MULTISTAKEHOLDER PARTNERSHIPS AND LEGITIMACY

The CSOs' perception of the Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation

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List of Acronyms

3MR	GPEDC Third Monitoring Round
AAA	Accra Action Agenda
AFD	Agence Française de Développement
AG-CS	OECD Advisory Group on Civil Society and Aid Effectiveness
BA	BetterAid
BHS	Banque de l'Habitat du Sénégal
BPEDC	Busan Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation
CSO	civil society organization
CPDE	CSO Partnership for Development Effectiveness
DAC	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development-Development Assistance Committee
DP	development partner
EU	European Union
FWNGO	Forum of Women's NGOs of Kyrgyzstan
GPEDC	Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation
GNI	gross national income
GPI	Global Partnership Initiatives
HLF	High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness
HLM	High-Level Meeting
ICC	International Criminal Court
ICT	information and communication technology
ILO	International Labour Organization
IWSP	Integrated Water Supply Project
JICA	Japan International Cooperation Agency
JST	Joint Support Team
KII	key-informant interview
MSMEs	micro, small and medium enterprises
MSPs	Multistakeholder Partnerships
NECC	Non-Executive Co-Chair
ODA	official development assistance
OF	Open Forum for CSO Effectiveness
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PPP	public-private partnership
PSE	private sector engagement in development
SC	Steering Committee
SDGs	Sustainable Development Goals
ToC	Theory of Change
TUDCN	Trade Union Development Cooperation Network
UN	United Nations

UNCED	United Nations Conference on Environment and Development
UNGA	United Nations General Assembly
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
WP-EFF	OECD-DAC Working Party on Aid Effectiveness

Abstract

Multistakeholder partnerships (MSPs) are touted as a vehicle to address complex global problems. One of these MSPs is the Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation (GPEDC), which includes states and non-state actors in its membership and leadership. Why and how MSPs such as GPEDC receive support, especially from the relatively new actors in global governance, is yet to be fully explored. Thus, using the legitimacy lens, this study examines the CSOs' perspectives towards GPEDC to understand why and how CSOs engage in GPEDC. The argument is that it is inaccurate and insufficient to equate a stakeholder's participation in MSPs, such as the GPEDC, as a proxy of the partnership's legitimacy. Engagement is deemed more complex and cannot be reduced to acceptance or support to authority or norms. Key informant interviews and documents review were employed to gather data. Further, the sociological and normative concepts of legitimacy are used to develop criteria in assessing legitimacy. The interactions of these reveal relations and political choices by CSOs.

CSOs consider GPEDC legitimate but this should be nuanced since findings demonstrate that for CSOs, legitimacy has instrumental value and is content-dependent and conditioned on interest. While the study cannot represent the entirety of CSOs engaging in development cooperation, most of those who participated in the study are driven by the CSOs' agenda and their perceived roles in development. CSOs emphasized that their support on the claim to authority of the GPEDC is defined by the inclusiveness of its structure and processes and how these structures and processes can forward their agenda.

Relevance to Development Studies

Multistakeholderism is gaining more traction as a potential vehicle to address the global development crises. It opens up innovative ways of working together by including non-traditional governance actors, thereby creating collective work and solidarity. This study aims to contribute to examining multistakeholder partnerships through GPEDC by using the legitimacy lens to ascertain claims and actual practices in delivering solutions to development problems. Since development changes need to happen on the ground, attention should also be provided to the actors who used to be the objects of these development agendas. By focusing on CSOs' perceptions, this study can support exposing the spectrum of MSPs' potential and threats. It also invites opening the legitimacy discourse from claiming and

accepting authority to include relations and political choices. Further, this adds to the exploration of CSOs' roles as governance actors in the global sphere.

Keywords

civil society, legitimacy, global governance, multistakeholder partnership, development effectiveness, GPEDC

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This study allowed me to reflect on my experience when I was working with different development actors. It permitted me to understand better the hard work of civil society and the people's movement. I remain optimistic that a better world is still possible with their continued and persistent struggle in various forms to make people's aspirations become a reality.

Chapter 1
Overview of the Research

1.1 Introduction

The concept of partnership among different sectors of society is not a recent phenomenon (Watenhall in Buckup 2012:29). Partnerships have been in existence in many cultures in the various epoch of humankind. Partnering in development in a multistakeholder manner was officially introduced at the 1992 Rio World Summit, in which Agenda 21 was adopted (Polman 2016:2). Almost three decades since, and with the Agenda 2030 launched in 2015, multistakeholder partnerships (MSPs) gained higher currency as a crucial instrument to deliver sustainable development. MSPs become a go-to modus operandi on problems and situations deemed highly complex that demand various competencies, resources, and support from different stakeholders (Fowler and Biekart 2017:83). Donors, recipient governments, and civil society organizations (CSOs) usually form MSPs that target societal issues concerning poverty and inequality.

Over the years, the number of MSPs has consistently increased. And often, they are presented as the silver bullet in addressing the *wicked* societal problems brought by the evolving development landscape in a more complex global political, economic, and social order. The appeal for multistakeholderism emanates from the legitimacy and democratic crises of the traditional international organizations (Bäckstrand, Khan and Lövbrand 2010:10). Palladino and Santaniello (2021:25) present a parallel argument; by rallying state and non-state actors in a space to take part in global governance, MSPs can conform with the elements of democracy, e.g., *"participation, representation, and accountability"* (Palladino and Santaniello 2021:25).

One of the global governance processes known to adopt multistakeholderism is the *Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation* (GPEDC). Formally established in 2012, the GPEDC is a global multistakeholder partnership working towards the effectiveness of development cooperation that places in its core the common interest of *"people, planet, prosperity and peace"* (GPEDC n.d.[a]). Its membership and leadership include countries categorized as recipients of development co-operation, providers of development co-operation and recipients and providers of development co-operation, business sector, parliaments, civil society, multilateral development banks, multilateral organizations, trade unions, foundations, and sub-national governments (GPEDC n.d.[b]). It aims to offer a basis for working together

and managing synergies between development actors to achieve the 2030 Agenda (GPEDC 2020).

Despite the abundance of advantages cited on working in a collaborative manner such as increased productivity, better flow of communication and sharing of knowledge, reduction of costs and risks, and more active resource mobilization (Banerjee, Murphy and Walsh 2020:2), issues questioning the legitimacy of the MSPs and multistakeholderism are increasing, a red flag since legitimacy is a fundamental value that needs to be secured by the MSPs to thrive and remain relevant to succeed in instigating transformative changes in the world order (Tallberg and Zürn 2019:1; Buchanan and Keohane 2006:407; Hurd 2018:717).

Interrogations are emerging on international institutions' legitimacy (Bodansky 2013:321) and how this links to power imbalances and capacity to deliver as a development process and as development institutions (Bernstein 2005:142). From dwindling resources allocated to development activities to the worsening state of democracy at the country level, there seem to be substantial gaps that need to be addressed in the actual practice of partnerships. In addition, criticisms on the structure, processes, and relations are becoming more expressed. Some of the issues identified are the *"North driven"* (Bäckstrand 2006:299) processes and agenda settings (Palladino and Santaniello 2021:27) and ingrained unequal power relations (Hofmann 2016:33; Palladino and Santaniello 2021:27).

The crux in the acceptance and success of MSPs as institutions and processes is how they are perceived as legitimate by the stakeholders (Quack 2010:8; Buchanan and Keohane 2006:3). Legitimacy is the appropriateness of a regime's authority (Hurd 2018:719; Anderson, Bernauer and Kachi 2019:661; Palladino and Santaniello 2021:24; Levi, Sacks and Tyler 2009:355; Tallberg and Zürn 2019:583) and its justification (Bodansky 1999:601) to drive a development agenda. Measuring the perception of legitimacy is not an easy feat, especially for actors such as CSOs, which do not have much power and resources but, on the other hand, are acknowledged as a critical pillar to achieve the MSPs' objectives and even in the MSPs existence. The argument is that it is inaccurate and insufficient to equate a stakeholder's participation in MSPs, such as the GPEDC, as a proxy of the partnership's legitimacy. Engagement is deemed more complex and cannot be reduced to acceptance or support to authority or norms. As Hurd (2018:726) posits, *"acquiescence"* cannot provide a complete picture of how the subject perceives legitimacy.

As MSPs gain more traction, CSOs gain more grounds to perform their role as development actors. Without CSOs, MSPs cannot exist. To attract CSO engagement, global policy spaces such as the GPEDC demonstrate a level of accession to CSOs' expectations

and interests that can justify MSPs' legitimacy in the sphere of global governance and policymaking.

1.2 Contextual background to the research problem

The Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-Operation: From traditional partnership to inclusive partnership in development cooperation

The donor-recipient relations long defined the aid effectiveness agenda. However, this exclusive international governance space in development cooperation[1] was breached when the Accra Action Agenda (AAA), the outcome document of the Third High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness (HLF3) (OECD 2008), acknowledged the need for all development actors to work together in an inclusive partnership. Further, it officially recognized CSOs as *"development actors in their own right"* (OECD 2008:4) along with the commitment to open up the process to include CSOs. As a follow-through of the agreements in the HLF3 in Accra, the Fourth High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness (HLF4) served another milestone in the development cooperation arena when it forged the Busan Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation (BPEDC). Mawdsley, Savage and Kim (2014:30) captured the remarks of Brian Atwood, then Chair of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development-Development Assistance Committee (OECD-DAC), that the core of the BPEDC lies at transforming the donor-recipient relations into a *"world of partners"* (Mawdsley, Savage and Kim 2014:30).

The BPEDC defined the four development effectiveness principles and was adopted by 161 countries and 56 organizations. The signatories are composed of governments, bilateral and multilateral organizations, and non-state actors such as CSOs, private sector, trade unions, and parliament representatives, among others (GPEDC n.d.[a]). From the BPEDC, the four development effectiveness principles are (OECD 2011[a]:3):

> "a. ***Ownership of development priorities by developing countries.*** *Partnerships for development can only succeed if they are led by developing countries, implementing approaches that are tailored to country-specific situations and needs;*

[1] Different from the old interpretation as the provision of financial and technical resources, development cooperation is now defined as an initiative that satisfies four criteria: *"1. …support national or international development priorities; 2. Is not driven by profit; 3. Discriminates in favour of developing countries; and, 3. Is based on cooperative relationships that seek to enhance developing country ownership"* (Alonso and Glennie 2015: 1-2).

b. ***Focus on results.*** *Our investments and efforts must have a lasting impact on eradicating poverty and reducing inequality, on sustainable development, and on enhancing developing countries' capacities, aligned with the priorities and policies set out by developing countries themselves;*

c. ***Inclusive development partnerships****. Openness, trust, and mutual respect and learning lie at the core of effective partnerships in support of development goals, recognising the different and complementary roles of all actors; and*

d. ***Transparency and accountability to each other.*** *Mutual accountability and accountability to the intended beneficiaries of our co-operation, as well as to our respective citizens, organisations, constituents and shareholders, is critical to delivering results. Transparent practices form the basis for enhanced accountability."*

The outcome of the discussions in the HLF4 reshaped the narrative of development cooperation by moving from aid effectiveness to development effectiveness. The development effectiveness agenda is not only concerned about the quantity of aid but also the quality of aid while adhering to rights-based development, as guided by the development effectiveness principles (*interview CSO10)*. To implement the development effectiveness agenda, the agreement in Busan is to target country-level work and to reinforce political implementation. The stakeholders in the HLF4 named the GPEDC as the institution that will support the realization of the development effectiveness agenda. The BPEDC defined the establishment of the GPEDC to become *"an open platform that embraces diversity, providing a forum for the exchange of knowledge and the regular review of progress" (*OECD 2011[a]*:*12*).*

Diagram 1: From Aid Effectiveness to Development Effectiveness



Source: OECD n.d.

The role of CSOs

CSOs' existence and role in society have been the subject of lengthy discourse in development. CSOs demonstrate the operationalization of *"the rights to peaceful assembly, free association and (to) free speech"* (IBON International 2010:11). They are the expression of people's aspirations and concerns, especially of marginalized groups in society, and the pursuit of social justice.

There is no precise definition of CSOs. Instead, they are described broadly according to their roles as advocacy-based, membership-based, and service-oriented (IBON International 2010:3) organizations. Since they are founded on social solidarity, they have a voluntary character and need to be independent of the state and the market. Over time, CSOs have taken a big leap as governance actors in pursuit of public interest by reinforcing active citizenship and demanding the state to respond to people's concerns. CSOs as development actors and change agents have been recognized by the OECD's Advisory Group on Civil Society and Aid Effectiveness (AG-CS), a consultative body comprised of representatives from the WP-EFF coming from northern and developing countries with representatives from Northern and Southern CSOs (Wood and Valot 2009:ii). According to the AG-CS's

consultations (OECD 2009:27), CSOs are critical in democracy building and the pursuit of good governance. They bring to the table the concerns that are likely overlooked, if not rejected, by the lawmakers and various bodies of the government. Additionally, they assume roles that are not fulfilled by the state or even the market.

Various groups started the global movement against the economic-centered development agenda, critiquing the political, trade, and financial system since the early 1970s (Hooghe, Lenz and Marks 2018:735). In the aid and development arena, CSOs have marked their presence in the official processes since 2005 (Wood and Valot 2009:5). They gradually became part of OECD/DAC Working Party on Aid Effectiveness (WP-EFF) meetings by employing various strategies such as informal discussions with state representatives, researches, and public discourses. The effective delivery of messages of CSOs and their growing demand to include the people in the development discussion made way to the formation of the AG-CS (Wood and Valot 2009:ii).

The growing concern of CSOs in aid effectiveness led to the formation of BetterAid (BA), a global platform of CSOs whose membership includes CSOs that work or are interested in engaging the issue on aid and development. It documented more or less 700 members coming from different continental regions (Tomlinson 2012:12). BA became the official representation of CSOs in the WP-EFF meeting in 2008 (Tomlinson 2012:9). It has its own governance structure and processes independent of the WP-EFF. Concurrent with BA's existence was the Open Forum for CSO Effectiveness (OF), another global CSO platform that dedicated its work to strengthening CSOs' effectiveness and accountability while advocating for an enabling environment for CSOs (OF 2011). Both platforms worked together to enhance each other's efforts.

The decision of CSOs in Busan to establish GPEDC drove BA and OF to merge and form the CSO Partnership for Development Effectiveness (CPDE), which became the CSO platform in which CSOs' engagement in GPEDC is being coordinated.

1.3 Justification and relevance of the study

Academic Relevance

While studies have been published to explore the legitimacy of MSPs, there remains a paucity of literature inquiring legitimacy of MSPs from the stakeholders' perspective. Assuming that perceptions of MSPs' stakeholders are crucial in deliberative legitimacy, it is then essential to problematize how their legitimacy beliefs are shaped. This study explores MSPs' legitimacy

veering away from the traditional route of assessing only the institutions and the technical aspects of the partnerships. Instead, it centers on a particular stakeholder's perception to uncover the complexities of legitimacy by diving into the concepts of normative and sociological legitimacy.

The GPEDC as a forerunner MSP in elevating the inclusion of non-state actors does not receive much attention among scholars as the development effectiveness agenda has been eclipsed by Agenda 2030. However, this does not entail that it is less relevant for exploration regarding legitimacy discourse. It is a rich ground to investigate the legitimacy of multistakeholderism from the perspective of CSOs as they gained a special place not only as members of GPEDC but also as part of the leadership.

Policy and Societal Relevance

The GPEDC, an MSP forged into fruition by the commitment of 160 countries, more than 45 international organizations, civil society, and private sector (Killen 2015:51), to work together to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals is a vital MSP to investigate. With CSOs as relatively newcomers in global governance, examining their perceptions of GPEDC's legitimacy can be considered a potential source of knowledge to understand better how MSPs' success can be derived, disputed, and measured.

Using the legitimacy lens, the study aims to contribute to CSOs' reflection in their role(s) as a governance actor in a multistakeholder partnership. Moreover, the findings in this study can help provide recommendations to address issues and concerns that undermine the potential of MSPs in delivering solutions to development problems.

1.4 Scope of the research

The scope of the research is confined to the value of legitimacy and the formation of legitimacy beliefs of CSOs in a multistakeholder environment with a focus on GPEDC. The legitimacy beliefs are established through empirical evidence from CSOs directly involved in the GPEDC at any given period since the GPEDC's formation. Other actors in the GPEDC were also contacted to present a more holistic context of the GPEDC's ecosystem. Primarily documents published online were included in the study, and the discussion in the research does not follow GPEDC themes. Instead, analysis followed the suggested criteria under the normative and sociological legitimacy as informed by the existing literature.

1.5 Research objective and research questions

The study aims to understand how and why legitimacy contributes to the success and failure of MSPs, looking at the GPEDC as a specific case. Since the strength of the MSPs lies in the collection of efforts of development actors to address global problems, this study encourages us to navigate the question of MSPs' legitimacy from the perspective of the stakeholders, starting with the less powerful actors, CSOs.

Main research question: How does legitimacy influence CSOs' engagement in GPEDC?

The sub-questions are as follows:

- How can the legitimacy of an MSP be conceptualized?
- How do CSOs define legitimacy?
- How do CSOs perceive GPEDC's legitimacy?

1.6 Research structure

The paper has six parts. Chapter 1 introduces the research topic by presenting the link between MSPs and legitimacy and discussing the GPEDC and CSOs. It includes the relevance of the research, its scope, and the questions it seeks to resolve. Chapter 2 elaborates the relevant concepts of MSPs and legitimacy and the analytical framework that is the basis in analyzing CSO's perception of the GPEDC's legitimacy. Chapter 3 focuses on the methodology employed in this study and the researcher's positionality and ethical considerations. Chapter 4 centers on the presentation of the empirical data and secondary data that were gathered. Chapter 5 provides the analysis by looking into how CSOs construct their legitimacy beliefs towards GPEDC by examining payoffs and trade-offs. Finally, Chapter 6 presents the conclusion and reflections that could be considered by CSOs' on their engagement in MSPs and for future research on MSPs and legitimacy.

Chapter 2
A brief review of the key concepts

This chapter provides a discussion of the relevant concepts utilized to investigate the inquiries of this research. The multistakeholder partnership and governance will be introduced to elaborate further on the concept of MSPs and situate better the GPEDC. Also, the theoretical framing of legitimacy is presented alongside the suggested approaches of conceptualizing legitimacy – the normative and sociological legitimacy and how to bridge these approaches.

2.1 Multistakeholder Partnerships (MSPs)

Summing up the arguments of Penrose, Zingerli, and Harris (Schaaf 2015:70), partnerships are understood as symbiotic relationships among the actors involved. Partners work towards a shared goal and exhibit *"trust, transparency, accountability, reciprocity and respect"* (Schaaf 2015:71). In a different light, for partnerships governed by terms and agreements, values mentioned earlier do not necessarily apply or will be difficult to locate (Robinson et al. in Schaaf 2015:71). Principally, it is because actors are tied with the other members of partnerships in other relations, or actors had former asymmetric power ties just like the former donor-recipient country relations. Furthermore, Arts claims (Visseren-Hamakers, Arts and Glasbergen 2007:141) that partnerships are an *"expression of recent political modernization processes."* The neoliberal agenda impacted the development landscape and led to the reevaluating of societal roles and governance arrangements (Visseren-Hamakers, Arts and Glasbergen 2007:141).

Partnerships evolved into MSPs once the engagement of various stakeholders was established. Stakeholders are the development actors who have a claim or influence in the decisions elaborated and decided upon in a particular development process (Hemmati 2002:3). The Agenda 21 (UNCED 1992) provided a clear reference to roles, duties, and importance of the involvement of the non-state stakeholders, the Major Groups[2], and what the governments should do to encourage the Major Group's participation in the processes towards sustainable development. By having a multistakeholder approach in addressing

[2] Agenda 21 defined the following as members of the Major Groups: women, youth, indigenous people, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), local authorities, workers and trade unions, business and industry, science and technology sector, and farmers (UNCED 1992).

complex development challenges, members of the society who are disenfranchised in development processes are allowed to engage in spaces traditionally not open to them.

In the 1992 Rio World Summit, Agenda 21 was adopted in which partnering in development through a multistakeholder manner was officially outlined (Polman 2016:2). As a process, the multistakeholder terminology was formally introduced in 1998 (Dodds in Hofmann 2016:31). Although in the global political sphere, multistakeholderism or multistakeholder approach has been applied by the International Labour Organization (ILO)since 1919 through its *"tripartite composition"* (Hofmann 2016:29) that involves governments and non-state actors such as the business groups and trade unions (Hofmann 2016:29). In a 2016 United Nations General Assembly resolution (UNGA 2016:4), partnerships were defined as

> *"voluntary and collaborative relationships between various parties, both public and non-public, in which all participants agree to work together to achieve a common purpose or undertake a specific task and, as mutually agreed, to share risks and responsibilities, resources and benefits."*

2.1.1 MSPs and governance

Another critical concept that goes with the discussion of MSPs is governance. Hyden (2011:20) defined governance as the development of the *"regime"* governing the *"public realm"* to which actors in the society come together to address people's issues concerning the protection and promotion of their well-being. In the absence of a global authority, MSPs use multistakeholderism as a governance model working on a specific or multiple global public concern/s with different actors on board. The trajectory of the governance model adopted by the MSPs is to assert authority while striving for "democratizing global governance" (Macdonald; Bäckstrand in Palladino and Santaniello 2021:24).

Given the limitations and deficits of intergovernmental processes, the multistakeholder approach provides a viable alternative to address the compounded development problems on a global scale. According to Hofmann (2016:30), this allowed MSPs to produce legitimate imagery of governance through a) presenting reality along with expectations and new measures and b) performativity of the *"tale of inclusion, diversity and bottom-up policymaking"* (Hofmann 2016:30)

One prominent example of an MSP that benefitted from a multistakeholder approach is the global actors working on information and communication technology (ICT). Through multistakeholder mechanisms, gaps and limitations in governance were proclaimed to have been attended to since the issues faced by the community in a fast-changing ICT

landscape are not confined to specific territories and required engagement by various actors (Türkelli 2021:202).

Meanwhile, Hurd notes the presence of asymmetrical power dynamics in global governance that produces *"winners and losers"* (2018:725). There is a push-pull relationship between the powerful and less powerful actors, which needs to be investigated when looking at the multistakeholder partnerships and the creation or strengthening of international cooperation.

2.2 Legitimacy

2.2.1 Defining legitimacy

According to some scholars, legitimacy is concerned about proving the appropriateness of a regime's authority (Hurd 2018:719; Anderson, Bernauer and Kachi 2019:661; Palladino and Santaniello 2021:24; Levi, Sacks and Tyler 2009:355; Tallberg and Zürn 2019:583) and its justification (Bodansky 1999:601) to drive a development agenda. It is a *"relational property"* (Tallberg and Zürn 2019:586) between the judgment of the governed and a regime's claim to rule. Thus, legitimacy can be detected by exploring the attitude towards the acceptance of and resistance against a regime (Hurd 2018:718). Meanwhile, Buchanan and Keohane (2006:411) and Besson (Hurd 2018:722) insist that legitimacy generates deference and support from actors devoid of self-interest, a content-independent approach of acknowledging an authority.

Social processes and interactions produce legitimacy beliefs. These legitimacy beliefs fluctuate depending on the context of the actors and audiences and after a period of time (Tallberg and Zürn 2019:586). The process that produces legitimacy beliefs is called legitimation (Tallberg and Zürn 2019:588). It enables us to comprehend the relevant actors' interpretation of the structure and dynamics within a regime and how adjustments and innovations are established and recognized (Zelditch 2006:347). Hurd underscores the political and governance roles of legitimation as it *"changes the relationship between individuals and the organization, from opposition to support"* (2018:724).

Arriving at legitimacy beliefs (i.e., what is appropriate/inappropriate and justified as legitimate/illegitimate) is not randomly determined since it is constituted around systems of norms, beliefs, practices, values, etc. (Zelditch and Walker 2003:221; Suchman 1995:574; Tallberg and Zürn 2019; Anderson, Bernauer and Kachi 2019:673). It is dependent on collective acceptance (Bernstein in Baäckstrand 2006:291) and defining bases for support to the

positions of other actors (Bodansky 1999:603). Such acquiescence and endorsement are granted to the regime and not to a specific actor or outcome as legitimacy can be used to forego one's position in favor of the others (Bodansky 1999:602). Legitimacy is less susceptible to shocks brought by specific challenging events but at the same time *"dependent on a history of events"* (Suchman 1995:574). The claim to legitimacy can be established and maintained if an organization produces policies that are beneficial to society and more so if it can successfully defend *"universality"* despite not being able to satisfy some constituencies (Zelditch and Walker 2003:221).

In the governance model of MSPs, legitimacy is an essential element that brings together its existence and success. The voluntary character of MSPs in global governance does not give ground to use coercion to acquire support and deference (Palladino and Santaniello 2021:23; Hurd 2018:719). Legitimacy, on the other hand, is an effective instrument to enrich compliance and build the confidence of the stakeholders towards an organization without force and impositions (Bodansky 1999:603; Hurd 2018:723; McEwen and Maiman 1986: 257). MSPs need to ensure that their legitimate imagery is achieved and maintained to continue their strong position to coordinate different actors, pool resources, achieve compliance to international standards, and create new norms and rules that benefit from a bottom-up governance approach.

2.2.2 The Normative and Sociological Legitimacy

There are two widely accepted conceptualizations of legitimacy - normative legitimacy and sociological legitimacy. According to Tallberg and Zürn (2019:591), conceptualizing legitimacy in a normative approach relies on the *"exercise of authority as rightful and worthy of recognition"* using standards that are based on the principles of *"justice, public interest, democracy"* (Tallberg and Zürn 2019:591) and *"moral, political and legal theory"* (Bodansky 2013:327). Meanwhile, sociological legitimacy focuses on the "actors' perception of an institution's authority as appropriately exercised" (Tallberg and Zürn 2019:11). It provides *"empirical and explanatory arguments"* concerning people's beliefs on the legitimacy of a regime and the reasons that lead to these (Bodansky 2013:327).

Applying both normative and sociological legitimacy concepts can yield two different legitimacy beliefs. To illustrate this, I borrowed Tallberg and Zürn's and Gegout's presentations of the International Criminal Court's (ICC) legitimacy. In the normative legitimacy sense, ICC is deemed legitimate in relation to normative standards such as the *"rule of law"* (Tallberg and Zürn 2019:587). However, in the sociological legitimacy sense, ICC suffers

legitimacy crisis when it comes to the attitudes of some states towards ICC, with some states voting against it or their pronouncements that ICC acts as *"judicial bully"* (Gegout 2013:803).

Elements of Normative Legitimacy

Normative legitimacy is usually conceptualized using the following elements: output, input, and throughput. Schmidt (2013) adapted former US President Abraham Lincoln's adage on democracy where Lincoln depicted democracy as having a government by the people, of the people, and for the people. Schmidt (2013:4) used this to describe the elements of normative legitimacy as *"output for the people, input by (and of) the people and throughput with the people"* - an illustration that is seemingly influenced by Scharpf's working assumption that in understanding normative legitimacy is equated to a *"legitimate government"* (2006:2) that provides for its people and ensures that the collective interests prevail.

Input legitimacy is mainly concerned with the *"participatory quality"* of the processes and the institution (Schmidt 2013:4). It looks at the inclusion level of the stakeholders most affected by the agenda and the operation of the MSP and their representation (Palladino and Santaniello 2021:33) and the responsiveness of the rulers (Scharpf 2006:2; Quack 2010:7). When we say inclusiveness, this does not refer to mere quantity and diversity of membership. Instead, it emphasizes the involvement of the relevant actors (Mena and Pelazzo 2012:15). To prevent domination of a particular sector, a balance in representation needs to be secured and not only expanding the membership. Lastly, input legitimacy is assessed in terms of the representativeness of those engaging in the MSPs to answer whether those who participate are chosen by their constituencies and articulate the voices of those they represent (Palladino and Santaniello 2021:33).

Next, output legitimacy establishes the effectiveness of a regime's governance in delivering the development objectives and solving common societal problems while preventing exploitations and pursuing self-interests (Scharpf 2006:4). Bäckstrand (2006:295-296) suggests two approaches in assessing output legitimacy, *"outcome effectiveness"* and *"institutional effectiveness."* The outcome effectiveness refers to the success in achieving an institution's set goals and ambitions. This aspect is challenging to measure and assess since these require considerable time to implement aside from the lack of concrete, quantifiable outcomes (Bäckstrand 2006: 295; Palladino and Santaniello 2021:36). On the other hand, institutional effectiveness looks into the institutional structure, leadership, and management that drive the MSP to its goals (Bäckstrand 2006: 295).

Finally, to explain the governance processes and actors' interactions and dynamics, which Schmidt calls the *"black box"* (2013:5), he conceptualizes throughput legitimacy, the governance process that goes in between input and output legitimacy. Throughput looks into the *"procedural quality"* and *"discursive quality"* of the governance processes (Palladino and Santaniello 2021:35). Some of the significant criteria to be considered under procedural quality are fairness, accountability, and transparency. Fairness secures equitable and substantive participation of the stakeholders in the MSP processes (Palladino and Santaniello 2021:35; Dellmuth, Scholte and Tallberg 2019:635). Thus, fairness pertains to the practice of allowing members to voice concerns and act proactively. Meanwhile, accountability is assessed on how actors take responsibility for their actions, which goes hand in hand with transparency which pertains to access to resources and information (Schmidt 2013:6). Regarding discursive quality, Palladino and Santaniello (2021:35-36) characterize this with how actors' varying positions are presented in the debates and discussions and the openness of the process to take positions from the non-dominant actors in the MSPs.

In practice, the input, throughput, and output legitimacy cannot be encased independently. These can share the same criteria at some point. For instance, accountability and transparency can be used to assess not just the procedural quality under throughput legitimacy and review an MSP's institutional effectiveness in terms of its governance arrangements under output legitimacy. These then bring to the fore the argument that legitimacy requirements are both procedural and substantive. Also, it is not possible to establish exact direct relations between the three elements of normative legitimacy. For example, it is inappropriate to automatically presume that legitimate inputs automatically result in legitimate outputs or deficiencies in throughputs will mean illegitimate outcomes.

Elements of Sociological Legitimacy

The other side of political orders, structures, and claims of legitimacy are the actors finding meanings to accord acknowledgment, engagement, and compliance. Here, scrutinizing the experiences and expectations of the regime is vital. Discerning legitimacy through social context and power is critical to give meaning and explanation of the relations between the political authority of an institution and the stakeholders, including the public (Hurd 2018:727) and the compromises, costs, and rewards of awarding legitimacy (Hurd 2018:725).

Bondansky (2018) offers a set of areas of inquiries to empirically examine the sociological legitimacy of international institutions, which captures the following:

- Criteria of legitimacy that the actors consider;
- Degree of perception of legitimacy;
- Effects of the legitimacy (or illegitimacy) perception in relation to compliance, effectiveness, stability, etc.;
- Sincerity of the legitimacy belief vs. self-interest; and
- Power dynamics and achievement of equality.

Meanwhile, Tallberg and Zürn (2019:590) argue that the legitimacy beliefs of international organizations can be derived from two differing perspectives. The first one centers on the international organization's features which capture the actors' interest– authority, procedures, and performance. Au contraire, the second perspective assumes that actors' have limited resources that will allow them to assess an international organization's legitimacy rationally. Thus, cues and heuristics are employed. Legitimacy beliefs from these two perspectives are affected by factors emanating from individual experiences and social dynamics (Tallberg and Zürn 2019:592). This framework was critiqued by Hurd (2018) for leaving out the emphasis on power and politics and the contestations that happen between different actors. Hooghe, Lenz and Marks (2018), on the other hand, indicate that the proposition of Tallberg and Zürn misses the political ideologies on the ground as the basis of the legitimation processes and legitimacy beliefs and not the organizational features of an international organization.

2.2.3 Bringing together normative legitimacy and sociological legitimacy

Although generally accepted as viable measures to assess legitimacy, normative and sociological dimensions of legitimacy are not unchallenged. The stability of having normative expectations is a positive characteristic of normative legitimacy; thus, legitimacy beliefs emanating from the normative approach are widely acceptable and significant to drive changes in MSPs. The danger in this approach is that it is less attentive and responsive to the stakeholders' experiences and changes that are happening over time (Quack 2010:7). Since legitimacy beliefs generated from the normative-based approach are diverse, it reduces, if not ignores, the intricacies of a regime. On the other hand, the researcher believes that sociological legitimacy can fall into the trap of being heavily tied to the subjective ideals of a particular actor that cannot be generalized due to limited experiences, limited or lack of a priori knowledge, among others. The compounded structure and dynamics emanating from differing positions

of power of actors add layers of critical complexities to reveal the legitimation (and delegitimation) process that produces the legitimacy beliefs of the actors of the MSPs. Hurd (2018:728) argues that *"governance is a relation of power"*. At the same time, Bernstein (2005:144) determines that legitimacy can be regarded as *"a source of power"* by empowering or disabling actors through policies and institutions that are forged through it. Meanwhile, adopting Weber's proposition of social validity and subjective validity of a structure, Netelenbos (2016:2) contends that *"structures and institutionalized claims of legitimacy"* are as critical as how these are perceived and interpreted by societal actors in political legitimacy.

Given such statements, it will be impractical and erroneous to define legitimacy in an either-or approach by choosing between normative and sociological legitimacy. The value of having the two legitimacy concepts and their complementarity stands. Thus, it is critical to adopt a visioning of legitimacy that will coalesce *"subjective normative agreement with the objective structures and processes of politics"* (Netelenbos 2016:2).

2.3 Analytical Framework

The quest of the study is to understand how CSOs' legitimacy beliefs influence their engagement in GPEDC. To be able to do this, the legitimacy net needs to be cast far and wide. The framework suggests presenting the assessment using both concepts of normative and sociological legitimacy. Understanding both will allow us to trace the interaction between what is happening in the GPEDC and CSOs' experienced reality. The interaction of these two can potentially expose the politics of *legitimation* and *delegitimation*, which are usually eclipsed in exploring legitimacy (Hurd 2018:723).

The consideration in this study is that legitimacy provides rationalization of CSOs' acceptance or non-acceptance of GPEDC's legitimacy claims, bearing in mind that CSOs might have experiences and objectives that conflict with the other actors involved and the GPEDC in its entirety. Following Lejano's (2021:361) argument that attitudes towards policies and institutions cannot be readily determined by rules and regulations but also through the relations of the actors, and Hurd's proposition (2018:275) that situating legitimacy as political discourse is inevitable in global governance since MSPs entail *"political choices"* (Hurd 2018:275) – legitimacy can be framed in a transactional manner rather than straightforward causal relations of events. The transactional relations are defined by how CSOs process their subjective disposition in GPEDC as an institution in which power and structure exist. In this case, normative legitimacy is as important as sociological legitimacy.

Exploring the trade-offs and payoffs for CSOs in engaging the GPEDC will explain the relational value within GPEDC and the political choices of CSOs, which are believed to shed light on their legitimacy beliefs towards GPEDC. Payoffs are the expected and unexpected gains that CSOs perceive they achieve or receive in engaging GPEDC. Meanwhile, trade-offs describe the conditions and situations that CSOs need to manage or CSOs' positions to be given up to realize payoffs. Investigating trade-offs and payoffs is argued to capture legitimacy as derivatives of processing what is known by the actors together with the institutions and politics and power dynamics that go with these institutions, which may or may not be known to the actors before they become part of GPEDC. We go back to the beginning of this Chapter which defines legitimacy beliefs as products of social process and interaction that suggest dynamism and possible changes at particular points in time and setting but at the same time with reference to the structure and system that the actor is engaging.

Diagram 2: Analytical Framework



Source: Author's own illustration.

Chapter 3
Methodology and Methods

This chapter illustrates how the researcher obtained the data and its relevance in the study and how these were processed to respond to the research queries. The researcher's biases, ethical considerations, and limitations are also laid down in this section to ensure transparency and critical reading of the analysis of the findings.

The previous chapter defines the elements and interactions that lead to CSOs' legitimacy beliefs towards GPEDC. The analytical framework commits to present these using transactional relations of CSOs through trade-offs and payoffs. Since the commitment is to investigate these through the normative and sociological sense of legitimacy, the study leans towards critical realism. The study's orientation cannot settle between positivism, constructivism, or interpretivism. Easton's (2010) presentation on the limitations of choosing any of the three is adopted. Not all aspects of relations and interactions are observable and quantified; relying on experiences will deny other objective details of events outside the realm of CSOs' experiences, and refusing the possibility of causality and reality does not match the concepts of legitimacy both in its normative and sociological sense.

The study is qualitative research that used two methods, key-informant interviews (KIIs) and desk research. Since the study focuses on the GPEDC as the specific case study, the information gathered is related to GPEDC's operations and CSOs' work in this global MSP.

3.1 Primary data: Qualitative interviews

A total of 23 semi-structured key-informant interviews (KIIs) were conducted among representatives from CSOs, a partner country, donor countries, and multilateral organizations based in the continental regions of Africa, Asia, Europe, Middle East and North Africa, and North America. The respondents either had worked with or actively engaged with GPEDC. This method of interviewing was preferred to collect empirical evidence to support the framework described in Chapter 2 and at the same time surface other significant information that was not captured in the questioning plan (O'Leary 2017:240).

The respondents were identified from the researcher's network in her former role as part of the CSO community that engages in the GPEDC. Invitations for interviews were sent to target respondents through email and messaging platforms. Since these are former

colleagues of the researcher, the contact details were easily accessed, and the response rate is relatively high. Those who were not able to make it to the interview were limited by logistical challenges caused by problems in schedule[3], COVID-19[4], or bureaucracy[5]. The initial list of respondents was expanded based on the recommendations of the interviewees. Interviews via different communication platforms were organized from 23 July to 20 August, and each interview lasted from 45 minutes to one hour. Since there are two main categories of respondents, two sets of questioning plans were prepared (*See Appendix 1 for the Interview Guide and Questioning Plan*).

The feedback from the members of the CSO community[6] provides insights and data on how and when they engage in the GPEDC, their actual experiences as CSOs, their observations in being part of the institution and the processes in this multistakeholder partnership, and how these all affect their perception of GPEDC's legitimacy. The other respondents outside CSOs augment the secondary data, discussing GPEDC's relevance and its operations. Their responses also offer insights regarding the roles of CSOs as development actors in their own right and how these translate in their engagement in the GPEDC.

Although the number of respondents outside the CSO community does not match that of CSOs', it is believed that the information gathered is sufficient to establish the overall context of the relations and the dynamics in the GPEDC. Admittedly, the data could have been more robust, especially with the feedback coming from the partner countries since behavior change is expected to actualize at the country level.

Appendix 2 provides an overview of the respondents and the interviews conducted. Since the right to confidentiality was invoked in this study, the complete details of the respondents' identities were left out.

3.2 Analysis of Secondary Data

GPEDC documents were reviewed to understand the GPEDC's history, structure, and processes. These included but were not limited to the following: the GPEDC's Theory of

[3] July and August are usually the downtime for many offices in Europe and North America.
[4] The COVID-19 pandemic caused many changes, especially in CSOs' operations. Some of the previously identified interviewees were out in the field and could not accommodate online interviews due to various reasons.
[5] Some representatives from the state need to receive clearance first from their superiors. The timing of the interviews (see note 2) made it difficult to process the permit for some of the target respondents.
[6] Not all CSO respondents are members of the CPDE.

Change, progress reports, work programs, and Steering Committee (SC) reports. The outcome documents of the GPEDC High-Level Meetings (2014 and 2016) and Senior Level Meeting (2019) were also revisited. Meanwhile, the CPDE's Report to the Public, which is released yearly, and issued statements of CSOs serve as the main documents to inform on the positions and activities of CSOs in the GPEDC.

3.3 Limitations

Throughout the conduct of the research, I identified the following limitations:

1. The number of respondents in this research is small compared to the actual number of development actors in GPEDC and development cooperation, in general. Most of CSOs interviewed are members of the CPDE who have direct engagement in GPEDC[7]. Representatives of non-CPDE members who were interviewed have engagements with GPEDC either through direct initiatives or through CPDE. Others had been part of the earlier processes that led to the formation of the GPEDC.
2. Respondents from state actors are minimal. The study could have benefitted more from the perspectives of the state representatives, especially from the partner countries, to ascertain better the dynamics at the country level and give more insights on the global-light, country-heavy approach.
3. The responses of the interviewees do not represent the official positions of their organizations.
4. Not all official documents are accessible to the public.
5. Despite the availability of technology that supports distance interviewing, challenges were encountered due to slow internet connections or power outages.

The logistical drawbacks were foreseen when designing the research plan; thus, the researcher allocated ample time for data gathering. Also, besides online communication platforms, interviewing through mobile and landlines was also made available to remedy the digital divide.

Although the number and diversity of the interviewees in the study are relatively narrow compared to the actual stakeholders of the GPEDC, this is not seen as problematic since the actual respondents satisfy the defined scope of the study. The study focuses on CSOs' legitimacy beliefs; thus, CSOs need to be the central informants. In the end, the

[7] Not all CPDE members have direct engagement with GPEDC or are active members of the CPDE.

research should be treated as a potentially useful data source contributing to future discourses on CSOs' legitimacy perception, GPEDC, and MSPs, in general.

3.4 Ethical Consideration

Since the data collection was conducted online, issues on confidentiality and data security were floated. In addressing such concerns, informants were assured of their rights to confidentiality and privacy. I explained the purpose of the study thoroughly to the respondents to clarify the boundaries of the usage of collected information.

I conscientiously practiced reflexivity throughout the research process to ensure that my own experiences and biases were checked to prevent inaccurate representation of information gathered. Since most of the respondents are my former colleagues, I constantly underscored my position as a student researcher and not as a member of the CSO community. I intend to present and understand better the legitimacy perception of the CSOs and the dynamics and potential areas for improvement in GPEDC, in MSPs in general, to achieve transformative change.

3.5 Positionality

The researcher's positionality is essential to consider as this can influence the interpretation of the information gathered for the study.

For over a decade, I had been part of the CSO community working on policy and advocacy related to aid and development, consumers' rights, and women's rights. My background in the development sector allowed me to directly engage in multistakeholder processes and initiatives, including the GPEDC, the Task Team on CSO Development Effectiveness and Enabling Environment, and the UN Major Groups, and work closely with various CSOs at the international, regional, and local levels. While I appreciate the value of MSPs and the importance of participation of different development actors, especially those who are traditionally *out of the tent,* my experiences also exposed me to the complexity and ambiguity of the multistakeholder processes and institutions. Expectations and actual practices are not usually congruent, resulting in different appreciation of the CSO work in these areas and at the same time raising questions on the value of the multistakeholder partnerships in addressing the worsening multiple crises that the world is confronting.

My strong connection with the CSO community and issues from the South made me aware of the different debates on the necessity to engage the GPEDC and other MSPs, the diverse motivations, and varied appreciation of the legitimacy of the MSPs. I was involved with the CSO work in GPEDC for almost ten years, giving me the foundational knowledge and context of the respondents' feedback. On the other hand, I have not been directly involved in GPEDC for almost three years; thus, my previous knowledge was used to carefully explore the information provided by the respondents and the documents. There was a deliberate effort on my end not to accept information at face value. Partnerships such as GPEDC present political dynamics that need to be fleshed out to understand how norms and beliefs interact. In any case, I hold on to the perspective that development partnerships serve different levels of importance to CSOs' work as development actors, which can thereby explain CSOs' legitimacy beliefs of MSPs, such as GPEDC. Given my prior work and relations with the actors in GPEDC, I believe I have a level of *access to the kitchen,* so to speak. By using the legitimacy concept, I want to understand better the value of MSPs and CSOs' place in these global governance formations to maximize their unique position as an equal actor in development.

Chapter 4
Presentation of findings

This chapter surfaces the experiences and insights of the respondents using the criteria of sociological and normative concepts of legitimacy. It also presents the information gathered from the secondary data that substantiate the interviewees' feedback.

4.1 Entering the new age of development cooperation

The disappointments from the past and worsening economic, socio-political, and environmental crises led to inevitable changes in the development cooperation. The first High-Level Forum (HLF1) in Rome in 2002 embodied a donor-driven concept of aid. It was left unchallenged and did not hold much traction for the recipient countries because the conversations were highly technical, non-inclusive, and lacked political value (Abdel-Malek 2015:69). To remedy such a problem, the donor community started engaging the partner countries after HLF1. Towards the HLF2 in Paris, there was already a recognition of the need to strengthen the collaboration of donors and recipient countries to implement aid effectiveness even though doubts continued to ensue on the capacity of the latter (Abdel-Malek 2015:87).

CSOs worked hard to bring into the discussions how aid should be used in development and not only how aid is transferred from donor to recipient countries. With the inclusion of recipient countries in the aid effectiveness in the discussion, CSOs naturally gained a higher ground to carve their fight inside this global policy arena by highlighting social issues and rights-based development concerns. The HLF3 in Accra, as mentioned earlier, recognized the other actors in the society outside the state to drive the development agenda. By the conclusion of HLF4 in Busan, a multistakeholder partnership was conceived through GPEDC.

> *"There was a realization that aid effectiveness cannot be achieved without the involvement of the partner countries and non-state development actors. It was a very wise decision of first opening it up to the partner countries and then opening it up to the civil society organizations (interview MLO2)."*

A development milestone was marked in the HLF4 by adopting the Busan Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation (BPEDC) that committed to working towards *"a new, inclusive and representative"* partnership (OECD 2011[a]:12). With the understanding that the GPEDC does not exist in a silo but as part of the more extensive development

architecture, the GPEDC's Theory of Change (ToC) defined the partnership as one of the means of driving Agenda 2030, how working together among partners can be implemented and how the outcomes of the GPEDC's work contribute to the *"real world"* (Davis 2016:5). To bring into fruition the goals of the GPEDC, the ToC pointed out the need to produce evidence as a basis of change in development practice through monitoring and evaluation and promote effective partnerships among various actors (Davis 2016:7).

A global-light country-heavy approach is seen as the mechanism that will move the GPEDC with development actors working together and holding each other accountable. In addition, unlike the Working Party on Aid Effectiveness (WPEFF), the GPEDC has been moved to be jointly supported by a Joint Support Team (JST) which is hosted by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). This move was made to attend to the concern regarding OECD's legitimacy being an exclusive institution (Kindornay & Samy 2012:9). With the collaboration of OECD and UNDP, the former provides *"effectiveness and expertise"* while the latter offers *"legitimacy"* (Kindornay & Samy 2012:7).

The HLF 4 in Busan produced new energy that coalesces states and non-state development actors to work on development effectiveness that will support the realization of Agenda 2030. Stakeholders share the effectiveness principles and welcome the new ways of working in development cooperation that depart from the confines of technicalities and authority of donors.

> *"The GPEDC was regarded as a springboard for us to catapult in one direction. We see the whole project as a mirror where we check our gaps and improvements. The GPEDC presented innovative ways of partnering with others which we have not practiced before, and the primacy of country ownership stood out for us, which we believe should be the trajectory of development (interview Partner1)."*

> *"Something that I find unique about the global partnership is its membership which is composed of so many different constituencies. It allows different constituencies to engage on an equal footing. If you go to the UN and participate in an event at the UN General Assembly or the UN Economic and Social Council, you will find that governments are the ones that have seats at the table. The civil society and other actors have minimal space to engage (interview MLO4)."*

4.2 CSOs in the GPEDC

Through CSO Partnership for Development Effectiveness (CPDE), CSOs embarked on GPEDC with the vision of a world that regards and promotes human rights, democracy, and social and environmental justice (CPDE 2012). As an *"open platform"* (CPDE 2012: 2), its membership extends to different sectors and continental regions and work at the global, regional, and country levels. Some organizations work on advocacy and campaign, research, and service delivery, capturing various issues from rights, justice, development, trade, and climate change, to name a few. In consultation with the membership, CPDE developed inclusive and representative governance structures and processes that link the country, regional, and global membership (CPDE 2012:11-14).

CSOs believe that with the manifold crises around the world, they need to engage in global partnership and pursue a transformative agenda for development and development cooperation. They advocate for a human-rights-based approach to development and states to fulfill aid and development effectiveness commitments and other internationally agreed development goals (CPDE 2012). CSOs in CPDE commit to upholding the development effectiveness agenda by being partners and watchdogs while also improving their effectiveness (ibid).

4.2.1 Why CSOs take part in the aid and development agenda

GPEDC is seen as an invited space for some CSOs. Cornwall (2002:23-24) characterizes such a space where citizens engage in setting agendas and shaping policies. In GPEDC, CSOs were delegated a position where they could fulfill a dimension of their role as development and governance actors. But for many, they regard GPEDC as a product of CSOs' campaigning and peoples' struggles that have been going on for decades. Although the debates around the issue do not necessarily cause serious problems, these affect how they conduct their work in the partnership and their expectations from their engagement with GPEDC.

All these withstanding, there is a resounding acknowledgment among those interviewed that the GPEDC is a space, whether invited, claimed, or both, that offers a lot of potentials to deliver transformative change in development because of its multistakeholder character. The institutionalization of space for CSOs is seen as a breakthrough in global governance, and the presence of donors and partner countries are fundamental reasons for some CSOs to regard GPEDC as an essential institution to engage.

"This is civil society in action in the global development policy arena. In a way, GPEDC provided us a unique space, a first of its kind, where CSOs can conduct an exceptional experiment of pushing and making gains on having civil society formally at the table with the donors and countries. It gave us a unique opportunity to break some ground or do things differently, and that itself is enough to support it (interview CSO13)."

Overall, CSOs embrace the GPEDC's agenda and principles. However, this recognition and acquiescence involve complex issues that need to be unpacked. As CSOs come from different histories, contexts, and capacities, they have nuanced explanations for why they need to be part of the GPEDC.

GPEDC's agenda vis-à-vis CSOs' agenda

One of the common reasons provided by respondents when asked about the basis of their support to GPEDC is the direct relevance of GPEDC's agenda to their own. This is especially apparent for CSOs who have long-term engagements in development cooperation and development finance, policy and advocacy areas which are mostly dominated by policy or research-based CSOs in the north. Others mention that they have been part of the aid effectiveness process. Their involvement in the lead-up to Busan and the adoption of Busan Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation (BPEDC) created a sense of civil society ownership of development effectiveness. It is a critical reasoning behind their intention to believe and support GPEDC. Specifically for CPDE, since it was involved in the negotiations on how the GPEDC will function.

"The agenda that the GPEDC is meant to drive forward on development effectiveness is something we completely adhere to and want to advocate for. There is legitimacy on the content of the agenda, and the GPEDC is the combination of what CSOs have been asking for up until Busan (interview CSO5)."

For country-level and sectoral CSOs from the South, they find an alignment in their agenda and that of GPEDC's on the basis of the opportunity to seek redress as attacks on sovereignty and people's rights and environmental destructions are directly linked to official development assistance (ODA) projects. Such development concerns are captured on what GPEDC aims to address with the development effectiveness principles.

"…in the context of protecting our river, our forest, our land, and other natural resources, we see an increased intrusion not just of corporations but also financing of multilateral financial institutions. These ODA projects are in conflict with the communities for violating human rights and non-

involvement and lack of consultation and consensus of the directly and indirectly affected communities. The BPEDC commits to addressing these through the development effectiveness principles (interview CSO3)."

Overall, there is a general appreciation that the BPEDC and the formation of the GPEDC raised the bar in development policy discussions. The intention of the GPEDC to promote and implement the international development agreements at the country level (OECD 2011[a]) was seen as a strong factor that merits support and acknowledgment of CSOs, especially with the commitment to protect and promote the enabling environment for civil society.

Reflecting on CSOs' experiences and conditions on the ground

Tomlinson (2012:107-108) notes how CSOs suffer from a lack of enabling environment, causing them little or no space to be part of the consultations at the country-level. The limited openness of the state and other development actors to engage and support CSOs, lack of infrastructures for dialogues, and deterioration of democracy in the countries are the realities CSOs face at differing intensities. The GPEDC serves as an aperture for CSOs not only to participate in development policy discussions but to further develop their capacities as development actors outside service delivery and as mediators of aid for donors and communities, which for the donors are the most adequate and undisputed roles of CSOs (OECD 2011[b]:14). CSOs acknowledge that the diverse membership of the GPEDC promises a broad audience for them to showcase their work and learn from other stakeholders. If the spaces at the national level are restricted, opening up at the international level was seen as a way to increase CSOs' credibility and an approach to shifting attitudes towards CSOs.

Aside from the different appreciation of CSOs in the countries, the more critical concern that emerged from the discussion is the problematic state of affairs on the ground. Most of the time, these development issues are usually left untreated and confined inside the localities leading to the worsening situation, especially of the people in the margins. MSPs like GPEDC serve as an alternative route for CSOs to draw attention to realities often disregarded or unknown to the international community.

"People from the south are vulnerable, and we are witnessing a continuing turmoil in our region. We are exposed to huge devastating invasions. The capacity of the locals is becoming less and less influential, and we feel that the government has already abandoned its duties. We need to be everywhere, and we need to bring to the table our concerns to protect our rights (interview CSO1)."

Performing CSOs' role as development actors in their own right

Despite the wide range of particular concerns, strategies, and characteristics of CSOs interviewed, most of them explicitly mention that the fundamental reason for CSOs' existence is linked to advancing peoples' rights. They confirm that their engagement in GPEDC is centered on ensuring that development responds to the needs of the people while securing their effectiveness in representing the voices of their constituencies.

Strongly linked to the preceding sections of this chapter, CSOs underlined that it is their responsibility to engage in discussions on development to bring forth the aspirations of common people, who are treated as mere objects of development debates and hollow promises.

> *"We are motivated to engage GPEDC because this is a way of pursuing our development work. In deliberating the commitments in Busan and how the GPEDC was imagined, we believed we can follow through here the issues of democratic ownership of development agenda and transparency and accountability (interview CSO10)."*

CSOs believe that the international community has an obligation to support people's development, especially those from the margins, and, at the same time, exact accountability from states and big corporations. It is crucial for situations where national mechanisms can no longer support concerns brought by growing transnational transactions such as trade and finance (Armstrong and Gilson 2011:2). Some of the CSO respondents point out that the space provided by GPEDC allows them to add more pressure to states and other international organizations and hold big corporations accountable concerning the development aggressions that are happening on the ground.

Lastly, CSOs' roles include working on their effectiveness and accountability. Spaces such as GPEDC provide CSOs the opportunity to work with other CSOs. Expanding their reach among other CSOs gives them the prospect to reflect and ensure check and balance on their work. Working with thousands of CSOs from different countries and sectors allows them to compare notes and enrich their strategy. Engaging in GPEDC also expands their network, making them more credible among their constituencies and the wider public.

4.2.2 CSOs' experience in GPEDC

Bringing in the perspectives of CSOs on GPEDC's structure and leadership, processes, and impacts is an attempt to move beyond the traditional institutional-centric assessment of normative legitimacy. The ensuing discussions fuse the observations of CSOs and other empirical data with the dimensions of normative legitimacy. The latter was borrowed from Palladino and Santaniello's study in 2021:

- Inclusiveness, balanced representation, and representativeness (input legitimacy)
- Fairness, accountability, and discursive quality (throughput legitimacy)
- effectiveness of the structure to implement and deliver results (output legitimacy)

Input legitimacy

The principle of inclusiveness is high on the Busan Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation (BPEDC) agenda. It has been the gold badge of GPEDC, making it a lead institution promoting inclusive global partnership. It has universal membership and brings in the most diverse development actors in an MSP as equal players. It sets GPEDC apart from the Working Party on Aid Effectiveness (WP-EFF), which mostly was a donor-country-dominated body, or even from the UN; although considered more legitimate than the former or the OECD, which is only open for states' involvement.

With various development actors gathered together in one global partnership, the GPEDC (2020:12) claims to pool together a more significant number of resources and commitments to fulfill the development agenda. Moreover, the voluntary nature of the GPEDC allows its members to lead initiatives such as the Global Partnership Initiatives (GPIs) that help promote the development effectiveness agenda. This approach welcomes governance innovations, advances collaborations among various stakeholders, and reinforces the political will of development actors.

The governance structure of the GPEDC is composed of the Co-Chairs and the Steering Committee (SC), the ultimate decision-making body of GPEDC in which CSOs are members. In addition to the three original governmental Co-Chairs representing recipient countries, provider countries, and countries with both characters as both recipient and provider of development cooperation, the Nairobi Outcome Document of the 2nd High-Level Meeting (HLM) of the GPEDC recognized that a fourth Global Co-Chair needs to be instituted to ensure representation of non-state actors (GPEDC 2018[a]:31).

The campaign to expand the leadership to include non-state actors stemmed from CSOs' call prior to the official establishment of the GPEDC. They argue that the state does

not necessarily capture the peoples' aspirations in development cooperation. Furthermore, CSOs confirmed that at the global activities of the GPEDC, processes are in place that make sure CSOs are always represented in the panels and deliberations.

> *"GPEDC is a legitimate space for fulfilling the principles of inclusion and representation. In a way, us being part of the leadership loses the tokenistic approach that we see in other multistakeholder partnerships. We are not just invited, but we have real decision-making power in the structure (interview CSO5)."*

Nevertheless, despite these strong features and progress, CSOs raise the point that the voluntary nature of the GPEDC costs imbalance in the participation of members in different initiatives. From the interviews made, it was mentioned that those which are led by actors with more resources, *fashionable*, or are easy to execute gain more traction while those which are more political in nature, for example, the GPI on Civil Society Continuing Campaign for Effective Development[8] led by the CPDE and the GPI on Advancing the CSO Enabling Environment & CSO Development Effectiveness[9] led by the Task Team on CSO Development Effectiveness and Enabling Environment [10] do not receive adequate support from other members of the GPEDC. There are also observations by CSOs and other stakeholders of the GPEDC that there is a varied level of engagement coming from donor and partner countries.

> *"CSOs have been strongly engaged in achieving effective development cooperation throughout the years, whereas engagement by the private sector and by southern governments and global north governments fluctuate (interview MLO3)."*

On the issue of representativeness, CSOs are skeptical on whether the members of the GPEDC actually represent their constituencies or if they participate only as individuals

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[8] This GPI aims to promote and contribute to implementing international norms and standards that will enable CSOs to participate in multistakeholder dialogues meaningfully at all levels. It advocates for policy translation and concretization of the development effectiveness principles focusing on private sector accountability, South-South Co-operation, peace, and security. (GPEDC 2018[a]:38).

[9] This GPI intends to support the enhancement of Indicator Two of the GPEDC Monitoring Framework; promote CSO enabling environment and CSO development effectiveness; and build the capacity of development actors to effectively take part in carrying out Indicator Two (GPEDC 2018[a]:38).

[10] The Task Team is a multistakeholder initiative that consists of representatives from provider countries, partner countries, and CSOs who are members or have connections with CPDE (Task Team n.d.). It is an initiative that was brought about by the discussions in the WP-EFF.

or a member of their agency. Unlike CSOs who have established a coordination system, information on how the rest of the GPEDC's members choose their representatives is not known to many.

Throughput legitimacy

Multistakeholder governance is promising in achieving throughput legitimacy. In MSPs, the traditional representative democracy is being replaced by "stakeholder democracy" (Bernstein 2005:147), which expands deliberation procedures to non-state actors such as CSOs. In theory, then, multistakeholderism can deliver throughput legitimacy since it counters the hegemonic position of particular actors by virtue of stakeholder democracy and can guarantee fairness, accountability, and discursive quality. However, in reality, this is not as simple as it sounds due to multi-level operations, voluntary character, and heterogeneous membership, to name a few.

GPEDC's institutionalization of inclusive participation serves as a backbone towards achieving fairness that permits CSOs to not only engage in a tokenistic manner. The governance structure was designed to make room for actors to contest and deliberate issues and concerns in relation to GPEDC work, including the GPEDC Monitoring Exercise[11]. CSOs are present in the SC meetings where strategic decisions are made and are represented in the GPEDC leadership through the Non-Executive Co-Chair (NECC). They also share a seat with state representatives and other non-state actors in the HLM and Senior-Level Meeting (SLM) of the GPEDC. Aside from being physically present in meetings, CSOs, through the coordination of the CPDE, are able to submit written inputs ahead of the gatherings and dialogues. Although completing written submissions is an additional task for CSOs, this layer of work is appreciated. It ensures early sharing of room documents, giving them more time to coordinate and discuss CSOs' positions. At the same time, they have the opportunity to study the political stands of other actors for outreach and negotiations.

Unfortunately, the robustness of the global governance structure is not observed at the country level despite the global-light and country-heavy approach of the GPEDC. There are no institutionalized GPEDC country-level mechanisms in place, and in-country discussions happen voluntarily depending on the level of interest of the states. CSOs in countries

[11] To track the progress in achieving effective development cooperation through the development effectiveness principles, the GPEDC ventured into the Global Monitoring Exercise with the partner countries as leads. The monitoring framework has ten indicators to unpack the progress and bottlenecks in putting into practice the development effectiveness principles. The results of the GPEDC Monitoring Exercise feed into the monitoring and review of SDG 15 and SDG 5 (GPEDC 2018[b]:5).

account not being included in dialogues that are happening at the national level. An example is the GPEDC 2021 Action Dialogue (GPEDC 2021[a]), a partner country-led initiative that has been launched in 20 countries, so far. This initiative intends to bolster the multistakeholder approach to development at the national level and at the same time discuss the SDG implementation and COVID response and recovery (GPEDC 2021[a]). In the CPDE Room Document (CPDE 2021:3) prepared for the Steering Committee (SC) meeting in July 2021, CSOs conveyed the little space provided for them to take part in the Action Dialogue and the lack of guidance on how these are being organized.

CSOs under the CPDE umbrella have diverse expertise that enables them to engage substantially both at the technical and political levels. Despite this, CSOs are sometimes impeded in participating fully because some of the debates are highly technical, and there is no sufficient support provided to amplify the capacities of the CSOs. Essentially, this sentiment is shared by other members of GPEDC. The lack of human resources, financial means, and technical capability makes it difficult for CSOs and others to perform their roles fully in the governance processes.

> *"The level of technicalities involved in the GPEDC conversations sets some thresholds in our participation in the debates. If you are not able to go beyond those thresholds, you cannot be part of any significant discussions. The conversations on monitoring framework and reviews of indicators are some of these technical conversations where many members' participation is impaired (interview CSO6)."*

MSI1 also mentioned that financial constraints hamper the participation of some GPEDC members in country-level activities related to enhancing CSO engagement in development. Although the *MSI1* project can afford to subsidize a person or two to participate in the meetings they organize, contributions from other GPEDC members need to happen to involve a substantial number of relevant actors. Since there are challenges in resources for individual sectors, actors become highly selective in their engagement. Each initiative and GPEDC member need to raise resources independently as GPEDC does not directly provide financial resources to its members. The GPEDC budget is highly concentrated on the Joint Support Team's (JST) work and the work program implementation managed by JST. In the GPEDC 2020-2022 Work Programme (OECD and UNDP 2021), OECD presents a budget requirement of 4,968,352 EUR while UNDP proposes 4,360,430 USD (*See Appendix 3 for the complete budget requirements for JST*).

Regarding the issue of accountability, concerns are being directed to the voluntary character of the GPEDC. For one, check and balance is lacking as it relies heavily on self-regulation (*interview MLO3, Donor1, Partner1*). For instance, the GPEDC Monitoring Exercise, although crucial, does not serve the purpose of putting in place any corrective measures for non-delivery of commitments. CSOs cannot truly hold other GPEDC members to account if the monitoring exercise provides evidence of poor performance or even actions contradictory to the development effectiveness principles. Since its establishment, the GPEDC has had a growing list of commitments and grand plans which were not time-bound and without resources. Although these commitments without accompanying action plans at the country-level still exist, GPEDC now follows a two-year work program to remedy this problem slowly. As informed by the work program and monitoring exercise, the progress and challenges in the implementation of GPEDC work are reported in the GPEDC Global Progress Reports.

In addition to the issue of accountability and transparency, GPEDC lacks a system to confirm whether the representatives in the GPEDC meetings bring their constituencies' positions to the table. Unlike CSOs who consciously set up their deliberation and feedback mechanisms accessible to their members and even the wider public[12], other GPEDC members do not divulge how they form policy positions.

Lastly, under accountability, *CSO6* noted a gradual diminishing of conversational memory as the seasoned members of the GPEDC moved on. Debates need to restart, especially when state representatives change and, more importantly, when politics take center stage. The non-binding nature of MSPs is flexible to changes in positions, allowing positive but mostly negative results. *Donor2* mentioned that they used to have a program dedicated to supporting the implementation of the development effectiveness agenda. It was transformed abruptly when a new leader was elected. Meanwhile, CSOs are guided by their agenda in GPEDC as defined by its founding document, Building a CSO Partnership for Development Effectiveness (CPDE 2012) and the Civil Society Manifesto for Effective Development Cooperation (CPDE n.d.). Changes in CSO representation does not equate to change in CSO commitments.

[12] The CPDE publishes its work on its website: https://csopartnership.org/ and social media platforms such as Twitter: https://twitter.com/CSOPartnership, Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/CSOPartnership, YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/user/CSOPartnership, Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/csopartnership/ and LinkedIn: https://ph.linkedin.com/company/cso-partnership-for-development-effectiveness.

Looking at the discursive quality of the GPEDC, CSOs shared a common perception that they are able to present their views during deliberations in GPEDC. The positive points outlined above are sufficient to lay down the requirements towards deliberative processes that allow participation of CSOs in the decision-making processes and debates and inclusion of issues of CSOs in the GPEDC agenda and even in the Outcome Documents of the GPEDC's HLMs and SLM. GPEDC sets a space for CSOs to register their concerns while allowing governments and other stakeholders to be informed, at the very least. One of which is CSOs' opposition to big corporations and development finance institutions' expanding roles in development while exposing the real-life problems hinged on the big corporations' operations (Pereira 2016; Longid 2020).

Despite this, CSOs questioned the discursive quality of the GPEDC by noting that being part of discussions and processes hardly secure an ultimate win in the final decision (*interview CSO2*) or if deliberations at the global level change conditions on the ground. *MO7*'s example resonates with this statement. *MO7* described an instance when CSOs raised the issue of increased violations of human rights in Country X[13] and demanded Country X to abide by its commitment to protect and provide an enabling environment for CSOs. Country X defended that their policies are the best fit for their situation. The differences of opinions among the members of the GPEDC create tension in areas as such, for which in *MO7*'s view is not GPEDC's place to judge what is wrong or right.

On the other hand, CSOs' ability to offer differing opinions leads to provisional encouraging results. For instance, *CSO6* shared that in a Steering Committee (SC) meeting he participated in, they raised concerns on the ongoing review of the GPEDC monitoring framework, which is proposed to be revisited as some indicators are considered passé or redundant and that GPEDC monitoring exercise be done every four years instead of within a two year-interval. CSOs countered this proposal and emphasized the accountability of actors, completeness of the reality that the monitoring exercise needs to capture, and how the results can be leveraged to influence policies and behavior change. The SC meeting concluded with a summary that briefly mentions CSOs' concerns. Nonetheless, the debate on having a leaner monitoring framework is still ongoing; thus, giving more opportunity for CSOs to push for their position.

Overall, the throughput legitimacy of GPEDC present a mixed bag of perception among CSOs, but an important point remains valid for some:

[13] The respondent did not divulge the name of the country.

"In GPEDC, civil society has the same right as the government and equal rights with the private sector. We can discuss directly with the government and other stakeholders that are engaged in committing violence, and talk face-to-face. That is why it is very important. Whether the stakeholders are listened to, recognized, or taken in confidence, that is a different point (interview CSO3)."

Output legitimacy

The GPEDC targets to bring together all development actors to put into practice the development effectiveness principles and achieve Agenda 2030 by influencing policies and practices and evidence-based results (GPEDC n.d.[a]) that deliver development at the country-level (GPEDC 2020:5). GPEDC is a partnership in progress with *"common goals and differential commitments"* (OECD 2011[a]:12). It means that the development effectiveness principles serve as guideposts for members to carry out their responsibilities without any strings attached, and structures and priorities can change over time.

Such a lenient setting in GPEDC brings forward flexibility in governance arrangements which some CSOs receive positively. One concrete positive outcome is the change in the old form of leadership in the development cooperation forum that has always been exclusive to states. The eventual installation of the NECC, which according to *CSO9,* is an *"important piece of the puzzle"* in operationalizing inclusive partnership, which the GPEDC promotes. This innovation in governance arrangement provides leverage to CSOs' positions in governance processes. *MOI2* finds this change a wise move for the partnership to demonstrate the value of non-state actors' voice in development cooperation and strengthen monitoring and implementation of GPEDC's targets.

While inclusiveness and representativeness are essential in the GPEDC's structure, processes and leadership give GPEDC a foothold for CSOs, which caused a backlash on several fronts. *CSO5* shared that it may not be the case; still, different actors have a brewing assumption that some of the tough issues were brought back to multilateral organizations or state-to-state negotiations instead of deliberating these within GPEDC. The inclusive consultation processes result in inefficiencies aside from the fact that non-state actors such as CSOs will have the chance to contest (*interview CSO5*). Examples of this are the discussions on the modernization of aid and blended financing, which are deliberated in OCED-DAC. Despite their relevance on aid and development effectiveness discourse, these have not been high in the GPEDC agenda (*interview CSO5).* The suspicions may or may not be accurate, but it upsets the relevance and acceptability of GPEDC for CSOs and the rest of the GPEDC's membership.

As for the voluntary nature of the GPEDC, although it provides like-minded actors to collaborate and harmonize their work, it can also cause inconsistent results and misaligned actions and commitments. For one, as mentioned earlier, the inclusive multistakeholder governance structures and processes do not have institutionalized country-level counterparts among the country members of GPEDC. Also, in the CPDE Report on Effective Development Cooperation, Tomlinson (2019) accounts important points that arose from Indicator 2[14] of the GPEDC Third Monitoring (3MR) that attest such a statement. In Diagram 3 (Tomlinson 2019:53), it is shown that CSOs and governments from 39 developing countries who responded to Indicator 2 ranked development partners' (DPs)[15] performance as lacklustre. Thirty-three out of 39 CSOs (85%) while 36 out of 39 governments (92%) scored DPs' performance below moderate when it comes to consulting CSOs, providing resources to CSOs, and promoting CSO enabling government together with the governments, and transparency in their work with CSOs (Tomlinson 2019:52). From the same report, Tomlinson (2019:59) informs that out of the 86 countries in total that responded in the entire 3MR, 62 countries (72%) are categorized in the CIVICUS Monitor[16] as countries in which civic space are *"closed, repressed, or obstructed"* (Tomlinson 2019:59). This data suggests that the disconnect in the commitments at the global level and the actions at the country level goes beyond the governance processes and structure described earlier in the chapter.

[14] Indicator 2 measures the progress in realizing the enabling environment for CSOs and their development effectiveness (GPEDC 2018:62)
[15] Development partners are defined as the "bilateral and multilateral agencies and funds" from which countries receive "official development co-operation funding" (GPEDC 2018:2).
[16] The CIVICUS Monitor is a study led by CIVICUS that reviews the condition of civic space in 195 countries (Tomlinson 2019:58).

Diagram 3: Assessment of Practice in Development Partner Support for CSO Enabling Environment



Source: Tomlinson 2019:53

For almost ten years since its establishment, the GPEDC has completed three monitoring rounds, organized multistakeholder activities, and produced case studies that aim to deliver evidence to inform the development community in improving development cooperation and contribute to the achievement of Agenda 2030. However, *Partner1* remarked that the information generated from this is seen as details that are *"good to know,"* and these do not necessarily spur change. When challenges are spotted in the monitoring exercise and GPEDC research, members have the prerogative to act on how to take these results forward. There are no concrete future actions to which all actors agree to carry out since GPEDC exercises the voluntary and differential approach as its operational framework (OECD 2011[a]). *CSO2, CSO3,* and *CSO9* shared the same assessment.

Indeed, shortcomings are evident, but CSOs were not quick to dismiss the positive changes in the GPEDC over the past years. *CSO3, CSO4, CSO6*, and *CSO10* stressed that the progressive deliberative process indicates the implementation of the effectiveness principles. Although most of the respondents concurred that concrete results on the ground are yet to be seen, ten years is regarded as a short period to evaluate work for a global partnership

with a broad scope of work. On the other hand, *CSO9* expressed that an urgent development agenda needs urgent actions that should not take more than a decade.

At this time of writing, a GPEDC Review is being conducted as part of the 2020-2022 Work Programme (GPEDC 2020:11) that will look into both governance and performance aspects of the GPEDC. It is a positive development to confirm the substantive value of GPEDC. However, without mid-term assessments beforehand, challenges might be encountered in establishing development over the years. Since GPEDC as an MSP involves an expansive number of actors and objectives that coincide with other development processes, it will be challenging to fully attribute results to GPEDC.

Chapter 5 Analysis of Findings: Constructing CSOs' Legitimacy Beliefs

The discussions preceding this chapter present a confounding sense of CSOs' legitimacy perception of GPEDC. Both sets of criteria for normative and sociological legitimacy do not provide a clear-cut conclusion on whether GPEDC is legitimate or not. From the findings, negative and positive aspects were detected. But, in the end, most CSOs have a positive insight of GPEDC being a legitimate partnership, and CSOs state continued interest to engage GPEDC.

Looking at both sociological and normative dimensions of legitimacy does not go in vain, though—what is seen here is that the relations and interaction of the sociological and normative legitimacy shape CSO's legitimacy beliefs in the GPEDC. The accounts offered two sides that make us understand how CSOs constitute legitimacy based on their interests within the boundaries of the available space and opportunities in GPEDC and how these boundaries can be transformed into something relevant and valuable according to their interests within or even beyond GPEDC. Thus, instead of a checklist or a myopic view of GPEDC's legitimacy, CSOs appear to center on the transactional relations - the relations and choices that are within their interests, defying the content-independent, interest-free and rule-following characters of legitimacy (Hurd 2018:22). Without the sociological legitimacy concept, CSOs' subjective interest will be at lost in the discourse, and without the normative legitimacy concept, there will be no setting to reveal relations and political choices.

In this study, the transactional relations are revealed through payoffs and trade-offs in CSOs' engagement in GPEDC. As explained previously, payoffs are the expected and unexpected gains that CSOs perceive they achieve or receive in engaging GPEDC. Meanwhile, trade-offs describe the conditions and situations that CSOs need to manage or CSOs' positions to be given up to realize payoffs. Establishing the payoffs and trade-offs is a complex task. First, compounded nodes of relationships need to be connected to derive a complete picture of the issues. Second, the payoffs might also produce trade-offs at one point in time. Payoffs and trade-offs need to be examined as these can contribute to understanding what dimensions of GPEDC are essential for CSOs to ascertain legitimacy.

From the interviews, CSOs made clear what their agenda is in GPEDC. *CSO10* described this as the need to transform CSOs' and people's agenda as the subject rather than the object of development aid and development cooperation. Inclusiveness is a recurring

criterion that makes GPEDC a worthwhile engagement despite some pushbacks that they also experience as a result of the narrative of inclusion in GPEDC.

Coming from CSOs' feedback, the payoffs and trade-offs are somehow rooted around the inclusiveness of the space and the process in GPEDC and how these intersect with CSOs' agenda. But there are no constant plans of actions or perceptions of right and wrong as the principle of inclusion and CSOs' agenda are manifested differently depending on the issues and context in a particular situation. Thus, payoffs and trade-offs cannot be taken in a linear manner, nor can they be assumed to be lasting.

CSOs adjust expectations and actions. For instance, at the start of GPEDC, they had been straightforward in rejecting the private sector in development, which in a way isolates them since inclusiveness in GPEDC translates to the involvement of non-state actors like the private sector. Instead of cancelling GPEDC as a legitimate process, CSOs adjusted their positions on the private sector by delineating micro, small, and medium enterprises (MSMEs) from big corporations (*interview CSO12*). By not boycotting, CSOs were able to present reports such as *"The development effectiveness of supporting the private sector with ODA funds,"* produced by the Trade Union Development Cooperation Network (TUDCN) and CSO Partnership for Development Effectiveness and authored by Javier Pereira, to evidence the danger of having the private sector engagement in development (PSE). Also, a deep-dive of the issues related to PSE was executed by the GPEDC, such as the review of more than 900 PSE and four case studies featuring Bangladesh, Egypt, Uganda, and El Salvador. Issues of states, CSOs and trade unions surface on the damages caused by PSE projects, deficient mechanisms that ensure accountability and transparency of the private sector, and the misuse of official development assistance in leveraging PSE, to name a few (GPEDC 2019).

Box 1. Overview of some cases from the ITUC and CPDE study

Issues on Human Rights (Pereira 2016: 28)

In Imphal Manipur, India, the Integrated Water Supply Project (IWSP) ventured into building and modernizing the area's water infrastructures. The Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) supported majority of these operations. Without following the free prior and informed consent and amidst cases filed on the Supreme Court against the project, IWSP and the government of India continued with the implementation of this so-called development project. The indigenous peoples in the area have since reported environmental problems that negatively affected their livelihood and overall living.

Issues on local ownership (Pereira 2016: 28)

The Agence Française de Développement (AFD) and the Banque de l'Habitat du Sénégal (BHS) entered into a public-private partnership (PPP) that aims to respond to the housing crisis in Dakar and benefit the poor. The PPP entailed 13m EUR concessional loans to BHS. However, without properly integrating the target segment of the population, the conditions in accessing loans did not match the capacity of the low to middle-income workers. Apart from failing to reach the poor, the lack of local ownership, transparency, and consultation among the relevant actors, the project led to "nepotism and political clientelism" (Pereira 2016: 28).

CSOs are open to taking advantage of the positive sides of the space and processes in GPEDC without dismissing that these gains might be temporary; thus, constant reality checks are critical. As *CSO15* put it:

> *"GPEDC is always a battleground for CSOs. Politics is highly involved in GPEDC, and it always threatens to trump what we achieved. Because of this, progression of agenda is always erratic."*

An example is the leadership of the non-state actors through the Non-Executive Co-Chair (NECC), although pushed by CSOs, is not locked to CSOs. The CSO representative, who presently serves in the NECC, needs to step down in the next HLM in 2022. The next NECC might have a different method of working that might put CSOs in a disadvantaged position. However, for the time being, CSOs enjoy the leverage of being the NECC.

Other illustrations are the inroads and small successes of CSOs due to their inclusion in the GPEDC deliberations, such as the inclusion of CSO enabling environment in the GPEDC Monitoring Exercise and the call for accountability mechanism for the private

sector, which reflects the Kampala Principles[17]. Arguably, not many concrete results emanate from these two areas. Still, *CSO7* pointed out, GPEDC is instrumental in understanding the political differences of various actors at the global level that eventually create opportunities for dialogue in countries.

Unfortunately, progress made in GPEDC can be easily retracted due to politics at the country level, the international community, and the actors within GPEDC. For instance, electing new officials can lead to reduction or redirection of commitments or positions in GPEDC. *Donor2* candidly stated, *"A new government has new priorities, and it can disregard past commitments."* These volatile positionings and actions can only be afforded by the powerful members of the GPEDC, such as the donor countries. CSOs, on the other hand, are expected to consistently perform at a level of *"excellence"* and in a *"non-CSO tone"*[18] (*interview MLO1*). These are not new to CSOs. Power asymmetries in the GPEDC exist, and these imbalances put those with resources at the driving wheel.

Additionally, the broad membership of GPEDC and its voluntary nature led to different interpretations of development effectiveness, which according to CSOs, threaten the real essence of the promise of rights-based development. *CSO1* strongly questioned GPEDC's legitimacy in affecting change in development cooperation. Despite this, *CSO1* joined the rest of CSOs in believing that GPEDC can contribute to the changes in other related processes.

The developments in GPEDC and the work of CSOs engaging the GPEDC and OECD-Development Assistance Committee (DAC) were instrumental in putting back the issue of CSO enabling environment and CSO development effectiveness in the DAC agenda. The call to protect civic space and the CSO enabling environment was adopted officially by the DAC in July 2021. The DAC policy instrument titled *DAC Recommendation on Enabling Civil Society in Development Co-operation and Humanitarian Assistance* institutionalizes DAC member countries' support to CSOs through the three pillars (OECD 2021):

"Pillar One: respecting, protecting and promoting civic space;

Pillar Two: Supporting and engaging with civil society; and

Pillar Three: Incentivising CSO effectiveness, transparency and accountability."

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[17] In 2019, the GPEDC launched the Kampala Principles. The GPEDC membership developed these five principles to guide the business sector, states, and other members of the society to ensure that development partnerships with the private sector are effective and accountable. The Kampala Principles are: *"Inclusive country ownership; results and targeted impact; inclusive partnership, transparency, and accountability; and leave no one behind"* (GPEDC 2021b).

[18] The "CSO tone" was described as confrontational.

Furthermore, in the CPDE Global Synthesis Report 2017-2018 (CPDE 2019), CSOs documented the realities on the ground and their initiatives in line with their commitment to contribute to the fulfilment of Agenda 2030 through pursuing development effectiveness. Reports such as this are a testament to how CSOs translate the work in GPEDC to advance their efforts and issues on the ground even outside the GPEDC plans.

Kyrgyzstan: Multistakeholder Partnership for the promotion of women's rights and gender equality (CPDE 2019: 20)

There is a lack of institutionalized mechanisms promoting women's and gender-based issues in development in Kyrgyzstan. Understanding that various actors of society need to work together to address this concern, the Forum of Women's NGOs of Kyrgyzstan (FWNGO) campaigned for a multistakeholder partnership in the country that aims to tackle SDG 5, gender equality goal. FWNGO also initiated the development of the Kyrgyzstan National Plan of Action on Women's Rights and Gender Equality. The Ministry of Labour and Social Development expressed its intention to support FWNGO in these efforts and boost coordination and co-ownership in development cooperation in Kyrgyzstan.

Indonesia: CSOs challenge Ormas Law (CPDE 2019:42)

Indonesian CSOs intensified their campaign against Indonesian government's policies that escalate violation of people's rights to freedom of association, freedom of assembly and freedom of speech. Among the issue that was brought to the attention by the CSOs in this report is the government's proclamation of support in delivering SDGs through the Presidential Decree No.59/2017 while also enacting the Ormas Law which have vague provisions that can be used to threaten CSOs expressing political dissent.

Table 1 is an attempt to process the responses of CSOs to demonstrate further the interactions of GPEDC's structure and processes with CSOs' agenda. These are the points that the respondents emphasized in discerning why and how they believe that GPEDC is worthwhile to engage in and support.

Table 1: Trade-offs and payoffs in engaging GPEDC

Trade-offs	Payoffs
The GPEDC provides an inclusive space in which CSOs are on equal footing with other actors. It led to the involvement of the private sector in development which CSOs highly contest.	CSOs gain arenas to demand accountability from the state and the corporate sector.
	CSOs can connect with other stakeholders, especially state representatives, increasing credibility and collaboration opportunity even outside GPEDC.
	CSOs can lead initiatives that are in line with their agenda.
	CSOs expand their network leading to enhanced CSO solidarity on the issues related to development effectiveness.
GPEDC presents opportunities to be involved in decision-making and dialogues. However, CSOs are expected to follow technical discussions and abide by consensus.	CSOs increased their expertise on aid and development discourse and capacity in negotiation to better push forward the CSO agenda.
	CSOs can connect with other stakeholders, especially the state representatives, increasing credibility and opportunity for collaboration even outside GPEDC.
	CSOs secured the NECC role in the GPEDC, which gives more hold to push the CSO agenda and CSO space.
	Inroads were made on the issue of the accountability of the private sector through the Kampala Principles.
	The GPEDC monitoring exercise included CSOs, and a dedicated indicator on CSO enabling environment was secured.
The comprehensiveness of the development effectiveness agenda generated different interpretations by members of the GPEDC that led to weakened commitments to rights-based development.	The development effectiveness agenda provides a launchpad for CSOs to pursue rights-based development.
	The GPEDC committed to promoting and protecting the CSO enabling environment, which resulted in spillover effect in other development processes in the UN, OECD, EU, and some country-level work.

CSOs' emphasis on these issue areas can be regarded as the settings for legitimation, and legitimation takes shape when trade-offs result in payoffs. Here we can see the interaction of CSOs' agenda, the dynamics and relations, and GPEDC structure and processes that CSOs navigate and engage. Interestingly, payoffs are not constant and can become a trade-off at some point, as in the case of the NECC. CSOs take chances since the political value of the claim and acceptance of authority plays a big part for CSOs in deciding what is worthy of their support and engagement, and arriving at legitimacy beliefs depends on the evolution

of the context and the factors at play in a particular setting. It could be that defining a route or pattern to achieve legitimacy may serve as a futile exercise. In the end, constructing legitimacy by analyzing trade-offs and payoffs leads us towards legitimacy that does not invoke pure compliance. Legitimacy is way more complex than achieving subjective goals or fulfilling norms and standards. Through payoffs and trade-offs, we can see that for CSOs, legitimacy is appreciated in its instrumental sense. As long as CSOs have the ability and space to challenge the current system in development cooperation, they regard the GPEDC as legitimate.

Chapter 6 Conclusion

The study was aiming to find out how legitimacy influences the engagement of CSOs in a multistakeholder setting, that is, GPEDC. From the discussions and deliberations of findings, it can be concluded that CSOs' perception of legitimacy is produced by weighing trade-offs and payoffs in which elements of legitimacy are affected by political context and power relations. Because the GPEDC process is dynamic, legitimacy perception varies based on the actors' context and priorities. It is evident in how CSOs accept decisions in GPEDC despite setbacks in their own agenda. Understanding that legitimacy is not a zero-sum game; CSOs make compromises as long as they can still use their place in the GPEDC to push for more relevant concerns and build more capital in pursuit of their larger agenda.

CSOs' perception of legitimacy is not about accepting and following rules but having the ability to challenge and influence without fully compromising their development roles and peoples' aspirations. CSOs will not maintain their support to GPEDC if their functions and agenda are largely compromised. In fact, some of the CSOs who were interviewed do not have the same high level of involvement as before in the GPEDC because they do not see their efforts to yield policy gains as they expected. Instead, they continue to engage the CSO agenda but in other forums. Those who remain active in GPEDC, even though they have a more positive disposition in their engagement than other CSOs, also have other initiatives outside GPEDC under their radar. In general, CSOs continue to cast their nets far and wide to pursue rights-based development outside GPEDC, whether through other multi-stakeholder processes or building their own initiatives outside the boundaries of partnerships. If this is the case, MSPs' legitimacy through relations and interactions using different stakeholders' perceptions should be further investigated to understand better what MSPs can or cannot do.

The study's findings can be summarized by highlighting the following points:

a. CSOs view legitimacy as contingent on the realization of their agenda, which is critical in their choice to engage GPEDC. From the information gathered, CSOs give the highest credence to their duty to represent peoples' aspirations. The decision to take up the space in GPEDC and create and influence policy processes is based on the CSOs' overall goal to contribute to making development cooperation promote a human-rights-based development. CSOs appreciate the spaces and procedures of deliberation in GPEDC. Whether CSOs have a differing belief on GPEDC as a claimed or invited space, they recognize that it allows them to expose realities

from the ground. By providing evidence and being part of deliberations, they have the chance to convince other development actors of the importance of peoples' issues in development cooperation. Through GPEDC, they can highlight their capacity as governance actors and dive into discourses and dialogues with other stakeholders. Most importantly, CSOs regard GPEDC as a unique space that allows them to raise issues concerning accountability of the state and the business sector.

b. Legitimation is a political process that involves relations and political choices. CSOs are not naïve to believe that GPEDC is a neutral space but an arena where different development actors push their agenda. As Cornwall (2004:80) posits, spaces are locations of control and domination. Thus, CSOs operate in GPEDC with tempered expectations of what GPEDC can provide or what can be described as an approach with a reasonable amount of skepticism. However, this does not deter CSOs from doing well in the GPEDC. Instead, it makes them more persistent to underscore the importance of deliberation and inclusion as a way to counter power dynamics. A measure of the worthiness of taking part in GPEDC relies on the existence of contestation and the degree of the "tug of war" in policy positioning and decision-making. Endorsement or non-endorsement of CSOs' positions does not mean a dead-end for CSOs, but an opportunity to further crystallize their demands within and outside GPEDC.

c. GPEDC's legitimacy is transient. Strongly connected to points one and two, CSOs perceive GPEDC as legitimate as long as they see the potential to reach their objectives within and beyond GPEDC through GPEDC. GPEDC might not satisfy all the legitimacy requirements, but only when adverse effects to CSOs and people overwhelm the gains in engaging GPEDC that GPEDC loses its legitimacy. Donor2 remarked that mostly, GPEDC matters because of the processes and results that happen on the side, and such events are not necessarily documented. These make it necessary to understand legitimacy more in its relational value and as political choices, and both sociological and normative concepts of legitimacy are helpful to reveal these.

Also, under such a claim of legitimacy's transitory character, we can further explore the point of Zelditch (2006:342) that legitimacy is only an ancillary element. And instead of treating legitimacy as a way to retain the asymmetrical power relations (Zelditch 2006:342), there is a need to consider how this ancillary element can initiate pressure to create change in GPEDC and MSPs, as evidenced in this research.

Appendices

Appendix 1: Interview Guide and Questioning Plan

Interview Guide and Questioning Plan
Introduction: The research explores the importance of legitimacy for CSOs and how CSOs perceive MSPs' legitimacy. It will be done by assessing the normative and sociological concepts of legitimacy through focusing on CSOs' expectations, experience, and roles in GPEDC. At the same time, perspectives of other actors will also be sought to have a comprehensive understanding of the contexts in GPEDC. I want to seek your permission to record this interview. You may turn your camera on or off, depending on your preference. All information that will be gathered from this conversation will be treated with utmost confidentiality and anonymity. The researcher will also ensure that all recordings will be disposed of after the completion of the research. The interview will not last more than one hour.
Questions for representatives from civil society
Introductory question
1. Please provide a short background on the nature of your organization and engagement with the GPEDC? 2. Do you have direct engagement in GPEDC?
Relevance of GPEDC
1. What makes the GPEDC an authority to drive the development effectiveness agenda?
Why engage the GPEDC
1. What criteria did you use in deciding to engage the GPEDC (influences- social context, history, experience; alignment with your organization's objectives)? 2. How do you define your engagement in GPEDC from then until now?
CSOs in GPEDC
1.Are there approaches and frameworks that ensure balanced representation and inclusion of the relevant actors, especially the people/sectors who are most affected by the GPEDC's work? • Which worked best, least? • Why? 2. How does the GPEDC come up with decisions? • What is the focus of debates, and how are these resolved? • Who dominates the discussions? • How do CSOs respond to discussions and agreements in the GPEDC which are not aligned to your positions? 3. What are the GPEDC measures in place that ensure accountability and transparency? • Why do you think these are sufficient or insufficient? 4. What are the institutional design and approaches of the GPEDC that help it attain its desired outcomes (i.e., leadership, clear goal formulation, policy coherence)?

Weighing trade-offs and payoffs
1. What are the benefits of engaging the GPEDC as CSOs? 2. What are the costs of engaging the GPEDC as CSOs? 3. Do the costs outweigh the benefits? How? 4. Does the CSOs' engagement in the GPEDC result in changing relations or relocation of authority and opportunities in development cooperation? • If yes, in what ways does CSO engagement of the GPEDC shape/affect relations in development cooperation? • What does this mean/what is the impact in terms of a.(re)location of authority in development cooperation and b. flows of opportunities in development cooperation? • If no, why?
Concluding question
Do you consider GPEDC as a legitimate multistakeholder partnership? Why or why not?
Questions for representatives from donors, partner countries, multilateral organizations, and multistakeholder initiatives
Introductory question
1. Please provide short background on the nature of your organization and engagement with the GPEDC. 2. Do you have direct engagement in GPEDC?
GPEDC and legitimacy
1. How do multistakeholder partnerships contribute to alleviating global problems? 2. In your opinion, what is the unique character/added value of the GPEDC as an MSP? 3. What are the conditions that permit GPEDC to gain legitimacy? 4. How is the legitimacy of GPEDC challenged? 5. What changes are observed throughout the years in GPEDC in terms of processes, structures, and agenda? How did these come about?
Concluding question
Do you consider GPEDC as a legitimate multistakeholder partnership? Why or why not?

Appendix 2: Overview of the Respondents and Interviews

CSOs			
Background	**Organization**	**Level of Engagement in GPEDC**	**Interview Details**
Character: Regional CSO – Representative based in Lebanon Focus Areas: Trade and development	CSO1	Low-moderate CPDE member	Date: 27 July 2021 Online platform: Skype
Character: Country CSO – Representative based in The Netherlands Focus Areas: Peace, fragility and conflict, and development	CSO2	Low-moderate CPDE member	Date: 28 July 2021 Online platform: Microsoft Teams
Character: Country CSO – Representative based in India Focus Areas: Indigenous peoples' rights and environment protection	CSO3	High CPDE member	Date: 29 July 2021 Online platform: Skype
Character: International CSO – Representative based in the Philippines Focus Areas: Indigenous peoples' rights and women's rights	CSO4	High CPDE member	Date: 29 July 2021 Online platform: Telegram
Character: International CSO – Representative based in France Issues covered: Development, poverty and inequality	CSO5	Low-moderate Non-CPDE member	Date: 30 July 2021 Online platform: Skype
Character: Country CSO – Representative based in Italy Focus Areas: Development and aid	CSO6	High CPDE member	Date: 2 August 2021 Online platform: Microsoft Teams
Character: Country CSO – Representative based in Canada Focus Areas: research on public policies on development cooperation	CSO7	Low-moderate CPDE member	Date: 2 August 2021 Online platform: Skype
Character: Country CSO – Representative based in Ireland Focus Areas: rights-based development	CSO8	High CPDE member	Date: 3 August 2021 Online platform: Microsoft Teams
Character: Country CSO – Representative based in Bolivia Focus Areas: Women's rights and development	CSO9	High CPDE member	Date: 3 August 2021 Online platform: Zoom
Character: Regional CSO – Representative based in Kenya Focus Areas: poverty eradication, aid and development	CSO10	High CPDE member	Date: 4 August 2021 Online platform: Microsoft Teams
Character: International CSO – Representative based in South Africa Focus Areas: women's rights, economic rights, political rights, climate emergencies and humanitarian work	CSO11	Low-moderate Non-CPDE member	Date: 5 August 2021 Online platform: Microsoft Teams
Character: International CSO – Representative based in France Focus Areas: Development Cooperation and development effectiveness	CSO12	High CPDE member	Date: 5 August 2021 Online platform: Zoom
Character: International CSO – Representative based in Canada Focus Areas: promotion of civic action and civil society	CSO13	Low-moderate Non-CPDE member	Date: 9 August 2021 Online platform: Microsoft Teams

Character: International CSO – Representative based in the Philippines Focus Areas: Development Cooperation and development effectiveness	CSO14	High CPDE member	Date: 14 August 2021 Online platform: WhatsApp
Character: Regional CSO – Representative based in Belgium Focus Areas: Human Rights, governance and Development	CSO15	Low-moderate Non-CPDE member	Date: 16 August 2021 Online platform: Telegram
Multilateral Organizations			
Background	**Organization**	**Level of Engagement in GPEDC**	**Interview Details**
Multilateral organization – Representative based in Canada	MLO1	Low-moderate	Date: 23 July 2021 Online platform: Zoom
Multilateral organization – Representative based in South Korea	MLO2	Low-moderate	Date: 4 August 2021 Online platform: Microsoft Teams
Multilateral organization – Representative based in France	MLO3	High	Date: 11 August 2021 Online platform: Microsoft Teams
Multilateral organization – Representative based in the United States of America	MLO4	High	Date: 17 August 2021 Online platform: Microsoft Teams
Multistakeholder Initiative			
Background	**Organization**	**Level of Engagement in GPEDC**	**Interview Details**
Multistakeholder initiative – Representative based in The Netherlands	MSI1	High	Date: 26 July 2021 Online platform: Zoom
Governments			
Background	**Organization**	**Level of Engagement in GPEDC**	**Interview Details**
Donor Government	Donor1	High	Date: 6 August 2021 Online platform: Zoom
Partner Government	Partner1	Low-moderate	Date: 10 August 2021 Online platform: Zoom
Donor Government	Donor2	Low-moderate	Date: 20 August 2021 Online platform: Zoom

Appendix 3: Budget Requirements for JST core operations and functions

Areas of Institutional Support	OECD (EUR)			UNDP (USD)		
	2020	2021	2022	2020	2021	2022
Monitoring	1,079,000	1,094,633	1,0999,803	333,125	376,500	376,500
Country anchoring and implementation	220,000	146,390	149,257	223,100	325,000	370,500
Communication, KS, Learning	110,000	73,155	74,628	268,000	323,480	314,980
SC and governance	220,000	146,390	149,257	368,750	405,500	405,500
Modernised DAC Narrative (applicable only to OECD)	-	200,137	205,702	n/a	n/a	n/a
GMS (applicable only to UNDP)	n/a	n/a	n/a	68,798	89,438	90,759
Annual Total Cost	1,629,000	1,660,705	1678,647	1,261,773	1,519,918	1,558,239
Total Period Cost		**4,968,352**			**4,339,930**	

Source: **OECD and UNDP 2021**

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