc/Documents/H71/PBF%20%20PROJECT%20DOCUMENT%20(signed%20PBSO)%20(002).pdf)
- Pyman, M. (2013). *Corruption and Peacekeeping: Strengthening Peacekeeping and the United Nations*. Transparency International UK.
- Pyman, M., Bock, T., de la Blanche, E. V., Mustafa, S., and Zaum, D. (2014). *Corruption as a Threat to Stability and Peace*. Transparency International Deutschland eV.
- Ravichandran, S. (2011). Factors of Persistent Poverty in Sierra Leone. Retrieved from
<https://www.e-ir.info/2011/07/28/factors-of-persistent-poverty-in-sierra-leone/>
- Richards, P. (2001). 'War and Peace in Sierra Leone'. *Fletcher Forum of World Affairs*, 28 (2), 41-50.
- Richmond, O. (2013). Peace Formation and Local Infrastructures for Peace. *Alternatives: Global, Local, Political*, 38(4), 271-287. DOI:10.1177/0304375413512100
- Roberts, E. (2020). *In Sierra Leone, Corruption Isn't gone, but it is Falling under Bio* [Online]
 Available at: <https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/28679/in-sierra-leone-corruption-isn-t-gone-but-it-is-falling-under-bio> [Accessed 2nd May, 2021]
- Rose–Ackerman, S. (2008). Corruption and government. *International peacekeeping*, 15(3), 328-343.
- Rose-Ackerman, S. (2008). Corruption and Post-conflict Peace-building. *Ohio NUL Rev.*, 34, 405.
- Sieh, R. (2016). Foreign Aid to Liberia: An Instrument meant to empower the Political Elite and Oppress the Poor. Retrieved from
<https://frontpageafricaonline.com/opinion/foreign-aid-to-liberia-an-instrument-meant-to-empower-the-political-elite-and-oppress-the-poor/>

- Solomon, B. (2003). Kant's Perpetual Peace: A New Look at this Centuries-Old Quest. *OJPCR: The Online Journal of Peace and Conflict Resolution*, 5(1), 106-126.
- Spagnol, G. (2019). *Correlation between corruption and conflict* [Online] Available at: <http://www.ieri.be/en/publications/wp/2019/f-vrier/correlation-between-corruption-and-conflict> [Accessed 22 Oct 2021]
- The United Nations (UN) (2020). *Outlining Sierra Leone's Successes to Peacebuilding Commission, Deputy Secretary-General Says More Efforts Needed for Youth Empowerment, Women's Involvement in Decision-Making* [Online]
- Thomas, P (2010). 'Research Methodology and Design', *Research Methodology and Design*, pp. 291–334
- Thompson, D. (2018). Theories of Institutional Corruption. *Annual Reviews*, 21, 495-513.
- Transparency International (2019) *Conflict at the bottom*. [Online] Available at: <https://www.transparency.org/en/news/conflict-at-the-bottom#> [Accessed 22 Oct 2021]
- Transparency International (2021). *Transparency International Sierra Leone* [Online] Available at: <https://www.transparency.org/en/countries/sierra-leone> [Accessed 29th April, 2021]
- UNPBF. (2019). Secretary-General's Peacebuilding Fund
- UN Peacebuilding Commission. (2013). *Report of the Peacebuilding Commission Assessment Mission to Sierra Leone*. Retrieved from https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/pam_report_-_final.pdf
- UN Peacebuilding Commission. (2020). The PBF in Sierra Leone. Retrieved from https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/sierra_leone_two-pager.pdf
- Voors, M., Van Der Windt, P., Papaioannou, K. and Bulte, E. (2017) Resources and Governance in Sierra Leone's Civil War. *The Journal of Development Studies*, 53(2), 278-294, DOI: 10.1080/00220388.2016.1160068
- Zaum, D., and Cheng, C. (Eds.). (2011). *Corruption and post-conflict peacebuilding: selling the peace?* (Vol. 29). Routledge.