The Making of (Un)Safe Countries for Return

Assessing the Discourses and Realities on Conditions of Return Migration to Nigeria through a Human Security Framework

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Dedication

For all those escaping the mouth of a shark, may they never be returned. Let this be an act of solidarity – towards a world that embraces rather than fears mobility, one that protects all regardless of their passport.

For Roland and Maple, my biggest supporters who motivate me to work, and remind me to rest. Thank you for supporting me in all that I do, for loving me regardless of if I succeed or not. Thank you for your patience, your understanding, and of course, your help with pivot tables. I love you both more than I can express.

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For all of those unacknowledged, may your absence not be construed as unappreciation, but of a tired brain.

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List of Acronyms

AVR(R)	Assisted Voluntary Return (and Reintegration) Programs
CAMM	Common Agenda on Migration and Mobility
CDA	Critical Discourse Analysis
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
ECRE	European Council on Refugees and Exiles
EU	European Union
FAOSTAT	Food and Agriculture Organization Statistics
H(I)S	Human (In)Security Index
IMF	International Monetary Fund
ISS	Institute of Social Studies
IOM	International Organization for Migration
KCMD	Knowledge Centre on Migration and Demography
NGO	Non-governmental Organization
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UN DESA	United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
WHO	World Health Organization

Abstract

The capacity to deport migrants without a legal claim to reside in a territory has proliferated in recent times legitimated by the obligation to readmit own-nationals, only tempered by the principle of *nonrefoulement*. This process oftentimes relies on a wide range of actors to facilitate a migrant's return, leading to a diffusion of responsibility to adhere to *nonrefoulement*. Moreover, there remains an ongoing tension concerning the provision of security, either at the national or human level. Exemplary of this trend are bilateral agreements such as the Agreement on Immigration Matters between Ireland and Nigeria signed in 2001 focused on the readmission of irregular Nigerian migrants, and the use of AVRR programs such as the EU-IOM Joint Initiative founded in 2016. Taking both a quantitative and a discursive account of human security conditions in Nigeria, this paper highlights the diverse understandings of governance actors, conceptualized as discourse coalitions, for what constitutes conditions suitable for a safe, dignified return.

To overcome the limitations of a national security approach, which even at its most critical does not account for the lived experience, this paper develops a Human (In)Security Index, locating the human security conditions at a national level for Nigeria from 2000 to 2020. This reveals marked health insecurity, prolonged food, political, personal and community insecurity, and a trend towards increasing environmental insecurity; economic security is the only dimension which remains relatively secure. Overall, Nigeria scores as a relatively insecure country over the timeframe. Concurrently, this paper locates governance actors within discourse coalitions, uncovering disparate understandings of (in)security in Nigeria. Drawing on Irish and Nigerian news articles from 2000 to 2021 and promotional videos from the EU-IOM Joint Initiative, a critical discourse analysis locates governance actors' understanding on (in)security in Nigeria. From this, the included governance actors were situated within discourse coalitions based on their shared understanding, non-dependent on the reality exhibited by the index. This results in a non-exhaustive three-fold typology in which coalitions understand Nigeria as: 1) unsafe for return, 2) safe for return, and 3) unsafe but return is possible. None of the analysed actors acknowledge the dimension of food (in)security, or the increasing environmental insecurity of Nigeria, signalling the saliency of a human security framework to articulate overlooked dimensions necessary for dignified human life – this is particularly relevant for actors seeking to resist practices of deportation, or those seeking to better abide by international human rights norms.

Keywords

Human security, Asylum-seeker, Refugees, Return migration, Deportation, Ireland, Nigeria, Critical Discourse Analysis, Human (In)Security Index, Mixed methods

Relevance to Development Studies

Migration has become widely understood as essential to development – perhaps best exemplified by the process of return migration and the use of AVRR schemes which are intended to benefit both the returnees and their communities through facilitating voluntary return. However, the voluntariness of these programs has been continually challenged, and instead serve as a way of deporting migrants in a manner which appears to be compliant with international human rights norms and laws. In this way, human rights approaches are limited to the principle of *nonrefoulement*. This thesis seeks to set the bar higher than compliance with *nonrefoulement*, through a human security framework for understanding living conditions for migrants who risk being returned to their country of origin. This research, which lies at the intersection of migration governance and Peace and Conflict Studies, contributes to the further application of human security that has developed within the field of Peace and Conflict Studies. From this, the created Human (In)Security Index has been operationalized as a new policy tool for assessing claims for refugee status.

Chapter 1
Introduction

"No one leaves home unless home is the mouth of a shark," writes Warsan Shire in the opening line of her poem *Home*; undoubtedly in the twin 'age of migration' (Castles et al. 2014) and 'age of deportation' (Boehm 2016), there are a multitude of factors contributing to human mobility. To continue Shire's metaphor, for some migrants, home is the mouth of a shark - but what if no one else saw the shark, or perhaps didn't think the shark was dangerous enough to pose a threat? In order to avoid being sent back into the belly of the beast, migrants and asylum-seekers are dependent upon the recognition of unsafe conditions in their country of origin - if the shark is found to be not dangerous enough, migrants risk being sent back.

This research responds to an increasing trend towards return in (European) migration policy. The European Commission (2016: 6) identified as a short-term objective "to increase the rate of returns to countries of origin and transit", with the recommendation for collaboration with third countries for immediate action to achieve "increasing rates of return and readmission with a preference to voluntary return and a focus on reintegration" (see also: European Union Court of Auditors 2020). From a briefing for the European Parliament (Latek 2017: 1), the return of "migrants with irregular status to their countries of origin has become a key EU aim in efforts to reduce chaotic and dangerous migration flows" best achieved through "enhance[d] cooperation with partner countries on readmission, using a wide range of positive and negative policy incentives". These bilateral agreements combine requisites for re-patriation and migration controls such as visas, with non-migration policies such as "trade and development" (Zoomers et al. 2018a: 3; Zoomers et al. 2018b) while oftentimes remaining intentionally informal or flexible (Cassarino 2018; Cassarino & Giuffré 2017). These agreements mandate the "readmission of own-state nationals", while linked to the concept of a "safe country of origin" to legitimate the return (Lavenex 1999: 81; see also: ECRE 2017, 2018a; European Commission 2017).

Despite a growing research agenda around African migration, leading scholars state that "much of this was framed by a research agenda reflecting European preconceptions and concerns" (Bakewell & Jónsson 2011: 4) or that studies on return migration to Africa are scarce (Flahaux et al. 2017). Yet, Nwalutu and Nwalutu (2021: 117) hint at the interconnectedness of European and African research agendas, insofar that "youth migration to Europe from Africa is becoming a huge tragic concern both to Africa and to the receiving nations".

However, return as a solution is not straightforward, with concerns having been raised about the safety of returnees, with current approaches not considering "their situation on return" (ECRE 2018b: 1; see also: Salihi 2020; Zimmermann 2012).

Concurrently, Nigeria has been identified by the European Commission and Directorate-General for Migration and Home Affairs (n.d.) as "one of the main countries of origin of asylum seekers and migrants residing irregularly in Europe", the largest demographic vulnerable to being sent 'home'. From this context, this thesis sets out to examine how the conditions of Nigeria are understood and framed by key governance actors who are involved in the practice of returning Nigerian migrants from the EU. To do so, this research combines the methods of CDA (Wodak 2011) in order to map 'discourse coalitions' (Hajer 1993) to understand governance actors' understanding of safety conditions and corresponding return policy, as well as a creation of a H(I)S, as proposed by Werthes et al. (2011), to present quantitatively the structural and daily threats to human life in territories of return. In this way, I argue that through the framework of human security, the ongoing EU practice of 'deportation' (Walters 2002) or 'state-induced returns' (Koch 2014) constitutes the returning of migrants directly into the open jaws of a shark. This thesis shows how countries are discursively made (un)safe for return in order to (de)legitimize deportation, regardless of the substantive living conditions in the country of return.

Research Objectives

The study at hand has two objectives. First and foremost, it seeks to understand, deconstruct and challenge the notion of 'safe country of origin' as it is shared by governance actors in the process of return migration. As such, this thesis seeks to contribute to a growing body of work which acknowledges the "marked reliance on non-state" actors involved in migration governance (Lahav 2014: 3; see also: Lavenex 2016), and critically assesses the involvement of the IOM, the principle intergovernmental organization operating most of the (voluntary) return programs and positioned as an 'expert' for all things migration (for example: Adam et al. 2020; Bradley 2021; Fine & Walters 2021). Second, this thesis contributes to the conceptualization and application of a human security approach towards tempering (return) migration policy, offering a way towards extending protection to vulnerable populations which have been previously barred from enjoying their human rights (for example: Bilgic et al. 2020; Estrada-Tanck 2013a, 2013b; Gündogdu 2015). Moreover, it aims to contribute to ongoing efforts to correct the neglect of Europe's "colonial and imperial histories" which in turn limit the interpretation of "responsibilities in the present" (Bhambra 2017: 405; see also: Flynn

2020; Nwalutu & Nwalutu 2021), and in the words of Bilgic et al. (2020: 25) viewing "European security… as part of shared human security". Overall, this research sets out to achieve these objectives in a way which concretely contributes to the formation of migration policy that ensures a fair treatment for asylum-seekers and a dignified return from the perspective of migrants themselves.

Research Questions

As such, this thesis poses the question, taking the case of Ireland's deportation of Nigerians in the context of the externalization of EU's migration governance: To what extent are the living conditions of Nigeria safe for returnees as viewed through a human (in)security lens? In order to operationalize this question, the readmission agreement between Ireland and Nigeria will be taken as a starting point which coincides with neoliberal global migration governance arrangements such as the EU-IOM Joint Initiative will be used to examine practices and narratives of deportation. The leading question is complemented by several sub-questions:

1. What are the human (in)security conditions of Nigeria from 2000 to 2020?
2. To what extent do these conditions signal safe conditions for returnees?
3. What narratives do governance actors like the IOM, EU, Ireland, Nigeria, news outlets, and migrants use to frame the practice of (in)voluntary return migration to Nigeria?
4. How and in what way do these narratives overlap or differ? In other words, what sorts of 'discourse coalitions' emerge, and which actors join them?
5. Which dimensions of human security do these discourse coalitions use during their framings of Nigeria as an (un)safe country of return?
6. How do the human security conditions of Nigeria as supported by the different discourse coalitions and Human (In)security Index [H(I)S] compare?

A Mouth of a Shark? Mobility and Human Security in Nigeria

This section seeks to provide a cursory understanding of the potentially dangerous 'mouth of a shark' that is Nigeria. In line with scholars like White (2009: 70), this section critically assesses how various administrations' claims of "a new [safe] Nigeria" can be understood as "questionable, if not outright false". Historically, the colonial imposition of European states introduced insecurity in African communities through borders, drawn to exert control during

colonial governance thus not serving as "meaningful demarcations of identity" (Adam et al. 2020: 3103; Aguwa 1997; Awe 1999). Consequently, the nation-state of Nigeria experienced "incessant conflicts which undermine[d] the process of nation-building" spurred on by the presence of "ethnic, regional, and religious divisions", the tensions of which have evolved throughout time (Aguwa 1997: 335; see also: Falola & Heaton 2008; Onwuegbuchulam & Mtshali 2017). The emergence of the insurgent group Boko Haram and the state's fight against it signals for Walker (2016: 219) "a conflict over Nigeria's very identity" (see also: Abidde 2021: 7).[1] In turn, the "long tenure of military rule" within Nigeria has contributed to the valorization of "force or violence" as the "only way to attain success" (Akinwumi 2006: 80), evidenced by a continual pattern for administrations to be "found culpable in gross human rights abuses against its citizens" (Adeyeri & Aluede 2021: 142; see also: Adepoju 2017; Onuoha 2016; White 2009).

However, the presence of violent conflict and insecurity within Nigeria's territory cannot be reduced to ethnic or religious disputes (Heerten & Moses 2014; Oshita et al. 2019). Rather, violent conflict and displacement in Nigeria can be better understood as multidimensional (Amusan et al. 2017; Ibeanu 2000; Okwechime 2013; Olajide & Ojakorotu 2020; Sabo 2020). For instance, Olajide and Ojakorotu (2020: 518) view "the disorganization" of the Nigerian state and politics as contributing to the neglect of crucial "environmental issues and problems" which inhibit peace and "sustainable development"; likewise, Ibeanu (2000: 31) traces the environmental conflict induced by oil production as being based upon "the different meanings of security" governance actors have, thus tying together a complexity of environmental, economic, social, and political factors (for a similar interpretation of "environmental conflicts", see: Libiszewki 1991: 12).

In line with this, a growing number of scholars are viewing Nigeria through a human security lens (for example: Alumona & Onwuanabile 2019; Nnam et al. 2020; Olajide et al. 2018; Ololube et al. 2013; Onuoha 2009; Simmons & Flowers 2017), arguing that the human security approach is beneficial as it identifies multidimensional factors related to violent conflict and quality of life. These effects are felt unequally within the (national) community, for example affecting regions, women and youth disparately (for example: James 2020; Ukeje 2006). Scholars like Mujuzi (2009), Nindi (1986) and Chhangani and Chhangani (2011: 34) argue that displacement experienced by Africans has shifted "from individual persecutory to non-persecutory reasons", highlighting the (infra-)structural factors contributing to unsafe

[1] See Ekhomu (2019) for a policy-maker oriented analysis on Boko Haram.

living conditions and asylum-seeking. This can be seen in the plights of poverty, malnutrition, corruption, and so on (Adepoju 2017: 128) - all of which might be exacerbated by violent conflict (Adeyeri & Aluede 2021; Akinyemi et al. 2016). All of this to say, there is not *one reason* why Nigeria might be viewed as unsafe - the residents of Nigeria certainly swim in chummed water, the jaws of the shark-Nigeria emerging from the deep.

It is important to note that this insecurity is not essentialized, but malleable and changeable. In other words, this depiction of Nigeria is not intended to contribute to (neo)colonial narratives of "the African continent… portrayed as ridden with chaos and disarray needing the Whiteman messiah" (Nwalutu & Nwalutu 2021: 101). Similarly, Upadhyaya (2004) raises these concerns of intervention in relation to human security, reminding policymakers and researchers *why* they are interested in describing a place as unsafe and *who* gets to decide when there is a threat. For this study, I draw attention to the human insecurity of Nigeria as to resist the predominance of deportation in global migration governance – not to essentialize Nigeria's deficiencies.

Migration has been continually located as a livelihood strategy for Nigerians to improve material quality of life and avoid violent conflict (de Haas 2006, 2007; Hiralal 2018; Obi et al. 2020). Correspondingly, Bisong (2019: 2) remarks that, "West Africa is a key region in international migration, because of its highly mobile population". Concerning migration to Europe, de Haas (2006: 4-5) previously found that Nigerians applying for refugee status attribute "ethnic and religious conflict" as the reason for application, yet oftentimes Nigerians are denied due to the country's "size… and current *relative* stability" compared to other West African countries (see also: Komolafe 2008). This relative stability is evidenced by documents like the 2016 Nigeria profile published by European Commission KCMD (2017: 4) which shows neighboring states as all having similar levels in terms of natural, human, socio-economic, vulnerable groups, institutional and infrastructural risk. Komolafe (2008: 233) argues that the (occasionally unfounded) asylum claims have led to the "conflation between 'refugee', 'asylum seeker', and Nigerian migrants in Ireland" (see also: White 2009). In turn, this conflation aligns with de Haas' (2006: 20) earlier findings that Nigerian migrants "feel stigmatised and collectively treated as potential undocumented migrants, criminals and traffickers" and encounter barriers to authorized migration (Adepoju 2017; White 2009).

However, this stigma does not only occur for Nigerians in European countries, but also upon their return. Abidde (2021: 10) remarks that "many voluntary returnees in Nigeria" report various forms of physical and mental health complaints, in addition to "suffering social stigma upon returning" (see also: Akinyemi et al. 2016; Flahaux et al. 2017).

Nonetheless, readmission agreements dominate the migration policy between the EU[2] and Nigeria, with the occasional return being "symbolical", reaffirming the power of policy (de Haas 2006: 10). European-African collaboration on migration has been described "restrictive and control-oriented" while also being "preventative in nature and strives to eliminate 'root causes' of migration" (Trauner & Deimel 2013: 21). Concurrently, Bisong (2019: 2) writes that "ECOWAS is under a certain pressure from both international and local actors" to implement more intensive means for controlling mobility and accepting returnees, in exchange for European-backed investment in development projects. Likewise, these returns serve not only the agenda of the 'sending' state, but also the country which receives deportees. At the other end of the agreement, White (2009: 73) locates the practice of deportation as: 1) reaffirming Nigeria's re-branding and commitment to human rights despite the presence of violations, and 2) creating a stable national identity despite "tension and insecurity". Conclusively, the practice of deporting Nigerians satisfies European demands for stronger border control, and the Nigerian government's wish to appear compliant with international human rights and norms while masking 'root causes' of migration.

Where Does a Shark Swim? Planning the Dive

From this context, the thesis is developed through several chapters. The first chapter has sought to provide an introduction and contextualization of this research, identifying the objectives and questions at hand, as well as problematizing readmission agreements and practices of deportation to a 'safe' Nigeria. The second chapter presents a conceptual framework for return migration, discourse coalitions, and human security – showing what a safe return looks like. The third chapter outlines the methods employed in the thesis, detailing the data collection and subsequent process for analysis, as well as ethical considerations and methodological limitations. The fourth chapter presents the results of the analysis – the findings of the H(I)S, the positions of discourse coalitions, and how the two relate. The fifth chapter presents the conclusion of the study, identifying the academic and policy contributions before making recommendations for key governance actors.

[2] The popularity of such arrangements have been explored by Adepoju et al. (2009).

Chapter 2
Conceptual Framework

To begin, key contributions on return migration will be discussed with a focus on the categorization of practices of return, the positioning of actors within the associated knowledge production, as well as the shift towards neoliberal governance and migration policy. Next, the field of security studies will be examined considering the increasing trend towards securitization of the (European) migration policy field, with due emphasis on the notion of human security against the predominant notion of national security.

Coalition Building: The Who and How of (Return) Migration

To return undoubtedly means different things for different people (Cassarino 2004); within academic circles, attempts to cut through this uncertainty are done by means of categorization and definitions, albeit not unproblematically or with consensus (Amelia et al. 2021; Carling 2017; Crawley & Skleparis 2018; James 2014; Raghuram 2021). This categorization occurs through the state's labeling of mobility, embodied by Torpey's (1998: 240) remarks on the "states' *monopolization of the legitimate means of movement*", in tandem with the colonial legacy linking development and mobility (Bakewell 2008). The process of categorization ascribes different connotations to the mobility of certain populations, with each receiving different paperwork, different rights, and disparate reception in host societies (Hintjens et al. 2021; James 2014; Torpey 1998). James (2014: 214-215) maps out these potential "different faces/bodies of globalization" as "*The Citizen*… *The Migrant* or *The Terrorist*… *The Irregular Migrant*… *The Asylum Seeker*… *The Refugee*", all of whom elicit a different response to their mobility. Concurrently, the "international migration narratives" which emerge from notions of (under)development frame mobility in a certain way, wherein migrants "from the poor regions" regardless of legal classification are seen "as development burdens and security/economic threats" for affluent countries (Akanle 2018: 164-165). This disparate framing translates into different policy approaches, or rather 'solutions' to 'the migrant problem' (Akanle 2018; James 2014; Şahin Mencütek 2021). A considerable amount of research focuses on the 'frames' or 'narratives' which emerge around migration (for example: Akanle 2018; Moreno-Lax 2018; Şahin Mencütek 2021; Tannenbaum 2007). In order to understand how the use of 'frames' and 'narratives' are shared by governance actors and translated into policy and

engaged with through politics, I wish to refer to the formation of 'discourse coalitions' (Hajer 1993), a concept which has been sorely overlooked in migration research.[3]

Reflecting on the politics around acid rain in Great Britain, Hajer (1993: 45) called for "an argumentative turn" which requires discourse to be analyzed in terms of positions and "counter-positions" on a matter as "a highly significant element of the political process" (see also: Balch 2010: 42). In short, Hajer (1993: 45) describes a discourse coalition as "a group of actors who share a social concept" in ascribing meaning to "social circumstances", which overtime become structured into story lines which can be either shared between or opposed by the involved actors. This conceptualization of coalition building is important, as it is not a shared interest but a "shared use of ideas" (Wallaschek 2020: 1036) and "construction of a problem situation" (Scholten 2017: 350) that bring actors together. Ortega Alvarado et al. (2021: 362) argue that the framework provided by discourse coalitions is aptly suited to locate both the "similar socially shared understandings (structuration)" around a subject matter, as well as the institutionalization, or "stabilization of specific forms of understanding". From this, governance actors share an understanding of the world, what constitutes a 'problem' and what the 'solution' might be.

The use of a discourse coalition framework has been used only sparingly to understand migration (see: Arnall & Kothari 2015; Balch 2010; Scholten 2017; Wallaschek 2020), however this does not mean that examining shared discourse between governance actors has not been done before (for example: Adam et al. 2020; Akanle 2018; Jureidini & Hassan 2020). Concerning return migration, different problems and solutions emerge from "the resilient confusion between *return* and *expulsion*… and *readmission*" as a way of understanding "the effective departure of unauthorised migrants" (Cassarino 2008: 98); there exists an ongoing argument between governance actors on how to understand return migration. Notably, Crawley and Skleparis (2018: 50) offer a nuanced understanding of migration, one that frames the decision to move as "far more complex than typically presented by politicians, policy-makers and the media", consequently signaling the importance of examining the shared understanding of governance actors.[4] Alongside this simplification, Scheel and

[3] Rather than discourse coalitions, there has been a considerable amount of research which uses the concept of 'epistemic communities' (Haas 1992: 3) as "a network of professionals with recognized expertise and competence… and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain" (for example: Gamlen 2014; Jureidini & Hassan 2020; King 2020; Kofman 2020). However, I argue that discourse coalitions provide a more useful analytical framework due to including a wider range of actors *and* the implementation of policy.

[4] For similar views on the implications of simplified, categorical thinking, see also: James (2014); Raghuram (2021).

Ratfisch (2014: 926) find that "both the discourse on migration management and on refugee protection *are based on and lead to a categorization of migrants*". For Cassarino (2008: 99) the discourse which emerges results in "one-size-fits-all solutions" for the removal of unwanted foreigners, as well as ensuring that the "conditions in countries of origin" are not part of the conversation. In turn, Amelia et al. (2021: 2) recommend "to de-essentialize" labels and draw attention to the "interplay of routinized state and non-state institutional practices, power relations, and specific knowledge patterns". From this view, studying the governing of return migration is particularly interesting, looking beyond the ascribed categories of 'migrants' eligible for return and instead focusing on how governance actors share an understanding on *conditions* which are safe for return.

Understanding Return Migration: 'Voluntary' Deportation, Human Rights, and Development

States have an extensive history of controlling movement into and out of territorial boundaries (Torpey 1998; Walters 2002). According to Torpey (1998: 253-254) the obligation to accept a state's own national emerges "from the exigencies of sovereignty in the international state system" insofar that the international state system ensures that a state can "expel unwanted aliens" back to their territory of origin. With deportation being one of the final domains of "traditional forms of sovereign power", Beattie (2016: 229) writes that deportation serves as a mechanism to sort out "the good democratic citizen while removing those… that fail to live up to such expectations". Recently, migration governance has experienced "expanding practices in the grey area between forced and voluntary return" (ECRE 2018b: 1). Admittedly, Crane and Lawson (2020: 8) argue that deportation differs from contemporary AVR programs in numerous ways, with AVR offering benefits for the returnees, yet conclude that they create and reinforce "a paradoxical climate in which liberal humanitarian policies coexist with the creation of deportability and exclusion". In this way, the findings of Scalettaris and Gubert (2019: 91) comes as no surprise, the influx of AVRR "has gone hand in hand with an increased use of deportation" (see also: Bloch & Schuster 2005). Hence, deportation is an inherent part of the contemporary global migration governance.

Academic literature on the state facilitation of return migration have centered on understanding what makes for a 'successful' return, typically with the intention to 'improve' AVRR programs (Lietaert et al. 2017; Scalettaris & Gulbert 2019). This leads to conclusions which highlight the role of migrant agency or preparedness (Cassarino 2004; see also: Scalettaris & Gulbert 2019), the importance of being able participate in "economic… social and

cultural… and political-security integration" (Kuschminder 2017: 111) or "conducive conditions in the country of origin" (Scalettaris & Gulbert 2019: 100), and most importantly the migrant's perspective on their return (Lietaert et al. 2013; McAuliffe et al. 2018; Tannenbaum 2007; Zimmermann 2012). Likewise, in their study on return programs from Belgium, Lietaert et al. (2017: 964) argue that there is a gap in return and reintegration literature, focusing on the aim and fine-tuning of instruments of deportation while "leaving out the programmes' objectives and whether they have evolved over time" (e.g. Arowolo 2000; Leerkes et al. 2016). While the objective and interest for increasing return have remained unchallenged in these studies, others have continually put into question the 'voluntariness' or capacity for migrant agency within AVRR programs has been continually challenged and put into question (Blitz et al. 2005; Lietaert et al. 2017; Sacchetti 2016; Salihi 2020; Webber 2011).[5] Due to the contested nature of 'voluntary' return migration policy and practice, the definition of deportation as proposed by Walters (2002: 268) is highly relevant, outlining deportation as "the removal of aliens by state power from the territory of that state, either 'voluntarily', under threat of force, or forcible".[6]

Notably, Crisp (2001: 177) found that despite the "well-established international principle" of voluntary return for refugees, from the 1990s onwards coercive measures were oftentimes "exercised by host governments, host communities and other actors" with the aim of "forcing refugees to go back to their homeland" despite experiencing "high levels of physical, material and psychological insecurity" upon return (see also: Flynn 2020; von Lersner et al. 2008; Majidi 2013; Scalettaris & Gulbert 2019). In this way, current return migration governance approaches fall short not only of ensuring migrant agency, but also the principle of *nonrefoulement*, or safe conditions upon return. Accordingly, Webber (2011: 102-103) highlights that "political stability and personal security" are two important factors influencing the decision to return, with refugee-led associations highlighting the need for "democracy and physical, material and legal safety" to be included as guidelines for return migration - yet "they are given no such guarantees under current return agreements and schemes". The Asylum Information Database (2015: 5) challenges the ways in which the EU defines safe conditions for return, with its use of "arguably questionable - indicators of safety" based on a minimal interpretation of safety. Gündogdu (2015: 19) points out that both the legal and human rights norms which purport to protect migrants fail when migrants

[5] For a similar analysis on the description of *migration* itself as forced or voluntary, see: Erdal and Oeppen (2018).

[6] A similar yet more neutral understanding of this can be found in Koch's (2014: 908) "state-induced returns", highlighting the role that a *state* has for return.

are unable to "challenge their… deportation", consequently rendering them "dependent on highly arbitrary political and legal decisions" in tandem with cosmopolitan sympathy - similar to a condition elsewhere referred to as 'deportability' (De Genova 2002).

Within the context of asylum-seekers, Webber (2011: 101) describes how AVR programs are presented as a means for obtaining reparations or just outcomes for displaced persons who go back to their country of origin to assist with "post-conflict reconstruction". Yet commonly "such justifications do not match what actually happens to those returned" (Webber 2011: 101; see also: Sacchetti 2016). However, the same goes for returnees from *unrecognized* conflict zones, or "asylum seekers whose applications were rejected" (Lietaert et al. 2017: 964), wherein the trend has been to expedite the process of repatriating those not recognized as refugees or otherwise lacking a legal claim to reside within a territory (Rijpma 2018). Migrants have been both fashioned into a problem for host countries, as well as "agents of development" when they return 'home' (Bakewell 2008: 1341; see also: Zoomers et al. 2018a). In this way, returnees are expected to improve conditions within their country, to make the conditions of return better. Migration is no longer "merely part of development… but is now its core" which will influence all "future development cooperation" between states (Idrissa 2019: 4), for example in the form of "brain gain" which serves to reverse the process of brain drain (Castles et al. 2014: 77). The Joint Declaration on a CAMM between the Federal Republic of Nigeria and the EU and its Member States is a case in point, as it seeks to strike a "balance between brain drain and brain gain" amongst other development goals (European Parliament 2015: 6). Interestingly, finding a balance between 'drain' and 'gain' rests on the assumption of return, insofar that 'gain' only occurs after 'drain'; this perverse relation with mobility is expanded upon in the analysis section.

Policies of deportation are set against the backdrop of international requirements for a state to accept the repatriation of their "own nationals", and further entrenched by various bilateral agreements (European Court of Auditors 2020: 5). Consequently, the use of AVRR programs can be seen as a political band-aid for making deportation more palpable for otherwise liberal democratic societies (Bhambra 2017; Flynn 2020) under the guise of development (Sacchetti 2016; Webber 2011) and packaged as being compliant with international human rights legal requirements and norms (Gündogdu 2015).

Neoliberal Arrangements and New Actors for Return Migration

Readmission agreements are not arranged with "passive recipients of EU policies", but rather third countries exert a considerable amount of agency and control concerning agenda setting, interpretation and implementation within "their own domestic contexts" (Adam et al. 2020: 3102). However, Adam et al. (2020: 3114) admit that West African states have internalized "the EU's concern for (irregular) south-to-north migration" despite intra-West African mobility being the predominant migratory flows (see also: Bisong 2019; Pina-Delgado 2013: 404-405). Similarly, Idrissa (2019: 14) found that European-led intervention shifted the formation of ECOWAS mobility policy "toward the control and repression of migration" despite ECOWAS having previously agreed upon the traditional regional value of "free mobility" (see also: de Haas 2006: 11). Hence, there exists a limitation to which extent certain actors can influence agreements in their favor. Yet, the EU, ECOWAS and their member or partner states are not alone in this process, oftentimes relying on non-state actors to mediate between states or implement return programs (Lavenex 2016; Lavenex & Kunz 2008; Lavenex & Stucky 2011).

The most notable and "well-resourced institution" involved is the IOM (Ashutosh & Mountz 2011: 22; Pécoud 2018). The IOM is tasked with the operation of most AVRR programs, oftentimes funded by the EU (Adam et al 2020; Ashutosh & Mountz 2011; Brachet 2016; Quinn 2007). Typically taken to be the leading expert on the matter, the IOM's (2018: 4) framework for return and reintegration reaffirms the "sovereign right" of states to discern who may reside within the territory, as well as the accompanying obligation for states to accept "their own nationals, particularly those making voluntary use of their right to return". In this way, understanding the contributions of the IOM for return migration narratives is considerably relevant, especially as Pécoud (2018: 1627) describes the operations of the IOM as it "sits on both chairs and claims to be useful to both sides".

While the IOM is not a new governance actor, recently its activities and interests are being examined (for example: Brachet 2016; Bradley 2021; Geiger & Pécoud 2014; Fine & Walters 2021; Koch 2014; Pécoud 2018; Potaux 2011; Rossi 2019). Some scholars challenge the neoliberal nature or 'humanitarian' motivations of the UN migration agency (for example: Bradley 2021; Dini 2018; Frowd 2018; Geiger & Pécoud 2014) while others merely focus on the 'neutral' practical function of the IOM (for example: Potaux 2011). Although the IOM has yet to be researched within a discourse coalition framework, it has already been shown that the IOM influences the discourse states use around return migration through

AVRR (Fine & Walters 2021; Frowd 2018; Geiger & Pécoud 2014). Rossi (2019: 376) highlights the interaction between governance actors like the EU, UNHCR and IOM who co-create "a shared understanding" on the solution for migration that crosses the Mediterranean Sea. For Geiger and Pécoud (2014: 876), this discourse can be understood as: 1) security oriented in terms of border control and unauthorized mobility, 2) economic focused, and importantly 3) "the humanitarian imperative to foster *development* in sending regions". The outcome of these three aspects have been concisely summarized by Rossi (2019: 374) insofar that they present "[h]uman mobility… [as a] threat to public order and to the culture, identity and welfare institutions of European recipient countries". Similarly, Brachet (2016: 273) offers a warning about the involvement the IOM, with its operations dissolving "state responsibility with regards to policy and implementation" and consequently leaving no clear responsible party to answer for any potential mistreatment (Gündogdu 2015) while also further legitimizing the control of human mobility (Scheel & Ratfisch 2014).

These findings are especially concerning, insofar that unlike other UN organizations, the IOM is not obligated to adhere to human rights frameworks, laws, or norms (Brachet 2016; Pécoud 2018). Concurrently, Frowd (2018) positions the work of the IOM as "providing a technical good in service of a thoroughly political goal", while avoiding the language of politics; Dini (2018: 1692-1694) argues that the IOM "far from being a neutral service-provider… can endorse and reify preexisting political authority" while also positioning "mobility as deviant, and statism [sedentarism] as a proof of national allegiance… documented African citizens should also value (and even cherish) their national belonging by avoiding mobility". Fine and Walters (2021: 3) draw attention to the multidimensional nature of IOM's work, positioning the agency as "both an agent of migration governance *and* a media actor whose production of images and narratives shapes the perceptions of migration", especially how the promotional material disseminated by the agency constructs AVR programs as "an experience of homecoming and reunion". Specifically, state and non-state actors collaborate to govern international migration (Bisong 2019; Lavenex 2016; Scheel & Ratfisch 2014) and non-state actor's involvement has contributed to a de-politicalization and dissolution of responsibility (Frowd 2018; Geiger & Pécoud 2014) while influencing the ways in which migration governance occurs and is understood (Fine & Walters 2021).

National and Human Security: From Securitizing Migration Governance to Securitizing Migrants?

Migration governance has undergone an intensive (in)securitization process, typically under the nomenclature of 'national security' (Banai & Kreide 2017; Hintjens et al. 2021; Skleparis 2015). Several authors offer a succinct categorization of the different 'schools' and approaches towards understanding security (C.A.S.E. Collective 2006; Huysman & Squire 2009; Skleparis 2011) while others criticize theories of securitization for overlooking aspects of gender (Hansen 2000) and race (Moffette & Vadasaria 2016). From this body of literature, the most relevant remarks can be summarized as, security emerges from "a particular assemblage of historical discourses and practices embedded in institutionally shared perceptions" in which security "threats are politically constructed" (Skleparis 2011: 4).

In turn, migration serves as a fruitful social-political topic with linkages to numerous sectors of security, such as "economic… societal security… [and other] identity-related" arenas (C.A.S.E Collective 2006: 453). In the case of EU migration policy, the contextual historical discourses result in a "migration management system" founded upon "a human rights perspective but within a security logic" (Bilgic et al. 2020: 5; see also: Gündogdu 2015). This migration management system relies on the securitization and externalization of migration governance, relying on both non-state and non-European states for enforcement (Crane & Lawson 2020; Lavenex 2016; Lavenex & Stucky 2011; Rossi 2019). Moreover, the location of migration policy in the field of security signals a shift out of "the normal sphere of political debate" (Hintjens et al. 2021: 6) and legitimizes the use of extraordinary measures of "exclusions and legitimate violence" (Huysmans & Squire 2009: 12) to ensure 'safety' and control over borders, in the form of extensive screening, quotas, detention, and deportation (Banai & Kreide 2017; Şahin Mencütek 2021; Skleparis 2015).

These security measures have resulted in the restricted ability for certain categories of transnational migrants to enjoy their necessary human rights (Estrada-Tanck 2013a, 2013b; Gündogdu 2015). Consequently, it comes as no surprise that these sort of policy measures tend to bring about "not a *more secure* world, but an *in*secure world" (Banai & Kreide 2017: 4, emphasis in original). However, as this study aims to show, there is a possibility of amending these insecurities by shifting the focus on security from the nation-state to the human being. By doing so, migrants will be able to enjoy their human rights and dignified mobility.

Inspired by yet still distinct from the notion of human development, the UNDP (1994) popularized the notion of human security, in which Werthes et al. (2011: 6-7) describe

the ambition as being to "take the protection of the individual as the starting point for political thinking and practice" rather than the nation-state, while linking together "complex political challenges of development and security" as they appear within and between communities. In this sense, interrelatedness can be seen as the core of human security (Bilgic et al. 2020; Estrada-Tanck 2013a, 2013b; UNDP 1994; Upadhyaya 2004; Werthes et al. 2011). Upadhyaya (2004: 74) locates the conceptual need for interconnectedness due to the increasing complexity of globalization, with "threats arising in any part of the world" posing a risk for "global security". In favor of human security, Roberts (2005: 3) acknowledges the increasing consensus around "considering non-conventional areas that represented security issues" as a necessary shift away from traditional security concerns. From this, seven distinct dimensions of human security have been articulated in order to become operationalized: 1) economic, 2) food, 3) health, 4) environmental, 5) personal, 6) community, and 7) political (UNDP 1994: 24-25; Werthes et al. 2011).

Huysman and Squire (2009: 6) remain critical of human security's capacity to achieve a "radically re-framing of migration" in practice due to the emphasis on "highly selective operations" which exclude certain regions while remaining within a state-centric[7] framework, heavily associating both security and migration with development; likewise, "Third World anxieties" emerge from the possibility for hegemonic power to mobilize human security in order to intervene in the lives of others (Upadhyaya 2004: 91). For Werthes et al. (2011: 9), these concerns originate from "the lack of conceptual clearness" of human security (these criticisms have also been explored by: Olajide et al. 2018; Ololube et al. 2013; Onuoha 2009; Roberts 2005). To clarify the concept, Werthes et al. (2011: 12) recommend employing "a threshhold-based conceptualization" by: 1) making the distinction between the seven dimensions being "security *issues*" which must transgress to an extent in order to be conceived of as "security *threats*", and 2) identifying what this threshold might be. Alongside these thresholds, scholars such as Bilgic et al. (2020) and Estrada-Tanck (2013a, 2013b) argue that human security is a necessary compliment for human rights, and the concept's capacity to locate risk factors across numerous fields regardless of the source of risk or party responsible for cross from issue to threat, and across traditional nation-state borders; legally speaking human security "may have the potential to act as a catalyst for the realisation of human rights in the contemporary world" (Estrada-Tanck 2013b: 167). In this way, human security goes beyond

[7] The ways in which human security, despite a focus on the individual, furthers the development of a state-centric framework has been interestingly explored by Galtung (2004) and Upadhyaya (2004). Importantly, human security locates security threats outside of the traditional statist agenda(Olajide et al. 2018).

revisions of human rights frameworks which attempt to nuance the contemporary social-political contingency for mobile populations to enjoy human rights (see: Gündogdu 2015) and provides a framework for orienting policy around "risks and protection" *across* and *between* political communities (Bilgic et al. 2020: 15; Estrada-Tanck 2013a, 2013b; UNDP 1994).

In order to further amend the conceptual vagueness, authors like Roberts (2005) and Werthes et al. (2011) propose inverting the concept - looking at human *in*security. Roberts (2005: 10-11) proposes that since there has been no consensus on "what constitutes human security… the subject is [best] approached from the other side… human *insecurity*" which furthers the concept to "include human agency and indirect violence" with human mortality as the demarcation. Similarly, Werthes et al. (2011: 12) introduces gradience of thresholds based upon "the worst threat situations, whatever their cause" to delineate when a situation requires intervention. Due to their operational and analytical capacity, these thresholds will be maintained and incorporated into the analysis of this thesis.

In closing, this thesis seeks to continue the work of campaigning for a human security perspective (Bilgic et al. 2020; Estrada-Tanck 2013b) for migration governance and return policies. This is done against the background of rising externalization and securitization of migration policy. Inspired by the work of Werthes et al. (2011) to craft an index to measure human insecurity, this thesis sets out to present the human (in)security conditions of Nigeria, juxtaposed with the understanding shared by governance actors via discourse coalitions. In short, this paper mobilizes both discourse coalitions and human security to understand the framing and consequent use of deportation as a solution for governance actors, to see how a country can be (un)made as safe.

Chapter 3
Methods

This study combines "both quantitative and qualitative traditions" to answer the research question (O'Leary 2017: 8). This mixed methodology approach was selected due to the strengths therein, as identified by O'Leary (2017: 165), namely "adding depth and insight to 'numbers' through inclusion of dialogue" while also instilling "precision to 'words' through inclusion of numbers and statistics". This research intertwines different methodologies to provide a multifaceted understanding of deportation to Nigeria and the conditions therein. In this way, the research aligns to the "concurrent triangulation design" approach, as it requires the collection of "different but complementary data on the same phenomena" (Edmonds & Kennedy 2017: 181). This approach "look[s] for corroboration that improves the overall robustness and credibility" through the inclusion of multiple sources of data (O'Leary 2017: 169). This leads to the analysis and synthesis of quantitative and qualitative data, which can then be compared in order to become validated (Creswell & Creswell 2018; Edmonds & Kennedy 2017), presenting the human (in)security conditions of Nigeria in a thorough manner. This process is further expanded upon in the next sections, first addressing the quantitative data collection then qualitative.

Data collection

To answer the first, second, and sixth subquestions, **t**he first source of data comes from the indicators as outlined by Werthes et al. (2011) to create a H(I)S (see: Table 1.1). Importantly, the indicators remain the same as used by Werthes et al. (2011), except indicators which came from unavailable datasets, or contained skewed data.[8] Alternative indicators were selected based on recommendations in the literature (Roberts 2005; Srinivas n.d.; Webber 2011; Zimmermann 2012).[9] In this way, the findings of this research do not align with the original 2008 score presented by Werthes et al. (2011) either due to the retroactive correcting of numbers for some datasets, or supplemented indicators. Here, it is important to note that not all

[8] Skewed data sets scored between a 1 and 2 for skewness, and involve Werthes et al.'s (2011) indicators for economic security (GDP per capita, PPP from the IMF), food security (Percentage of Population that is Undernourish from FAOSTAT), environmental security (Percentage of population that is affected by disasters from International Emergency Disaster Database), and personal and community security (Refugees under UNHCR's mandate from the UNHCR).

[9] Additionally, guidance for alternative indicators to compensate missing ones was provided by Dr. Shyamika Jayasundara-Smits.

dimensions have valid data for each year; the overall rank for years with missing data is adjusted for only dimensions with valid data, meaning that the overall insecurity score does not contain all dimensions yet still provides insights (Werthes et al. 2011). The combination of providing distinct dimensions and an overall score allows for both a targeted and general understanding of key fields of human living. The process has been extensively detailed by Werthes et al. (2011), and for this research can be found in Appendix 1.

Table 3.1
List of Indicators, Sources, and Associated Dimension of Human (In)Security

Indicator	Source	Human Security Dimension
Bertelsmann Transformation Index (Combination of two indicators: Social Safety Nets and Equal Opportunity)	Bertelsmann Foundation	Economic
Number of children under five underweighted for age (%)	WHO	Food
Cause of death, by communicable diseases and maternal, prenatal and nutrition conditions (% of total)	World Bank	Health
Child deaths per 1000 live births	UN Interagency Group for Child Mortality Estimation (UNICEF, WHO, World Bank, UN DESA Population Division)	Health
Combined mean: Proportion of population using improved sanitation facilities and Proportion of population using at least basic drinking water services	WHO and UNICEF Joint Monitoring	Environmental
Political Terror Scale	Political Terror Scale Project	Personal & Community
Index of 4 Personal Security (Indicators: Disappearance, Extrajudicial Killing, Political Imprisonment, Torture)	Human Rights Data Project	Political
Combined mean: Political Stability and Absence of Violence / Terrorism and Voice and Accountability	Worldwide Governance Indicators	Political

To answer the third, fourth, fifth and sixth subquestions, the second source of data comes from the promotional videos made for the EU-IOM Joint Initiative, the transcripts of which can be seen in Appendix 2, 3, and 4. The video material promoting the use of the

EU-IOM Joint Initiative for return migration centers on telling personal experiences of migrants, from their attempt to leave their country of origin, their experience in transit, and their return 'home' with the explicit purpose to promote the return and reintegration of migrants. This analysis draws on three promotional videos which tell the experience of Nigerians who have taken part of the return program. The three videos were selected according to: 1) containing narratives of Nigerian migrants, 2) containing information about their subsequent return and reintegration. Put simply, the analyzed videos were seen as best representing the EU, IOM, and migrant views on the practice of return.

Similarly, the third source of data comes from news articles concerning the return of Nigerian migrants to Nigeria from Ireland. These articles were accessed through LexisNexis and found with the broad search "Nigeria* migrant Ireland". From this, two news outlets were selected, one from Ireland and one from Nigeria. In order to do so, the following filters were applied: Language (English), Geography by Document (Africa OR Europe), Newspapers, Years (2000-2021). The outlets which contained the most articles for Ireland was *The Irish Times*, and for Nigeria *The Nation*; for a breakdown of articles considered for analysis over the years, see Table 1.2. Unfortunately, despite having been in circulation since 2006, The Nation news articles were not accessible on LexisNexis until 2014; to compensate this, The Nation includes articles from 2021 whereas The Irish Times stops at 2020. Within these results, the filters 'Nigeria' and 'Ireland' were permanently added to ensure the migratory flow between the two countries were included, whereas the keywords 'deport', 'voluntary', 'asylum', 'IOM', 'return' were cycled through to capture the articles overtime. The keywords 'Football', and 'FA Cup' were excluded to constrain the results. A cursory reading of the headline and featured preview (which indicate the keywords within sentences) was done to maintain relevancy. In the end, 257 news articles were selected for discursive analysis as outlined in the next section.

Table 1.2
Distribution of News Articles according to Year and Source

Year	Count of Articles from The Irish Times	Count of Articles from The Nation	Total
2000	17	N/A	**17**
2001	15	N/A	**15**
2002	15	N/A	**15**
2003	12	N/A	**12**
2004	14	N/A	**14**
2005	28	N/A	**28**
2006	4	N/A	**4**
2007	6	N/A	**6**
2008	3	N/A	**3**
2009	15	N/A	**15**
2010	15	N/A	**15**
2011	15	N/A	**15**
2012	4	N/A	**4**
2014	1	1	**2**
2015	4	5	**9**
2016	1	19	**20**
2017	1	13	**14**
2018	2	13	**15**
2019	4	15	**19**
2020	1	8	**9**
2021	N/A	6	**6**
Total	**177**	**80**	**257**

Coalition Location: Critical Discourse Analysis

Studies which implement discourse coalition frameworks rely on qualitative or "discursive methodologies" (Ortega Alvarado et al. 2021: 362). Likewise, this paper relies on CDA as outlined by Wodak (2011) in which CDA seeks to uncover the ways in which inequality, power imbalances, and social reality are created, resisted or legitimated through speech acts (see also: van Dijk 2015; Sengul 2019). Notably, there is no overarching method or theoretical framework behind CDA, rather understood as "a discourse study *with an attitude*" that seeks to uncover and critique uneven social-political constellations (van Dijk 2015: 466, emphasis in original). Jäger (2011: 20-21) outlines a brief, malleable structure for discourse analysis, consisting of: a brief summary of the "discourse plane" (the EU-IOM Joint Initiative and news outlets), an analysis of the "material base" (providing a summary of the discourses, the mediums, contextualization, rhetoric use, and underlying ideology), and an analysis of the structure (the practice of deporting Nigerians) - this process was adapted to incorporate the emancipatory focus of CDA. Accordingly, the news articles were read, coded (according to dimensions of human security as presented in Nigeria, and represented governance actors), and reflected upon by year - this process can be found within Appendices 5 and 6. Moreover, the articulation of the CDA comes from the discourse coalition approach, due to the capacity to locate the shared understandings or storylines of the world between actors *in addition to* tracing the manifestation of these understandings into practice (Hajer 1993; Balch 2010).

The focus is constrained on the speech or textual discourse (Wodak 2011) contained within the videos and news articles. The videos contain certain audio-visual elements (music or b-roll footage) which undoubtedly contribute to understanding the EU-IOM's desired portrayal of AVRR, but falls outside of the scope of this paper. These elements have been set aside due to the considerable revision to the spoken words of the migrants telling their story as done by the IOM's use of captioning, thus paying more attention to the "the social processes and structures" which influence the creation and interpretation of a discourse (Wodak 2011: 3). Consequently, the non-identical word choice used to describe practices of return migration become the key mode for understanding the actors' position within the discursive coalition; in this way, confirming Wodak's (2011: 10) remark that "texts are often sites of struggle" with multiple 'authors', discourses and ideologies competing between each other.

Research Ethics and Positionality

This section outlines the research ethics and ethical considerations for conducting research on a topic which directly relates to politics and human lives. By using a human security approach, I seek to contribute to the further theorizing of global humanitarian norms and laws which can ensure a dignified, humane treatment of migrants; due to the interconnected nature of human security, it offers a framework which ensures safety and dignity for all those who move, regardless of which passport they hold. The ethical considerations relate predominantly to securitization, and representation of (non-Western) countries as places of instability, or 'underdevelopment'.

The ethical concern of securitization has been conceptualized as 'security traps' by Skleparis (2011) and C.A.S.E. Collective (2006). For C.A.S.E. Collection (2006: 460) security traps can be described as "the nonintentional dimension of the consequences of widening [a security agenda] and to the fact that these consequences might conflict with the underlying intention", and that regardless of any actor's aims to enhance or expand security, "one cannot necessarily establish a feeling of security… simply by securitizing more issues or by securitizing them more". In other words, studies which use a security approach need to avoid going down a securitized rabbit-hole (for an exploration of the 'spiraling' nature of securitization in European migration policy, see: Bello 2020). Within the realm of migration and security, Skleparis (2011: 12-17) recommends shifting the focus away from 'security', and instead gravitate towards other analytical frameworks centering on migrants themselves – for example "political agency of specific migrants… capital-labor relations… gender…. migrants' irregularity as a political condition… rather than as a de facto status and/or a problem". In other words, to place emphasis on "the people who migrate" as they relate "to the circumstances in which they find themselves and the degree of choice they have" (McAuliffe et al. 2018: 1). From this view, I argue that a human security framework (as understood by: Bilgic et al. 2020; Estrada-Tanck 2013a, 2013b; Ololube et al. 2013; Onuoha 2009) overcomes security traps through: 1) the interconnected nature of security, 2) the placement of the *human* individual as the object of security, instead of nation-states, and thus 3) providing an alternative analytical frame that centers on (non-)migrants themselves.

Another ethical consideration can be found in the notion of 'reductive repetition' as understood by Andreasson (2005) wherein cultures are understood as inferior compared to Western ones. Here, reductive repetition occurs through the "oversimplifying and distorting the origins and perpetuation of impoverishment of African peoples" (Andreasson 2005: 972). In this way, reduction means to compress, to conceal, to be satisfied with leaving power

imbalances incorrectly explained. Andreasson (2005: 981) develops this argument further and places reductive repetition as an assumption which limits the "other options in terms of what societies may aspire to", an overriding notion of development. In other words, the aim of this study is not to essentialize Nigeria as a territory of (human) insecurity and underdevelopment, or to prescribe one way of development modeled after European countries. Rather, the focus of this study is on the migrants themselves, the conditions to which they are being returned to, and expanding upon a framework of human security that serves as a complement to the human rights principle of *nonrefoulement*.

Limitations

Throughout the course of this study, there have been several limitations. While these limitations have provided structure for the analysis and feasibility, they must be identified to properly situate the research findings.

First, this study does not account for all actors involved within the field of global migration governance (e.g. UNHRC, Irish or Nigerian NGOs, etc.). This became most apparent through the news articles, which included interviews with Irish based NGOs (i.e. Residents Against Racism) or Nigerian based NGOs (i.e. Patriotic Citizens Initiative). Nor does this study accommodate for the framing of other receiving countries of deportation or AVRR programs, due to the constraint of taking the Nigerian case. In this way, discourse coalitions are guaranteed to contain many more actors which have not been currently incorporated, and other countries are likely framed as safe in different ways. Yet, the methods of this study are able to be replicated for other cases.

Second, due to the outbreak of COVID-19, lack of time and resources for this research, I did not travel and conduct interviews with returnees themselves; rather, this study takes the ways in which other actors (e.g. the EU-IOM Joint Initiative, The Irish Times, and The Nation) present the perspective of migrants. It is possible that depicted migrants might have had their stance misconstrued by the other actors, or through the analysis process due to the inability to ask clarifying questions. This is especially apparent in the EU-IOM videos, which occasionally 'cuts' a migrant's sentence short, or stitches two together.

Third, the selection of data sources for the CDA was limited to the English language, and sources which are available online. While the case of Ireland and Nigeria is quite interesting, the competence for conducting a discourse analysis (or lack thereof) in a language heavily determined the scope of the research. Likewise, this study has attempted to contextualize the discourses as best as it can. However, this is not a perfect process – for example,

reading news selected through the LexisNexis search parameters takes articles out of their original context, and the news articles which were published alongside them. In other words, the focus on practices of return migration to Nigeria required the overlooking of other subjects, and consequently the larger background of socio-political and economic context.

Chapter 4
Analysis

This section provides an analysis in four parts, in accordance with the order of the research questions. First, the recreation of the H(I)S on Nigeria will be presented to answer the first two sub-questions. Then, to answer the third, fourth and fifth research question, the formation and membership of discourse coalitions on return will be presented. Lastly, the quantitative index will be synthesized with the qualitative discourse analysis to answer the sixth question that is how the two compare.

Counting the Teeth: H(I)S for Nigeria from 2000 to 2020

Before going into the details of the H(I)S, this section seeks to answer the first and second sub-questions of the research paper. This section answers:

1. What are the human (in)security conditions of Nigeria from 2000 to 2020?
2. To what extent do these conditions signal safe conditions for returnees?

Displayed in Table 2.1, the human (in)security conditions of Nigeria from 2000 to 2020 can be seen according to each dimension, and as an overall score; in Table 2.2, the thresholds used for analysis can be found. In this way, this section seeks to 'count the teeth' of the shark; the H(I)S presents a quantitative, empirical account of human security conditions which will later be compared to discursive framings.

Table 2.1
H(I)S for Nigeria from 2000 to 2020

	Economic	Food	Health	Environmental	Personal & Community	Political	Overall H(I)S
2000	N/A	N/A	86	40	50	44	**55**
2001	N/A	N/A	78	40	75	40	**58**
2002	N/A	N/A	77	41	75	59	**63**
2003	N/A	59	77	41	63	51	**58**
2004	N/A	N/A	76	42	75	42	**59**
2005	N/A	N/A	76	42	75	49	**60**
2006	35	N/A	76	43	75	51	**56**
2007	N/A	N/A	76	43	63	52	**58**
2008	41	N/A	76	44	75	54	**58**
2009	N/A	N/A	75	45	75	42	**59**
2010	35	N/A	89	45	88	29	**57**

2011	N/A	62	80	46	75	31	**59**
2012	35	N/A	82	47	75	56	**59**
2013	N/A	N/A	83	48	75	53	**65**
2014	35	6	84	48	83	56	**52**
2015	N/A	51	92	50	75	69	**67**
2016	35	98	88	51	75	70	**70**
2017	N/A	N/A	90	53	92	67	**76**
2018	35	52	91	55	63	64	**60**
2019	N/A	N/A	96	57	58	64	**69**
2020	35	100	N/A	59	N/A	N/A	**65**

Table 2.2
Thresholds for H(I)S

1	Level of human security	0 to 25	No systematic and sustainable threat to life / survival
2	Level of relative human security	26 to 50	Some factors and contexts threaten life/survival but individuals and groups usually have strategies, means, behavioral options, or aid/help at their disposal to cope with these threats
3	Level of relative human insecurity	51 to 75	Some factors and contexts threaten life/survival and individuals and groups have only limited or inadequate strategies, means, behavioral options, or aid/help at their disposal to cope with these threats
4	Level of human insecurity	76 to 100	Some factors and contexts threaten life/survival and individuals and groups have no adequate strategies, means, behavioral options, or aid/help at their disposal to cope with these threats

N.B. Taken from Werthes et al. (2011: 28)

Overall, Nigeria is situated within the threshold of a 'level of relative human insecurity' – except for 2016 where the country enters the 'level of human insecurity'. This shows that the conditions to which migrants return are likely to be insecure, placing them in a compromising situation for which there are little or no solutions readily available. Put simply, Nigerians have been returned to insecure conditions and encountered hardships. Moreover, the rejection of asylum applications from Nigerians and the compliance with *nonrefoulement* can be challenged. In this way, the H(I)S helps to highlight the multidimensional aspects of (in)security within a country, beyond the traditional scope of *nonrefoulement*. However, the H(I)S highlights only the (in)security at a *national* level, rather than at local or other intra-national scales. Put differently, it remains to be seen how this (in)security might be distributed unevenly within a national territory, resulting in disparate local, or regional conditions. In

this way, different areas of Nigeria might be more or less insecure than others; for example, illustrated by the multidimensional insecurity of the Niger Delta.[10]

Along the economic dimension of human (in)security, from 2006 onwards, Nigeria remains relatively stable at the 35.29 score or at 41.18, both falling into the threshold of 'relative human security'. This means that the economic conditions for returned migrants are likely not a cause for concern, albeit some support would be beneficial. Notably, this is where the limitations of the H(I)S can be seen due to the national scale of the data – ideally including indicators like the reliability of income and standards of living (Srinivas n.d.), and the question of inequality *within* a country, across demographics (e.g. gender, age). That being said, the economic dimension is not as insecure as others.

Along the food dimension, Nigeria falls either into the 'level of relative human insecurity' (for 2003, 2011, 2015, 2018), or 'level of human insecurity' (2016, 2020). The score of 2014 places Nigeria at a 'level of human security', although this is likely an outlier due to the sharp increase in the two following years. Regardless of this, the food security of Nigeria requires attention. While it is not presently possible to discern a trend either upwards or downwards, it seems that the insecurity will remain unless properly addressed. The possibility of going hungry or receiving inadequate nutrition is something that falls outside of the traditional scope of *nonrefoulement*, although when viewed through the lens of human security clearly demonstrates practices of deportation as placing migrants in a situation in which their nutrition is no longer guaranteed.

Along the health dimension, Nigeria consistently falls within the 'level of human insecurity', only descending to the threshold of 'relative human insecurity' in 2009. This places Nigeria within the most insecure threshold for the years analyzed. From this, the health security within Nigeria is considerably worrisome, seemingly without progress being made to improve. In this way, deportation to Nigeria unquestionably placed returnees in an insecure, compromising situation with absolutely no necessary means to respond to health needs, something that shapes their day to day and long-term wellbeing.

Along the environmental dimension, from 2000 to 2015 Nigeria sits in the 'level of relative human security', albeit at the higher end of the threshold with a noticeable trend towards the upper boundary. In this way, until 2015 Nigerians were in a relatively secure position regarding environmental threats. However, from 2016 onwards Nigeria becomes

[10] The multifaceted insecurity of the Niger Delta has been explored by many scholars, showing that the area encounters insecurities that are unique to the region, which may or may not be shared at the national level (for example: Ibeanu 2000; Okwechime 201; Ololube et al. 2013).

situated within the 'level of relative human insecurity' – signaling a trend towards increased environmental insecurity. From this, the deportation of Nigerians back to Nigeria warrants some concern – while from 2000 to 2015 the country scored as relatively secure in terms of environmental security, the clear and rapid trend towards insecurity makes their return less secure as time goes on.[11]

Along the personal and community dimension, Nigeria began at 2000 within the highest boundaries of the 'relative human security' threshold, before steadily moving into the threshold of 'relative human insecurity' (from 2001 to 2009, 2011 to 2013, 2015 to 2016, 2018 to 2019), oftentimes at the uppermost boundary. In 2010, 2014, and 2018 Nigeria scored within the threshold of 'human insecurity', undoubtedly making return to the country an unsafe practice. In this way, the personal and community security of the country remains problematic, albeit to varying degrees throughout time.

Along the political dimension, Nigeria remains steadily within the 'relative human insecurity' threshold, except for 2000-2001, 2004-2005, and 2009-2011 where the country ranks within the 'level of relative human security'. This means that oftentimes Nigerians returned to a political situation in which there were only limited or insufficient means to cope with threats. From this, it can be concluded that throughout time returnees faced challenges in enjoying their political rights.

Describing the Shark: Discourse and Narratives around the Return of Nigerians

This section seeks to place governance actors within discourse coalitions, based on their understanding of the conditions in Nigeria. For each actor, a cursory analysis was done to understand their own positionality (see: Appendix 7). For the sake of demarcation, migrants have been grouped together according to their source: migrants (EU-IOM), migrants (The Nation), migrants (The Irish Times). Coalitions emerged in alignment with the: a) discursive understanding of safety conditions, and b) proposed policy solution. This section answers the sub-questions:

3. What narratives do governance actors like the IOM, EU, Ireland, Nigeria, news outlets, and migrants use to frame the practice of (in)voluntary return migration to Nigeria?

[11] While outside of the selected indicators, the 2021 Institute of Economics and Peace's Ecological Threat Register supports this concern for Nigeria.

4. How and in what way do these narratives overlap or differ? In other words, what sorts of 'discourse coalitions' emerge, and which actors join them?
5. Which dimensions of human security do these discourse coalitions use during their framings of Nigeria as an (un)safe country of return?

Coalition A: Nigeria is Unsafe, Let Us/Them Stay.

This coalition recognizes Nigeria as unsafe, and migrants should not be returned there. Within this coalition, The Irish Times and migrants (The Irish Times) band together in stressing the insecurity waiting for migrants back 'home'. For instance, The Irish Times extensively covers from 2000 to 2016 the political instability, living conditions, and violence within Nigeria; reporting that "[i]n the most recent riots more than 1,000 buildings have been burned" accompanied by a death toll of over 300 (*The Irish Times* 2000b). Within the coverage, the articulated understanding of Nigeria is not stable, but rather continually at heads with the Irish government's statements on the matter. In other words, The Irish Times depicts Nigeria as unsafe for several reasons – due to the political climate, the lack of rule-of-law or legal accountability, the predominance of Shariah law and subsequent cultural practices (like female genital mutilation), and most recurrently the inferior healthcare system. This insecurity always requires evidence for reinforcement, relying on current events or interviews to continually provide examples of insecurity. In this way, the news outlet demonstrates the ability to expand and adapt the ways in which they describe conditions in Nigeria.

Sharing in this view of Nigeria, Nigerians who appear within the news outlets coverage recount their reasons for fleeing their country, and stories of finding their new home in Ireland. When faced with the prospect of being returned, one migrant (The Irish Times) said, "[i]t is like living with a death sentence over your head" (*The Irish Times* 2010b), and another saying "that Nigeria is an extremely dangerous and corrupt country" (*The Irish Times* 2005). Through interviews, migrants (The Irish Times) contribute to the understanding of Nigeria as an unsafe place – detailing their experience fleeing from a "secret cult" that practices "human sacrifice" (*The Irish Times* 2004), the experience of "problems at home" (*The Irish Times* 2017). In this way, stories of Nigeria depict the communities there as 'backwards', with perverse and dangerous belief systems, or underdeveloped in terms of healthcare.

One family continues to make headlines with a mother's concern, that if her son diagnosed with autism is returned to Nigeria, "he could be deemed to have been possessed and could so face risk of death" at worst, and educational or psychological underdevelopment at best, in addition to her daughter potentially facing female genital mutilation (*The Irish*

Times 2007a). Reporters follow this story, recounting the legal procedure and the outcome. Unfortunately, their claim to remain in Ireland was unsuccessful and her "fears… [were] realized when they arrived in Lagos" - already at the airport her son received harsh treatment, being scolded and hit for behaving abnormally (*The Irish Times* 2010c). In this way, the healthcare system is not the only source of insecurity for the family, but also the society which was waiting for them. This family is not the only one who cite healthcare as a reason to fear their return to Nigeria, with many migrants (The Irish Times) expressing concern about lack of available treatment. In this way, migrants (The Irish Times) contribute to resisting and contesting practices of deportation to Nigeria, drawing on their own lived experiences and fears. The Irish Times and migrants (The Irish Times) oftentimes frame Nigeria as unsafe *in comparison to* Ireland. For instance, an interview with a Nigerian lawyer based in Ireland confirms "[t]he chances of having your fundamental human rights violated are much higher in Nigeria than any EU country" (*The Irish Times* 2013). However, Ireland is not always a place of security, with both The Irish Times and migrants (The Irish Times) raising awareness about the racism African migrants experience and negligence of the Irish government. This occurs within the asylum application process which is described by The Irish Times as "inconsistently run and lacks transparency" (*The Irish Times* 2007b), culminating in the news outlet reporting that one lawyer found that "much of the knowledge on which decisions are based appears to come from Google searches" (*The Irish Times* 2012).

Moreover, The Irish Times criticizes the Irish government and asylum system for contributing to the depiction of asylum-seekers as "at least spongers, and at best criminals" (*The Irish Times* 2000a) and for confirming a bilateral re-admission agreement with "the most corrupt regime in Africa in order to speed up deportations" (*The Irish Times* 2001a). The news outlet blatantly states, "Ireland sees Nigeria as a democracy, rather than a country at war with itself. It sees all Nigerians as a one-stop package, requiring a one-stop response" (*The Irish Times* 2001b). In this way, the media outlet contributes to the narrative of understanding Nigeria as an unsafe place for people to be returned to, an insecurity that is not always recognized by government officials and returning anyone there is both legally and morally wrong (or at least, a gray area). This critique to the process of deportation, by reporting on the human rights violation and drawing attention to the "first-hand testimonies of the harsh treatment of women and children on the [deportation] flight" (*The Irish Times* 2010a). In this way, mobility is constructed as a source of insecurity, this time through government violations of human rights – from 2000 to 2016 complaints emerge of belongings and money

stolen, maltreatment in the form of withholding bathroom facilities, drugging deportees, or being taken from their (Irish) home without being allowed to pack.

However, this coalition did not persist. The Irish Times stops their critical stance around 2016 and 2017, no longer offering such a critical take on the Irish governments practice of deportation. A cursory look at The Irish Times publications related to 'migrant' in 2016 reveal a preoccupation with the treatment of migrants in other EU countries, their struggle for recognition of asylum and perils of transit. From this brief examination, there was relatively little talk about returning migrants to their country of origin. In 2017, the only relevant coverage from the news outlet interviewed a migrant who was only cited as having vague concerns of insecurity in Nigeria and details her contributions to the Irish community – somewhat shifting the emphasis from conditions in faraway Nigeria to the migrants currently interacting with communities in Ireland. From 2018 onwards this trend continues, paying more attention to the life migrants *have now* and not the conditions they *left behind*, or rather had to leave.

The actors rely on the dimensions of health insecurity, political insecurity, and personal and community insecurity. Overtime, both The Irish Times and migrants (The Irish Times) focus on the disparate health security accessible within Ireland and Nigeria. The concern about not receiving adequate or lifesaving medical assistance is recurring and continually emphasized. For political, personal and community insecurity, this is done predominantly by the migrants (The Irish Times) who recount their stories and fear experienced both there, and when faced with the prospect of going back. To bolster this, The Irish Times provides an outlet for migrants to share their stories, while also offering coverage about current events of Nigeria. This combination clearly sets the vision of Nigeria as a place of insecurity, a country with ongoing violent conflict, lacking (governmental and/or legal) accountability, and sometimes an unwelcoming, 'backward' or downright hostile populace.

Coalition B: Safe(r) at Home

The next coalition emerging considers Nigeria as safe, so Nigerians can go 'home' and stay there. Within this coalition, governance actors have different understandings of *why* and *to what extent* Nigeria is safe, but agree it is sufficient to enact a policy of return. This includes, the EU, the IOM, the Irish government, the Nigeria government, The Nation, and migrants (EU-IOM; The Nation). This coalition forms through the sparing acknowledgement of problems or insecurities in Nigeria but emphasizing that all of them are either work-in-progresses, or worse somewhere else (especially in countries of transit). This narrative seeks to

discipline 'greedy' migrants, who were not appreciating how good they have it – or rather, how *bad* they *could* have it.

Some actors focus on stressing the security of Nigeria. This becomes most explicit when in 2005 the Irish government proudly acknowledges that Nigeria is one of the "safe countries" of origin which migrants can be safely returned to, and other concerned parties need not worry about what that return feels like (*The Irish Times* 2005). There is no evidence provided by the government to substantiate this understanding of Nigeria as a safe country of origin, but rather grouped together with four other countries[12] which just became recognized as such. In one outlying article, this viewpoint is shared by a Nigerian migrant, who chastises fellow mobile Nigerians, and that their homeland "is not as backward as the Western media are trying to paint it" (*The Irish Times* 2009). This understanding of Nigeria persists, wherein 2018 a government official reaffirms that "Nigeria… [is] not acknowledged [as a] conflict zone" (*The Irish Times* 2018) to justify rejected asylum applications. By positing that Nigeria is safe, the Irish government legitimizes the expedited processing of Nigerian applicants in accordance with the 'safe countries of origin' principle; Nigeria being safe is heavily tied to the bolstering of the Irish migration and asylum system, as migrants from safe countries ought to apply through the legal channels rather than burdening an already strained asylum system. This preoccupation with legal procedures and protocol inadvertently positions Nigeria as a safe country, especially for migrants who break either Irish or international migration laws, with deportation becoming an instrument for the legal correction for returning humans where they belong. The Irish government presents itself as benevolent (by protecting the asylum system for *deserving* migrants), merely exercising the legitimate and internationally recognized right to sovereignty. In a perverse way, the Irish government's preoccupation with legal procedure makes sense – migrants with a legitimate claim of insecurity in Nigeria ought to have proof, and can translate this insecurity into an asylum claim. Should migrants be unable to do this then Nigeria must be safe, they must be *migrants* not *refugees*.

Likewise, the EU and the IOM share an understanding of Nigeria as safe. This is evidenced by the EU-IOM captioning of interviews replacing the spoken word 'Nigeria' with 'home', subtly hinting at Nigeria being the best place for migrants to remain. The EU-IOM captions present a formalized, professionalized storyline for return, using vernacular familiar to government programs; migrants are 'informed' of opportunities for getting 'assistance' to

[12] The other four countries were: Croatia, South Africa, Bulgaria and Romania.

go back 'home'. Oftentimes, when recounting a story of return, the captions provided by the EU-IOM switch all insecure-verbs to the past time, ensuring that there is no suffering after return. Any form of insecurity encountered is spatially and temporally separated from their return, consequently positioning insecurity as always lurking outside of territorial borders. Any discussion of insecurity gets distinctly dislocated from where the migrant is now - home, Nigeria. The EU-IOM videos present Nigeria safe in relation to mobility; to stay *home* is far safer than attempting to travel towards a nameless European destination, and the involvement of the EU's strict border regime contributing to insecurity in mobility is left unspoken entirely. Consequently, the IOM is positioned as a savior of sorts – righting the wrongs of mobility and bringing migrants back home. However, migrants (EU-IOM) are allowed to hesitantly acknowledge the insecurity of Nigeria so long as they emphasize insecurity of transit.

Migrants (EU-IOM) all praise the work of the IOM for rescuing them from a journey gone wrong, a plunder in the quest to "find greener pastures" (*EU-IOM Joint Initiative* 2017). Upon their homecoming, they are blessed with seemingly perfect conditions, a safety and prosperity one would never want to foolishly leave again; one migrant, Deborah, who received business training remarks that after only one month operating her business, she has "a lot of profit" (*EU-IOM Joint Initiative* 2018). Similarly, the rescued returnee-trio of Kennedy Joseph, Onyeka, and Monday Edwin found each other through the IOM, when Monday Edwin realized that the three "came from the same side, using the same language" and could form a successful business venture together (*EU-IOM Joint Initiative* 2020). In this way, Nigeria is positioned as being decisively safe, a place one can operate a business and have a bright future, the people are friendly and looking to collaborate, the trauma of a journey-gone-wrong and human rights violations supposedly healed. In this vein, the promotional videos produced detail the horrors of Libyan prisons, of traffickers who always break promises, of an illegal migration industry that always violates human rights and the only recourse is for people to stop moving, to go *home*.

For instance, after recounting their experience in Libya, one migrant (EU-IOM) advises "the young ladies in Nigeria… If you are patient, what you are looking for in Europe, you might get it in Nigeria. So be prayerful" (*EU-IOM Joint Initiative* 2018), a stance mirrored by another migrant (The Nation) who says "Nigeria is far better than that country. We need prayers and sincerity in Nigeria" (*The Nation* 2019b). Within an extensive expose entitled 'Dark torturous tunnel of sex slavery', The Nation and two featured migrants dig into the experience of Libya, from the original promise of mobility (going to "Germany and try to

make a better life"), to the brutal reality of transit (after drinking and bathing in the water, "in the morning, we saw five dead bodies in the well"), escaping these conditions only via the flights arranged by IOM (*The Nation* 2021). Stances like this acknowledge that Nigeria might leave a lot (or rather, a little) to be desired, but Nigerians are far better off there than risking their lives and dignity in transit.

In this way, other actors hesitantly acknowledge Nigeria as safe, instead seeing it as safety in progress. Within the Nigerian news outlet, this occurs from 2017 onwards, with articles oftentimes referring to other countries along the path to Europe as 'volatile' or 'unstable' where migrants are always 'stranded' - until the IOM arrives on scene to whisk them away from harm's way, a recurring trope within the news articles. The Nation details the number of Nigerians returning home, providing demographics of those who are being rescued, with featured interviews of government officials and returnees who remark on the better conditions of the country compared to countries of transit. Within these interviews, The Nation presents detailed, terrifying and heartbreaking stories of migration-gone-wrong; the Nigerian news outlet presents the country as some place which is imperfect yet livable compared to alternatives, while identifying concrete solutions and offering a way forward for Nigeria.

For example, while discussing the security conditions of the country, the article outlines numerous threats while also recommending ways to quell the insurgency (both in the short-term and long-term) which include "security collaboration and intelligence sharing" at the national level, "diplomatic channels and pacts" at the international and local level, increasing the financial incentive for the military thus "instilling the notion of patriotism in them", and "a complete overhaul of the traditional method of Quaranic education" (*The Nation* 2014). In this way, the news outlet acknowledges that Nigeria encounters multifaceted impairments for a secure lifestyle among its residents, but solutions are there and impairments of other countries are more severe. The Nigerian government is often depicted as working towards a 'better' Nigeria, evidenced by a promise to keep confidential all information on those assisting with undocumented travel which migrants might like to share, attempting to tackle the ongoing insecurity brought by Boko Haram, and ensure a "strengthening of Nigeria's national security" (*The Nation* 2018b). One government official involved with returnees stated that, "They have another opportunity to make a new start of posterity and abundance… The best option is to live a dignified life, make their families happy and make the country proud by contributing their own quotas" (*The Nation* 2018a). Thus, the Nigerian government acknowledges that the situation is far from perfect, but there is

considerable progress being made towards Nigerians being able to enjoy a 'safe Nigeria', especially when prospects elsewhere are inhumane.

Within this coalition, the dimensions of economic security, political security, personal and community security are present. The EU, IOM, Nigeria, and migrants (EU-IOM) focus on the economic security of Nigeria, the viable businesses opened upon return, and the (gradually) improving conditions. Personal and community security are promoted by migrants (EU-IOM; The Nation), EU, IOM, Nigeria, and The Nation - to a lesser extent, Ireland. This is done by reference to the families, loved ones, and communities waiting for migrants back home; the endearing left behind populations rendered in a way which highlights the absence created by mobility. Nigeria is presented as being politically secure by the Nigerian government itself, as well as The Nation and migrants (The Nation) - especially compared to Libya or countries of transit. The EU, IOM, Ireland and migrants (EU-IOM) prefer to showcase the already present security; Nigeria, The Nation and migrants (The Nation) aren't afraid to highlight that security is an ongoing project, but one that returnees ought to help out with.

Coalition C: Nigeria is an Unsafe *Home*

The last coalition emerging around the practice of deporting Nigerians shares the understanding that Nigeria is unsafe, but posits that for some migrants, this insecurity is excusable, return is feasible. In this way, life in Nigeria is by no means depicted as secure (or guaranteed), but acceptable enough *for some*. The key distinction within this coalition is *safe for who?* Within this coalition, the governments of Ireland and Nigeria, accompanied by migrants (The Nation), share an understanding of the insecurity of Nigeria, but acknowledge it only for some returnees.

From the Irish government's perspective, the insecurity of Nigeria is hesitantly acknowledged, with officials conceding that "in the case of a Nigerian woman arrested and raped in [police] custody, the authority found that, though 'this must have been a dreadful ordeal', the rape was merely 'a criminal act perpetrated by the guards'" (*The Irish Times* 2000c), and in another case that Nigeria offered "adequate protection", not by means of the state itself bur rather in the form of support from the IOM (*The Irish Times* 2008). Additionally, the Irish government conceded that an inferior healthcare system, while dreadful, falls outside of the purview of asylum applications. In this way, Nigeria is understood and discussed as an unsafe but denied being viewed as structurally insecure, a suitable place for the return

of exceptional cases. The stance of the Irish government can be best expressed in the affirmation "that state protection *does exist, albeit in an imperfect manner*" (*The Irish Times* 2008).

From the Nigerian government, this understanding of unsafe-but-not-really can be seen spanning from 2014 to 2021, wherein the government continually recognizes there are security problems and instability but welcomes returnees regardless. In an interview with The Irish Times, the Nigerian President shared that, "Nigerians… love their homes. When situations improve at home you will be surprised how those people will come back home" (*The Irish Times* 2002). In this way, the state acknowledges that the insecurity (mainly in an economic sense) of the country might lead some Nigerians to move, but they will return to Nigeria soon enough because it is their home. Likewise, the government acknowledges that it still has work to do towards providing "a conducive environment for young Nigerians", and promises to do realize that, yet frames this decision with an explicit intent to improve the country for those returning and "to curb the scourge of irregular migrations" (*The Nation* 2019c).

Both Ireland and Nigeria acknowledge that migrants who have entered the country unauthorized deserve to be returned to Nigeria, regardless of conditions awaiting their return. The return of unauthorized migrants is a major preoccupation for the government of Ireland (and by extension Nigeria), relying on deportation as a means to legitimize the asylum system and other legal routes for migration. Consequently, the return of migrants who have been non-compliant in legal procedures (in one case, failing to report a traffic infraction) is positioned as justified, for those that fail to adhere to legal standards for seeking asylum (in one case, failing to have filed a police report in Nigeria). Put differently, while Ireland can admit that life in Nigeria might leave a lot to be desired it is still safe, mobility outwards must be from authorized *migrants*, not spontaneous *asylum-seekers*. Sharing in this legal preoccupation, the Nigerian government's stance can be represented by an official who concludes that "a lot needs to be done in sensitizing the youth" of the dangers of irregular migration (*The Nation* 2020a). Likewise, the Nigerian government has a long track record of promoting the dangers of trafficking and welcoming migrants back after their unauthorized journey. This coalition is unique in the sense that it acknowledges Nigeria as a location of insecurity, but still one which can receive returnees.

Likewise, this sort of ambivalence and reluctance to acknowledge Nigeria as desirable in terms of safety seems to be shared by the migrants (The Nation), who upon returning in 2016 "expressed mixed feelings" despite their government celebrating their return and rescue (*The Nation* 2016) and continues as one who upon their return in 2021 has "learnt to keep to

myself" in the face of stigmatization from the community (*The Nation* 2021). Similarly, others lament that "their joy of returning to Nigeria… is being cut short by rejection and stigmatization from family, friends, and the society. They are ready to leave… again" (*The Nation* 2018c). Upon return and expecting help from the state, migrants were disappointed to find that "there was no such gesture from any government official" (*The Nation* 2020b). This experience of stigmatization was shared by one migrant, who writes that the experience is double ended, occurring both back 'home' and in the destinations to which they fled:

> "In this essence, my original home (Ekiti) was nothing but a make-shift for facilitating transition into a 'dream space' in the new destination… Let us be fair to ourselves. If conditions at home deteriorated to such an extent that you could no longer guarantee to yourself and family the basic necessities of life… Now who, under these conditions, would have resisted the urge to seek greener pastures… Home, it goes without saying, offers a condition of stability, which migrancy cannot afford, let alone offer… since the homeland (Ekiti) I once constructed as a site of neglect is getting better, can I go back home? How do stay-at-homes perceive me? … To stay-at-homes, Diasporas are cowards and opportunists who jumped ship, sold out and abandoned them to their ill-fated circumstances… And in exile, I am viewed with distrust by members of the host community who are unwilling that I should be classified with them… I am stuck in-between, exhausted with no place of refuge" (*The Nation* 2019c).

In this way, I contend that for the migrants (The Nation) within this coalition, Nigeria is simultaneously understood as both a site of security and insecurity, albeit to differing degrees for each migrant. While this understanding and experience is not tethered to the understanding of 'unauthorized' migration as a way to 'deserve' return to Nigeria, there exists a category of migrants who's return to an unsafe Nigeria is still palatable. Rather while sharing the caveat that Nigeria is insecure yet a place desirable to return to, the migrants (The Nation) within this coalition emphasize their ties to 'home', a bond which is irreplaceable and inaccessible in exile or supplemented by mobility, despite 'home' no longer welcoming them. Mobility is again construed as a source of insecurity, not as a panacea; perhaps, having moved exacerbated insecurity back 'home', due to the severing of communal ties. Hence, migrants (The Nation) affirm the insecurity of Nigeria, but still express the wish to return, to be accepted back to their home. In this way, a coalition can share an understanding, albeit while having different perspectives on it.

This coalition intricately ties together notions of human (in)security, incorporating the dimensions of political, health, personal and community (in)security. On one hand, all

the involved actors recognize the political, and personal and community insecurity; Nigeria is recognized as a volatile place. In addition to this, the Irish government recognizes the health insecurity of the country but refuses to acknowledge this as a legitimate reason for preventing return. In tandem, the actors also address the conditions of Nigeria in the framework of political, personal and community security; thus, a depiction of Nigeria as stable enough to be livable emerges. From the Irish and Nigerian government, this can be seen through the identification of adequate or sufficient protection available within the territory. This is especially apparent through the migrants' (The Nation) emphasis on the home which they wish to return. Hence, this coalition differs greatly from the others, in that it acknowledges the insecurity of Nigeria in its own right, not by comparison to countries of transit. Yet, this insecurity is not enough to stop the process of return; on one hand, from the Irish and Nigerian state perspective this is legitimized due to the legal situation, whereas for migrants this is due to their desire to return home.

Evolution and Competition: Overview of Discourse Coalitions.

In summation, three coalitions have been identified around the practice of deporting Nigerians back to their country of origin, each with their own understanding of Nigeria. The coalitions, as summarized in Table 2.3, reveal that actors, even when they are part of the same discourse coalition, have different reasons supporting their view on Nigeria as (un)safe, and whether return should occur. The coalitions are not stagnant understandings of Nigeria, evolution over time and 'in-fighting' occurs within coalitions themselves as actors abide by their own agendas. Moreover, contrasting coalitions shows certain dimensions of human security might have priority over others. This can be best seen through Coalition C, which suggests a hierarchy of security needs (e.g. migrants willing to accept health insecurity in order to achieve personal and community security) and a 'mismatch' between safety conditions and return – return can occur in unsafe conditions. This mismatch is supported by states but also migrants, albeit for different reasons. For instance, Ireland deems an 'unsafe return' permissible if the migrant has broken the law, a legal formality which Nigeria is required to uphold; for migrants who joined the return program, an 'unsafe return' is permissible if they are returning *home*.

Table 2.3
Summary of Discourse Coalitions

	Actors	Dimensions of Human Security	Safe or Unsafe	Return or Stay
Coalition A	The Irish Times, Migrants (The Irish Times)	Health, political, personal & community	Unsafe	Stay
Coalition B	EU, IOM, Ireland, Nigeria, The Nation, Migrants (EU-IOM; The Nation)	Economic, political, personal & community	Safe	Return
Coalition C	Ireland, Nigeria, Migrants (The Nation)	Political, health, personal & community	Unsafe	Return

These coalitions have been identified as they evolve from 2000 to 2020. Initially, Coalition A 'ruled' in the sense of being the most active and exerting the most influence over the discursive field. At the same time, Coalition B was present albeit weaker, as the only active actor in the dataset was Ireland until 2014 when it was joined by Nigeria and The Nation. However, Coalition A faded to the background around 2016, with Coalition B and C arriving at the forefront. This is likely due to the actors involved in the coalitions – Coalition A has neither of the state actors or one directly involved in the practice of returning migrants (e.g. IOM). Put differently, while Coalition A 'ruled' and undoubtedly influenced the understanding of practices of deportation and its dangers, it was unable to influence the practice in the long run. In this sense, Coalition B is the most powerful, as it includes the operational participants: both states *and* the EU-IOM. Within the current identified coalitions, regardless of which understanding they have, migrants serve as a *necessary* legitimating source through providing their stories and experiences. Consequently, it can be said that the current ruling coalition and its actors engage with the practice of deporting Nigerians, while working towards upholding an understanding of Nigeria as safe. However, to what extent does this predominant understanding align with reality?

A Shadow Lurks Below?: Discourse Meets Reality

To synthesize the quantitative findings of the H(I)S and the qualitative findings of the discourse coalitions, this section seeks to answer the subquestion:

6. How do the human security conditions of Nigeria as supported by the different discourse coalitions and Human (In)security Index compare?

It should be noted that while some discourse coalitions formed around the practice of deporting Nigerians addressed some of the dimensions at various degrees, none of them

acknowledge either environmental or food (in)security. In this way, it is already sufficiently demonstrated that that discourse coalitions do not fully acknowledge the real conditions, but rather which (in)securities fit within their narrative. The (non)alignment for the dimensions used by the coalitions can be found in Table 2.4.

Table 2.4
Alignment of Coalitions with H(I)S

Coalition	**Viewing Nigeria (Un)safe?**	**(Non)Alignment?**	**To which dimensions?**
A	Unsafe	Alignment	Health, political, personal & community
B	Safe	Alignment & Nonalignment	Economic (aligned); political, personal & community (nonaligned)
C	Unsafe	Alignment	Health, political, personal & community

Coalition A conceives of Nigeria as unsafe, and does so by highlighting health, political, personal and community insecurity. Regarding to the political (in)security, the coalition accurately diagnosis the political climate as insecure, although in some years this might be an exaggeration or based on past events (for example, in the early 2000s or 2010 with a score of 29). The identification of personal and community insecurity aligns with the index, providing some legitimacy to their claims. The strongest claim of this coalition can be found within the dimension of health (in)security, with the country scoring at the most insecure threshold throughout time and a point which is stressed for the duration of the coalition. Accordingly, the dimensions of human insecurity mobilized within this coalition are in alignment with the H(I)S. Unfortunately, it seems that despite this alignment, there has been no improvement in conditions or a halt in the practice of deportation. However, not all dimensions are used (e.g. food, environment, economic). In this way, Coalition A presents an accurate, albeit selective depiction, of Nigeria's insecurities, but one which has potential claim to legitimacy. Due to the 'falling' of this coalition from 2016 onwards, the rising and otherwise unidentified food and environmental insecurity present an opportunity for the involvement governance actors to continue to resist the depictions of a 'safe' Nigeria. From this, actors have the possibility to introduce new discourses and framings of Nigeria which have not been addressed by other coalitions, thus highlighting the environment and food insecurity returnees would encounter. Neither of these insecurities have been presented as realms of security yet, signaling the path of least resistance in positioning Nigeria as unsafe.

Coalition B presents Nigeria as safe in terms of economic, political, personal and community security. From the H(I)S, the actors' focus on economic security is reliable; throughout time Nigeria scores relatively well in that dimension. In this way, the economic dimension is the only dimension of human security which aligns with the findings of the index; the focus of IOM's AVRR on supporting returnees to open businesses makes sense. Consequently, the claims of political, personal and community security do not match conditions in Nigeria. Here, the claims of political security are largely unsubstantiated – Coalition B begins promoting political security (2016 with all actors, around 2015 with Nigerian ones) long after Nigeria moved into the threshold of relative insecurity (from 2012). Similarly, personal and community security is consistently within relative insecurity, crossing the threshold to insecurity entirely in 2017 – undermining the claims of a 'homecoming' for returnees. These misalignments are alarming – Coalition B exerts the most control over deportation, containing both the state and nonstate actors involved while also co-opting migrant stories to legitimize their claims. In this way, the involvement of the EU-IOM backed AVRR programs functions as a way to make Nigeria into a safe country. This process is twofold, on one hand, by refusing to provide any sign of insecurity, it contributes to a positive imagery of Nigeria. On the other hand, the EU-IOM provides financial investments *and* the return of a (through IOM training, now disciplined) population which can answer the Nigerian government's call for a dedicated, hard-working populace. The return of a workforce contributes to the clear ambition of Nigeria to 'develop', and links together the dimensions of economic-political-personal and community security. In this sense, I would argue that the Nigerian government's project of development continues to rely on European actors for legitimation works. Nigeria collaborates on accepting its own nationals back under international law, provided that their counterparts agree that Nigeria is safe and developed enough to be compliant with *nonrefoulement*.

Coalition C presents Nigeria as unsafe, although still welcomes the possibility to return. This is done through the political, health, personal and community dimensions. In this sense, the alignment of discursive understanding and the H(I)S is similar to Coalition A, however this time the reality of insecurity is not enough to inhibit return. Rather, this nonalignment highlights that certain dimensions of human (in)security have more importance than others. For instance, while this coalition acknowledges the health insecurity of the country, there remains an emphasis on the personal and community security which contributes to the conditions of return – at the end of the day, Nigeria is still 'home'. In this manner, the coalition demonstrates the ability to align with the realities of insecurity, while offering a

policy solution which is in (intentional) misalignment. From this, the facilitation of return not only satisfies the agenda of states for the recognition of compliance with human rights, but also the agency of migrants to control their mobility. Crucially, the distinction here is that migrants (The Nation) acknowledge the insecurity of Nigeria, and the developmental improvements needed in the country – something not afforded to other represented migrants (EU-IOM).

From this, the importance of the H(I)S becomes clear in relation to discursive understandings, as a means to hold governance actors accountable for the promises made in regards to AVRR and their compliance with *nonrefoulement*. In addition to that, the H(I)S provides governance actors with a tool to address overlooked problems – to draw attention to the burgeoning security threats which have been unacknowledged in current migration governance arrangements. Moreover, a widespread implementation of the H(I)S would reveal the condition in countries of transit as well, to confirm or deny the claims that conditions are worse elsewhere and it is best to always 'stay home'.

The Dangers of Swimming: Findings on (In)Security, (Im)Mobility, and (Under)Development

To reiterate the leading question for this research, to what extent are practices of deportation to Nigeria safe as viewed a human (in)security lens? From this study, it can be concluded that the deportation of Nigerians back to their country of origin is not a safe governance practice, one which is not compliant with an understanding of the human rights-based principle of *nonrefoulement* as complemented by human security. Put differently, I argue that the state-led return of Nigerian migrants constitutes an unsafe governance practice, endangering returnees. However, the perspective on 'safe' or 'unsafe' is highly subjective and evolves throughout time, exhibited best by migrants who wish to return to unsafe conditions. Alongside this understanding of safety, actors oftentimes relied on notions of (under)development, especially in the form of 'progressive' or 'backwards' cultural beliefs, practices, and standards.

As such, this study finds that discourse coalitions have different interpretations on the human security conditions of Nigeria, and consequently different conclusions in regards to viewing the practice of deporting migrants as safe or unsafe. Through a discourse coalition framework, the point is not to uncover the actor's (individual) interests, but rather their (shared) understanding and knowledge on a situation. The understanding of Nigeria's (in)security is heavily related to the understanding of Nigeria as (under)developed – this is best seen in terms of health insecurity being related to a poorly developed healthcare system, or

in the cultural sense of being dominated by outdated, archaic and barbaric beliefs - female genital mutilation as a case in point. Migrants express their fear of the practice and recount horrible experiences, whereas Nigerian state officials attempt to minimize the prevalence of the practice and claim Nigerian society has become more 'enlightened'. Through this, actors disagree on what precisely constitutes 'backward' (unsafe) or 'progressive' (safe), to what extent those labels accurately reflect reality, who deserves to live in places classified as one or the other, and so on. Yet, the predominant notion of 'development' remains, especially with the assumption that Nigeria must 'do' whatever 'it' is.

However, neither the actors nor coalitions are monolithic in their understanding of security and development. For instance, the Nigerian government's Janus-faced acknowledgement of the need to further develop and provide security, while still being at a level adequate for a dignified life. From this work-in-progress mindset, the Nigerian state implores Nigerians to come home, put in the work and contribute towards the 'development' of their own 'nation' - be it in the culturally, socially, politically, or economically. In this way, deportation touches upon the tension between living in the developed world (in this case, Ireland) and being removed, sent back to the develop*ing* world (in this case, Nigeria).

Likewise, there is an interesting discursively constructed relationship between insecurity and mobility, and security and immobility. Mobility is understood as insecure in several ways - discourse coalitions like Coalition A and B view mobility as insecure insofar that countries of transit, deportation, traffickers and modes of irregular migration make mobile persons vulnerable to exploitation, violence and other human rights violations. This means that, in the absence of opportunities for authorized mobility, the (unauthorized) mobility from Africa to Europe is understood as being a source of human insecurity; the removal of Nigerians as done by the Irish state uproots migrants from their newfound home and life.

While these two ways of understanding the relationship between (im)mobility and (in)security use different examples to illustrate their point, the core of the relationship is kept intact. Put simply, to be mobile is to be insecure; to be immobile is to be secure. None of the discourse coalitions address *why* or *how* this mobility is forced to be expressed in an unprotected manner; the exclusionary, disciplinary global migration governance of the EU-IOM is left unchallenged. In this way, the tethering of mobility to insecurity serves as an excuse for (Western) governance actors to intervene and participate in the disciplining of mobile (African) bodies – even if it contradicts the West African interest of intra-regional free mobility – and by extension prescribe the developmental ambition of the Nigerian state to develop an apparatus to discipline the mobility of its citizens. From this view, the IOM

contributes to both the supply and demand of the 'problem-solution' that is migration, participating in both the legitimating of a global migration governance system that relies on insecurity and irregular movement and offering on-demand assistance to alleviate this insecurity and return migrants to their country of origin with some form of financial or educational compensation. However, as the videos made by the EU-IOM Joint Initiative show, migrants only receive this assistance after moving. In this way, the current arrangement offers a perverse carrot-and-stick governance, one in which migrants must receive the stick in order to get a carrot.

Chapter 5
A Return to Open Jaws with Sharp Teeth: Conclusion and Recommendations

Through the H(I)S, it has been shown that for Nigerians, in some ways 'home' is the mouth of the shark – with discourse coalitions providing varying views on if residing between teeth is permissible. This paper has conducted a mixed methods research through a human (in)security framework to understand the conditions of Nigeria in both an empirical and discursive way. From this, it has been demonstrated that governance actors share different understandings of safety conditions for countries of return, which in turn influence stances towards return migration. Importantly, these understandings do not necessarily align with the quantitative measurement of human security. In this way, governance actors discursively make countries (un)safe for return. While the understanding of security is subjective, I have argued that as evidenced by the H(I)S, the practice of returning migrants to Nigeria constitutes an unsafe migration governance practice.

More importantly, the study has identified which dimensions are *missing* from ongoing discourses, highlighting the necessity of a human security framework to draw attention to what threats to human life have gone unidentified. This concerns Nigeria's environmental and food (in)security, neither of which have been acknowledged – governance actors are ignoring fins in the water. Alongside this, the next step is assessing migrant treatment in host communities. The interconnectedness pronounced within human security offers a framework to protect migrants vis-à-vis citizens, especially regarding the ongoing maltreatment of asylum seekers in the EU.

In accordance with the politically aware orientation of CDA, this thesis concludes with recommendations for governance actors:

State governments:

- Develop coherent data collection methods which can be used for understanding human security conditions at local and national levels
- Expand the principle of *nonrefoulement* to the additional stipulations provided by human security

The IOM:

- Formally agree to abide by international human rights law and norms, while expanding the mandate to include human security
- Align discursive representations of AVRR with the *actual* conditions awaiting returnees, combined with monitoring programs

Media Outlets:

- Continue to provide accurate coverage of state practices of migration governance, and hold them accountable to adhere to human right norms
- Shift towards promoting a discourse which incorporates environmental and food security

Migrants:

- Continue to share firsthand experiences with mobility, resist exclusionary governance practices, and draw attention to human rights violations
- Adopt a discourse which incorporates environmental and food dimensions of security, when relevant

Researchers:

- Further develop the notion of human security by stressing the interconnection between humans to avoid discriminatory practices, and theorize on the creation and implementation of a H(I)S
- Continue to challenge the operations and motives of the IOM, identifying power imbalances and trends in migration governance

Appendices

Appendix 1: Human Insecurity Index Creation

The re-creation of the Human Insecurity Index was done according to the recommendations of Werthes et al. (2011). This required the identification of available indicators from a variety of datasets (see: Table 1.1) spanning the years 2000 to 2020. From these data sets, the score of Nigeria, as well as the minimum and maximum ones from each year were taken. While Werthes et al. (2011) did this for all countries, this thesis only calculated the scores for Nigeria, so the formulas have been adjusted accordingly. The process of this can be found in Table 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 3.4, 3.5, and 3.6. In order to compute the score for each dimension, Werthes et al. (2011) recommend using the following formula which has been used:

$$Nigeria\ (i)\ on\ Indicator\ x = \left(\frac{x_{i-Min(x)}}{Max(x)-Min(x)}\right) \times 100$$

By doing so, the scores were adjusted to a scale of 0 (best case) to 100 (worst case), which places Nigeria in relation to all of the countries included in each data set. In other words, this serves as a form of 'ranking' Nigeria compared to other countries. These indicators were then combined to represent each distinct dimension of human security. For the dimensions (i.e. environmental and political) that used averages for one indicator, this process was done as a sub-indicator which was then combined to make the indicator, which then was used for calculating the dimension. Again, as outlined by Werthes et al. (2011), the dimension was calculated using the formula:

$$Nigeria\ (i)\ on\ Dimension\ y = \frac{\sum Values\ indicators\ on\ y\ for\ i}{Valid\ values\ for\ i\ on\ indicators\ for\ y}$$

The dimensions were then combined together to create an overall ranking. The formula Werthes et al. (2011) used to do so was used:

$$Human\ InSecurity\ Index\ for\ Nigeria(i) = \frac{\sum All\ dimension\ values\ for\ i}{Valid\ values\ on\ all\ dimensions\ for\ i}$$

It should be noted that due to the available data, some dimensions relied on only one indicator (e.g. economic, environment, food, personal and community security). This results in an overrepresentation of the indicator for the dimension, but due to the computational process and weight given to values as suggested by Werthes et al (2011: 27), "this does not hinder the analytical interpretation as this only counts for the dimension value" and not for the

score as a whole. In addition to this, some dimensions did not have a score for every year (e.g. economic and food). These were scored as 'N/A', and the formulas were adjusted according to account for the missing dimensions.

Table 3.1
H(I)S Dimension: Economic

Year	Nigeria: Bertelsmann Transformation Index (Social Safety Nets and Equal Opportunity)	Min	Max	H(I)S Score
2000	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
2001	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
2002	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
2003	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
2004	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
2005	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
2006	4	1	9.5	35.29411765
2007	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
2008	4.5	1	9.5	41.17647059
2009	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
2010	4	1	9.5	35.29411765
2011	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
2012	4	1	9.5	35.29411765
2013	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
2014	4	1	9.5	35.29411765
2015	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
2016	4	1	9.5	35.29411765
2017	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
2018	4	1	9.5	35.29411765
2019	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
2020	4	1	9.5	35.29411765

Table 3.2
H(I)S Dimension: Food

Year	Nigeria: Prevalence of underweight children under 5 years of age (% weight-for-age <-2 SD) (%)	Min	Max	H(I)S Score
2000	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
2001	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
2002	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
2003	26.7	0.2	45.3	58.7583149
2004	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
2005	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
2006	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
2007	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
2008	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
2009	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
2010	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
2011	24.2	0.7	38.4	62.3342175
2012	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
2013	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
2014	2.6	0.4	34.6	6.43274854
2015	19.5	2	36.3	51.0204082
2016	31.5	0.4	32	98.4177215
2017	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
2018	19.7	0.4	37.5	52.0215633
2019	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
2020	18.4	2.1	18.4	100

Table 3.3
H(I)S Dimension: Health

Year	Mortality rate, infant (per 1,000 live births)	Min	Max	H(I)S Score
2000	110	3	139.5	78.38827839
2001	107	2.8	136.9	77.70320656
2002	104	2.6	134.1	77.11026616
2003	101	2.5	131.2	76.53457653
2004	98.1	2.4	128.2	76.07313196
2005	95.2	2.3	125	75.71312143
2006	92.5	2.3	121.6	75.60771165
2007	90.1	2.2	118.2	75.77586207
2008	88	2.2	114.5	76.40249332
2009	83.1	2.1	110.8	74.51701932
2010	84.6	2.1	107.2	78.49666984
2011	83.3	2	103.5	80.09852217
2012	82.2	1.9	100.2	81.68870804
2013	81.2	1.9	97	83.38590957
2014	80.4	1.8	94.9	84.42534909
2015	79.5	1.8	94.2	84.09090909
2016	78.5	1.7	88.6	88.37744534
2017	77.3	1.6	85.9	89.79833926
2018	75.7	1.6	83.4	90.58679707
2019	74.2	1.5	81	91.44654088
2020	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A

Year	Cause of death, by communicable diseases and maternal, prenatal and nutrition conditions (% of total)	Min	Max	H(I)S Score
2000	73.62037	1.817655	78.63711	93.46944078
2001	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
2002	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
2003	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
2004	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
2005	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
2006	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
2007	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
2008	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
2009	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
2010	68.93552	1.502447	69.33697	99.4081922
2011	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
2012	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
2013	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A

2014	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
2015	66.47001	1.208531	66.47001	100
2016	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
2017	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
2018	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
2019	65.20789	1.283611	65.20789	100
2020	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A

Table 3.4
H(I)S Dimension: Environmental

Year	Proportion of population using improved sanitation facilities	Min	Max	Sub Indicator
2000	52.466625	6.456069	100	49.18604073
2001	52.839287	6.9393473	100	49.32260667
2002	53.225933	7.4251952	100	49.47430124
2003	53.626488	7.9124446	100	49.64193392
2004	54.040829	8.4015064	100	49.82540739
2005	54.468521	8.8923969	100	50.0245013
2006	54.909992	9.3855371	100	50.23972271
2007	55.365387	9.8871059	100	50.4681173
2008	55.83	10.462874	100	50.6739171
2009	56.317192	11.043204	100	50.8943555
2010	56.813496	11.629394	100	51.13023894
2011	57.319786	12.220675	100	51.37782844
2012	57.84	12.817948	100	51.63675891
2013	58.361115	13.413192	100	51.9108211
2014	58.895164	14.014045	100	52.19587199
2015	59.43792	14.620132	100	52.49221983
2016	59.988098	15.231947	100	52.79837087
2017	60.546234	15.848679	100	53.11569025
2018	61.111374	16.471691	100	53.44257957
2019	61.68	17.052668	100	53.80550154
2020	62.260559	17.298349	100	54.36676228

Year	Proportion of population using at least basic drinking water services	Min	Max	Sub Indicator
2000	43.15	18.085445	100	30.5984584
2001	44.555824	19.712585	100	30.9428806
2002	46.243401	21.329157	100	31.6689679
2003	47.939045	22.933168	100	32.4470026
2004	49.642372	24.525267	100	33.2788259
2005	51.35268	26.105438	100	34.1665764
2006	53.070305	27.674269	100	35.1134177
2007	54.795235	29.240498	100	36.1149192

2008	56.527462	30.894808	100	37.092226
2009	58.26564	32.534962	100	38.1392774
2010	60.010788	34.162518	100	39.2607208
2011	61.758945	35.776226	100	40.4565434
2012	63.510208	37.377026	100	41.730982
2013	65.26403	38.954914	100	43.0978441
2014	67.020508	40.519478	100	44.5541315
2015	68.779755	41.247509	100	46.8614105
2016	70.540932	41.186813	100	49.9107777
2017	72.304802	40.248817	100	53.6491219
2018	74.070847	39.227547	100	57.3340359
2019	75.84	38.212269	100	60.8965767
2020	77.60906	37.2024	100	64.3442743

Table 3.5
H(I)S Dimension: Personal & Community

Year	Political terror scale	Min	Max	Human Insecurity Indicator
2000	3	1	5	50
2001	4	1	5	75
2002	4	1	5	75
2003	3.5	1	5	62.5
2004	4	1	5	75
2005	4	1	5	75
2006	4	1	5	75
2007	3.5	1	5	62.5
2008	4	1	5	75
2009	4	1	5	75
2010	4.5	1	5	87.5
2011	4	1	5	75
2012	4	1	5	75
2013	4	1	5	75
2014	4.333333	1	5	83.333325
2015	4	1	5	75
2016	4	1	5	75
2017	4.666667	1	5	91.666675
2018	3.5	1	5	62.5
2019	3.333333	1	5	58.333325
2020	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A

Table 3.6
H(I)S Dimension: Political

Year	Index of 4 personal security (Disappearance, Extrajudicial Killing, Political Imprisonment, Torture)	Min	Max	Indicator Score
2000	0.4	0	2	20
2001	0.8	0	2	40
2002	1.2	0	2	60
2003	0.8	0	2	40
2004	0.4	0	2	20
2005	0.8	0	2	40
2006	0.8	0	2	40
2007	0.8	0	2	40
2008	0.8	0	2	40
2009	0.4	0	2	20
2010	0	0	2	0
2011	0	0	2	0
2012	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
2013	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
2014	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
2015	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
2016	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
2017	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
2018	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
2019	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
2020	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A

Year	Voice & Accountability	Min	Max	Sub-Indicator Score
2000	-0.48	-2.12	1.68	43.15789474
2001	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
2002	-0.63	-2.14	1.57	40.70080863
2003	-0.66	-2.19	1.61	40.26315789
2004	-0.8	-2.12	1.8	33.67346939
2005	-0.87	-2.18	1.74	33.41836735
2006	-0.62	-2.31	1.57	43.55670103
2007	-0.76	-2.24	1.55	39.05013193
2008	-0.74	-2.23	1.55	39.41798942
2009	-0.85	-2.27	1.56	37.07571802
2010	-0.78	-2.23	1.6	37.85900783

2011	-0.71	-2.24	1.63	39.53488372
2012	-0.7	-2.25	1.73	38.94472362
2013	-0.69	-2.25	1.74	39.09774436
2014	-0.59	-2.26	1.68	42.3857868
2015	-0.37	-2.24	1.69	47.5826972
2016	-0.32	-2.18	1.66	48.4375
2017	-0.34	-2.2	1.69	47.81491003
2018	-0.41	-2.2	1.73	45.54707379
2019	-0.41	-2.19	1.69	45.87628866
2020	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A

Year	**Political Stability and Absence of Violence / Terrorism**	**Min**	**Max**	**Sub-Indicator Score**
2000	-1.46	-2.48	1.76	24.06
2001	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
2002	-1.63	-2.38	1.76	18.12
2003	-1.63	-2.58	1.69	22.25
2004	-1.75	-3.18	1.62	29.79
2005	-1.67	-2.71	1.60	24.13
2006	-2.03	-2.83	1.50	18.48
2007	-2.01	-3.22	1.49	25.69
2008	-1.86	-3.26	1.51	29.35
2009	-2	-3.31	1.55	26.95
2010	-2.21	-3.13	1.65	19.25
2011	-1.96	-3.06	1.94	22.00
2012	-2.04	-2.86	1.93	17.12
2013	-2.09	-2.76	1.93	14.29
2014	-2.13	-2.75	1.92	13.28
2015	-1.93	-2.97	1.94	21.18
2016	-1.88	-2.92	1.97	21.27
2017	-2	-2.94	1.92	19.34
2018	-2.09	-2.99	1.94	18.26
2019	-1.93	-2.77	1.90	17.99
2020	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A

Appendix 2: Transcript of video: Deborah, from Migrants' hell to business management in Nigeria

Script of migrant:	Script of captions:
2016, I travelled to Libya. I was going to Italy.	In 2016, I decided to travel to Italy through Libya.
So they catch my boat atop of the sea, and they took me to prison, spent four months inside a prison.	But we were caught on the sea and taken to prison, were [sic] I spent four months in prison.
The experience inside Libya is very hard. They are killing people, raping people, selling people like chickens – that is the experience I have had Libya. And they are using girls for prostitution.	The experience in Libya is bad. They killed people, raping and selling humans like animals and also use the girls for prostitution.
So IOM, they came to my rescue. They ask me if I want to go back to my country, I say yes I want to go back to Nigeria so they helped me to Nigeria. I find myself Nigeria.	IOM came to my rescue, and facilitated my trip back to Nigeria.
They teach us skills, how to manage business. I start my business February, that is last month.	They taught use [sic] different skills to how to manage a business
I sell foodstuffs, provision, drink. I have a lot of profit on it.	I started by business in feb [sic], selling foodstuffs and provisions, and I make I [sic] of profit
My advice for the young ladies in Nigeria, they should not travel. To travel to Europe is not an easy journey.	My advice for young ladies in Nigeria, is that they should not travel illegally I [sic] its [sic] not an easy journey.

If you are patient, what you are looking for in Europe, you might get it in Nigeria. So be prayerful.	With patience what you are looking for in europe [sic] you can get it here

Appendix 3: Transcript of video: The Story of Augustine

Script of the migrant	Script of the captions
I just want to go.	I just wanted to go.
I just want to leave.	I just wanted to leave.
I just want to find a greener pasture.	I just wanted to find greener pastures,
A something more better, you understand?	Something better, you understand?
Then uh I board a bus to Agadez.	So I boarded a bus to Agadez, Niger.
The way you being smuggled was the hardest part of the journey.	Being smuggled was the hardest part of the journey.
30 people at the back of the Hilux Vigo	Thirty people at the back of a Hilux pickup truck.
30 people!	Thirty people!
Driver took my camera, took my money and everything	Our smugglers took my camera, money and everything,
Then drop us at the desert	Then dropped us in the desert.
It was above 45 degree, you understand?	It was above 45 degrees Celsius.
Something that is above 45 degree, your skin is burning.	When it's above 45 degrees, your skin starts burning.

When I got to Algeria, then I began to see the risks of the journey.	When I got to Algeria I began to see the risks of the journey.
The, Even the one I've just passed through is just the preamble	Even the harsh journey there was just a preamble.
Who can swim the Mediterranean Sea? No one.	Who can swim the Mediterranean Sea? No one.
Then I said, No, I can't.	Then I said, "No, I can't"
I have a lovely mom who does not know where, where am I	I have a lovely mother who does not know where I am
I just have to go back home and start a new life.	I just have to go back home and start a new life.
Why internet radio?	Why an internet radio?
I got my inspiration during the journey, when I was in Agadez, uh during the IOM Center, when I met up to 5,000 people.	I got my inspiration during the journey, when I was in Agadez at the IOM centre, where I met up to 5,000 people
People who were coming and were going.	Who were coming and going
People went to prisons,	People who were in prisons,
people who their brothers, their loved one was killed at their sides.	People whose brothers and loved ones were killed at their side.
80 percent of people did not know the risks of their journey.	Eighty percent of these people did not know the risks of the journey

They don't know the dangers of their journey.	They did not know the dangers of that journey
I then thought it is better for me to go back home, to sensitize Nigeria	I then thought: it is better for me to go back home to sensitize Nigeria.
And I'm happy, that uh I have achieved something.	I'm happy that I have achieved something.

Appendix 4: Transcript of video: Returning Nigerians are Joining Forces to Start-up Business Back Home

Script of the migrants[13]	Script of the captions
JK: My name is Kennedy Joseph	My name is Joseph Kennedy,
I met Onyeka in Libya in prison	I meet Onyeka in Libya in prison
We spent time together in prison,	We spent some time together in the prison
we stayed about two to three months in prison.	We spent about two-three months in prison in Libya
O: I haven't heard anybody speaking that language	I have never heard any one speaking my language
since I came since I went to Libya	Since I travelled to Libya
Where did you came from?	I asked him, where is he from
He say I come from Delta states. I say where part of Delta states. He say Ika […][14] he say Agbor. I say you are my brother. I'm from so-so place too.	And he informed that he is from Agbor, Ika South LGA of Delta State in Nigeria
JK: After some time,	After a while in the prison,
the UN came and promised us to take us back to Nigeria.	The UN came and informed us that they will assist us to go back home
Though we are not on the same flights.	However, Onyeka and I were not on the same flight

[13] Presented as: Joseph Kennedy (JK); Onyeka (O); Monday Edwin (ME)

[14] Here the speaker uses a Pidgin English way of saying the location which differs phonetically than the caption. However, it has been confirmed from a fellow ISS MA student from the same area of Nigeria as the speaker that he is saying the location as it appears in the captioning. In this way, the exact expression is not important, but rather the nonalignment with the captioning here and elsewhere.

O: I left him in the prison.	I left him in the prison in Libya
When I came back, I didn't met him anywhere in in in uh Agbor.	After I returned home, I did not see Kennedy again
On a day came, I receive an SMS from IOM.	I received a text message from IOM
That I should come to so-so place, Lagos for so-so training.	That I should come to Lagos for business training
JK: I was surprise also to to meet him at Lagos	I was surprised to see Onyeka again
when we having our training in Lagos.	During business training in Lagos
O: I ask what are you doing here?	I asked him, what he was doing here,
He say he receive an SMS from IOM too	He said that he received a text message from IOM too
JK: We are very lucky we came back	We are very lucky IOM came back
because we almost die in the prison	Because we were almost dead in the prison
Many die in the prison, many could not survive it	Many died, we could not survive it
We almost dead, until the IOM came to rescue us, they rescued and brought us back to Nigeria.	Until IOM came to rescue us and brought us back to Nigeria
They didn't just leave us,	They did not just leave us
they promised us they're going to open business for us	IOM promises to open business for us

We asked to choose three persons per group	We were asked to form a group, three persons per group
O: We unite ourselves together immediately. Start looking for 'nother person	We united ourselves immediately and then started looking for another person
who came from the same town.	Who is from the same town with us.
ME: My name is Monday Edwin.	My name is Monday Edwin,
I notice that all of us came from the same side,	I noticed that we all come from the same side,
using the same language	Speaking the same language
O: He say the work that he knows perfectly is, aluminium business	Monday said that the work he knows perfectly is aluminium business
ME: Before I travelled, I been into the aluminium business,	Before I travelled, I was into aluminium business
so that have been my job.	That has been my job
O: When I heard the Agbor, I say Kennedy so-so person come from Agbor,	I heard Monday speaking our dialect – Agbor, told Kennedy, this guy is from Agbor
talking to somebody want to unite people from Asaba	And he wants to join people from Asaba
I ask Kennedy, I don't know anything about aluminium business.	I told Kennedy that I don't know anything about aluminium business,
How about you Kennedy? I don't know anything about aluminium business so okay	Kennedy said he also has no idea too

I He knows he was doing it before he travelled to Libya	Monday said he was doing it before he travelled to Libya
ME: So I tell them about the business, tell them about the income,	I told them about the business, about the income,
tell them about the challenges surrounding the business	The challenges surrounding the business,
so that convince them the more that the business is okay	That convince them the more that the business is okay
One of us, his wife have been assisting us,	One of us, his wife have been assisting us,
at the end of the day we do commission her.	At the end of the day, we do give her commission
O: Thank you very much.	Thank you very much,
God bless Nigeria,	God bless Nigeria,
and God bless IOM.	And God bless IOM

Appendix 5: CDA 'Field Notes' from EU-IOM Videos

General video analysis.

Overall, the videos allow for the discussion of several notable nuances and framings around the EU-IOM Joint Initiative as implemented in the practice of Nigerian assisted return migration. First and foremost, the promotional videos never challenge the ongoing practice of border militarization or practices of detention and imprisonment in Libya. Moreover, Libya is a placed of marked insecurity, leaving it hard to imagine that any place of origin could be worse than that. In this way, the correct response is to remain *home*, and if migrants fail to do that, their illegal movement is deserving of harsh treatment which can only be escaped through being helped to return. The videos heavily focus on the danger that irregular migration *results in*, not on *how* this insecurity is manufactured and systematically constructed by the EU. In other words, the videos do not challenge the current system for policing and regulating movement across international borders, but rather serves to strengthen contemporary disciplinary mechanisms. However, the narratives around this insecurity have a certain tension – within the captions provided by the IOM, all of the danger is talked about in the completed past tense, whereas the migrants sometimes locate these mistreatments as continuous and ongoing. This temporal displacement stimulates the audience to view the return programs as an all-encompassing successful solution to the mistreatment of migrants, one which has resulted in the proper return of migrants to their *safe* country of origin. This displacement occurs spatially, with insecurity being situated with countries of *transit*, whereas countries of origin and destination (i.e. EU member states) are innately secure.

In line with this altering of the story, the captions provided by the IOM removes the conversational or storytelling style of the migrants' experiences. Instead, the IOM favors a retelling of the experience in the vernacular belonging to official press releases, or recommendations for best practices. In this way, the IOM attempts to establish the appropriate discourse around assisted return; the IOM does not *ask if migrants want to return* and *help* them back to their *country of origin*, rather the IOM *comes to the rescue* and *facilitates* trips back *home*. Additionally, the captioning removes or alters references that the migrants make which might be unpalatable to the European audience – for instance through the change in references to religion and manners of speech. In this way, the videos can be seen as having two distinct audiences – one audience receives the 'benefit' of these programs through the policing of their borders from unwanted migrants, whereas the other audience 'benefits' from the use of programs to return to their country of origin. Consequently, the videos avoid providing any sort of information on how to migrate, with only the vague implication that all mobility

must be exercised through the regular, legal channels. Here, it is interesting that the EU portion of the partnership is entirely absent in the video, especially concerning the financing of development assistance – while the IOM supports migrants back to their 'homes', there is no mention about improving living conditions. This becomes most blatant in The Story of Augustine, who searches for "greener pastures" and suddenly finds them in Nigeria upon return. The same can be said for Deborah, Kennedy, Onyeka, and Monday, all who spontaneously operate a successful business upon return.

In turn, this leaves the viewer confused – why are people returning to their place of origin and suddenly successful in achieving a desired life? Are they only able to do this through the support of the IOM, or where the conditions always suitable for pursuing their dreams? What made them originally want to migrate, and what has changed besides undergoing harsh treatment in the process of irregular migration? Unfortunately, not all of these questions can be answered. Rather, it should be understood that these promotional videos serve as discouragement for 'undesirable' migration, and seek to legitimize the militarization of the current international border regime. In this way, it becomes useful to apply the lens of human security to address how the IOM presents the conditions for life in Nigeria along the dimensions of personal, economic, health, environmental, food, community and political security. Put simply, human security applied through the method of discourse analysis allows for the understanding of these complex, unanswerable questions in terms of how the conditions are framed, or discursively constructed.

Human security is never explicitly mentioned within the videos, but is implicitly present. Notably, the videos only address conditions *upon return*, and never pay attention to the conditions *at the time of departure*. This can be seen most prominently in the form of economic security, with all three videos presenting migrants who return home, receive some career support from the IOM, and then operate a successful business venture.

Deborah, from Migrants' hell to business management in Nigeria

The story. The general outline of the story of Deborah's journey from living in a '*migrants' hell*' to becoming a successful business owner in Nigeria is as follows. In 2016, Deborah passed through Libya on the way to Italy, planning to cross the Mediterranean Sea. The original motivation for her journey is absent. However, the boat which Deborah was aboard got apprehended, and she was sent back to prison in Libya. The situation in Libya is described as incredibly insecure, with gender based violence occurring. Notably, this is the only video which explicitly states an EU member state as the desired end destination, with the others only referencing the Sea or Libya. Deborah stayed in prison for 4 months before the IOM

offered her return back to Nigeria. Upon return, Deborah received business training and now operates a successful shop selling food products – presumably opening in February 2017, and interviewed in March 2017. The video closes with Deborah giving advice to the young girls of Nigeria. The nuances and details of the story vary between the words of Deborah and the accompanying captions provided by the IOM. These differences will be addressed next.

The migrant perspective. Deborah locates an actor as responsible for her detention in Italy yet leaves them unnamed, saying "*they* catch my boat… *they* took me to prison". This configuration places emphasis on the act being done by someone else to her, seemingly unaware of committing any crime or internalizing any guilt. When talking about her time in a Libyan prison, she uses the present continuous tense to denote that the conditions are presumably ongoing, that life there still "*is* very hard. They *are killing* people, *raping* people, *selling* people like chickens… they *are using* girls for prostitution". However, it remains unclear whether she experienced this violence herself, or was only traumatized by being aware and watching it: "that is the experience I have had in Libya". Subsequently, it makes sense why Deborah says that "IOM… came to my rescue" by offering her the opportunity to return to Nigeria. This savior role becomes even stronger through the provision of education and career training offered, vaguely teaching the returnees "how to manage business". The IOM professional training, and indirectly the economic conditions in Nigeria, must be immaculate because after one month in business Deborah reports that she has "a lot of profit". In this way, hearing about the entrepreneurs success and happy life in Nigeria, the viewer has to wonder – why didn't she open a business before migrating? To conclude her interview, Deborah advises young women in Nigeria that "they *should not travel*" because the journey is too dangerous. Instead, it is better to be "patient, what you are looking for in Europe, you might get it in Nigeria. So be prayerful". However, Deborah only received the answer to her prayers in exchange for giving up her ambition to travel to Italy. Put simply – potential migrants gain nothing for their immobility, they only avoid danger – a manufactured dangerous journey due to militarized borders and detention centers.

The IOM perspective. The close captioning provided by the IOM presents a similar story although from a vastly different perspective. Recounting the boat being seized on the Mediterranean, the IOM captions, "But *we were caught* on the sea". This subtle change erases the focus on an arresting party, instead hinting at the considerable power and success of the disciplinary policing forces in the Mediterranean upholding the rule of law. The captions go on to change Deborah's description of prison as "very hard" (used to describe it as an

experience) into "bad" (used to describe a condition), and switch all of the verbs in to the past tense or completed forms – allowing the audience to imagine that the harsh treatment is no more. In line with these subtle changes, the captions change Deborah's expression of "selling people like chickens" in to "selling *humans* like *animals*", shifting the expression to align better with a Western or European framework. When the video progresses to the point of Deborah describing her experience with IOM, the captions condense the process and remove the conversational tone, using the language of headlines and bureaucracy – "IOM came to my *rescue*, and *facilitated* my trip back to Nigeria". The last alteration of note can be found in the advice Deborah gives Nigerian woman. The IOM captions change her advice to be that want-to-be migrants "should not travel *illegally*", and removes her reference to religious contemplation. Certainly, the captions appeal towards a secular, law abiding European audience. Notably, the IOM captions contain numerous typos and improper sentence structures – for example, "They taught use [sic]… I make alot [sic]… becuase [sic]… europe [sic]". In this manner, the IOM attempts to professionalize the migrant's description of assisted return migration programs and orient it towards a European understanding, yet fails to upkeep this I.

The Story of Augustine

The story of Augustine started with the drive to find something better, with only a vague reference to 'better' being spatially located across the Mediterranean Sea. Augustine shares that being smuggled was the worst part of the quest for betterment, after paying smugglers they stole his belongings and left him stranded in the dessert. Upon reaching Algeria, Augustine realized that the journey could only get worse from there. The words which remain the same in both the spoken word and caption are exemplary of this realization – "Who can swim the Mediterranean Sea? No one". At an IOM Center in Agadez, Augustine got the support needed to return back to Nigeria, and the idea to start an internet radio focused on raising awareness of the dangers related to irregular migration. Overall, the story skips around, focusing more on the dangers of smuggling and the life-saving assistance provided by the IOM.

Migrant's Perspective. Augustine tells his story in a conversational and familiar manner. This is done by ending sentences with "you understand?", engaging the viewer, and reminding them that he has "a lovely mom who does not know where" he had gone. His story is rich with specifics, providing the exact make and model of the truck (a Hilux Vigo), which smuggler took his belongings (the driver), and the numbers of people he met at the IOM facility (although those are probably rough estimates). This precision recreates the exact

experience, informing the viewer of the specific dangers emerging from being smuggling. In this way, Augustine uses the video the further his mission with his internet radio station "to sensitive Nigeria" of the dangers of irregular migration, and in turn stresses the voluntariness of his return via IOM. Moreover, this specificity humanizes the story, giving attention to the "people who *their* brothers, *their* loved one was killed at *their* sides". However, this specificity is not present when Augustine and his fellow travelers are stranded in the desert; only recounting the burning temperature and stolen belongings suffice, not detailing how they managed to make it to Algeria. Similarly, the process of arriving at the IOM Centre or the conditions there are not described, only the fact that Augustine met "up to 5,000 people... Who were coming and were going". Interestingly, Augustine focuses on the harshness of the journey, without offering any advice or insights for potential migrants to build upon in order to make the journey more manageable. In other words, the journey towards the Mediterranean Sea is brutal, with no possibility for relieving the brutality – it is "the *way* you being smuggled" that is the worst. Rather, the only way to alleviate any of the discomfort of being smuggled is to report to the IOM Center, and voluntarily go home.

IOM Perspective. The captions provided by the IOM differ slightly, albeit in different ways than Deborah's video. The captions switch the verb tense to be in the completed past. Switching the opening list of desires in the past implicitly reimagines the current conditions of Nigeria to no longer be drivers of migration, "I just *wanted* to go… to leave". Similarly, when Augustine remarks that a majority of migrants "don't know the dangers" of irregular migration, the captions switch to the successful awareness raising "they *did not* know" – certainly, after undergoing the hardships of irregular migration combined with the IOM-EU awareness campaigns (or at least, after watching the video), potential migrants now know better and cannot claim innocence or misinformation. Another notable alteration between the audio and captions can be found in the removal of the friendly, conversation tone; the captions present a far more formal account, how one could imagine it would be reading a legal testimony. For instance, the IOM replaces Augustine's familial "45 degree, *you understand*?" with "45 degrees *Celsius*" as well as changing "lovely *mom*" to "lovely *mother*", as well as removing transition words used for structuring the story-telling process throughout .

Returning Nigerians are Joining Forces to Start-up Businesses Back Home

The migration story of Kennedy Joseph, Onyeka and Monday Edwin starts with Kennedy and Onyeka meeting in a Libyan prison. How they ended up there is omitted from the narrative, and instead the video centers on their return and assistance given by the IOM. Kennedy and Onyeka meet due to their shared background, both originating from Agbor

and speaking the same dialect. Upon returning back to Nigeria, the IOM contacted the two who coincidentally attended the same reintegration training session. At this session the group was asked to form teams of three, upon which they met Monday who was also looking for people from the same area. From this, the trio used the experience of Monday in the aluminum business to form their IOM-supported entrepreneurial venture, with the support of one of the member's wife. The video focuses heavily on the return and reintegration process, avoiding entirely what events unfolded which led the three to attend an IOM training session.

Migrant's Perspective. Three migrants are present within the video. To begin, Kennedy Joseph introduces himself and how he met Onyeka, where they "spent time together in prison" – for the remainder of the video, he is the migrant who talks the most about the time in prison. Notably, Kennedy remarks that the two have been lucky to be able to return to Nigeria, since "we almost die in the prison. Many die in the prison, many could not survive it". Their story lacks any prelude as to how the three found themselves in this position, but rather after spending two to three months there, "the *UN* came and promised us to take us back to Nigeria" which becomes repeated and clarified through "the *IOM* came to rescue us… they didn't just leave us, they promised us they're going to open business for us". The confusion of which agency or organization was providing assistance is not surprising, due to the complex relationship between the IOM and the UN – however, it is necessary to note here that the IOM left this particular slip of the tongue within the captions. In this way, Kennedy's story focuses on the danger in Libya, and the need for organizations like the UN or IOM to rescue people back to their country of origin.

Onyeka provides a fast-paced, conversational re-telling of his migratory experience, while also focalizing the words of others. His speech is full of inferential "*so-so* place… *so-so* training" to gleam over details he deems unnecessary. Onyeka's portions of the video center on the group coming together and return to Nigeria. Onyeka even denotes the specific area of Nigeria that him and Kennedy are from, "Ika […], he say Agbor. I say you are my brother". Onyeka goes on to describe the process of … Sharing the story energetically, Onyeka's storytelling is relaxed and friendly, for instance recounting to the viewer, "I ask Kennedy, I don't know anything about aluminum business, how about you Kennedy? I don't know anything about aluminum business, so okay". In this way, the portions of the video in which he narrates become fast-paced, and place the viewer in the chaotic whirlwind of being a return migrant. Onyeka closes the video, "Thank you very much. God bless Nigeria, and God bless IOM".

Monday Edwin tells the parts of the story from the IOM integration training onwards, at which he noticed "that all of us came from the same side, using the same language". Before entering the IOM training session, Monday was involved with the aluminum business; here, the viewer misses a considerable amount of information because Monday remarks on "the income" but also "the challenges" which "convince them the more that the business is okay". In this way, it remains unclear why Monday was ever wanting to leave the industry, and how he ended up at the IOM training. Similarly, where Monday was prior to this training is never explained.

IOM Perspective. The captions provided by the IOM alter and condense the story as told by the three migrants. Most notably, the captions remove all of the conversational tone of Onyeka's speech – where he would say upwards of four lines of dialogue in a relaxed and excited tone, only two lines of caption would appear in an overtly formal configuration. This change blatantly orients the captions towards a European audience, formalizing the story and condensing it into a narrative suitable for a professionalized NGO with aspirations to be equated to the UN – these changes take on an undertone of signalling technological and cultural progressiveness as opposed to outdated backwardness by changing "an SMS" in the audio to "a text message" within the captions. While the audio might be appealing towards potential (African) migrants, the captioning reassures Western audiences about the achievements and quality of return initiatives. Another dramatic change comes from the switching of the "UN" who "promised us to take us back to Nigeria" to "informed us that they will assist us to go back home". The switching between promise-inform and take-assist clearly demonstrates the desire to change the language in which the IOM operates – the agency does not make promises, but provides information; the agency does not take people places, but assists them in their journey. However, most shockingly, the switch between Nigeria and home clearly demonstrates the sedentary bias underlying the EU-IOM Joint Initiative. Ideally, the audience is convinced that migrants are not returned to their country of origin, but rather helped back to their home, where they belong. The captions also subtly guide the audience to think about the upbeat, collaborative brotherhood formed through the IOM training, and forget about those left behind. This can be seen in the change from Kennedy saying "many die in the prison, many could not survive it" which appears as "many died, we could not survive it" – dying is placed in to the past tense, and the audience is invited to not envision those who still are present there.

Appendix 6: CDA 'Field Notes' from Newspapers

The Irish Times

2000. Coverage of instability in Nigeria focuses on the material damage to buildings, and ethnic-religious motivations for killings - moreover, highlighting the inability of Nigerian officials to state the reason for this violence, calling into question the transparency of the government to acknowledge violent conflict (May 25). In this way, the Irish media frames Nigeria as unsafe due to political instability, and threats to the individual and community. One asylum-seeker, Ms. Ojoh, laments that "her life in Ireland was not as comfortable as in Nigeria, *but she had to leave*" due to the oppression faced by her tribe (November 15). Likewise, media reports are skeptical of the legitimacy of deporting Nigerians back to their country of origin. Moreover, Ireland is depicted as facing a crisis in regards to their treatment of asylum-seekers, with the UNHCR using the neo-colonial patronizing logic of European states setting a "dangerous precendent" for the non-European poorer states closer to the countries of displacement, who 'naturally' will want to follow the lead of the Western world (May 20). This reluctance towards and maltreatment of asylum-seekers is not by accident, but rather symptomatic of the Irish racism (September 19), expressed both among the wary citizenry and a government which was described as depicting asylum-seekers as "at least spongers, and at best criminals" (June 15). This approach was criticized as being "blunt, [and] confrontational" which places "foreigners as problems and liabilities rather than potential assets" (May 11). However, it should be noted that the UNHCR representative, along with an Amnesty International director, are one of the few who remark on the increasing violation of human rights in Nigeria as a driver for asylum-seekers and migrants; others begin to view Nigerians as taking advantage of the situation, as deceitful foreigners who are exaggerating their claims (August 31). Nigerians interviewed by the press plead their case, identifying Ireland as a stable home and Nigeria as unsafe, either accompanied by Irish voices verifying their plea or others calling them a liar.

2001. The Irish and Nigerian government begin to public talk about a re-admission agreement, with the explicit intention to expedite the return of failed asylum-seekers; yet one letter to the editor writes, "The Nigerians that I know are terrified of returning" (April 20). The agreement faces two charges within the press: 1) the coercive links to development assistance, bribing the Nigerian government to accept their own nationals back (August 29), and 2) consolidating Nigerians in to one category of asylum-seekers from a homogeneously safe country thus no longer treating applications as individuals (August 14). The Irish government is accused of making "a deal with the most corrupt regime in Africa in order to

speed up deportations" (August 30). This second challenge can be made most clear in the views that "Ireland sees Nigeria as a democracy, rather than a country at war with itself. It sees all Nigerians as a one-stop package, requiring a one-stop response" (April 6). Consequently, Nigeria is depicted as unsafe in the economic, political, individual and community dimensions, yet one which the Irish government is happy to legitimate as a stable environment. However, Nigeria is not *that* unsafe that asylum-seekers have a legitimate claim, with the removal of military rule and a transition to democracy in June 1998 (March 16). The depiction of African and Nigerian migrants remains wary, with one editorial locating the migrants themselves as the reason Africa continues to suffer, with the "most motivated and skilled people" being the ones who flee hence reinforcing deficiency in war-torn countries (March 10). The same editorial praises the work of the IOM, an organization with the most knowledge and capacity on migration, consequently uniquely equipped to return people back home where they belong. However, others remark on the linguistic and educational talent of Nigerian asylum-seekers, most of which were responsible for "resisting the imposition of the shariyah" back home and cannot return due to the persecution awaiting them (April 20). As such, the view seems to be that while Nigeria is unsafe, the good ones have made it to Europe (or, better yet, remain out of sight in Africa), while the bad ones continue to tear apart their country. Nigeria is not safe, but whether Nigerians should be placed back there remains contested.

2002. The Irish asylum system is seeing less applications, with government officials reportedly attributing it to *the strength of the system* (January 5), rather than an *increased security* elsewhere in the world. In this way, the readmission agreement's intention becomes clear - it was never about safe conditions of return, it was about an intimidating and inaccessible asylum system. This can be seen in a eugenic-esque practice of bone testing African asylum-seekers to determine their real age, an off-putting nod to science under colonialism (March 2), as well as an increasing budget for deportation, for instance costing upwards of 100,000 euro to deport only 12 people (November 15). The Irish government uses the press to steer the conversation of deportation towards legal proceedings, deportation coming as a logical outcome to the legal processes when matched with the noncompliance of Nigerians in the court of law (August 21). In other words, Ireland is presented as a country of laws and routine, whereas Nigerian remains lawless, and ruled by religious or ethnic violence However, Nigerian asylum-seekers don't take their deportation sitting down, with several orchestrating a hunger strike while in detention. Likewise, the Irish press lends a hand - stressing the inferior healthcare system of Nigeria (October 9; March 30). In one article, the Nigerian

President focuses on the economic potential of Nigeria, and is quoted as saying "Nigerians… love their homes. When situations improve at home you will be surprised how those people will come back home", despite most Nigerians quoted in the press reflecting on religious and ethnic persecution rather than unfavorable economic conditions (June 29). Nigeria is continued to be depicted as unsafe due to political instability, threats to individual and community life, while expanding to include lacking healthcare. However, Nigeria is not categorically unsafe, with some headline asylum-seekers receiving more sympathy than the general category 'Nigerian' who should tough it out back home. The asylum-system is intended to prevent unwanted visitors, who should instead use the legal channels (which remain under-explored).

2003. The UNHCR announces, for the first time, the plan to intervene in to the Irish asylum system, in regards to the guidelines for internal relocation and refugees. In this way, the media reaffirms that Nigeria experiences "[e]thnic and religious clashes" sporadically throughout various internal regions, with Nigerians consisting of 1/3 of all asylum applications received by the Irish (November 24). This insecurity was reflected by an Irish mayor, who in regards to a young Nigerian from the eastern part of the country, that he would be "in real danger of death if he returns home" due to the violence of Muslim extremists (June 24). However, for the Irish asylum system, this poses the question, aren't there parts of the country that are safe? This falls in line with the identified task of Western countries to "ensure that the 'real' refugees got the help they needed" while expediting the denial and removal of false asylum claims (November 18). Notably, the emphasis remains on the need for an Irish asylum system to 'weed out' false appeals for protection, while finding that for every 5 deportations issued, "only one failed asylum-seeker was actually deported" with another choosing to return voluntarily (December 24). This need for an improved system is mirrored by articles which address the inability to identify one African man's nationality (June 5). Nonetheless, there remains an undercurrent within the media, which focuses on the insecurity the Irish asylum system is legitimating *in Ireland* itself, with the Irish Refugee Council talking of "a new underclass" stemming from the exclusionary system (December 30; June 7, January 25). In this manner, Nigeria is continued to be portrayed as politically volatile, while also acknowledging that the security of Nigerians in Ireland is not guaranteed.

2004. The call for Nigerian security within Ireland grows, with the Irish Refugee Council continuing toe demand "that the human rights of failed Nigerian asylum-seekers are being respected when they are deported", with the Irish Department of Justice making an announcing that all deportations adhere to "the principle of non-refoulement" (August 12). Of course, with the press operating under the assumption that this claim is true, there remains

no questions raised about *if* Nigerians should be deported, but instead *how*. Mobility, this time in the form of deportation, is depicted as insecure and inhumane. In spite of this, Nigeria is still depicted as unsafe, either due to the harsh religious based Sharia law with a deadly punitive system (September 23, August 11, February 3), the threats from a "secret cult" members to use a Nigerian as "a human sacrifice" (July 31), gender based violence (March 20) or a lacking healthcare system (August 9). In one court hearing, while making the case for remaining in Ireland a potential deportee said that "he would rather die than return to Nigeria" (July 31). For others, returning to their family and friends in Nigeria is exactly what they want to do, "but as long as Sharia law" is present they are unable to do so (August 11). Notably, The Irish Times ran a letter-to-the-editor feature, where readers reflected on a piece which discussed Nigerian immigrants (not included in the corpus created). In response to this article, readers came to the defense of Nigerians, saying that the article (which was written by a Nigerian immigrant) showed a revolting and dangerous "lack of compassion for her compatriots" (May 24); while readers showed their disappointment for the article's degrading of Nigerian migrants, they reaffirmed Nigeria as a place of economic and political insecurity, and gender based violence. While Ireland is still an exclusionary, racist place for Nigerians (August 17), it sure seems to be a lot better than an impoverished, conflict-ridden country.

2005. Making an official designation of the security conditions in Nigeria, the Irish government recognizes from "January 25th, 2005, Nigeria… [is] regarded as [one of the'] safe countries"' of origin, consequently making it unlikely for asylum-seekers to receive recognition through an expedited application process; this safety is highly contested, with one asylum-seeker upholding "that Nigeria is an extremely dangerous and corrupt country" (June 24). Similarly, the willful oversight of the Irish government can be seen through the overlooking of "the reality of genital mutiliation" within Nigeria (March 31). In this manner, media actors recognize the insecurity of Nigeria, as well as the intentional 'safening' from the perspective of the Irish government. The depicted insecurity of Nigeria remains focused on religious and ethnic driven political instability, backwards cultural practices and lacking healthcare infrastructure (March 26; March 31; December 9). However, for some Nigerians, Nigeria remains their desired yet unsafe home, with Ireland becoming more and more unsafe for them (April 22). Consequently, the process of deportation still emerges as an inhumane practice of the Irish government, with deportees reporting that they were forced to soil themselves en route due to not being allowed to use the toilet, removed from Ireland "without even being allowed to pack" and what little they could bring, was immediately stolen upon return to Nigeria (March 26), offset by the headline-making Nigerian student being returned

to Ireland after a highly protested deportation (March 25a, March 25b). While the Irish Ministry of Justice was clear that the return of the student did not set a precedent (March 25b), a growing sentiment from NGOs such as Residents Against Racism escalate their calls for the return of deportees, and a change in the asylum system away from an elected official towards a human rights based ministry (April 7). Overall, the Irish media remains transfixed on the insecurities of Nigeria (and the burgeoning insecurity of Ireland for Africans), and question the rule-of-law and adherence to human rights of the Irish government.

2006. The expectations for adhering to laws applies not only to the Irish government in the deportation process, but also Nigerians in the migration process. Fearing the female genital mutilation of her daughters in Nigeria, one mother was accosted for her "unexplained failure" to convincingly apply for asylum - here, convincingly means to provide all evidence and documentation of her fear at once and use every legal channel possible (February 1). In this way, Nigeria is still presented as insecure (due to traditional practices of FGM), but asylum-seekers are expected to compose themselves properly when applying. Along this reasoning, the strength and protection of the Irish asylum system becomes clear - applicants cannot escape the system, and must contribute to the stability of it. This trend is remarked upon in an op-ed, noting that "if you are from Nigeria you face a massive uphill battle, especially if you have no contacts with political clout" that can lobby on their behalf for credibility (April 1). This serves as an outcome of the preceding bolstering of the migration and asylum system, a successful attempt to secure Ireland *for the Irish*, while making it insecure for Nigerians. This can best be illustrated by the previously returned headline Nigerian student, who upon noncompliance with traffic laws, faces deportation again (January 26).

2007. Concurrently, the Irish asylum system experiences a dip in applications for the first time in a decade, attributed to many factors like "change in citizenship rules… tougher fines for carriers of asylum-seekers and a general decline… across Europe" (January 29) - entirely overlooking the *reason* for refugees and asylum-seekers. In other words, lower asylum applications are associated with a 'better' asylum system, rather than improve security in other countries. This imagined better' asylum system exists in a contradiction, with some articles reflecting on the improvements whereas others locate it as "inconsistently run and lacks transparency" thus stranding asylum-seekers in 'limbo' (June 6a; June 6b). However, Nigeria remains insecure, especially in terms of access to healthcare and education for children with mental disabilities. This "absence in Nigeria of medical and educational facilities to ensure his full development" begins a conversation of splitting threads (May 5) - the difference between safe, unsafe, and *safe enough*. In order to push past this divide, another article

about the same child introduces the reasoning that "he could be deemed to have been possessed and could so face risk of death" and a reminder of female genital mutilation looming over Nigerian girls (June 14). This shows that the Irish media can knowingly and actively combat the narratives of the Irish government, introducing and reminding the audience of insecurities waiting on the other end of deportation.

2008. The adhere to legal procedure is still being stressed, with a woman who "failed to show the family would suffer irreparable damage if returned to Nigeria", formally having exhausted all application processes, would be deported to Nigeria in order to "maintain the Integrity of the State's asylum system" (November 19). Here, while Nigerians might have a rightful fear of FGM upon return, the Irish asylum system does not have enough evidence (which must be provided by asylum-seekers) to substantiate this fear. Despite having a claim due to being the mother of an Irish child, one Nigerian woman is set to be returned due to her illegal activities (e.g. having 4 passports), despite having a fear of political violence (March 31). In this way, Nigeria is again unsafe, but not unsafe enough to justify granting of asylum. This safe-but-unsafe becomes the most interesting in the news coverage of a trafficked Nigerian girl, who fears return due to the binding ceremony with her traffickers and subsequent broken promise. The legal proceeding for her deportation found that Nigeria is safe enough for her due to the "adequate protection available… from the International Organisation for Migration (IOM)" which lead to the conclusion "that state protection *does exist, albeit in an imperfect manner*" (December 1). This signals a knowing deportation to insecure conditions, where formally there would be protection in place, but practically no guarantee of its effectiveness. The Irish government clearly embraces overlooking the material conditions in favor of 'protecting' it's asylum system. Nigeria is not considered safe, but *safe enough* for Nigerians.

2009. Yet again, there is a tension between the security of the Irish asylum system, and the security of Nigerians. One article reports that the legal proceeding found that the (acceptable range of) infringing migrant rights "would be proportionate to the legitimate aim of the State of maintain control of its borders and there necessary in a democratic society" (February 23). Another concisely states, "deportations are clearly seen as a political as well as an economic imperative" (September 12). In this way, the deportation (and slight human rights violations) of Nigerians is acceptable insofar that it protects the Irish state, economy and citizenry. The emphasis remains on the legal process of the asylum system, and the requirement for Nigerian applicants to abide by these laws. The law-abiding applicant trope becomes used against one Nigerian applicant who made headlines previously, this time for the use of forged documents (March 31, April 14). This approach is bolstered in an opinion

piece written by a Nigerian migrant themselves, who urges the Irish to accept that "Nigeria… is not as backward as the western media are trying to paint it" and that the trickster-asylum applicant is using the Irish prejudice to win favor (April 2). In other words, for applicants who break the rules, Nigeria is far safer than they make it seem. This is offset by stories like one deported mother, who fearing the conditions of the country for her children, "refused to disclose her whereabouts" so that her child could not be reunited with her in Nigeria (December 21). However, Ireland is not the only state which seeks to present Nigeria as safe; the Nigerian ambassador (mis)reported FGM as a "non-existent issue" despite numerous separate investigations finding that the practice is still widespread in certain regions (April 14). In this way, it becomes clear how safety serves the agenda of both states, with the ambassador arguing that FGM "is no longer in the consciousness of Nigerians. It is… completely insignificant in the present Nigerian culture" (April 2). Certainly, this presentation of FGM aligns with the argument of Nigeria not being 'as backwards' as some make it seem, with changes to laws to forbid such practices; yet, it remains reported that "practical experience and evidence abound that enforcement level is negligible" with the Irish branch of Amnesty International making a statement that, "Nigeria cannot protect girls from genital mutilation" (April 2). It should be noted that these conversations of safety heavily rely on a gendered understanding of (in)security, with little being said about the sons who are set to be deported. Moreover, this gendered understanding correlates to age, with one woman suffering from PTSD was recommended to stay in Ireland for her safety and health treatment, yet the media reports that the court argued that she could relocate internally in Nigeria (July 20). Here, Nigeria is depicted yet again as unsafe, yet not unsafe enough according to the Irish government; the Irish Times focuses more on challenging this notion of 'not unsafe enough' while also allowing for the expression of 'not unsafe enough'..

2010. Discussing her potential deportation and the subsequent deportation of her child, one Nigerian says that "[i]t is like living with a death sentence over your head" (December 4). Interestingly, the insecurity of Nigeria becomes linked through time, with a previously head-line making deportee having her "fears… realised when they arrived in Lagos", with the Nigerian culture and health system being hostile towards her autistic child (September 3). This follow-up highlights the insecurity of Nigeria through time, and challenges the government's inability to take into account (or rather, to trust) Nigerians themselves reporting unsafe conditions awaiting at 'home'. Likewise, Nigeria remains depicted by current awaiting deportees as insecure in terms of political climate (January 11; November 13), healthcare (January 11; February 4; August 3), and individual or community life (January 11;

November 13). Yet, Nigeria also falls in to the 'unsafe but not enough' category, for example with the British-Danish report rhetoric that "if homosexuals are discreet, they are unlikely to run foul of the law" (November 13). Again, the idea of deportation "as an important tool" for the government to protect the populace, deter unwanted migrants and address the "security risk given by the potential threat from global terrorism" remains present within the news (August 30), with Ireland still being a place of insecurity (August 30). However, this deportation remains depicted as inhumane, with "first-hand testimonies of the harsh treatment of women and children on the flight" (December 23). This includes practices of forbidding deportees from using the restroom, and providing little to no food or water. Despite this, the notion of deportation itself is never challenged, but rather pushed towards becoming more humane. This humaneness is expected in cases where the decision to deport is described as "truly shocking, heartless and barbaric", yet in this case "Nigeria's relatively poor cancer services were not deemed sufficient grounds" in combination with the breaking of immigration laws previously (August 3). The Irish media brings up the principle of *nonrefoulement*, which for the first time within the selected articles (in the context of a presumably first time Supreme Court ruling) is used to challenge the return of a migrant who "would be forced into an arranged marriage and subjected to female genital mutilation" upon return (February 11). In this way, Nigeria is finally made *unsafe enough*. In other words, some people deserve to be deported to insecure or unstable conditions (especially if they break any laws), whereas others require protection from insecurity. Through the news, the Irish government seeks to place Nigeria as insecure yet livable if done correctly, whereas the media exposes this mistruth.

2011. The process of deportation continues to be criticized by the Irish media, especially "the conduct of the Garda National Immigration Bureau" and field officers who are continually accused of harsh treatment of returnees (February 8) and as it rips families apart (July 9a, July 9b). Concurrently, the Irish asylum system and increased technological control over borders is presented as a good thing - namely, the reason for the "reduction in the number of asylum applications from Nigerian nationals" (September 20). In this way, the conditions of the country of origin for asylum-seekers remains kept out of sight, instead focusing on the increased expert knowledge and technological practices (e.g. finger-printing) as keeping asylum seekers out. Notably, one court ruling made headlines due to the acknowledgment that the Irish asylum system "had failed to properly assess the high risk" of FGM for one Nigerian girl should she be returned home (October 8). Unfortunately, the most high profile Nigerian asylum seekers did not have such luck, and instead continues to be derided

for submitting falsified documents in regards to FGM (June 27). In this way, in certain cases the Irish government is presented as overlooking the already acknowledged "ineffective in practice or unavailable" protection from the Nigerian state in regards to FGM (November 21). Hence, Nigeria is still acknowledged to be insecure (either in a religious/political or individual communal sense), although some *do* 'deserve' to be sent back. In terms of healthcare (August 17, October 25), Nigeria remains depicted as an insecure place. In addition to this, Nigeria is clearly identified as "the country that receives by far the largest number of deportation flights from Ireland every year" (July 9). Likewise, the Irish government works towards making Nigeria safe by focusing on the laws or procedures broken by migrants, while acknowledging that there is marked insecurity for some. The Irish media seems to raise a critical point, highlighting how inhumane the process of deportation is, while ensuring that migrants themselves have a voice.

2012. One opinion article raises the critical question, 'Why does racist and cruel treatment of asylum seekers barely raise a whisper?' and challenges the understanding of the Irish government on countries of return, with one lawyer arguing that "he has found much of the knowledge on which decisions are based appears to come from Google searches" (October 19). In this way, the media challenges both the process of deportation (in regards to human rights), as well as the conditions of potential countries of return. Not only the conditions of the countries, but the *Irish knowledge* around these countries, and the adherence to the required benchmark for information to make decisions upon. This intentional oversight of the Irish government becomes clear in the reporting of asylum cases, with one trial using the "demeanor and credibility" to show that the applicant was lying about the fact "that there was no effective state protection in Nigeria" for religious persecution (April 30). In this way, Nigeria is presented as unsafe from the media, which now actively combats the Irish government's attempts to position the country as safe.

2013. In one long expose on Nigerian migrants who were deported, the Irish media reports that while economically Nigeria has become more secure, "most people have not benefitted in this nation that is tired of paradoxes" (August 31a). Within this expose, the migrants raise concerns of political or individual/community based violence, a lacking healthcare and educational system, limited economic opportunities; on the other hand, certain threats never manifested into actual danger ("they have had no contact with the person who… threatened her"), and found jobs upon return (August 31a). The (in)security of Nigeria is presented as complex, and oftentimes in relation to the harsh discrepancy between life in Nigeria and Ireland (August 31a); exemplified by a Nigerian lawyer in Ireland who was

quoted as saying, "The chances of having your fundamental human rights violated are much higher in Nigeria than any EU country" (August 31b). This complexity can be seen in the case of one Nigerian asylum, who upon his return visit to Nigeria to pursue a court case, lost his status due to having "the protection of that [Nigerian] state" (January 22). The media remains skeptical of the safety within the country, with migrant sharing their concerns. However, the Irish government presses on with a stricter asylum system, and boasts about "two voluntary return programmes with the International Organisation for Migration" which target migrants before needing to be deported (August 31b).

2014. The Irish Government "dismissed an appeal" of a 4 year old girl and her mother who feared FGM in Nigeria (December 13). No reason was provided from the Irish government, but the mother acknowledged that there would be unavoidable "pressure from family and neighbors" (December 13). This is interesting, insofar that the mother is capable of resisting this pressure, albeit when placed in line with previous discourses on FGM, it seems unavoidable that her daughters will undergo the ritual. Hence, Nigeria is positioned as unsafe (by the media and migrants), but safe enough (by the Irish government).

2015. The asylum application of one Nigerian mother "was correctly rejected" due to her unsubstantiated claimed - fleeing from religious persecution and violence from "some Muslims" in her area, the woman failed "to seek protection from the Nigerian police. This undermined her claim" the Irish government found (November 20). Again, the focus on asylum-seekers pursuing the correct and appropriate legal channels remains a key reason to return people to otherwise unsafe conditions. This emphasis on legal migration can be illustrated in an opinion piece, which remarks that while Nigeria's population is projected to increase considerably, "[w]e need to turn it to our advantage" and find ways to cooperate within the EU for migrant resettlement, especially because "Europe leads where others follow" (October 30). However, the unspoken portion of this opinion piece reinforces the use of deportation - the mechanism which the EU and Ireland's migration governance relies on to legitimize it. When discussing deportation, the media still remarks about how inhumane it is - with one article finding that Nigerians being deported from Ireland were mistreated, drugged, abused, robbed, and in one case denied the option to leave voluntarily (January 6). Throughout the article, representatives of the Irish government either deny claims (e.g. the use of drugs) or say that the information is confidential; one activist remarked "and most people, if they knew the reality, would be opposed to" deportation (January 6). However, the use of deportation is not always questioned within the media, especially in the case of one Nigerian who intentionally misused the asylum system and in her application said "she had

no grounds to fear persecution but wanted to remain to look after her daughter and grandchildren" (March 20). Nigeria remains depicted as unsafe (to some degree), yet becomes depicted as more safe than years before; more attention becomes paid to the process of deportation.

2016. No relevant articles.

2017. One asylum-seeker laments about "problems at home" which made her originally move to Ireland, "I had to leave because of my safety. I was afraid, so I left" (August 30). Here, the threat remains quite vague, implying some individual or communal insecurity insofar that the migrant did not want to have her second and third child born in Nigeria. The article goes on to detail her strength and resilience, as well as her contributions to the community in Ireland. In turn, the emphasis is less on the reasons for moving, but rather what she has done since.

2018. Nigeria remains one of the top countries of origin for rejected asylum seekers, with a government official saying that along with 4 other countries, "Nigeria… [is] not acknowledged [as a] conflict zone with high grant rates" despite all being the leading countries of application (February 12). In this way, the Irish government categorically denies an insecurity in Nigeria, and positions the country as safe as a means to legitimize low asylum recognition rates. This falls in line with the finding that a considerable amount of deportations in 2018 were to Nigeria, albeit less than in 2016 (November 5). Interestingly, a shift occurs in the vernacular around returning unwanted migrants, with an explicit call from the UN Refugee Agency for "a stronger emphasis… on voluntary return" (November 5). Here, the conditions of Nigeria are only positioned as safe, and no longer challenged by the Irish media.

2019. The Irish government announces that the reason for booking business class flights for personnel escorting deportees is due to the "security risk for a garda to leave an airport", with Lagos being an example of an unsafe city (June 17). In this way, the Irish government acknowledges that Nigeria is indeed unsafe, albeit only for the garda, not the deportees whom they escort. Yet, the Irish media and Nigerian migrants maintain that Nigeria is unsafe for them as well. One deportee quoted in the media requests to stay in Ireland, "I beg and plea with my life, my heart, body and soul to be allowed to remain here in this safe and secure nation" (November 20). Interestingly, they do not go in to detail as to why Nigeria might not be a 'safe and secure nation', but rather focus on their extensive life in Ireland, after being in the asylum system for 5 years. Unlike the unnamed threat, one Nigerian clearly described her escape from her in-laws due to their membership in "a sect that

practiced human sacrifice" but focuses her asylum application on "the seriousness of the child's medical condition" in order to justify her staying in Ireland (September 10). In this way, the media and migrants continue to focus more on the health (in)security at hand, with the Irish government resisting these claims as legitimate for asylum.

2020. No relevant articles.

The Nation

2014. "More than any other issue in Nigeria today, the greatest concern is the security condition of the country" begins one news article (November 28). This article goes on to detail the political, individual and communal insecurity plaguing the country, especially within the Northeastern region. Here, the insecurity of the Northeast is attributed to the insurgent movement, which is driven by "high levels of poverty, unemployment, education, religious extremism" and so on (November 28). In turn, the news article posits that the Nigerian government has not been doing enough to stabilize the country, and should invest more in to their military strength, combat the rise of private military, and eradicate the "traditional method of Quranic education" which should be replaced with one that results in "more learned, enlightened" students (November 28). In this way, the Nigerian media depicts the country as markedly insecure, especially in regards to political, economic, individual and community (in)security.

2016. The Nigerian media is heavily preoccupied with reporting numbers of returnees, oftentimes providing the flight number and total Nigerians returned 'home', either from Libya or en route to Europe, and in line to complete a reintegration/rehabilitation (June 16; October 10; December 20). In one instance, the collaborative efforts of Nigeria and the IOM brought Nigerians back, although "[s]ome of the deportees narrated their ordeal in Libya, and expressed mixed feelings on their return" (December 20). Articles like this avoid discussing on the conditions of Nigeria or any motive for originally leaving, instead focusing on the insecurity of mobility (e.g. treatment in Libya or elsewhere). Conversely, one article details in depths the dangers and insecurity of Boko Haram, especially insofar that it contributes to widespread political, individual and community insecurities, and leaving victims with impaired (mental) health states and social stigma; undoubtedly a cause for leaving the country, and making the possibility of return skeptical. This article expresses a considerably negative view on Nigeria's condition, "as the country limps towards some vague promise of a better future" (July 23). In this way, the Nigerian government (and by extension, the IOM) depict Nigeria as a country safe and suitable for returnees, whereas the Nigerian media and returned migrants offer no consensus on this.

2017. The media remains focuses on reporting numbers of returnees, especially from Libya. Notably, the framing is always similar to "returnees were brought back on the expression of interest… through the assistance of the International Organisation for Migration" (October 23). In this way, the agency of the migrants becomes unclear - while they requested return, the IOM is ultimately the one responsible for their movement (only sometimes mentioning the involvement of the EU), this is reflected in conflicting headlines using categories such as 'deportees', 'returnees', 'migrants'. Oftentimes, these migrants are returning from "having been stranded in the volatile country [Libya] en route to Europe" (December 16) and to be "rescued from harsh and inhuman conditions in Libya" (March 23). The word 'stranded' is oftentimes repeated, drawing attention to the responsibility of the care of these migrants; ultimately, the IOM is responsible for bringing Nigerians back to the protection of Nigeria, something that is only accessible within the territorial state. Return is met with promises of an 'improved' Nigeria, with the government offering a promise to "treat all information with utmost confidentiality and secrecy needed" which might be provided by returnees to stop traffickers; calming any worries about political insecurity (December 29). Moreover, returnees are asked by the Nigerian government "to learn from the bitter lessons they learned in the course of their unpalatable sojourn", calling on Nigerians to realize the dangers and unnecessary nature of irregular migration because, in the words of a government official, "[t]here's no place like home and Nigeria is peculiar nation that God has endowed with bountiful resources that everyone can harness and prosper" (December 8). In the words of one migrant themselves, "[m]y advice to Nigerian that still want to embark… is that they should not try it. Keep doing anything you are doing here because your country is your country" (December 5). Consequently, the Nigerian government positions Nigeria as incontestably safe, especially in comparison to countries of transit. This is done by using cautionary tales from returnees and focusing on the insecurity of countries such as Libya. In this way, Nigerian migrants themselves stress the security of Nigeria; whereas the news outlet presents both detailed cautionary tales and experiences abroad, in contrast to reports of insecurity and terrorism from Boko Haram or similar sects. Thus, Nigeria is depicted as safe in terms of economy, political, individual and community safety by the government, migrants and media; whereas only depicted as unsafe in terms of political or community and individual security by the media.

2018. Nigeria remains a 'safe-country-in-progress' of sorts, with the government working with Cameroon, Niger and Chad (as well as Libya) to actualize "the implementation of a tripartite agreement for the voluntary return of Nigerian refugees" while working

towards stabilizing the political and community security damaged by Boko Haram and "porous and poorly managed borders", with the aim to "strengthening of Nigeria's national security" (August 3). In this way, the Nigerian government recognizes that Nigeria *was* unsafe, but is in the process of becoming safer - mobility plays an interesting role here, presented as both the threat and solution. The return of Nigerians is intended to stabilize the country, whereas the irregular and free mobility is thought to bring instability. Similarly, the return of Nigerians rescues them from the "volatile North African country" of Libya, always in search of opportunities in an unnamed European country, in which upon return "[t]he best option is to live a dignified life, make their families happy and make the country proud by contributing their own quotas" remarks one government official (July 14). The support given by the IOM, EU and Nigeria comprises of "£100 to settle down in Nigeria" in addition to phones "to facilitate their reintegration", in a perverse reward for righting the wrong of their unwanted mobility (March 2) with the IOM making a headline in "UN launches radio talk to educate Nigeria's illegal migrants" (October 31). In this way, a considerable amount of effort from both the Nigerian government and news outlet is spent towards raising awareness about the insecurity of mobility, and the security of Nigeria. The destination countries remain vague and unexplored, focusing instead on the deadly nature of countries of transit. The security of Nigeria is even presented as undermined by international organizations, who are using IDPS as "political props" and blocking their return to their original locations (June 2). Unfortunately, the safety seems premature, with one article reporting that returnees "say their joy of returning to Nigeria… is being cut short by rejection and stigmatization from family, friends, and the society. They are ready to leave… again" (April 11). In this way, the Nigerian government presents Nigeria as safe (or rather, soon to be safe) in terms of political, economic, individual and community dimensions of security, with the media both going along with it, and challenging the extent of political or community security. Migrants themselves either boast about the safety of Nigeria in opposition to other countries, or lament their poorly received return.

2019. A Nigerian government official stated that "the Federal Government would work with development partners to create a conducive environment for young Nigerians", with the explicit aim to create conditions for returnees and "to curb the scourge of irregular migrations" (April 4). Hence, Nigeria is again positioned as being in the making of becoming safe(r), while already being safe enough for returnees. This stance is shared by the returnees themselves, with one saying "Nigeria is far better than that country [Libya]. We need prayers and sincerity in Nigeria" (February 16). Nigeria is considered safe in relation to countries of

transit, in which migrants endure harsh conditions en route to Europe. The Nation remains fixed on reporting the 'facts' of return migration, counting each passenger on a plane, providing demographics and detailing horror stories of Libyan human rights violations, or other countries of transit. However, the news outlet also reports on insecurity within Nigeria, citing the IOM on the "need of protection and life-saving assistance" for 7.1million people (April 11). In an extensive expose, one returnee discusses how their movement was spurred on by an "aspiration that *constructed home as a site of neglect*" and a want for more (April 4). The article goes on to detail the double-bind migrants face - discrimination at home both for leaving and for returning, and discrimination from the host society. The article raises the question, "since the homeland (Ekiti) I once constructed as a site of neglect is getting better, can I go back home?", and acknowledges that while migrants 'flee' their site of neglect, those who remained "were confronted with deep-rooted problems… Their legs chained like an anchored ship, they shouldn't move" away from social, economic and political insecurity (April 4). However, these insecurities are depicted as fading away, with one government official imploring returnees, "[w]ith your return now, you have realised that Nigeria is the best that has opportunity for everyone. All you need to do is tap in whatever you want to do and the present government is making things easy" (May 1). In this way, the Nigerian government and returned migrants largely view Nigeria as safe, with the migrants acknowledging that there is still some insecurity in regards to individual and community life. The Nigerian media supports this implicitly, tracking the number of returnees and detailing the horror stories of transit countries. Hence, by all involved, mobility is positioned as a guaranteed route towards insecurity.

2020. Despite the continual efforts of the government (in collaboration with the EU and IOM) to sensitive Nigerians of the dangers of (illegal) mobility, "a lot needs to be done in sensitizing the youth" a government official concludes (January 25). The media continues to outline the number of returnees, mainly focusing on those who "return home after they realized they could no longer cope with conditions in the North African [Libya] country" (March 15), tracking that voluntary returns far exceed those who were deported. In the same report, the government boasts that, "all the returnees were treated like normal passengers, as they were profiled without any form of stigmatization", in an attempt to assuage the individual and community insecurity previously identified (March 15). Migrants contribute to the identification of Nigeria as secure, especially in relation to their experience in transit countries, one noting that, "I will advise people too tay in Nigeria because there is no place like home. Those middle easterners will lure you with beautiful stories only to make your life

miserable in their country" (February 4). Transit countries are positioned as insecure in terms of political, economic, individual and community security; conversely, Nigeria is understood as stable, plentiful and welcoming. However, one media article challenges this notion, in regards to deportees returning from Germany, these "traumatized deportees were expecting to get some sympathy from the plethora of government agencies… there was no such gesture from any government official" (March 14). In this way, the image of Nigeria as safe is not incontestable, but rather highlights the 'safety-in-progress' nature of the administration.

2021. The attitude towards Nigeria becomes most clear when articulated in relation to transit countries, with one migrant clearly saying that, "Staying in Nigeria to struggle is now much better than traveling abroad and be enslaved" (August 19). In this way, Nigeria is relatively safe, not perfect but far better than any alternative. The project of sensitizing Nigerians is ongoing, with returned migrants having an ambivalent view towards it. On one hand, a migrant reports that "I try to alert people of this danger… what they do is stigmatize me. So I've learnt to keep to myself" (January 3), whereas on the other one migrant received funding from the EU-IOM for administering "basic training on how to utilize the funds" offered for voluntary return (January 24). When asked who is responsible for the horrors of human trafficking, "leadership problem and loss of family values", focusing on the depiction of Europe rather than the inhibited means for legal mobility (January 24). In line with this, one extensive expose tracks the gruesome "Dark torturous tunnel of sex slavery" associated with mobility, focusing on detailing the dangers of transit countries and the safety offered in Nigeria (January 3), evidenced by the aim to return "all Nigerian refugees in Cameroon… back home safely to a life of dignity and pride" (February 9). In this way, the government continues to valorize the security of Nigeria in an economic, political and individual or community sense. Migrants themselves contribute to this mission, albeit sometimes challenging to what extent this security applies to returnees.

Appendix 7: CDA 'Field Notes' - Who Makes a Shark? Reflections on the Analyzed Governance Actors

This appendix analyzes the sources of information for the identification of discourse coalitions. This includes assessing the about pages of the sources, as well as source criticism, identifying the strengths and limitations of each media.

EU-IOM Joint Initiative.

Founded in December of 2016 through the financing of the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa, the EU-IOM Joint Initiative for Migrant Protection and Reintegration describes itself as "the first comprehensive programme to save lives, protect and assist migrants along key migration routes in Africa"; however, the assistance provided for migrants is less about facilitating their mobility but rather supporting "migrants who decide to return to their countries of origin to do so in a safe and dignified way" adhering to "international human rights standards and in particular the principle of non-refoulement". Put differently, the Joint Initiative seeks to rescue African migrants from the hazards of mobility. Following the ambition of development and removing 'push' factors of irregular migration, this is done in order to create opportunities for "returning migrants to help them restart their lives in their countries of origin through an integrated approach… that supports both migrants and their communities". For this aim, six 'pillars of action' are identified, namely: 1) capacity building, 2) protection and voluntary return assistance, 3) reintegration support, 4) migration data collection and analysis, 5) information and awareness raising, 6) community stabilization. The promotional videos selected for analysis fall predominantly into the fifth category, although due to their disciplinary and normative nature they likely span into other categories.

These videos have a seemingly twofold purpose, each of which addresses a different audience. On one hand, the videos raise awareness about the 'good work' and happy outcomes achieved through the EU-IOM Joint venture targeted towards Western (European, Global North) audiences. With this intention, the videos serve a legitimizing function for the practice of deportation or voluntary return migration for unwanted Nigerian migrants, or unwanted migrants in general. On the other hand, the videos serve as a coercive or incentivizing message for migrants, as an invitation to rethink their mobility and return 'home'. From this view, the videos depict a disharmonious (or rather from the perspective of the EU and IOM, counter-intuitive) understanding of migration and development – migrants are encouraged to not leave their country of origin (or at least, do so using the regulated legal channels), yet only receive support to improve their livelihood by exercising their mobility which is thus disciplined; to get the carrot, you must get the stick first. The tension formed through the combination of presenting a 'cautionary tale' with a happy ending never fades away entirely.

In turn, this promotes an open-ended, ambivalent interpretation to migration and human security in Nigeria. The twin purpose-and-audience become discernable through the different actors disseminating their discourse throughout the course of the video.

Notably, the words of the interviewed migrants and the captioning provided by the IOM differ – both in terms of slight grammar and vernacular changes, as well as a considerable alteration of words and tone. These slight changes in grammar or word choice reflect certain norms and expectations of (personal) development and appropriate ways of engaging in the discussion around migration governance practices. In other words, even slight changes contribute to the locating of an actor's position within the discursive coalitions. In this way, the videos become interesting sources for analysis; while ultimately edited, produced and approved by the IOM, the videos are ripe with divergent perspectives on (return) migration. As such, the videos cannot be understood merely as bolstering the point of view of state or international governance actors, but also present migrants with an outlet for resisting these narratives and changing the mode of discussion on practices of return. Moreover, through altering the words of the migrants by means of closed captioning, the IOM inadvertently underscores these different, resistant perspectives.

The Nation.

The Nation sets out to be an independent news agency, which is "[n]ot beholden to any interest group. Loyalty is to the nation" (The Nation n.d.). In this sense, the news outlet presents Nigeria as one nation, attempting to overcome any sort of religious, ethnic, or geographic divides; this widespread and encompassing nature of The Nation is self-described as being "[t]he most national newspaper with a very strong presence in all the geo-political zones" while providing the cities and areas with the most circulation, including being the third most circulated "in Abuja, the nation's political capital" and fourth "in Lagos, the nation's commercial centre". However, this does not stop the news outlet from boasting that, "[w]e are accessed in all nations of the world". Importantly, The Nation seeks to cover topics ranging "from political tensions to the arts, to education, to society" while offering a solution for those struggling "to find a reliable online source for current Nigerian events and the latest news". In this way, The Nation sets out to provide accurate, informative, relevant news to all residents of Nigeria, and also a global audience.

However, the extent to which this encompassing audience becomes challenged when looking at the target audience of The Nation. The targeted readership for the news outlet consists of "[b]usiness and political elite… [t]he affluent, the educated, those in leadership positions in all spheres of life; the upwardly mobile, policymakers" (The Nation n.d.). Hence,

The Nation sets out to inform the decision-making process, targeting the movers and the shakers of the country. Yet, the membership of this elite audience is blurred and remains unresolved, with the mission being "[t]o provide the general public with information they need to be free and self-governing in a democratic society", a tension reflected in the writing style self-described as "elevated language, concise – yet detailed analysis and clarity of thought". Nonetheless, The Nation assures (likely oriented towards advertisers) that their "subscription base in Lagos guarantees the paper on the tables of vital discerning readers". In this way, while the viewer might range from the general to elite strata, the aspiration is clear – to emulate ideals about what it means to become Westernized, to become enlightened.

Consequently, news articles written and published for the news outlet are likely to provide both accurate information regarding both current events and return migration to Nigeria, while offering some sort of normative guidance for the reader; the reader can be understood mainly as (potential) Nigerian migrants, but also a wider global audience. Put simply, The Nation writes with a purpose, explicitly aiming to inform the decisions of the powerful. In line with this, it becomes crucial to locate the discourse shared by The Nation when discussing the living conditions of Nigeria, the conditions awaiting returnees. While attempting to inform the powerful (e.g. political or economic elite), it remains to be seen to what extent The Nation safeguards the interests of the less powerful (e.g. returnees). In other words, The Nation is an interesting actor to include in the discourse coalitions around the practice of deporting Nigerians back to their country of origin.

The Irish Times.

The Irish Times describes itself as having "delivered top quality news, opinion and analysis since it was first published" and as it continues to adapt to emergent "methods of storytelling and delivery". The self-description of the news outlet identifies principles which guide their journalism, and explicitly identify the intentions of their articles. According to the principles of the news outlet, The Irish Times sets out to, among many other things, contribute to "[t]he progressive achievement of social justice between people and the discouragement of discrimination of all kinds… [t]he promotion of a friendly society… where the quality of spirit is instinct with Christian values, but free from all religious bias and discrimination… [and] [t]he promotion of understanding of other nations and peoples and a sympathetic concern for their wellbeing". Conclusively, the aim of the news stories should be "to enable readers… to reach informed and independent judgements… news shall be as accurate and as comprehensive as is practicable and be presented fairly". In addition to these principles, The Irish Time boasts a unique exemption from being coerced by "commercial and other

sectional interests" due to the trust established to fund the news outlet. The news outlet also has a global albeit hierarchical focus, as it seeks to detail "the affairs of Ireland – North and South – Britain, the European Union, the United States and the wider world".

From this basis, the discourse shared by The Irish Times in regards to practices of deportation becomes quite relevant, insofar that the traditional Christian-benevolence and sympathetic orientation undoubtedly attempts to shape the readers views towards current events. Similar to The Nation, the audience of The Irish Times constitutes the upper echelon, with the news outlet serving as "the most important national forum for thinkers and doers in Irish society". This normative writing style is addressed in the letter from the editor, who assures the readers that "[w]e are acutely aware that readers of The Irish Times identify with the paper… but they do not want to be taken for granted. They want to be informed and then make up their own minds". In other words, the news outlet clearly takes a social justice approach, and attempts to do so outside of a human rights framework or without overt exertion over the reader; that being said, The Irish Times doesn't seek to only comfort the readers, admitting that "[w]e may present our readers with unpalatable realities on occasions, but we do not employ shock tactics for their own sake" and assuring that "we do not exploit the vulnerability of individuals". Hence, locating the depiction of Nigeria's condition as 'fact' of a grim (or not so grim) reality for returnees serves as an interesting means of locating the actors disposition in discourse coalitions.

The Irish Times serves as a relevant actor to analyze in regards to the return of Nigerians back to their country of origin, especially as it seeks to promote a humanitarian, Christian ethos to the Irish society at large. This self-described stance positions the news outlet as a potential 'activist' of sorts, ensuring that state practices comply with human rights norms. In other words, The Irish Times disseminates a discourse around practices of deportation that has the potential to either challenge or legitimate state practices, and transfers this knowledge to their readers. Similar to The Nation, The Irish Times seeks to inform the 'movers and shakers' of Irish society, attempting to discipline and orient their viewpoint according to a progress social justice agenda.

(Returned) Migrants.

From the aforementioned media sources, a diverse range of migrant voices are represented. This is done by means of interviews and (recurring) featured stories, all of which share the stories and experiences of Nigerian migrants. From the three selected sources, the experience and perspective of migrants from different positionalities (i.e. age, gender, occupation, point of time in migratory trajectory, etc) can be found. These migrants are either

already in their desired country of residence (e.g. Ireland) and in the process of being returned, or have already (been) returned back to Nigeria. The only shared factor is that they are Nigerians who have moved outside of their country of origin. From their stories, each depicts a different situation in Nigeria. For the purpose of analysis, the migrants have been distilled based on which source they feature in, meaning the perspective of migrants (EU-IOM), migrants (The Irish Times), and migrants (The Nation) can be separated and reflected upon.

The EU-IOM Joint Initiative promotional videos feature migrants who were unable to make it fully to Europe, stopped either before or during the crossing of the Mediterranean Sea, either voluntarily or by force. This group of migrants includes experiences of imprisonment, the dangers of traffickers and transit, and the success of their return and reintegration. The Irish Times features migrants who are either still in Ireland, or have been returned from Ireland to Nigeria. This group of migrants include experiences of home-making in Ireland, reasons for their original departure and/or hesitancy to return, and their experience with the Irish migration and asylum system. The Nation features migrants who are back in Nigeria, returning from various countries of origin. This group of migrants include experiences of imprisonment, the dangers and human rights violations of transit and countries of transit (predominantly Libya), and their experience of return.

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Notes

Appendices 5, 6, and 7 are not an analysis in their own right, but rather to transparently reflect the thought process of the researcher during the CDA and formation of discourse coalitions.