



# **Democracy Promotion in the Changing World Order.**

*The case of Indonesia.*

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## **Preface.**

The research you are about to read has been written for the completion of the Masters programme Global History & International Relations at the Erasmus University in Rotterdam. My thanks goes to Mano Delea for his role as supervisor of this thesis, and to all my previous professors, lecturers, fellow students and others whom helped me to develop my academic work, as well as my personality in the past years. Within this thesis I tried to connect my historical interest in Indonesia, from the time of European expansion and colonialism with international relations theory, democracy promotion and 21<sup>st</sup> century Indonesian foreign policy. The last notion I want to make here, is that I hope that you as the reader will read my thesis with enthusiasm, curiosity and joy, as this is the manner in which it was written.

28-06-2021, Rotterdam, The Netherlands.

Map of Southeast Asia.



Source: Arnault, Morrison. (2015). Economic Zones in the ASEAN, figure 10, Map of Southeast Asia.

*The region of the Indo-Pacific (blue) and ASEAN Members (green).*



Source: own figure.

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## **List of Abbreviations.**

<b>AIIB</b>	<b>Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank.</b>
<b>ARF</b>	<b>Asian Regional Forum.</b>
<b>ASEAN</b>	<b>Association of South East Asian Nations.</b>
<b>BDF</b>	<b>Bali Democracy Forum.</b>
<b>BRI</b>	<b>Belt and Road Initiative.</b>
<b>CC</b>	<b>Copenhagen Criteria.</b>
<b>EAC</b>	<b>East Asia Community.</b>
<b>ECHR</b>	<b>European Convention on Human Rights.</b>
<b>ERP</b>	<b>European Recovery Program (Marshall Plan).</b>
<b>EU</b>	<b>European Union.</b>
<b>GATT</b>	<b>General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.</b>
<b>GDP</b>	<b>Gross Domestic Product.</b>
<b>IMF</b>	<b>International Monetary Fund.</b>
<b>LSE</b>	<b>London School of Economics and Political Science.</b>
<b>MENA</b>	<b>Middle-East and North-Africa.</b>
<b>NAM</b>	<b>Non-Alignment Movement.</b>
<b>NATO</b>	<b>North Atlantic Treaty Organization.</b>
<b>NDB</b>	<b>National Development Bank.</b>
<b>NU</b>	<b>National Awakening Party (<i>Nahdlatul ‘Ulama</i>).</b>
<b>SCS</b>	<b>South China Sea.</b>
<b>TCE</b>	<b>Treaty establishing the Constitution for Europe.</b>
<b>TEU</b>	<b>Treaty on European Union.</b>
<b>UN</b>	<b>United Nations.</b>
<b>US</b>	<b>United States of America.</b>
<b>WTO</b>	<b>World Trade Organization.</b>

## Essential Features of Indonesia.

Indonesia is an archipelago that consists of 17.508 islands, of which about 6000 are inhabited.<sup>1</sup> It consists of five major islands, Java, Sumatra, Kalimantan, Sulawesi, and Papua. The capital, Jakarta, resides on the most populous island of Java. In terms of population, Indonesia is the fourth most populous nation in the world, lacking behind China, India, and The United States of America (US), with an estimated 253.609.643 (2014) people living within its borders.<sup>2</sup> This population simultaneously makes Indonesia one of the three largest contemporary democracies, with China being the only one of the four with an authoritarian regime. Based on GDP, Indonesia's economy exceeds all other economies of South-East Asia. The second economy of the region, Thailand's GDP value is a mere fifty per cent of Indonesia's 1.119 trillion US Dollars (2019).<sup>3</sup> However, based on GDP per capita, Indonesia is behind the ASEAN average. Besides having the largest land area, 1.919.443 square kilometres, Indonesia's geographical location, connecting The South-China Sea, The Strait of Malacca, The Indian Ocean, and The Pacific Ocean, makes Indonesia a central hub connecting several of the world's most crucial and busiest trading routes.<sup>4</sup> A position that in the past has been valued by the Dutch, Portuguese, Arabs, Indians and Chinese. In addition, militarily, Indonesia is recognised as the strongest in Southeast Asia, with an estimated 675.000 active personnel (2018).<sup>5</sup> Another distinguishing feature of Indonesia is that it is the home of the highest number of Muslims, about 80% of the total population, making it the most significant Islamic democracy globally.<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> “Basic Facts,” Embassy of the Republic of Indonesia, Washington D.C., accessed June 24, 2021, <https://www.embassyofindonesia.org/basic-facts/>.

<sup>2</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>3</sup> “Indonesia,” World Bank, accessed June 24, 2021, <https://data.worldbank.org/country/indonesia>.

<sup>4</sup> “Basic Facts,” Embassy of the Republic of Indonesia, Washington D.C., accessed June 24, 2021, <https://www.embassyofindonesia.org/basic-facts/>.

<sup>5</sup> “Indonesia,” World Bank, accessed June 24, 2021,

<https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.TOTL.P1?locations=ID>.

<sup>6</sup> “Basic Facts,” Embassy of the Republic of Indonesia, Washington D.C., accessed June 24, 2021, <https://www.embassyofindonesia.org/basic-facts/>.

## **1. Indonesia, Democracy and International Relations.**

The first chapter will introduce the subjects of this thesis, Indonesian democracy and foreign policy, and the context in which it is researched, global order and democracy promotion. First, a short historical overview of Indonesian democracy and foreign policy is outlined. Afterwards, what is understood as world order and democracy promotion is explained, and why the world order is shifting, changing or refocussing. Throughout section 1.1, the historiography will be addressed shortly, within the respective chapters there will be more dept. The structure of the chapters follows the same architecture as this chapter, first world order, second democracy promotion, and finally, the case of Indonesia. The rest of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 1.2 shall introduce the research question, as well as its relevance and urgency. Within section 1.3, the most important theories and concepts inherent within the research shall be outlined, namely democracy promotion and international relations theory, in particular constructivism and role theory. The fourth section, 1.4, will shortly mention the primary sources and methods that are used for the analyses of the sources and provides a summary of the thesis structure.

### ***1.1 Historical Overview.***

The first section, in short, gives a historical overview of when and why democracy was implemented in Indonesia, Indonesian foreign policy and a brief introduction to the changing world order. The logical start for the overview is the end of World War II, or the Indo-Pacific War, because it marked the beginning of a new world order lead by the United States (US). At the same time, in 1945, Indonesia became independent from the Netherlands and was able to construct its own form of government and foreign policy.

#### **1.1.1 World Order.**

The idea of world order is related to interactions between states, power distribution between them, and ideas and institutions that are characteristic for a proportional part of these relationships between states during a certain time. Different sorts of order have been visible during the evolution of history. Well-known varieties of order are the balance of power order, evident in 17<sup>th</sup> century Europe, the hegemonic orders, such as 19<sup>th</sup> century Great-Britain and the post-Cold War US, there is also the constitutional order, such as the European Union and other forms of regionalism such as the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) . All these varieties of order have used other types of concepts about the principles of the

relationships between states within that specific order. Order or world order is thus not a fixed form of state interactions but can differ and this shifts the hierarchy, structure, beliefs, ideas, and participants within. Therefore orders are resisted by those not willing or able to comply to the various concepts of a order. The current world order that is most visible, at least from a Western-European or Northern-American perspective, is the liberal international order with the United States as its hegemon. However, new and re-emerging states are shifting this post-Cold War liberal international order.

The post-World War II order was based on liberalism and is dubbed the liberal order or liberal international order, created and dominated by the United States and in part Western-Europe. This order flourished after the Cold War when the US established itself as the sole hegemon. This lead to Francis Fukuyama's famous essay *The End of History*.<sup>7</sup> However, the hegemonic and unipolar status of the US, and in part Western-Europe, has not remained unchallenged and the focus of this alliance has shifted from the Atlantic to the Indo-Pacific.

Institutions play(ed) an essential part in the US lead world order. To what degree this order is in fact 'worldwide' can be heavily debated. Within this thesis international order or liberal international order shall be used, as this better grasps the extent of the order. The UN, together with other related institutions, such as the IMF, World Bank, and GATT, but also NATO, were established based on a US project that reflected their liberal ideas of institutions and interactions based on universalism and multilateralism. However, this liberal international order was not universal. It had been limited to a group of like-minded states centred around the US and its Trans-Atlantic allies and did not include states such as China, India, Indonesia, or other parts of the Global South or Third World. Thus, the liberal international order lead by the US was an international order and not a world order in the post-World War II period.<sup>8</sup>

The liberal international order nowadays is challenged by the growing influence of other states and actors that challenge US unipolarity, institutions and the liberal international order. As a consequence, it becomes harder for the US to keep its hegemonic position within its order, changing the liberal international order altogether. It is predominantly the (re)rise of China as a great power, that can economically compete and possibly overtake the US. The economic rise of China is combined with the creation of institutions such as the National Development Bank, Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, and the widely known Belt and Road Initiative as an alternative for US institutions. For others, it could be argued, there is something to choose, there

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<sup>7</sup> Francis Fukuyama, 'The End of History?,' in *The National Interest* 16 (1989), 3 – 18.

<sup>8</sup> Amitav Acharya and Dan Plesch, 'The United Nations: Managing and Reshaping a Changing World Order,' in: *Global Governance* 26 (2020), 221 – 235.

is ideological and political diversity. Besides the rise of China, the Trans-Atlantic alliance has seen cracks during the Donald Trump presidency, but this trend has been evident since the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. With the European Union now acknowledging it cannot always be relying on the US and vice-versa. Therefore, the EU has to reinvent itself in light of this changing alliance and their place in the liberal international order. The EU has the power of setting the standards in the norms and rules that are regulating international trade. This power, dubbed the ‘Brussels Effect’, means that the EU can set the rules for food production, privacy laws and animal welfare, thus influencing the order.<sup>9</sup> The EU, but also the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) are both institutions and international bodies that enhance the diversity within the relations between states and the order that follows from these interactions. Within the liberal international order the belief that democracy would be the governing form that brings security, stability, open markets and peace made the US/EU advance a policy of democracy promotion. The role of democracy promotion within the world order will be elaborated on in chapter two and then be put in perspective in the Indonesian case.

Within this research, the changing world order, will be used to define a shift from a unipolar, US lead order, towards a multipolar order in which the economic and political focal points will relocate and the market for institutions and ideas will diversify. Within this research that means that the focus shifts from the Atlantic towards the Indo-Pacific. The Indo-Pacific is the fastest-growing economic region globally, the direct neighbourhood of rising China and India, the region of ASEAN, Japan, Australia and Indonesia, and combined an important region for US/EU security issues and their respective economies. At the same time, globalization continues to broaden the opportunities of states to participate in various institutions and the exchange of ideas, goods, people and capital. However, intensified globalization might not always be seen as a favourable force in international relations and regionalism might gain the upper hand.

Francis Fukuyama’s *End of History* announced the victory of the US lead liberal order, but this has been eroded in the 21<sup>st</sup> century and stands under competition by the EU and China, admitted by Fukuyama himself.<sup>10</sup> Within the research this dynamic of competition on underlying concepts of the liberal order will be a central point in the Indo-Pacific region, with attention focussing on ASEAN and their democracy promotion most specifically.

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<sup>9</sup> Anu Bradford, ‘The Brussels Effect,’ in: *Northwestern University Law Review* 107:1 (2012), 1 – 64.

<sup>10</sup> Francis Fukuyama, “At the ‘End of History’ Still Stands Democracy,” *The Wall Street Journal*, June 6, 2014, <https://www.wsj.com/articles/at-the-end-of-history-still-stands-democracy-1402080661>.

### **1.1.2 Establishing Democracy in Indonesia.**

After the Japanese capitulation in 1945, the leader of the Comity for Indonesian Independence, Sukarno, together with Muhammed Hatta proclaimed Indonesian independence from The Netherlands. The leader Sukarno would be head-of-state for Indonesia from 1945 up until 1967 when Suharto replaced him. Suharto was another authoritarian leader who would be in power until 1998. Asia's financial crisis prompted the resignation of Suharto and would instigate the transition of Indonesia to becoming a democracy.

After the fall of Suharto's so-called New Order Regime, Indonesia held elections for the first time. The various Islamic parties promised their electorate high election wins, but the results in the first free and fair elections were rather disappointing. However, some individual Muslim politicians performed well and above expectation. On the 20<sup>th</sup> of October, 1999, the *Nahdlatul 'Ulama* (National Awakening Party) leader, Abdurrahman Wahid, became the first democratically elected president since Sukarno and Hatta had proclaimed independence fifty-four years prior.<sup>11</sup> However, the implementation of democracy in Indonesia was not a hard break with the New Order Regime. The democratic government could not be installed right away and had to be developed through multiple stages, starting in 1999.

The strategy for democratic reforms that was implemented had three main characteristics. First, many of the people that had to envision and structure the reforms were former leaders in Suharto's authoritarian regime. It took fifteen years until the head of Indonesian democracy was free of the Suharto legacy. Joko Widodo, President of Indonesia since 2014, was the first President that had not been in a position of power under Suharto. Secondly, within the reformation process there was a preference for elections before any constitutional change had taken shape. Thirdly, constitutional change only came into being over the passing of multiple years. From 1999 to 2008, and even later, changes were made in the statutes for political parties, election procedures and government structures. The processes of reform had taken more than a decade since Indonesia first free elections, the time taken for this process is, however, not unique for states reforming into a democracy.<sup>12</sup> Indonesian democracy in other words is still a work-in-progress, which is by no means a unique situation for new or old democracies.

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<sup>11</sup> Ted Piccione, *Five Rising Democracies and the Fate of the International Liberal international order* (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2016), 10.

<sup>12</sup> Donald L. Horowitz, *Constitutional Change and Democracy in Indonesia* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 2.

Countries that are in transition to become a democracy face numerous obstacles and challenges. Securing democratic institutions, new principles of representation, accountability, and the rule of law are perhaps the most obvious for a new democracy. The more subtle and complex concerns were the attempts at accommodating and reconciling powerful traditions, rich cultural heritage and religious beliefs with democratic practices.<sup>13</sup> These concerns are still evident today, throughout democratic nations worldwide, and are by no means unique for the democracy in Indonesia.

The political development in Indonesia after the Suharto regime had consequences for how it saw its role within the regional framework of ASEAN. In 2003 Indonesia initiated an idea within ASEAN that one of the tasks of the regional body should be political development or to encourage the democratization of Southeast Asia.<sup>14</sup> From this point onward, it becomes clear that Indonesian democratic development is not just a phenomenon that can be researched domestically or from an international perspective but also outward-looking from Indonesia itself into the regional and international sphere.

### **1.1.3 Foreign Policy in Indonesia.**

Studies that focus on early Indonesian foreign policy often highlight the role of the United Nations (UN). The international institute had a vital role in forcing The Netherlands into negotiations during the Indonesian War for Independence. The UN provided colonised countries with a platform to make their claims for self-rule. Solidarity for the Indonesian cause by India and Australia had put the Indonesian quest for independence on the agenda of the UN Security Council. Another advocate for Indonesian independence was the United States of America (US), which even threatened The Netherlands with withdrawing the European Recovery Program (ERP or Marshall Plan). Kevin Fogg argued that Indonesia was the first colonial subject that successfully used diplomacy in the newly established international order as a weapon against colonial power and the struggle for independence. As will become evident in chapter four, this Indonesian struggle for independence from a colonial power is still relevant in today's foreign policy. A foreign policy that, in many ways, can be interpreted as the legacy of colonialism. That legacy becomes evident through the Indonesian initiative, among others, in organizing the Bandung Conference in 1955. This was the first large-scale meeting of African

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<sup>13</sup> Haig Patapan, "Democratic Leadership," in: Azra Azyumardi and Wayne Hudson, *Islam beyond conflict: Indonesian Islam and Western Political theory* (Hampshire: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2008), 65 – 66.

<sup>14</sup> Rizal Sukma, "Political Development: A Democracy Agenda For ASEAN," in Donald K. Emmerson, *Hard Choices: Security, Democracy, and Regionalism in Southeast Asia*, 135 – 150, (Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2009), 137.

and Asian states, most of which were newly independent. The conference would be the beginning of the Non-Aligned Movement, in which participants declared they would not formally align with or against any major power blocs. This independent thinking in great power politics is still visible today, in Indonesian foreign policy and ASEAN.

However, Fogg also argues that it was the Arab League, most prominently Egypt, and also other countries from the Middle-East and North-African region that laid the foundation for Indonesian success in presenting their struggle for independence at the UN. Their recognition of Indonesian independence meant the UN denied the arguments made by The Netherlands, which claimed that the war was merely an ‘internal’ conflict of The Netherlands. The relation between Indonesia and the MENA region was based upon the foundation of Islamic brotherhood. The relation had been strengthened by Indonesian Muslim students in these countries and maintained by befriended statesmen from both Indonesia and the Arab League.<sup>15</sup> Although the relations between Indonesia and the Islamic world are still relevant within Indonesian foreign policy, that relation will not be the focus of this research.

During Sukarno’s presidency, both the Indonesian public and some of the political leaders displayed strong anti-American and anti-Colonialist sentiments. Demonstrations were evident in which there was a condemning of “imperialist America” and anti-Colonial pronouncements that were underlined with the government’s attempts of building an alliance with Communist China at the expense of its relationship with Washington. However, during the Suharto presidency, the anti-Chinese and anti-communist sentiments among the population reflected were reflective of the choice of the government to loosen the Indonesia-Sino diplomatic ties, and at the same time the strengthening of the relation with Washington became important.<sup>16</sup> Sukarno’s foreign policy is often labelled as an divergent policy. Remarks by his companion Hatta have had a more lasting impact on Indonesia policy, *bebas dan aktif* (independent and active) is still relevant and has its roots in anti-colonial thought.

Since attaining independence Indonesian foreign policy has been considered deviant and illogically, from an US and European perspective. That mainly has to do with the fact that Indonesian policy has not been in line with US originating realist paradigms and their prominent balance of power theory. In chapter two, the US and EU will be more prominently examined as part of the international liberal word order and why the order changed or refocussed. There is still a disputation among scholars and practitioners about what theoretical approach would most

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<sup>15</sup> Kevin W. Fogg, *Indonesia’s Islamic Revolution* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019), 206 – 219.

<sup>16</sup> Daniel Novotny, *Torn Between America and China: Elite Perceptions and Indonesian Foreign Policy* (Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2010), 6.

adequately explain Indonesian foreign relations in the post-Cold War era.<sup>17</sup> However, it is evident that Indonesian foreign policy focusses on the regional, in which Indonesia envisions a leadership role for itself.<sup>18</sup> The fourth chapter will provide a more in-depth analysis of Indonesian foreign policy as outlined by former President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, especially in his second term and present-day President Joko Widodo's first term, and their developments and goals within their respective foreign policies.

## **1.2 *Research Question and Relevance.***

### **1.2.1 *Research Question.***

From the first section (1.1) it became evident that, from a US/EU perspective, Indonesian foreign policy in the post-Cold War era is often seen as irrational and ambiguous. At the same time, China and the broader Asian region have become a centre and focus in international relations and the foreign policies of the US and EU. With US President Obama's "Pivot to Asia" and more recently the United Kingdom's shift to Asia as the major region of interest in their foreign policies.<sup>19</sup> Against this background it is interesting to research if and how this shift to the Indo-Pacific and China and the broader Asian region has affected Indonesian foreign policy in a broad sense, and specifically its influence on Indonesians 'young' democracy and democracy promotion. This has resulted in the following main research question: *Does the changing world order influence Indonesian foreign policy, especially when focused on democracy promotion and Indonesia's 'position' in the world order?* The research within the Master-Thesis will be conducted within the context of the changing world order and the increased attention of the Indo-Pacific within it. Within this context the focus is on Indonesia and Indonesian foreign policy with special attention to democracy and democracy promotion. In order to come to a comprehensive study on the changing world order, democracy promotion, and the effects on Indonesian foreign policy, this research will cover approximately the second decade of the 21<sup>st</sup> century (2009-2019). Thus, starting at the second term of President Yudhoyono and ending after the first term of the present President Joko Widodo, who is popularly known as Jokowi.

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<sup>17</sup> Ibidem, 4 – 5.

<sup>18</sup> Donald E. Weatherbee, *Understanding Jokowi's Foreign Policy* (Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2016), 5.

<sup>19</sup> Kenneth G. Lieberthal, "The American Pivot to Asia," *Brookings Institute*, December 21, 2011,

<https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-american-pivot-to-asia/>.

Christina Gallardo, "Global Britain pivots to Asia," *Politico*, March 15, 2021,

<https://www.politico.eu/article/boris-johnson-walks-on-a-tightrope-in-uks-foreign-policy-reset-asia/>.

### 1.2.1 Relevance.

In 2009, former Indonesian President Dr. Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono gave a speech at the London School of Economics and Political Science. Although, this speech will be analysed more thoroughly later on in this research, it is relevant to make one remark here. Within his speech he sketches what he believes should be Indonesia's role within the global order in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. 'We have come to be regarded as the natural bridge between the Western world on one hand and the Islamic and Oriental worlds on the other. And "bridges" – strategic, generational, technological, cultural, economic, religious – are what the 21<sup>st</sup> century world order will need plenty of.'<sup>20</sup>

The (re)focussing of the world order on Asia as the continent that will shape future international relations is relevant because it forces other power such as the US and EU to reimagine their roles within the world order. As became evident from the speech by Yudhoyono this rethinking of the world order has its implications within the formulation of the foreign policy for nations and institutions, such as the US, EU and China, but also for Indonesia.

In subparagraph 1.1.1, on Indonesian democracy, authors such as Huntington and Horowitz were rather positive about the development of democracy in general and about Indonesian democracy in particular.<sup>21</sup> However, the region of Asia remains among those deemed not democratic, and becoming less democratic. Most regimes do not move towards democracy and authoritarian regimes remain a popular ideological competitor for democracies.<sup>22</sup> As recent turmoil in Myanmar showed, the establishment of a democracy is not set in stone. Besides, in 2017 the Economist Intelligence Unit's Democratic Index placed Indonesia 68<sup>th</sup>, a drop of twenty places.<sup>23</sup> Its democratic ranking suffered a decline, domestic democratic issues are thus not uncommon in Indonesia. On the other hand, Indonesia initiated the Bali Democracy Forum (BDF) in 2008 as an instrument of democracy promotion in the region and beyond.<sup>24</sup> Research has been conducted by numerous scholars on issues of order and its challenges, democracy promotion in the foreign policy in the US, EU, ASEAN and Indonesia. However, there has not yet been a convincing research on how changes in world

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<sup>20</sup> Dr. Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, "Indonesia: Regional Role, Global Reach," Speech at the London School of Economics, 31 March, 2009.

<sup>21</sup> Samuel P. Huntington, 'Democracy's Third Wave' in *Journal of Democracy* 2:2 (1991), 12 – 34. Horowitz, *Constitutional Change and Democracy in Indonesia*, 62 – 65.

<sup>22</sup> Giovanna M. Dora Dore, *Asia Struggles with Democracy: Evidence from Indonesia, Korea and Thailand* (New York: Routledge, 2016), 53 – 67, 56.

<sup>23</sup> The Economist Intelligence Unit, *Democracy Index 2017: Free speech under attack* (London: The Economist, 2018), 27.

<sup>24</sup> Mohamad Rosyidin, 'Promoting a home-grown democracy: Indonesia's approach of democracy promotion in the Bali democracy Forum (BDF),' *Asian Journal of Political Science*, 28:3 (2020), 312 – 333, 312.

order and the focus of major powers on the Indo-Pacific have influenced democracy promotion in the region, ASEAN, or Indonesia specifically focussing on two presidents. This thesis will thus try to bring all of the subjects together. This will be done from a historical perspective meaning that important events and/or historic continuity will not be neglected. It is also important to explain why I have opted for the case of Indonesia to be studied here.

### **1.2.2 Why Indonesia?**

In important question that has to be answered is why the case of Indonesia? The argument for researching the case of Indonesia is two-fold. First, in acknowledging the presumption that global attention in the study of international relations and foreign policy has shifted to the Indo-Pacific, this region deserves attention in the examination of the changes and challenges for the liberal international order. In research into challenges a lot of attention has been given to China, among other. This is of course relevant as China is the main challenger of the US in terms of economic power within this region and globally. Other major economic and strategic nations in the region are Japan and India. However, within the South-East Asian region Indonesia is an important nation due to its size of area, economy and military, as well as its location near the South-China-Sea, the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean. In short the broader region deserves attention in studying order and the liberal international order. The distinction becomes more evident due to the second research area of this thesis, democracy promotion.

Although there are other democracies in the South East- and Asian region such as Japan and India, Indonesian democracy is relatively new. As well as being a ‘young’ democracy Indonesia does not fall into the sphere of influence of the liberal international order as prominent as for example Japan. Indonesia has since World-War II deployed a non-alignment strategy in international relations and has thus been rather independent from direct Cold-War politics. Because of the democratic aspirations of Indonesia it is interesting to see if and how they deploy democracy promotion. Is this promotion in line with the democracy promotion of the founders of the liberal international order built by the US and EU? Or do they have an independent line in their promotion? This will be analysed and compared from a constructivist perspective, which will be explained in section 1.3.

In researching the great powers focussing on the Indo-Pacific and the challenges to the liberal order, Indonesia is a strategic nation which is an important player in the Southeast Asian region. Because of the more obvious competition between India and China I have not opted for India, but chose one of the founders of the Non-Alignment Movement, Indonesia as the case study for its role in the global order and the effects on democracy promotion.

### **1.3 Theories and concepts.**

The upcoming third section will outline and explain the theories used for this research, mainly constructivism. The other sub-paragraphs will provide the explanation of frequently used concepts within constructivism, namely role theory and how democracy promotion can be incorporated within constructivism and role theory.

#### **1.3.1 Constructivism.**

The reason for deploying constructivism, along-side role theory, for this research lays in the fact that the themes and concepts highlighted by constructivist theorist can be brought under the same umbrella role theory. Constructivists see international relations as a social construct that differences across contexts and not as a single reality. It thus acknowledges, as does role theory, that there can be a variety of policies across issues in both time and space. Therefore, constructivism is ideal for understanding the ideological changes in international relations, for example when researching foreign policy in the context of a changing world order.

Traditional theories of international relations often assume the sameness of states, while constructivist acknowledge the importance of historical context. Secondly, constructivism emphasises the social aspects of international relations and thus focusses on ideological factors such as norms, rules, language, culture, identity and self-image. Thereby it looks further then a purely material analyses, evident within realism, or institutional emphasis by liberalism, and combines ideological factors that influence possible policy and actions. Thirdly, constructivist argue that international politics is a social construct full with human meaning and action, states therefore do not solely react as rational individualities but interact in a meaningful world. Because the central themes of values, identity, ideology and legitimacy are so common in constructivism it works well within the framework of this research that focusses on change in the world order and how Indonesia's positionality within this change is being designed.<sup>25</sup>

#### **1.3.2 Role Theory and Constructivism.**

The theoretical framework of this research is based on role theory and constructivism as applied by international relations theorists. States, and to some extend also international organisations such as the EU and ASEAN, hold a variety of roles that can constitute to their identity, regulate behaviour and shape the international order to their interests. Applying role theory in the study of state behaviour and international relations has two main reasons. First, role theory is flexible

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<sup>25</sup> K. M. Fierke, "Constructivism", in Tim Dunne, *et al*, *International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 187 – 204.

so it can incorporate other theories in the study of international relations, state behaviour and foreign policy. Secondly, the use of role theory is especially relevant in the context of the changing world order as described in paragraph 1.1.3, because the increased competition for the US hegemon has as a consequence the rethinking of states and their roles in the changing order. A major part of role theory is that the role conception of a state, meaning the states own idea of what it's role in various contexts should be, shapes its role enactment, or how a states beliefs and ideas are transformed into performance and policy.

Role theory has two potential problems. First, a state often has multiple roles at the same time in various settings. Those settings can be institutions, international bodies on the international and regional level, but also domestically. Meaning that a certain role, in Indonesia's case for example, democracy promotor, has different implications in various international settings (domestic, ASEAN, UN). Secondly, who is it that determines a state's national role conception? Role contestation among domestic and international actors will complicate the process for a state to come to terms with a national role conception. Even if it does, new governments or a changing domestic or international environment can immediately influence role conception making it very fluid. When and under what conditions a state changes its role conception is also important for applying role theory. For example, what does it mean for a role conception if in a given political system there is a change, in Indonesia's case that that could be the resignation of Suharto, a change of the role of religion in politics, discussions on how a democracy should function and foreign policy goals.<sup>26</sup>

Role theory is closely connected to the concepts of identity and self-image. Within the Indonesian context identity and self-image are contested areas. Although Sukarno's notion of *Pancasila*, Indonesian nationalism, has tried to form a unique Indonesian identity, the more than 17.000 island are home to various peoples with varying cultures and identities. Research on role theory can use identity because it grasps concepts such as norms, values and cultures that can shape a role. Therefore, role theory can reach beyond the observable material characteristics of the state – size, military, economy – and focus on the role perspective based upon the interpretation of the self, perceived identity (*Pancasila*), values and legitimacy in foreign relations.<sup>27</sup>

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<sup>26</sup> Cristian Cantir and Juliet Kaarbo, 'Contested Roles and Domestic Politics: Reflections on Role Theory in Foreign Policy Analysis and IR Theory' in *Foreign Policy Analysis* 8:1 (2012), 5–24.

<sup>27</sup> Marijke Breuning, 'Role theory research in international relations: State of the art and blind spots', in S. Harnisch eds. *Role Theory in International Relations: Approaches and Analyses* (London: Routledge, 2011), 16 – 35, 18.

### 1.3.3 Understanding Democracy Promotion through Constructivism.

As was outlined in paragraphs 1.3.1 and 1.3.2 the central theories of this research are constructivism and role theory, which can both be intertwined in researching international relations and foreign policy based on ideological factors within a changing world order. The concept within foreign policy that this research will primarily focus on is democracy promotion. How both theories relate to democracy and its promotion through foreign policy will be discussed below.

Democracy is often associated with values such as sovereignty, legitimacy and freedom, in choice, speech and press. Those values, in the US and EU, became part of the identity and culture of the state and its peoples. Often such values and norms are being reflected within the particular foreign policy of those states, the idea of the EU as a value based union derives from such similarities in ideological perspectives. Active democracy promotion can also be placed as such an ideological driver and is translated into foreign policy and is used as a justification for intervention or other forms such as sanctions. This is evident in the central role of democracy and its promotion in the US's Global War on Terror and Bush's Iraq invasion, but the famous and researched example might be the democratic peace theory. Studies into this theory and the use of the studies within policymaking have resulted in the claim that democracies are more legitimate than other states and provided a rationale for practices in the expansion of democracy promoting activities.<sup>28</sup>

The concept of democracy is famous for its contested nature and multiple meanings. Contestation over its meaning is inherent for the concept of democracy. Within the research on democratic peace theory, most used a fixed definition. Within this research there will be room for both. Both the domestic discussions on democracy and what it should entail and how democracy is conceptualised within foreign policy. In order to do so it is important that within the research, the historical context of democratic developed within Indonesia and in the international sphere, is outlined. This will be done in the chapters on Indonesian democracy and democracy promotion. When researching democracy within the historical context of interest it becomes part of the social world it interacts with.<sup>29</sup>

Because of the emphasis on the social interactions that became visible when using a historical conceptual analysis. Thereby, the theoretical framework is based on role theory and constructivism which both underscore the importance of social constructions. Thus, the use of

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<sup>28</sup> Christopher Hobson, *The Rise of Democracy: Revolution, War and Transformations in International Politics since 1776* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2015), 18 – 44, 18 – 20.

<sup>29</sup> Ibidem, 34.

role theory and constructivism should be well fitted to research the concept of democracy and democracy promotion because both are inherently based on norms, rules and values. Also, this theoretical framework is suited for examining how and if foreign policy is translated from such democratic ideas and how it fits in the context of the changing world order.

### **1.3.4 Values, Identity, Ideology and Legitimacy.**

Important terms in the use of constructivism will be shortly elaborated on below. It is important to bare these terms in mind because they will return regularly throughout the thesis. Whenever the definition or meaning changes in other contexts this shall be notified in text specifically. Values, what is a value? In this thesis I will use the definition put forward by Foret and Calligaro in their book *European Values*. They understand values as ‘cultural representations and points of reference about what is good or bad.’<sup>30</sup> Meanings of values can vary within the cultural, social and historical context.

Identity, what is identity? The concept of identity has been diversely defined. In international relations theory identity has been conceptualised as role identity to account for social interaction among states. In this thesis the understanding of Huber will be used, which she derived from Alexander Wendt and Katzenstein. ‘Identity comes from social psychology, where it refers to the images of individuality and distinctiveness (the “self”) held and projected by an actor and formed through relations with significant “others”’.<sup>31</sup>

Ideology, following the *Macmillian English Dictionary* can they be defined as ‘a system of ideas and principles on which a political or economic theory is based.’<sup>32</sup> For example, in paragraph 1.1.1 the liberal order was explained. The ideological driver behind this order, was liberalism and the ideas and principles as defined by liberal thought.

Legitimacy as defined by Stephen Brooks and William Wohlforth the context of constructivist theory ‘is a set of beliefs about the propriety, acceptability, or naturalness of an action, an actor/role, or a political order.’<sup>33</sup> These are influenced by legal rules and moral norms. Legitimacy isn’t simply a matter of its constitutionality or justness, but rather is determined on whether its constituent members see it as acceptable or better than any possible alternatives.<sup>34</sup>

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<sup>30</sup> Francois Foret and Oriane Calligaro, “Analysing European values: an introduction,” in: Foret and Calligaro ed. *European Values: challenges and opportunities for EU governance* (New York: Routledge, 2018), 1 – 21, 1.

<sup>31</sup> Daniela Huber, *Democracy Promotion and Foreign Policy: Identity and Interests in US, EU and Non-Western democracies* (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 37.

<sup>32</sup> *Macmillan Dictionary*, accessed 5 March, 2021.

<https://www.macmillandictionary.com/dictionary/british/ideology>.

<sup>33</sup> Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, *World out of Balance: international relations and the challenge of American primacy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), 173.

<sup>34</sup> *Ibidem*.

## **1.4 Sources, Method and Structure.**

Within the following three sub-paragraphs the primary sources that will be used within the research will be explained, as well as the method of analysis. This section and chapter will be concluded with an overview of the structure of the thesis.

### **1.4.1 Sources and Method.**

The primary sources included within this research focus on statements made by the Indonesian presidents Yudhoyono and Widodo, or individuals from within the government or other institutions that are complementary to the government, such as the BDF and ASEAN. Statements should touch upon, or be related to, international relations, the world order, democracy or democracy promotion. Through analysing these speeches and statements it should become evident how and on which basis Indonesia positions itself within the world order and on topics such as democracy and democracy promotion. A good example that has already been was Yudhoyono's 2009 speech in London. The pitfall with these public sources is that the proclaimer and the matters discussed are often reshaped for public use. Especially in international relations, public governmental figures, choose to commend strategically instead of transparent or 'honest'. Therefore it is necessary to also keep an eye on the possible results and actions of certain claims made on foreign policy and democracy promotion. A method that can be used in order to separate speech from action, read between the lines and finding silences, is the reading of sources 'against' or with the grain. This method entails that the reader engages in a deeper analyses of the sources used within the research.

### **1.4.2 Structure.**

The structure for the rest of the thesis is as follows. The upcoming chapter two evaluates the role and function of democracy in the changing world order. How is the current world order changing and what does this mean for democracy and democracy promotion? The third chapter will research Indonesia's road to democracy, the current status of democracy, domestic discussions about what democracy entails in terms of ideas, values, norms and rules. In the fourth chapter Indonesian foreign policy will be more thoroughly discussed, especially the role of democracy and democracy promotion within it. The last chapter and at the same time the conclusion of this thesis will bring together the three chapters on democracy in the changing world order, Indonesian democracy and Indonesian democracy promotion. Within this conclusion the question: did the changing world order make Indonesia reassess its foreign policy, especially when focussed on democracy promotion?, should be answered.

## 2. The liberal International Order and Why It Is Challenged.

This chapter will provide an introduction to the history of world order and the necessary context about the liberal international order and the challenges that occur within it as well as from outside of it. The relevance of explaining this is that it gives greater insight into the underlying framework on which the liberal international order was built. That means the focus lies on the ideology, values, identity and legitimacy as outlined by constructivist in paragraph 1.3.4. Because there is a focus on the changes and challenges, the information is a helpful context in the following chapters. This is necessary for a better understanding of democracy promotion in chapter three and the case study of Indonesia's role in the global order and their democracy promotion in chapter four.

Before we dig deeper into the liberal international order that was briefly introduced in paragraph 1.1.1 and why I argue that it is being challenged, some conceptual and terminological notes are necessary. What do we mean by global or world order? How do we study it? Furthermore, why do we study it? Global order or world order in the *Macmillan Dictionary* is described as 'the political, economic, or social situation in the world at a particular time and the effect this has on relationships between different countries.'<sup>35</sup> Henry Kissinger defines world order as follows 'world order describes the concept held by a region or civilisation about the nature of just arrangements and the distribution of power through to be applicable to the entire world. International order is the practical application of these concepts to a substantial part of the globe.'<sup>36</sup> Hedley Bull also formulated an influential definition of global order: 'a pattern of activity that sustains the elementary or primary goals of the society of states, or international society.'<sup>37</sup> These goals can be identified as preservation of the state system, maintaining sovereignty, relative peace and stability. Nevertheless, it could also involve considerations of morality, inclusiveness and justice. The working definition of global order in this thesis refers to institutions as the cornerstones of the liberal international order, norms, values, distribution power, identity and legitimacy as understood by constructivists.<sup>38</sup>

How do we study, and why do we study world order? In IR theory, the normative conception of order emphasised by constructivist partly accept this broad range of goals. But, is still too descriptive in analysing or understanding order. Therefore, the constructivist tends

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<sup>35</sup> *Macmillan Dictionary*, accessed 16 March, 2021,  
<https://www.macmillandictionary.com/dictionary/british/world-order>.

<sup>36</sup> Henry Kissinger, *World Order* (New York: Penguin, 2014), 9.

<sup>37</sup> Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1999), 8.

<sup>38</sup> Amitav Acharya, *Constructing Global Order* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018), 8 – 9.

to focus on the existence of ideas, ideologies, legitimacy, identity and shared values on a global scale in conceptualising order. Thus, constructivist go beyond the more descriptive definition of Bull that implies a status quo. They deviate from realist and liberals due to the fact that the latter are concerned with international institutions and global governance, while the former focuses on the political and military balance of power within the global order. Although the classifications for currents and sub-currents within the theory or schools of thought on IR could be extended, realist and liberalist form the majority of IR scholars. However, within this paper, the focus is on a constructivist approach to world order, as has been explained in paragraph 1.1.1. Studying world order can lead to a different understanding of how it is understood and managed in various parts of the world to ensure stability and cooperation in a pluralistic world.<sup>39</sup>

We already saw that Kissinger in his definition argued the importance of regionalism, in the sense that world order is conceived locally, including outside of the US/EU core. This outward looking is also stressed by Acharya.<sup>40</sup> Therefore this chapter will first outline the liberal international order based on the liberal theorist G. John Ikenberry. I have opted for a liberal theorist, because this is the theoretical framework on which the order was built. Specific attention will be given to the US and EU as two separate power blocks. Although both blocks are often referred to as the ‘West’, I do not want to use the terminology of Western and non-Western because it does not grasp the distinctions between the various entities within it. Thereafter we will shift to why this global order is challenged and pay particular consideration to the Southeast- and broader Asian Pacific region, the Indo-Pacific. I opted for this region because this is the Indonesian region, the subject of the case study in chapter four and the presence of a (re)-emerging global power, China. Throughout the chapter there will be a focus on the constructivists’ conceptualisation of global order based on ideas, ideology, norms, values, identity and legitimacy.

## **2.1 *World order and Liberal Internationalism.***

### **2.1.1 An Introduction.**

The three most important varieties of order among states are those organised around the balance of power theory, hegemony, and constitutionalism. Within each of the orders state power is distributed and exercised in a different manner. A balance-of-power order is organised around the principle of anarchy, with no overarching authority. Because of the anarchy there are

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<sup>39</sup> Ibidem, 11.

<sup>40</sup> Ibidem.

incentives for states to seek balance. Order is based on the balancing actions of states who want to ensure their security in an anarchic system.

An hegemonic order is based on the distribution of power among states, but it operates according to a very different logic, the organizing principle of hierarchy. Within such a hierarchic international order, states are integrated vertically with defined positions. It can be achieved and maintained in different ways. But, ultimately, hegemonic order is established and maintained by preponderance of the power of the leading state, and when that power declines or passes to another state, the order will break apart. Ikenberry argues that ideological and status appeals are integral to the perpetuation of hegemonic order by the other states from the hierarchy.

Constitutional orders are political order organised around agreed-upon institutions that operate to allocate rights and limit the exercise of power. They have three characteristics. First, shared agreements over principles and rules of the order. Second, the rules and institutions that are established set binding and authoritative limits on the exercise of power by individual states. Thirdly, the rules and institutions are entrenched in the wider political system and not easily altered.<sup>41</sup> In the next paragraph the characteristics of the liberal international order will be outlined, as well as the US hegemonic position within it.

### **2.1.2 The Liberal International Order and US Hegemony.**

In paragraph 1.1.1 the liberal international order, led by the US, was already briefly introduced. After World War II the US established itself as a great power, shaping the international order after its interest. The US became the sole hegemon after the collapse of the Soviet-Union (USSR), which marked the end of the Cold-War period. In the introductory paragraph (1.1.1) the role of institutions within this US hegemonic order was already emphasised. Therefore, within this paragraph the focus will be on analysing how the US handled to keep its hegemonic role within the world order it created.

During the first decade after the Cold War, democracies and markets flourished globally. The World Trade Organization (WTO) was established in 1995 as a successor of GATT, strengthening the world economic rules and institutions. The EU continued to add new members and progressed in further economic integration and NATO expanded eastward. President at the time Bill Clinton implemented policies for expanding democracy and the institutions that embodied his vision of the liberal international order. The character of this order, that did not

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<sup>41</sup> G. John Ikenberry, *After Victory* (Princeton University Press, 2001), 21 – 32.

have to compete with the USSR, reflected the sense that the US, Western-Europe, and the wider liberal democratic world formed a political community defined by the shared affinities of values, identity and democracy.<sup>42</sup> What exactly were these shared affinities of value, identity and democracy within the liberal international order? In answering this question it should become clear how the US shaped the international liberal international order. This is an important part of this research as it could portray how Indonesia was and is related to this liberal international order.

Ikenberry, a liberal international theorist, argues that at its core, liberal internationalism 'offers a vision of an open, rule-based system in which states trade and cooperate to achieve mutual gains.'<sup>43</sup> Ikenberry understands the idea of openness as the ability of states to access each other's societies and economies. The driving idea behind this, is that as nations become more integrated into a worldwide economic or political system, it is harder for them to pursue other ideological goals that would disrupt the flow of benefits. Whether or not this argument is valid, remains debated as shall be shown in the challenges to the US liberal international order. The second idea Ikenberry coins are rules and institutions. He argues that the building of a system of rules and institutions has been driven by several different logics. Liberal democracies responded to their increasing interdependence by creating rules and institutions to secure property rights, facilitate cooperation, and lay down an infrastructure for a international order. Those were seen as a principled set of organised arrangements around which sovereign states could operate and cooperate. It can therefore be argued that the rules and institutions, ideationally, are not simply reflections of power, but a framework that works for every country, regardless of their power or circumstances. As shown before, Rosyidin argues that this order created a hierachal and biased order.<sup>44</sup> The third idea Ikenberry relates to the liberal international order is democratic solidarity. The claim is that because of their common interests and shared values they can easier work together than non-democracies. Following Ikenberry's argument, liberal democracies should be able to operate in a rule-based international system, and as a group pursue cooperation and manifest advantages in economic growth. In return, those states outside of the order want to be integrated into it.<sup>45</sup> The rules and institutions, democratic values and openness of trade and society are the three pillars on which the liberal democratic

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<sup>42</sup> Ikenberry, *A World Safe for Democracy*, 198.

<sup>43</sup> Ibidem, 33.

<sup>44</sup> Mohamad Rosyidin, 'Promoting a home-grown democracy,' 313.

<sup>45</sup> Ikenberry, *A World Safe for Democracy*, 33 – 37.

world order was shaped. These fit in with the non-material factors like culture, norms, beliefs, ideas and (state)identity studied by constructivist scholars.

What about the ideology behind the US hegemonic place within their created international liberal international order? The idea of the US hegemon or American primacy has deep roots within US history. The idea of American exceptionalism has been evident from George Washington to George Bush. The period after the Cold-War was seen as a unipolar-moment in time in which US global power had the ability to (re)shape the world in its own image. The case for a unipolar world rests on two arguments. The first is that hegemons provide public goods such a security, stability and commerce. We will focus more broadly on the second argument of American unipolarity, that the US's interest and values are not merely national, but universal. The idea that the fate of humanity is inextricably bound to the fate of the US, is that in its own self-image America is the universal nation, against which all other nations are to be judged.<sup>46</sup> This belief in the indivisibility of Western values has also been a fundamental ground of Trans-Atlantic thought since the Word-War II. It was specifically endorsed in Tony Blair's justification for standing shoulder to shoulder with America in the Iraq War. He states that 'the basic values of America are our values too ... Democracy, freedom, tolerance and justice.'<sup>47</sup> President at the time Bush argued 'in keeping with our heritage and principles, we do not use our strength to press for unilateral advantage. We seek instead to create a balance of power that favours human freedom: conditions in which all nations and all societies can choose for themselves the rewards and challenges of political and economic liberty.'<sup>48</sup> The 2002 National Security Strategy in accordance stated that the US is determined to promote the 'single sustainable model for national success: freedom, democracy and free enterprise.'<sup>49</sup>

#### **2.1.4 The European Union and the Liberal International Order.**

In 2020 Anu Bradford published a book called *The Brussels Effect: How the European Union Rules the World*. In this book, based on her famous 2012 article 'The Brussels Effect', Bradford argues that the EU remains an influential superpower that shapes the world through a concept she dubbed 'The Brussels Effect.' Bradford, in her argumentation, refers to the EU's unilateral power to regulate global markets. Without having to turn to international institutions or

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<sup>46</sup> David Clark, 'European Foreign Policy and American Primacy,' *International Politics* 45 (2008), 276 – 291, 277 – 281.

<sup>47</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>48</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>49</sup> Mary Nolan, *The Transatlantic Century: Europe and America, 1890 – 2010* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 368 – 369.

multilateral cooperation, the EU has the exceptional ability to instate regulations that shape the world trading system, raising standards worldwide and Europeanizing many rules and norms around global commerce. Different from other ways of global influence, the Brussels Effect does not mean that the EU imposes these standards on anyone. Rather, markets themselves and the forces that drive them, convert to EU standards voluntarily within their global operations. Bradford argues that through this setting of rules, the EU has enormous and unique power to transform diverse markets such as competition regulation, data and environmental protection.<sup>50</sup>

Why is this relevant in relation to the Indo-Pacific or Indonesian foreign policy? On the one hand the ‘Brussels Effect’ shapes international standards and thus influences other economic blocks, such as ASEAN. On the other hand, this influence and the ideas behind the setting of rules and standards is based upon EU thought on how the world should be shaped. Thus, the EU provides an ideology that can be implemented or dismissed. In the context of ASEAN that means that EU norms and values on various aspects, economically, culturally, or strategically influence ASEAN in their functioning, comply or reject. Indonesia presents itself as the natural leader of ASEAN and can therefore influence the agenda of organization and the ideology. Understanding the basis for EU normative power is therefore relevant in relation to ASEAN and Indonesia.

The European Union and its role within the world order today is shaped not only by the Brussels Effect. The creation of the European Economic Community (EEC) through the Treaty of Rome in 1958 marked a key step in the creation of what we know now as the EU. In following decades the economic integration intensified and more European countries joined the organization. This can be regarded as an important component of the US post-World War II goal of promotion economic exchange between countries. But European integration has obviously not only served a strictly economic purpose. Safeguarding of the liberal democracies in Europe was equally important. Countries lead by authoritarian regimes, such as Spain, Portugal and Greece were refused membership. EU membership has thus become strongly associated with liberal democracy.<sup>51</sup> In 2001 the European Commission defined democratic values as an important facet of the European identity. Most importantly, these values are explicitly promoted by EU institutions.<sup>52</sup> In 2017, the European Council adopted a

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<sup>50</sup> Anu Bradford, *The Brussels Effect: How the European Union Rules the World* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2020).

<sup>51</sup> Antonina Bakardjieva Engelbrekt, *et al.* “The European Union in a Changing World Order: What is at stake?” in Antonina Bakardjieva Engelbrekt et al. (eds.) *The European Union in a Changing World Order* (Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2019), 1 – 22, 5.

<sup>52</sup> Odilia Oshri, *et al.* ‘A community of values: Democratic identity formation in the European Union,’ in *European Union Politics* 17:1 (2016), 114 – 137, 115.

recommendation on common values. The promotion of values is presented as part of the fight against the rise of populism, xenophobia, nationalism and fake news. The recommended text builds on a previous declaration on the promoting citizenship and the common values of freedom, tolerance and non-discrimination. Foret and Calligaro argue that although values are increasingly referred to, their actual role is rarely systematically studied.<sup>53</sup>

Erik O. Wennerström researched aspects of EU efforts to ensure that the established common values are respected by the member states. He found that the values in the various European treaties, especially in the Treaty on European Union (TEU) which was first incarnated by the Treaty of Maastricht, the Copenhagen Criteria (CC) and the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe (TCE). In the TEU it was established that “The Union shall respect the national identities of its Member States, whose systems of governance are founded on the principles of democracy.” It also states the union’s respect for Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR).<sup>54</sup> It was only after the CC and TCE that the term value was explicitly named and their number expanded. “The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. These values are common to the Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men prevail.”<sup>55</sup> The six mentioned values are human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights. The other notes are rather desired characteristics deemed desirable, pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men.<sup>56</sup> These values were ratified in 2009.

In the previous paragraph 2.1.3 and within this paragraph the values that underline the liberal international order, the US hegemon and the European Union, have been outlined. Within, the emphasis was on the importance of democracy, (human) freedom, tolerance and justice. As an ideology the liberal international order is based on the principles of democratic values and openness, openness of trade and society to enhance cooperation and thus mutual gains. However, US/European identity and legitimacy have been dispersed. According to former Swedish Prime Minister Carl Bildt Europe and America once shared a common fate,

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<sup>53</sup> Francois Foret and Oriane Calligaro, “Analysing European values: an introduction.” in: Francois Foret and Oriane Calligaro ed. *European Values: challenges and opportunities for EU governance* (New York: Routledge, 2018), 1 – 21, 1.

<sup>54</sup> Erik O. Wennerström, “Can the EU protect its fundamental values?” in Antonina Bakardjieva Engelbrekt et al. (eds.) *The European Union in a Changing World Order* (Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2019), 245 – 275, 247.

<sup>55</sup> Ibidem, 248.

<sup>56</sup> Ibidem.

1945, but now Europe's defining date is 1989 and America's is 2001.<sup>57</sup> Although this statement is too neat and does not capture the full story of the relationship, it does show that US unilateralism and EU constitutionalism are not as uniform as it once was. Nolan therefore argued that 'the American Century in Europe is over.'<sup>58</sup> Jürgen Habermas and Jacques Derrida criticised and captured the differences in ideology, identity and legitimacy rather well in their 2003 manifesto *February 15, or, What binds Europeans Together*. They argued that old Europe sees itself challenged by the hegemonic politics of its ally (the US)... Many reject the unilateral, pre-emptive and deceptively justified invasion (Iraq-War).<sup>59</sup> They defend the EU model as a form of 'governance beyond the nation-state.'<sup>60</sup> Europe has been shaped by its totalitarian past, the Holocaust, imperialism and the loss of empire. Unlike Americans, Europeans realize that 'the domestication of state power demands a mutual limitation of sovereignty, on the global as well as the nation-state level.'<sup>61</sup> Thus, the shared values and ideology within the liberal international order do not comply with the identity and legitimacy ideas of the two powers in the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

## 2.2 *Challenges to the Liberal International Order.*

### 2.2.1 An introduction.

In 1992 Undersecretary of Defence, Paul D. Wolfowitz drafted a plan to shape the world in accordance with American ideas. He wanted to implement a strategy of selective involvement within the other parts of the world. In other words, the US would intervene there where American interest were being undermined. This strategy of selective involvement meant that as long as the US was not threatened it would remain at the side-line of international politics, and being firm in international politics if American interest or values were being harmed.<sup>62</sup> Under the umbrella of American interest and values, as has already been shown, was the protection and promotion of democracy.

Wolfowitz's plan was named the *Defence Planning Guidance* and focused on the prevention of potential new rivals joining the world stage. A strong new opponent would reduce the US's freedom to act in international politics. As a consequence this would imply that

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<sup>57</sup> Nolan, *The Transatlantic Century*, 373.

<sup>58</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>59</sup> Jürgen Habermas and Jacques Derrida, "February 15, or, What Binds Europeans Together: Plea for a Common Foreign Policy, Beginning in Core Europe," in Daniel Levy (eds.) *Old Europe, New Europe, Core Europe: Transatlantic Relations after the Iraq War* (London: Verso, 2005), 3 – 13.

<sup>60</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>61</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>62</sup> Rob de Wijk, Power Politics: *How China and Russia Reshape the World* (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2021), 19.

American interests and the promotion of American values could not be protected. The *Defence Planning Guidance* focussed on three possible threats. The first, Russia that returned to the centre of international politics. Secondly, a united Europe, and thirdly the rapid growing of China. Wolfowitz plan outlined the possibility of a shift from a US lead unipolar to a multipolar world, a world in which the US was not the only superpower. This increased competition in international politics would put American interests at stake.<sup>63</sup> Within this paragraph two of the three threats will be analysed, the EU and China. The fact that Russia is left out of this analysis is not because the Russian threat is denied, but because the focus is on democratic nations, and democracy promotion within South-East Asia, namely Indonesia, and China as the other great power influencing that region. First, we will look at the weakening of the liberal international order from within.

The foundations on which the liberal hegemonic order was built are weakening. The US and its allies, today, are less powerful than when they shaped the post-Cold War order. The political troubles of liberal democracies are a mirror of these global power shifts. Democracies around the world are facing internal difficulties and discontents. In the older democracies of Europe and the US there is rising inequality, economic stagnation and political polarization. In the newer and poorer democracies rising inequality, corruption and backsliding are also among problems they face. The ‘third wave’ mentioned by Huntington seemed to have ceased and democracies fail to address their problems, domestic legitimacy decreases and there is a resurgence of nationalist, populist and xenophobic movements.<sup>64 65</sup>

A well-known example of how the liberal world order was challenged, from the inside, is the election of Donald Trump as US President. Although since World War II foreign policy has varied, all his successors stood for more than just its own wellbeing, as has been argued by Ikenberry. But, Donald Trump promised a new foreign policy which focussed on nationalist and transactional gains for the US. There was no outline of the broader role the US should play as the defender of the free world. National advantages will guide his policies, Trump made clear. Trump wanted to reassess previous deals and alliances. What does this mean for the Asian region and Obama’s pivot to Asia? Patrick argued that as the US becomes less trustworthy or less to be relied upon, policymakers would begin hedging their bets between the US and other regional powers, China, Russia and Iran. In Asia, Patrick argues, hedging against the US

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<sup>63</sup> Ibidem, 20.

<sup>64</sup> G. John Ikenberry, ‘The end of liberal international order?’ in: *International Affairs* 94:1 (2018), 1 – 23, 17 – 18.

<sup>65</sup> Huntington, ‘After Twenty Years: The Future of the Third Wave,’ 11 – 12.

unreliability could stir up the regional security order. Although China stands at the centre of the Asian economy, the US, has traditionally been the guarantee of security through a network of alliances and partnerships.<sup>66</sup> If any of the before mentioned problems are of influence in Indonesia shall be discussed in the next chapter. Now let's turn to South-East Asia and China.

The rise of China in the world is a subject studied by many scholars. It is therefore impossible to give a comprehensive summary of all the literature produced within this thesis. However, there is a consensus that liberal internationalism will increasingly be influenced by the re-emergence of China as a major power on the world stage and in turn also the reaction of the US to China's growing importance. The most important question in this rising China debate is to what extend and how China will adapt or challenge the liberal international order, and as a consequence the US and European position within this order. The fact that China has an authoritarian regime is a challenge for the order in itself. However, before we jump to the paragraph about China, there will be a concise introduction to the region of South-East Asian, embodied by the Association of South East Asian Nations within the liberal international order.

## 2.2.2 ASEAN.

From a constructivist approach it is argued that ASEAN could actively shape great power interest in maintaining its prominence by acting as a norm entrepreneur and socializer. ASEAN continued a tradition of Asian nations localising external norms and creating indigenous norms. These formed a normative structure which determined what was appropriate for different types of powers to do in the region and thereby accounted for the region's division. ASEAN's success in establishing the Asian Regional Forum (ARF) reflected the embeddedness of sovereignty and anti-colonialism in the normative structure. Non-hierarchal cooperative security led by small powers was more appropriate than great power-led collective security. ASEAN's informal forums offered conducive environments for socialising great powers into accepting and internalising these norms. China's increasing comfort with multilateralism and moves towards a benign good neighbour policy in the early 2000's were seen as a reflection of such internalisation by ASEAN.<sup>67</sup> Yates also addresses the role of ASEAN after the fall of the USSR. He argues that in the immediate post-Cold War years ASEAN faced irrelevance, because of the Cold-War logics that underpinned the previous decades. ASEAN states took steps to ensure the

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<sup>66</sup> Stewart M. Patrick, 'Trump and World Order: The Return of Self-Help' in: *Foreign Affairs* 92:2 (2017), 52 – 59.

<sup>67</sup> Robert Yates, 'ASEAN as the 'regional conductor': understanding ASEAN's role in the Indo-Pacific order,' *The Pacific Review* 30:4 (2017), 443 – 461, 445.

US commitment to providing public goods was secured by agreeing access arrangements, and engaged China to socialise it onto considering itself a ‘responsible regional great power’ rather than seeking to revision the regional order of the Indo-Pacific.<sup>68</sup>

ASEAN emphasised its indigenous identity through rejecting ‘external’ proposals for a security dialogue which it deemed inappropriate for Asian culture and instead promoted its own model. It highlighted its neutrality and status as a successful manager through the design of a proposed dialogue based on the ASEAN Way: informal dialogue, moving at a pace comfortable to all, and with all decisions based on consensus. This ensured the process could not be dominated by any single power, showing that ASEAN was acting as a neutral facilitator of an inclusive dialogue. The ASEAN meeting in 1993 outlined the rationale of this ‘inclusive engagement,’ stating that: ‘... continuing presence of the US, as well as stable relationships among the US, Japan and China, and other states of the region would contribute to regional stability... ASEAN and its dialogue partners ... (should) ... work with other regional states to evolve a predictable and constructive pattern of relationships in the Indo-Pacific.’<sup>69</sup>

Yates argues that the major challenge for ASEAN in maintaining its role as ‘regional conductor’ is in upholding the role bargains that are acceptable to the great powers. The ASEAN-US bargain has been re-invigorated in the more recent debated of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. The US has endorsed ASEAN’s role and its commitment to provide public goods as part of the post-Cold-War rebalance. However, the US now expects ASEAN to use its diplomatic leadership to legitimise US interests and preponderance in the South China Sea. Furthermore, the US expect ASEAN to promote a ‘rule-based order’, with emphasis on upholding freedom of navigation and overflight and obstructing China’s efforts to consolidate its control over the SCS. The problem with this is that it exacerbates existing issues between ASEAN and China. There is a question regarding China’s commitment to the ‘responsible regional great power’ role as it was defined in the 1990’s-2000s during China’s ‘good neighbour’ strategy. China seems to have dropped its commitment towards ‘restraint’ and now seeks to redefine what its rights and responsibilities are in the region. Evidence of this can be seen in the China-led One Belt, One Road initiative, Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, and China’s assertiveness in the SCS. This has tested ASEAN’s ability to maintain an acceptable role bargain with China, especially as China sought to scupper any efforts at ASEAN developing a consensus on the SCS and instead re-focus ASEAN’s attention to the broader ASEAN-China relationship whilst promoting bilateral negotiations with claimants over the SCS. This is not acceptable for

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<sup>68</sup> Ibidem, 455.

<sup>69</sup> Ibidem, 456.

ASEAN which are uncomfortable with the prospect of Chinese hegemony. ASEAN therefore seems stuck. It cannot wield its authority as a ‘regional conductor’ in the SCS because of Chinese contestation and lack of consensus, but it needs to act in order to meet the expectations of the US. This means its ‘regional conductor’ role is in a precarious balance between consolidation and deterioration as the expectations of two powerful legitimating constituencies pull ASEAN in different directions.<sup>70</sup>

Drawing further on the constructivist concepts of social identities Iris Chen Xuechen argues that the identities and actors construction play a significant role in shaping behaviour of states. Actors not only construct their identity based on their domestic cultural and political contexts, but also develop a multiplicity of social identities through the process of interacting with other international actors, which was also mentioned in paragraph 1.3.4.<sup>71</sup>

In relation to ASEAN she demonstrates that ASEAN as an institution has developed an identity based on a combination of Westphalian legal norms and its own distinctive sociocultural norms, as well as the principle of ASEAN centrality. Based on these principles, ASEAN self-identities function as a distinctive model for regionalism and a central player in the Indo-Pacific region.<sup>72</sup> The relevance of regionalism has already been underlined by Henry Kissinger in Acharya.<sup>73</sup> ASEAN has constructed a dual social identity in relation to the EU. First, Xuechen argues, ASEAN sees itself as an economic and trade partner rather than a strategic partner of the EU. Second, it considers itself a distinctive model of regional integration and cooperation. Her study identifies that the EU has been influenced by ASEAN’s identities and has consequently redefined its perceptions of ASEAN. Although the early years of this interregional relationship were marked by ASEAN’s low profile in EU’s foreign policy and the EU’s self-perception as a superior normative power, the EU has now elevated ASEAN’s rank in its external relations, recognizing it as an equal partner, a central power in Asia and a distinct model for regionalism. Nevertheless, she argues that the future of ASEAN-EU relations and the extent to which the EU’s good intentions can be translated into substantial cooperation, is contingent largely on whether the existing challenges, notably the perception gaps on normative issues, can be addressed.<sup>74</sup> In other words how can European perceptions on values, identity, ideology and legitimacy be incorporated with ASEAN and the other-way-round.

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<sup>70</sup> Ibidem, 458.

<sup>71</sup> Iris Chen Xuechen, ‘The Role of ASEAN’s Identities in Reshaping the ASEAN-EU Relationship,’ *Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International and Strategic Affairs* 40:2 (2018), 222 – 246.

<sup>72</sup> Ibidem, 239.

<sup>73</sup> Acharya, *Constructing Global Order*, 11.

<sup>74</sup> Xuechen, ‘The Role of ASEAN’s Identities’, 239.

### 2.2.3 China's Vision on World Order.

Within this paragraph the Chinese challenge to liberal world order shall be evaluated. In which ways does China integrate within this order and how does it challenge the order and the position of the US within it? China is partly adapting to the liberal international order, its institutions, networks and rules of the game. But it also partly resists the call for liberalization and holds on to distinctive aspects of its state-society model and governance.<sup>75</sup> The focus will however be on the values, identity, ideology and legitimacy on which the Chinese challenge is founded. The article *China's historical statecraft and the return of history* by Maximilian Meyer is particularly useful. Within this article Meyer argues that China is increasingly mobilizing historical narratives as part of a broader trend that challenges Fukuyama's thesis of the 'End of History' in an effort to skilfully connect domestic discourses within international developments and aspirations. His findings also correlate with the notion made at the beginning of the paragraph that China is both adaptive and resisting the liberal international order.<sup>76</sup>

Meyer shows that underlying the construction of Chinese foreign policy is a practice of historical statecraft. The idea of one 'harmonious world' as a concept on the basis of which international relations could be recast in the light of traditional Chinese Confucian values. The construction of an antithesis for Fukuyama's 'End of History' has been prevalent in Chinese scholarly work. Because of China's economic growth and technological progress some intellectuals declared their conviction that the authoritarian governing model has won against liberal systems. Other scholars began to further exploit the similarities and ideological continuity of Confucianism and modern Chinese Socialism. They embraced a new vision on modernity on the basis of Chinese history instead of the Enlightenment features of European modernity. China uses historical statecraft to legitimize its claims in international relations and as a framework for its foreign policy goals. Taking the example of the BRI, Meyer argues that China is 'provincializing' Europe and the US by emphasizing the centrality of China. The development of powerful ideologies essentially aim at remodelling the existing world order. Historical statecraft can thus be used to create a distinct Chinese model for world order based on values, identity, ideology and legitimacy as was the liberal international order. This underlines the importance of studying international relations from a constructivist perspective.<sup>77</sup>

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<sup>75</sup> Nana de Graaff, Tobias ten Brink and Inderjeet Parmar, 'China's rise in a liberal world order in transition – introduction to the FORUM,' *Review of International Political Economy* 27:2 (2020), 191-207, 192.

<sup>76</sup> Maximilian Meyer, 'China's historical statecraft and the return of history,' *International Affairs* 94:6 (2018), 1217 – 1235, 1220.

<sup>77</sup> Ibidem, 1226 – 1234.

Opposed to ASEAN, Meyer shows that China constructs a distinctive ideology that draws partly on liberalism but embeds it within Confucian values, the idea of Chinese centrality and legitimizing it with China's 'historical place' in the world. By this means it challenges the US and the EU, provincializing them through the BRI.

Another scholar that wrote about China's place in the world order is Daniel A. Bell in the book *Chinese Vision of World Order: Tianxia, Culture and World Politics* by Ban Wang. In this book, on the notion of values, identity, ideology and legitimacy, he argues as follows.<sup>78</sup> On the aspect of legitimacy the Chinese political culture differs from that of US/EU political culture because it has no history on the idea of territorial boundaries. Bell argues that instead of viewing itself as merely a state that is in competition in the international environment, China views itself as the centre of the world that should be unified and peaceful. This has also been explained as a hierachal world order, also by contemporary Chinese thinkers. From this point of view US/EU critics noted that this would merely mean a replacement of hegemony from the US to China. However the idea of China as the centre of the world both gives the state an identity as well as a legitimacy for growing its influence in global affairs. Bell also goes into some values associated with the idea of Confucian political ethics, namely the idea of harmony. This idea of harmony does not mean sameness, uniformity or conformity. It is basically understood in international relations as a way to work out an arrangement that allows the 'self' as well as the 'other' to adjust, shaping situations into a harmonious one. However, the value of harmony does not mean that all values are equal. Confucians do believe that their values are superior to other non-Confucian values and as such would be better than Christian or Liberal values. But Bell also acknowledges that although there is no ideological tradition within Confucianism that directly relates to values as freedom, democracy or human rights that does not mean they definitively have no place in China's political future.<sup>79</sup>

Although the above mentioned approach to Chinese political thought on international relations from a constructivist standpoint does not begin to grasp the complexity of Chinese visions on order or the challenge it poses to the liberal international order it does show that the liberal international order is not without competition. It also underscores the diversity of political thought on order and the variation in values, ideology, identity and legitimacy that are evident within the Indo-Pacific.

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<sup>78</sup> Daniel A. Bell, "Realizing Tianxia: Traditional Values and China's Foreign Policy," in: Ban Wang, *Chinese Visions of World Order: Tianxia, Culture, and World Politics* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2017), 127 – 146.

<sup>79</sup> Ibidem, 127 – 146.

The goal of this chapter was to show exactly that point, that all international actors active within their region, and in the world, have their own agenda's based on their own construction of the 'self' and of the 'other' or how the 'other' or 'self' should be in order to achieve goals that are seen as necessary for their own vision of the region, or world, and the order within it. There was an extra emphasis on ASEAN because of the fact that Indonesia is member and has traditionally presented itself as a leader within it. The information provided in this chapter is necessary for understanding the chapter that follows on democracy promotion. This chapter is about how and why democracy is promoted, how this is done within the Indo-Pacific, or how it is not done.

### 3. Democracy Promotion.

Within this chapter the focus lies on the role of democracy promotion in the international liberal international order, ASEAN, China and the Indo-Pacific. In order to be able to do a sufficient case study of Indonesia in the next chapter, it is necessary to dig deeper into the role of democracy promotion in the world order as explained in the previous chapter. But first, what exactly is democracy promotion? How do we study it? And why do we study it? In paragraph 1.1.2 the concept was already briefly introduced in relation to constructivism and role theory. However, the conceptual and terminology has to be elaborated on more thoroughly.

Why study democracy promotion in the light of a changing global order? In the previous chapter we saw that from a constructivist perspective the idea of democratic values is the pillar of the liberal world order. Liberal democracies captures the values, identity, ideology and legitimacy of the order as constructed by the US and EU. Together with the fact that US and EU attention has shifted towards the Indo-Pacific it is relevant to research democracy promotion in this region because it can provide a broader perspective on the willingness of countries in this region to conform to the concept of liberal democracy and thus the liberal international order. Important within this region is the rise of China which might provide another path to prosperity as an authoritarian regime.

From the perspective of the core founders of the liberal international order democracy is understood in two ways. Electoral democracy in which the accentuation on free and fair elections and liberal democracy, which brings with it liberal constitutionalism and fundamental right as key standards of meaningful democratization. But as we saw in paragraph 1.1.2 democracy is a contested concept. This means that there are various other models of democracy on offer. But from a US/EU perspective democracy is equated with liberal democracy.<sup>80</sup> The question remains, what does democracy promotion entail?

The first question we will have to address is if democracy promotion is truly a value driven undertaking or merely a interest driven one. I argue, in line with Bridoux and Kurki that it is value driven. Interests actors can and will promote values when the opportunities present themselves, while value driven actors will promote independent of interest consideration. However, Bridoux and Kurki also acknowledge that value-principles can be aligned with and imbedded in interest agenda's. From a liberal perspective democracy promotion does seem to assume, on the question of interest and values, that "all good things go together." Because of the peace-creating, stability engendering and wealth-spreading functions that democratization

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<sup>80</sup> Jeff Bridoux and Milja Kurki, *Democracy Promotion: a critical introduction* (New York: Routledge, 2014), 2.

has.<sup>81</sup> Although all of these assumptions are still heavily debated. But for this research and due to the scope of it, we will work with the assumptions.

Democracy promotion is a specific type of foreign policy. Promotion is above all a ideological agenda. It contributes to reconfiguration of power relations between the donor and the recipient who are constantly in a process of renegotiating the political and economic future of the countries that are assisted.<sup>82</sup> Daniela Huber uses the following definition of foreign policy “the sum of official activities conducted by an independent actor that are directed at the external environment with the objective of influencing that environment and the behaviour of other actors within it.”<sup>83</sup> Democracy promotion is then defined as “all those foreign policy activities which aim at fostering the transition to, consolidation of, or improvement of democracy in other states and their societies.”<sup>84</sup> Bridoux and Kurki use the following definition “attempts to install or assist in the institution of democratic governance in state’s outside one’s own.”<sup>85</sup> Both definitions thus focus on activities that have the goal of strengthening democracy abroad. Bridoux, Kurki and Huber all argue that democracy promotion from a US/EU perspective tends to focus mainly on the liberal model of democracy. Under the umbrella of democracy promotion are several other terms such as assistance, support, conditionalities and military intervention in defence of democracy all fall under this umbrella.

The study of democracy promotion in constructivism has focused on the question of identity. The constructivist approach that was also evident in the previous chapter will therefore be used within this one as well. How do identity dynamics affect democracy promotion from a constructivist perspective? In order to answer this question we will once again focus on the generalities of democracy promotion (a short historical overview was already given in paragraph 1.1.3, with special attention to the specifics of US and EU democracy promotion. Thereafter the focus shifts towards South East -and Asia as a whole. What has been the role of democracy promotion in the region? What can be said about democracy and its promotion in general? From a constructivist perspective, what are the similarities or differences with the US and EU? In answering these questions it becomes clearer how the case study of Indonesia can be better contextualised within the Indo-Pacific and in relation to the US and EU. But first, a short introduction.

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<sup>81</sup> ibidem, 38.

<sup>82</sup>Ibidem, 7.

<sup>83</sup> Daniela Huber, *Democracy Promotion and Foreign Policy: Identity and Interests in US, EU and Non-Western democracies* (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 22.

<sup>84</sup> Ibidem, 23.

<sup>85</sup> Bridoux and Kurki, *Democracy Promotion*, 2.

### 3.1 An introduction.

First the concept of democracy will be discussed. Democracy is one of the most discussed concepts in political science. However, among scholars there is no consensus on the concept of democracy itself. As a analytical tool, Rosyidin sees it as “a system of governance in which rulers are held accountable for their actions in the public realm by citizens, acting indirectly through the competition and cooperation of their elected representatives.”<sup>86</sup> Huntington defines democracy as a system of governance in which “elite decision makers are elected through a just, fair, and periodic election in which they compete to each other to win the most votes.”<sup>87</sup> Also, Huntington added three requirements for democracy, the three freedoms: freedom of speech, freedom of press, and freedom of association.<sup>88</sup> In this study we assume, from the concepts, that democracy has three pillars: competition, participation and regular elections. Besides these three pillars there are the values and norms most heavily associated with the political system of liberal democracy. Huntington already expressed freedom as an important value. In paragraph 1.3.3 it was outlined that sovereignty and legitimacy are also often linked with democracy. Within the rest of this research the focus will stay on the three pillars and the added norms and values as outlined above.

The history and concept of democracy can be traced all the way back to Greece and Athens in the fifth century BC. As a consequence the agenda for promoting the expansion of democracy was probably first implemented by the Athenians during the Peloponnesian War. The promotion of democracy was a political strategy to safeguard the loyalty of areas under its control.<sup>89</sup> In more contemporary times and during the US lead, post-Cold War, liberal world order democracy promotion is a key foreign policy goal of the US. Henry Kissinger argued that US foreign policy has been influenced by its desire to set an example for other nations as a propagator for moral values. This included the promotion of democracy abroad as a fundamental value.<sup>90</sup> This idea also laid at the basis of the argumentation of two other well-known political scientist, Huntington and Fukuyama. The former arguing in 1997 that the conditions for the Third Wave are much more favourable than ever.<sup>91</sup> Fukuyama, even declared his famous *End of History*, a insinuation that that the liberal democracy would be the ultimate

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<sup>86</sup> Mohamad Rosyidin, ‘Promoting a home-grown democracy,’ 315.

<sup>87</sup> Samuel P. Huntington, *The Third Wave: democratization in the late twentieth century* (University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), 5 – 6.

<sup>88</sup> Ibidem, 6.

<sup>89</sup> Daniela Huber, *Democracy Promotion and Foreign Policy: Identity and Interests in US, EU and non-Western Democracies* (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 8.

<sup>90</sup> Kissinger, *World Order*.

<sup>91</sup> Samuel P. Huntington, ‘After Twenty Years: The Future of the Third Wave,’ *Journal of Democracy* 8:4 (1997), 11 – 12.

form of government.<sup>92</sup> Or as John Ikenberry states it “a worldwide consensus seemed to have arrived on the virtues and accomplishments of market capitalism and liberal democracy.”<sup>93</sup>

Like the US, Europe also believed in promoting democracy. The creation of the Common European and Security Policy (CFSP) after the Cold-War, gave the EU an incentive to become more involved in international issues, including democracy. The 1992 Treaty of Maastricht stated that one of the EU’s foreign policy goals is “to develop and consolidate democracy”. This stance only intensified in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. In 2009 the European Parliament accepted a resolution which stated that the EU will give “support for democracy-building, and, above all, the promotion of democratic values throughout the world, more effective.”<sup>94</sup>

Democracy promotion in the Global South has been on the EU’s agenda since the early 1990’s, the time of Fukuyama’s ‘End of History’. Anne Wetzel argues that there are about two scenarios of European democracy promotion and its broad substance. The first is the ‘one-size-fits-all’ scenario. This is based on the expectation that the EU promotes the same content around the world. Scholars have come to the conclusion that in its democracy promotion activities the EU uses one script around the globe.<sup>95</sup> Thus the EU, like the US, considers the promotion of democracy beyond their own borders to be of utmost importance and a moral responsibility to make sure long-lasting peace. Which is based upon the democratic peace theory, which proposes that fellow democracies will not go to war with each other.

From a non-US or EU perspective, the goals of democracy promotion created a hierachal and biased world order. Rosyidin argues that these great powers act as a “teacher” whom are dictating to the rest of the world what political values they must adopt. She further argues that ‘spreading democracy is inherently political, and despite inspired by moralism, promoting democracy is undoubtedly a strategy to achieve a country’s own national interest, especially with regards to security and maintaining US unipolarity.’<sup>96</sup>

In this paragraph democracy promotion was introduced. It is clear that democracy promotion is a goal that is actively pursued. Rosyidin also made clear that for non-US or EU nations this emphasis on democracy promotion creates a hierachal and biased order that is incited by the US to maintain its hegemony.

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<sup>92</sup> Fukuyama, *The End of History*, 3 – 18.

<sup>93</sup> G. John Ikenberry, *A World Safe for Democracy: Liberal Internationalism and the Crisis of Global Order* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2020), 1.

<sup>94</sup> Mohamad Rosyidin, ‘Promoting a home-grown democracy,’ 313.

<sup>95</sup> Anne Wetzel and Jan Orbis, ‘Promoting Embedded Democracy? Researching the Substance of EU Democracy Promotion,’ in: *European Foreign Affairs Review* 16:5 (2011), 565 – 588, 578.

<sup>96</sup> *Ibidem*, 313.

### **3.2 Democracy Promotion in the Indo-Pacific.**

#### **3.2.1 US and EU Democracy Promotion.**

In section 3.1 it was outlined that both the US and the EU made democracy promotion an integral part of their foreign policy goals after the Cold War. In this chapter we will examine their democracy promotion in the Indo-Pacific. Again, this shall be done by keeping a focus on the four constructivist concepts: values, identity, ideology and legitimacy.

The first question we will have address is why both the US and EU want to promote democracy, that is liberal democracy. Democracy as we have seen in chapter 2 lies at the core of the US and EU in their self-identification and the cornerstone of the liberal international order. The promotion of democracy, values and principles in other regions is a natural progression of their self-image as democratic. Second, promoting and spreading liberal democracy abroad has gained value in US and EU foreign policy due to the perceived contribution for international security and stability. Stability and security through democratization. Third, democracy is used because of the assumption, which is widely contested, that democracies facilitate peace-building and socio-economic development. This is especially important for the EU, they have a strong belief that democracy enhances socio-economic development and as such take a more developmental approach to democracy promotion. From a US perspective democracy promotion is a value in itself, and as such should be promoted.<sup>97</sup> Therefore democracy promotion also falls under the umbrella of the constructivist approach.

Three mechanisms are central to US and EU democracy promotion, strategic calculation, normative suasion and democratic empowerment. Strategic calculation refers to conditionality-based instruments and involves a set of social and material incentives or of punitive measures on the part of democracy promotion agents. The logic behind it is the assumption that governments of targeted countries are rational actors, who weigh the costs of compliance with requirement of democratic norms against the benefits of doing so. If the benefits are higher, democracy promoting measures are more likely to succeed. The second mechanism is normative suasion. In discussions democratic norms with political elites in targeted countries it is hoped that these norms will be adopted. The third, democratic empowerment, is linked with domestic actors who might bring or support change, this is highly focussed on civil society organizations, mass media or youth.<sup>98</sup>

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<sup>97</sup> Aijan Sharshenova and Gordon Crawford, 'Undermining Western democracy promotion in Central Asia: China's countervailing influences, power and impact,' in: *Central Asian Survey* 36:4 (2017), 453 – 472, 458.

<sup>98</sup> Ibidem, 456 – 457.

However, the triumph of liberal democracy promotion faded during the aftermath of the failed US regime-change-driven invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, the survival of authoritarianism in most Arab Spring countries. Therefore, Sonja Grimm argues, that the assumption that peace, security, socioeconomic development and democracy – do not necessarily go hand-in-hand.<sup>99</sup> The mechanisms described before might not function. Grimm gives four explanations why EU activities for democracy promotion have not worked.

First, Grimm argues, there is not consensus among the most important European democracy promoters about what to achieve and how to achieve it. The variety of actors that invest in democracy promotion all have their own agenda's that do not necessarily coincide. Second, European democracy promoters neglect the national interest of domestic actors who seek to modify, adapt, change or even reject external reform demands due to diverging preferences or domestic constraints. Third, authoritarian regimes successfully learn and adapt to liberal democracy promotion rhetoric and thereby withhold effort of democracy promotion. Fourth, external autocrats undermine European democracy promotion by promoting autocracy, and making aid offers without putting democratization pressure on aid recipients in the developing world.<sup>100</sup>

How then is US democracy promotion employed? Michael W. Fowler argues, after examining multiple US governments, that democracy is not seen by US foreign policy as an end in itself. Democracy promotion is not a decision to subordinate US security and economic interest to the spread of democracy throughout the globe. Democracy promotion is merely an activity selected by some to protect US security and economic interests over the long term. It is a means to an end. That end might be international peace, economic prosperity, human rights, or US national security. Fowler concludes that presidents will choose democracy promotion as a foreign policy tool when they perceive that it will help achieve their desired end.<sup>101</sup>

Now that we have established the mechanisms, means and problems of US and EU democracy promotion how is it deployed in the Indo-Pacific? This will be examined within the context of the Indo-Pacific, mainly by underlining US/EU influence in the ASEAN framework for democracy promotion. There is also room for the China's influence within this framework.

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<sup>99</sup> Sonja Grimm, 'European Democracy Promotion in Crisis: Conflicts of Objectives, Neglected External-Domestic Interactions and the Authoritarian Backlash,' *Global Policy Volume 6:1* (2015), 73 – 82, 73.

<sup>100</sup> *Ibidem*, 74.

<sup>101</sup> Michael W. Fowler, 'A brief survey of democracy promotion in US Foreign Policy,' in: *Democracy and Security* 11:3 (2015), 227 – 247, 245.

### 3.2.2 ASEAN and China.

ASEAN was established in 1967, by the Bangkok Declaration, as a regional organization that consisted of five countries, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. Within the Declaration the goals of ASEAN were formulated as follows, economic growth, social progress and cultural development. Interesting is the notion that ASEAN seeks to develop cooperation with other international organization with similar aims and purposes.<sup>102</sup> Throughout the 1980's and 1990's ASEAN added five more members, Brunei, Vietnam, Laos, Myanmar and Cambodia. It gained the reputation of being able to sustain peace and stability in the region. However, explicit promotion of political norms and values, or democracy, were deliberately excluded from the organization's agenda. ASEAN thus accepted the variety of political ideologies and systems of its members and implemented a non-interference policy in domestic affairs of member states as a key principle for regional cooperation. Therefore in the majority view ASEAN has not been interested or engaged in the promotion of democratic ideals.<sup>103</sup> Where other regional organizations implemented and actively endorsed and promoted political liberalism in their regional settings, ASEAN chose a different path.

Some scholars argue that ASEAN in process has even strengthened authoritarianism. "The central issue is ASEAN's decision not to interfere in support of democratic forces that challenge an incumbent government. By not interfering, either rhetorically or institutionally, ASEAN has denied democratic groups moral support and political legitimacy."<sup>104</sup> Therefore Dosch argues, is ASEAN the sum of its members interests and policies. An organization that compromises mainly soft authoritarian regimes and governments cannot be expected to promote democracy. No matter how much others wish for ASEAN to commit its member to democratic values, it is a rational decision by sovereign nation states not to support democratic movement if the majority of these states believe that liberal democracy is neither the best nor the most suitable form of government. Dosch then does not agree with the statement that ASEAN has strengthened authoritarianism. He argues that although member-states have not collectively supported democratic groups and their agenda's, they have also not openly discredited them. There is no anti-democratic consent within ASEAN.<sup>105</sup>

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<sup>102</sup> ASEAN, <https://web.archive.org/web/20150211121705/http://www.asean.org/news/item/the-asean-declaration-bangkok-declaration>.

<sup>103</sup> Jörn Dosch, 'ASEAN's reluctant liberal turn and the thorny road to democracy promotion,' in: *The Pacific Review* 21:4 (2008), 527 – 545, 528.

<sup>104</sup> Ibidem, 529.

<sup>105</sup> Ibidem.

Here it is evident that from a EU perspective, for whom democracy promotion within the civil society of a state is a spearpoint, is not evident within ASEAN. Whereas the EU sees a strong civil society, including pro-democracy groups, as a cornerstone of liberal democracy. In the next chapter the focus will be on Indonesia, one of the member-states that does promote democracy among civil society pro-democracy groups. This is also evident, to varying degrees, in the Philippines, Thailand, Cambodia and Malaysia.

But, an agreement in 2003, the Declaration of ASEAN Concord II, has declared that ASEAN will commit to the promotion of a ‘just, democratic and harmonious environment’. In 2007 the US praised ‘the critical role of ASEAN in promoting democracy in the region. ASEAN’s agenda at the time, Jörn Dosch argued, was the “pursuit of liberalism, the element of which include the norms of human rights and democracy, the most urgent item on ASEAN’s current agenda.” He argues that ASEAN’s deliberations on democracy are not necessarily the result of active interactions within pro-democracy actors but were indirect consequences of democratic norms and values diffusing from the domestic to the regional spheres.<sup>106</sup> Again, the next chapter will elaborate on this more from the Indonesian perspective.

Dosch argues that ASEAN’s democratic turn is still a reluctant one, and it is a long way from accepting general democratic values or active promotion and regional active enforcement of rules and norms. Only two out of the ten governments have openly pushed the idea of democracy promotion. Dosch argues that in view of the diversity of political systems and ideologies within ASEAN it is no surprise that the association as a collective is not able to agree on any strategy for political change in the direction of democracy. The promotion of democracy through regional organizations requires the member states to become democracies themselves and agree on the ideological pillars of such democratic government. As is the case in the EU or OAS, but not in ASEAN.<sup>107</sup>

Rizal Sukma also points towards the remarkable of ASEAN Security Commission (ASC) Plan of Action that included and emphasised the promotion of democracy as a legitimate goal of ASEAN. In the 2007 ASEAN Charter there are references to the need for ASEAN member states to adhere to democracy and to promote and protect human rights. Sukma then asks the question whether or not ASEAN is able to promote democracy in the region and if they even should? Sukma argues that the relationship between democracy and security is problematic for ASEAN. Imposing democracy on a member state and spreading it throughout the region would trigger interstate tensions harmful to security. Therefore Sukma argues that

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<sup>106</sup> Ibidem, 529 – 530.

<sup>107</sup> Ibidem, 542 – 543.

democracy as envisaged by the ASC and the Charter is not the instrument for regional security. Thereby ASEAN is not mandated to inculcate democracy directly inside member states. Democracy promotion inside ASEAN will take place within the limits of, and in line with, its long-established commitment to non-interference and conflict-avoidance.<sup>108</sup>

A more recent study of ASEAN conducted by Jürgen Rüland underlines the ‘non-interference’ norm. He argues that the norm has reached an almost sacred status, the 2007 ASEAN Charter and the notions of democracy have not weakened the non-interference norm. He concludes that with the non-interference norm firmly locked in, regional governance has never been close to democratic principles.<sup>109</sup> This makes ASEAN an interesting puzzle, although there is increasing rhetoric from the member-states and also attempts for democracy promotion, the national sovereignty and non-interference value of members is a higher good.

Now let’s turn to the great powers active within the Indo-Pacific, China, the US and the EU and their relation within ASEAN on the issue of democracy promotion. Catherine Jones examines that ASEAN has shifted and re-developed their role and function as a dialogue partner. Away from receiving assistance and support towards the development of more equal relations. She argues that within this new position, built upon greater internal cohesion, the ability to use external powers and organisations benefitted the ASEAN region. However, this is evident on the policy of security and not as much when it comes to democracy promotion. But, Jones does provide a case in which great powers, through cooperation with ASEAN can create more internal cohesion and thus contributes to the development of the ASEAN community and identity. In return Jones argues, great power initiatives in the region in which ASEAN was not involved have not been particularly successful. Greater involvement of great powers and ASEAN can thus be beneficial for both.<sup>110</sup> Jones emphasis on security if of course not the approach of this research.

However, an argument can be made based upon the Jones’s determination that security is the area in which the member states of ASEAN can form a coherent community, while at the same time bringing the US in as a dialogue partner. Increased US commitment to providing public goods to ASEAN brought along US demands for legitimacy and support for their efforts in the SCS. Together with the notion by Fowler, that US democracy promotion is not a goal in

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<sup>108</sup> Rizal Sukma, ‘Political Development: A Democracy Agenda For ASEAN,’ in Donald K. Emmerson, *Hard Choices: Security, Democracy, and Regionalism in Southeast Asia*, 135 – 150, (Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2009), 136.

<sup>109</sup> Jürgen Rüland, ‘Democratic backsliding, regional governance and foreign policymaking in Southeast Asia: ASEAN, Indonesia and the Philippines,’ in: *Democratization* 28:1 (2021), 237 – 257, 242 – 243.

<sup>110</sup> Catherine Jones, ‘Great Powers, ASEAN, and security: reason for optimism?’ in *The Pacific Review* 28:2 (2015), 259 – 280.

itself but rather a tool deployed when it is deemed necessary, the assumption can be made that from a US perspective their (national) security interest in the region, especially in the SCS are a more important factor than democracy promotion in the Indo-Pacific. What also became evident is that democracy promotion by the members of ASEAN is predominantly a rhetoric without real attempts, because the notion of non-interference is still “sacred”. This also imposes real problems for EU promotion of democracy which focusses mostly on the development of democratic movements in a countries civil society, which means direct interference. The opposite of the ASEAN value of non-interference. Rebecca Strating researched why democracy promotion seems to be absent from the Indo-Pacific.

Since the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century a debate has been going on about the extent to which democracy is in retreat. In 2019, the Freedom in the World report stated that democracy is in decline (a trend that has been visible since 2006). Strating argues that democracy as an international standard of domestic legitimacy has been undermined by a variety of sources as resistance to democracy promotion has increased. This pushback is also called the ‘autocracy promotion’, or the competitiveness of authoritarian regimes to provide alternative modes of governance that can compete with democracy as the standard for political legitimacy. A number of states have cracked down on democracy promotion activities, promoted state media condemnation of US/EU democracy promotion and blocked foreign aid. This is related to the idea that US/EU democracy promotion means regime change.<sup>111</sup>

In Asia, as becomes evident from Rebecca Strating’s article, authoritarian regimes are no longer defensive. She argues that democracies have not been able to gain control of narratives or counter messages to authoritarian regimes or their policies. Democracy promotion by US has been deemed ‘hypocrite’ because it abandons democratic principles when it suits its own national interests. Critics of US democracy promotion have framed American ‘exceptionalism’ as meaning ‘exemptionalism’, referring to their capacity to act unilaterally on behalf of its own interests, particularly in the area of democracy promotion. This is especially evident when US security interest are at stake.<sup>112</sup> Now let’s turn to the most prominent authoritarian regime in the region, China.

What is the role of China when it comes to democracy promotion? As an authoritarian regime China represents an alternative development model that has gained significant growth. The question then remains whether China is actively counterworking democracy promotion or

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<sup>111</sup> Rebecca Strating, ‘Enabling authoritarianism in the Indo-Pacific: Australian exemptionalism,’ in: *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 74:3 (2020), 301 – 321, 302.

<sup>112</sup> Ibidem.

does it watch as a bystander? Within this research we will look at the broader region of the Indo-Pacific. Dinding Chen and Katrin Kinzelbach argue that China is both a decisive blocker as well as an indifferent bystander of democratization. When it comes to domestic politics, which includes the regions from the “one country, two systems” system, the CCP determined to withstand, repress, outperform, and outsmart pressures for democratization. In regard to the broader Indo-Pacific region they argue that the CCP will only counteract democratization, including US and EU promotion, where it perceives such a process a possible challenge to the survival of the CCP. They do however see the path of the CCP – economic liberalization without political reform – as competitor for liberal democracies which no longer is the only path to prosperity.<sup>113</sup>

Another study of Chinese influence on US and EU efforts for democracy promotion has been conducted by Christine Hackenesch. In the context of Angola and Ethiopia she argues that although the US, EU and China are all invested within both authoritarian nations, Chinese presence does not explain US and EU difficulties in implementing their democracy strategies. She thus concludes that domestic factor should be highlighted to explain differential effects of external democracy promotion in authoritarian regimes.<sup>114</sup> However, Sharshenova and Crawford argue that the Chinese government does actively try to undermine US/EU democratization processes in Central-Asia.<sup>115</sup> Although there is no clear literature on Chinese democracy promotion undermining in the Indo-Pacific, in the case of Myanmar it does support the military regime that toppled the democratically elected president. From this perspective it seems that China does not actively undermine democracy promotion but instead supports authoritarian regimes in cases where liberal democracies do not.

The goal of this chapter was to examine how the various international actors that are active within the Indo-Pacific relate themselves to democracy promotion. There is definitely a distinction that can be made between the US and EU, especially since the Iraq War. Whereas the US seems to give preference to security in the region, especially in the SCS, it does not exclude authoritarian regimes due to democracy issues or relate democracy promotion to their security interest in the region. This does fit within the pattern of Arab Spring in which other

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<sup>113</sup> Dingding Chen and Katrin Kinzelbach, ‘Democracy promotion and China: blocker or bystander?’ in: *Democratization* 22:3 (2015), 400 – 418, 413.

<sup>114</sup> Christine Hackenesch, ‘Not as bad as it seems: EU and US democracy promotion faces China in Africa,’ in: *Democratization* 22:3 (2015), 419 – 437, 431 – 432.

<sup>115</sup> Sharshenova and Crawford, ‘Undermining Western democracy promotion in Central Asia’ 458.

considerations often had a preference over democratic values. From a US perspective democracy does not seem to be the ‘only’ legitimating factor for cooperation. This does fit well within the American tradition of realism and the balance of power theory. This distancing stance on democracy promotion in the Indo-Pacific is however not a unipolar decision by the US. As became evident, there is a discontent with the idea of US exceptionalism and the idea of copying or adhering to US values, norms, ideas and ideologies. As a consequence this might have contributed to the US prioritizing security interests without emphasizing liberal democratic thought and values. From a EU perspective this is also evident. Especially the notion within ASEAN about non-interference might be an obstacle for EU democracy promotion. Because EU democracy promotion focusses on the development of civil society this directly affects domestic policy within nations, this does not align with the non-interference norm of ASEAN. At the same time ASEAN stresses their own values, identity and norms under the umbrella of the ASEAN ‘Way’. Taken together with the critical assessment of EU democracy promotion as a whole, the EU might not have the right approach as well. Despite the discrepancy between the EU and ASEAN and the different ideologies, legitimacies, identities and values, it has also been shown that through altering the ‘self’ and the ‘other’ EU-ASEAN relations on the aspects of economy and security has indeed improved. If anything this chapter showed that there is an abundance of ideologies, values, identities and legitimacies that are constantly (re)shaped in order to achieve certain goals. This is done on the national, regional and international all together. The area in which the ASEAN, EU and US are most visibly ‘finding’ each other is on the issue of security and the SCS, as this area marks an economic value for all involved nations. On the issue of democracy it has been shown that democracy is in retreat within the region, however from the liberal international order there has not been an effective and welcomed progression of democracy promotion, but this is of enormous importance for all actors involved.

#### **4. The Indonesian Case: Global Order and Democracy Promotion.**

The fourth and final chapter of thesis provides a case study of Indonesia. The two previous chapters gave insights into the global order, its challenges and democracy promotion in the context of ASEAN and China in the Indo-Pacific. On the basis of this information we will go into the role that Indonesia had/has within this order, how it shaped their foreign policy and within foreign policy, what the role of democracy promotion has been under the Presidencies of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and Joko Widodo. This will be done through the use and analyses of primary sources, mainly speeches given at an international audience on Indonesian foreign policy and the use of constructivism and role theory as outlined in section 1.3. The narratives that both presidents or their governments provided, will be compared and viewed in the light of the changing world order, Indonesia's role within it, the promotion of democracy, and compared to that of their authoritarian predecessors. Therefore any notifications made within the sources on order, democracy, and/or democracy promotion shall be noted and examined. This will be done in relation to the EU, US, ASEAN and the broader Indo-Pacific when that is relevant on world order and democracy promotion from chapter two and three. Naturally, this case study of Indonesia on its role in the global order and democracy promotion will be done following the constructivist theory and thus focusses on the role of values, identity, ideology and legitimacy.

The structure of the chapter is as followed. First, a historical overview of democracy in Indonesia shall be given, together with an introduction in Indonesian foreign relations with both the US and the EU. Secondly, the authoritarian regimes of Sukarno and Suharto will be compared. Thereafter the focus shifts towards democracy promotion, important questions will be whether or not democracy promotion by Indonesia was a natural given after it transformed into a democracy? Why it uses democracy promotion as a foreign policy goal? And how values, identity, ideology and legitimacy shaped its democracy promotion strategy? In answering these questions it should become evident how Indonesia's role conception within the world order and on democracy promotion has changed under the presidency of Widodo in comparison to Yudhoyono. And then how can we place the results of this comparison within the broader framework of this thesis: the challenges to liberal international order, it's challenges and US/EU democracy promotion.

Rizal Sukma in his article *Political Development: A Democracy Agenda for ASEAN?* identifies ten constraints on why, despite greater rhetoric for democratic aspirations, real democracy promotion has not been achieved. Besides the before mentioned non-interference

principle, within this chapter we will focus on other constraints that have a more national character instead of regional. Thereby the focus will be on Indonesia. In paragraph 1.1.2 and 1.1.3 the Indonesian road to democracy was already briefly introduced until the Presidency of Yudhoyono. Before Yudhoyono's presidency is explained further, the focus will be on Sukarno and Suharto.

#### **4.1 Democracy and Foreign Policy.**

This section focusses on democracy and foreign policy in Indonesia. First, a historical overview of Sukarno and Suharto shall be outlined. After, the periodization shifts towards the democratically elected presidents Yudhoyono and Widodo.

##### **4.1.1. Sukarno and Suharto in Comparison.**

In order to be able to grasp differences between the Presidents Yudhoyono and Widodo in the upcoming paragraphs (4.1.2 and 4.1.3), the first paragraph of section four outlines the legacy of the two authoritarian leaders from the who governed Indonesia in the second half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. How did Sukarno and Suharto view democracy and foreign policy and to what means did they employ it?

Sukarno's government had the opinion that Indonesia's position in the arena of international politics should be one of independence and that this position should be actively pursued. This, *bebas dan aktif* (independent and active), became visible through speeches by Minister Mohammad Hatta. The second underpinning of this strategy was anti-colonialism. These notions evolved around the concept of *Pancasila* or Indonesian nationalism. *Pancasila* consists of five principles: humanitarianism, national unity, democracy, social justice and the belief in one God. Anindya Batabyal argues that this foreign policy stance could solve a domestic issue as well, namely to mitigate rivalry between Indonesia's domestic elites by taking an independent position towards the outside world.<sup>116</sup> Hatta also proclaimed two other foreign policy objectives. First, it should be aimed at safeguarding the national interests as states within the Indonesian constitution. Second, foreign policy should be conducted pragmatically.<sup>117</sup>

In 1957 President Sukarno presented his 'Guided Democracy and Guided Economy'. This policy was a continuation of *bebas dan aktif* and *Pancasila* as well as a break with it. National unity and anti-colonialism were still prevalent, but it became more radical and

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<sup>116</sup> Anindya Batabyal, 'Change and Continuity in Indonesian Foreign Policy: From Sukarno, Suharto to Megawati,' in: *Jadavpur Journal Of International Relations* 6:1 (2002), 29 – 44, 31.

<sup>117</sup> Ibidem, 29 – 31.

militarily. West-Papua (*Irian Jaya*) was confiscated and restrictions were placed on KLM and Dutch publications were forbidden. At the same time he implemented a new ‘Indonesian’ socialism (Guided Economy) and tried to make Indonesia a leader in Afro-Asian affairs (Guided Democracy). The latter stance became evident through the organization of the Bandung Conference. Whether or not the 1957 policy can be marked a change with previous policy is debated. However, most observers stress the importance of continuity from *bebas dan aktif* and not the change.<sup>118</sup>

After the fall of Sukarno, due to an aborted coup in 1965, the New Order Regime of Suharto was established. As a consequence some adjustments were made in the formulation of Indonesian foreign policy. Again, changes were not as radical. The principle of *bebas dan aktif* and *Pancasila* were still prevalent, but a return had to be made to the original promises. Suharto broke with the Sukarno’s focus on Afro-Asian relations and efforts were made at improving relations with the ‘West. The humanitarian and social justice values were the ideological basis for continuous support for anti-colonialism and greater equality among nations. Domestically, the implications were that national development became the core task of the Suharto regime. This development, however, could not be achieved without assuring foreign aid. As a consequence closer cooperation between Indonesia and the ‘West’ was necessary. This was seen a pragmatic solution for fulfilling the national interests. But, Suharto did not neglect the Asian and African countries from the Bandung Conference as had happened in the last decade of Sukarno’s presidency. However, in principle the foreign policy goals and ideology did not change, perhaps only in political style.<sup>119</sup>

#### **4.1.2. Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (2009-2014).**

In order to understand and eventually dig deeper into the question of Indonesia’s position within the changing world order, specifically in the Indo-Pacific and their democracy promotion under Yudhoyono and Widodo it is essential to get an understanding of how Indonesia’s leaders see their position on both subject. In March 2009 Yudhoyono delivered a speech at the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE), with the title *Indonesia: Regional Role, Global Reach*, within this speech Yudhoyono addresses his personal and his governments vision on Indonesia’s role within the world. Through the analyses of this speech, the role should become clearer. This has been done by finding the dominant discourses evident within his

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<sup>118</sup> Ibidem, 32.

<sup>119</sup> Ibidem, 32 – 36.

speech. Within his speech Yudhoyono often refers to the West, although therefore this terminology will be used here as well.

Discourse is the production of knowledge through language and groups of statements to create meaning.<sup>120</sup> Discourse thus exists in conflict with other discourses, that is a conflict over knowledge that should be dominant and is relevant. Therefore it is important to consider the historical context, use of language, the manner in which a text was uttered, and by whom.<sup>121</sup> In doing so, discourse can provide insight into many social aspects, such as power, norms, values and identity. Within this essay the discourse will be read ‘with the grain’, thus analysing the discourse as presented by Yudhoyono.

While dissecting the speech by Yudhoyono it becomes evident that he is presenting a success story on Indonesia’s domestic development with his audience. A success that is a break with past judgements and presents a ‘new’ Indonesia. After briefly addressing the economic crisis, political crisis, terroristic attacks and conflicts in Timor, Aceh and Papua, Indonesia’s ‘past’ issues, he follows with: “Today, Indonesia is the third largest democracy in the world – after India and the United States. We are Southeast Asia’s largest and arguably strongest democracy.”<sup>122</sup> Interesting are the norms, values and ideas Yudhoyono attributes to democracy. He talks about free press, a multi-party system, regular elections, tolerance, moderation and stability. These are norms and values often associated with in Western narratives of functioning liberal democracies, thereby he places the discourse of Indonesia’s democracy within the Western discourse of his audience of what Indonesia democracy is about. His remarks on democracy domestically are concluded with the observation that Indonesia is “living proof that democracy, Islam and modernity can go hand-in-hand harmoniously.”<sup>123</sup>

In his speech, President Yudhoyono, tries to enact the role prescribed to Indonesia by the West though attributing values to the Indonesian democracy that are in line with European values, while at the same time upholding the ‘unique’ Indonesian values of moderation and tolerance. In terms of role allocation, Yudhoyono mentioned: “we have been given a new role.”<sup>124</sup> The role that he meant with this, is the role of bridge-builder between the Western world on the one hand and the Islamic and Asian on the other hand. In this case the role of bridge-builder was not a role conception from the Indonesian side, but a role allocated by the

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<sup>120</sup> Stephanie Taylor, *What is Discourse Analysis?* (Bloomsbury Publishing, 2013), 16.

<sup>121</sup> Sara Mills, *Discourse* (United Kingdom: Taylor & Francis, 2004), 3 – 6.

<sup>122</sup> Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, “Indonesia: Regional Role, Global Reach,” (Speech, London School of Economics and Political Science, London, 31 march 2009), 1 – 9, 2.

<sup>123</sup> Ibidem, 3.

<sup>124</sup> Ibidem, 3.

West and thereafter enacted by Indonesia. Hereby he presents his audience with the confirmation of the dominant discourse that Indonesia, is indeed, a bridge-builder.

In the same speech he also provides a an example of how Indonesia enacts this allocated role by the West in the Southeast Asian region. President Yudhoyono uses the example of ASEAN to strengthen his argument. “Indonesia worked hard to ensure that its member (of ASEAN) are committed to democracy and democratization, and to the promotion and protection of human rights.”<sup>125</sup> Again, both concept are inherently Western ideas on which Yudhoyono wants to confirm Indonesian active participation. This fits within the wider discourse presented as the Indonesian success story on democracy and being a bridge-builder.

However, the Charter of ASEAN also stipulates that although democracy, democratization and human rights are issues to which member should be committed, they are prescribed in domestic issues only in particular cases, and are not ‘universal’.<sup>126</sup> As had been concluded in the previous chapter, this has mostly been rhetoric and the non-interference norm does not contribute. This approach differs from that of many Western policies that actively promote democracy and its values and sometimes enforce this with sanctions such as the freezing of humanitarian aid. Indonesia in ASEAN stresses the importance of supporting the implementation of democracy on the terms of the state itself, as in the case of Myanmar.<sup>127</sup>

Another institution that Indonesia has created is the Bali Democracy Forum. This 2008 initiative was the first inter-governmental forum in Asia related to democracy. Its goal is to enhance and provide a forum in which the region can discuss issues related to democracy in the Asian context.<sup>128</sup> Here, instead of complying with Western standards, Indonesia presents itself as a precursor with a distinctive Asian vision. Hereby Yudhoyono presented Indonesia as a bridge-builder, but still as distinctive from the West.

In his speech Yudhoyono also goes into the upcoming G20-meeting, the reason he was visiting London, and Indonesia’s role in the meeting. Again, he presents Indonesia as a bridge-builder. Although he accepts the leading role of the United States within the standards of the financial markets. However, within the context of the G20 Indonesia presents itself as a bridge-builder between the states neglected by this system, the underdeveloped, and the more

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<sup>125</sup> Ibidem, 4.

<sup>126</sup> Katja Freistein, “‘A living document’: promises of the ASEAN Charter,” in *Pacific Review* 26:4 (2013), 407 – 429, 420.

<sup>127</sup> Yudhoyono, “Indonesia: Regional Role, Global Reach”, 5.

<sup>128</sup> Ibid, 6.

developed states on the other side. “Indonesia will therefore ensure that the interests of developing nations, especially Asian countries, are taken into account”.<sup>129</sup>

This speech by President Yudhoyono is an example of how a prescribed role, in this case by the West, shapes the actual role conception of a country. Yudhoyono even accepts this allocated role and in his speech shapes Indonesia within this allocated framework. He points towards the Indonesian democratic values, which overlap with the Western democratic values at the time. He also stresses Indonesia’s role within ASEAN as a promotor of democracy and human rights, as well as the Bali Democracy initiative. Yudhoyono thus shapes the allocated role in such a way that he also enacts this role of bridge-builder. The dominant discourse within this speech is thus the confirmation of the bridge-builder role between the West, Asia, developed and underdeveloped countries when it comes to democracy, human rights and economic standards. This fits within his foreign policy that was named “Million Friends, Zero Enemy.” Within this speech Indonesia is portrayed as a regional leader on democracy, a partner for the West and a partner for the Global South. Before these statements will be examined further, we will analyse a speech by Indonesian President Widodo from his first term.

#### **4.1.2 Joko Widodo (2014-2019).**

Within this chapter we will analyse, not from primary sources, but from literature the differences between Yudhoyono and Widodo on the perspective of foreign policy related to Indonesia’s role in the world and their democracy promotion.

An important document to start with is Widodo’s “Vision and Mission” (*Visi-Misi*), in which he outlined his vision on Indonesian diplomacy within his first term.<sup>130</sup> This manifesto can be interpreted in short, diplomacy would be used selectively for the welfare of the people. Donald E. Weatherbee provided a summary of Widodo’s *Visi-Misi*. He identified five issues that would be on the top of Widodo’s foreign policy list. The first priority was the promotion of the Indonesian identity as a maritime nation. This policy was needed to resolve border issues both on land and sea in which great powers also had their rivalries. Although not completely focussed on the SCS this policy goal does touch upon it. The second priority of Widodo was to position Indonesia as a regional power with selective engagement with international actors only when relevant for the Indonesian people. The third priority was the expansion of Indonesia’s regional strategic role, focussing on the Indo-Pacific. Fourth, a strengthening of the foreign policy processes itself and fifth, the involvement in the Organization for Islamic Cooperation

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<sup>129</sup> Ibid, 8.

<sup>130</sup> Joko Widodo and Jusuf Kalla, *Visi-Misi* (2014).

and the Muslim world in general.<sup>131</sup> The first three priorities are especially important within this research focus on the changing world order to the Indo-Pacific. Before going into these notions, the first examining of the *Visi-Misi* is that there is not a single notion on democracy, not in relation to domestic affairs or democracy promotion outside the domestic context. This will be elaborated on more thoroughly in sections 4.2 and 4.3.

From the first three priorities on Widodo's foreign policy list it can be argued that he pursues a strong regional role within the Indo-Pacific based on the maritime character of Indonesia, geographically as well as an identity of Indonesia. Throughout the *Visi-Misi* and referenced as well in relation to the first three point Widodo's emphasised the importance of state sovereignty and autonomy. At the core of his foreign policy lies the domestic focus, within the establishment of Indonesia as a maritime nation, protecting its boundaries and economic gains and only engage internationally if beneficial for his domestic agenda. Also the third aspect strengthening their regional position is based upon defensive security.

In an interview in *Foreign Affairs* Widodo answered some questions about his foreign policy goals. Interesting again is that democracy is not a theme he elaborates on rather much. Only in the domestic issue of democracy he makes a comment that we will see later. In his foreign policy explanation is not mentioned. He does welcome foreign participation but primarily in the field of foreign direct investments. "We are open to all countries for investment." He also comments on Indonesia-US-China relations: "Both China and the U.S. are close friends of Indonesia, and we welcome their interest in our region. Indonesia is open. We will work with all major powers through strategic partnerships. As for the SCS problem, I think we can play the role of an honest broker."<sup>132</sup> Although the substance of his comments are rather thin, the fact that he allocates Indonesia a role in the US/China debate is interesting and we will come back to that later in relation to the changing world order.

Aaron L. Connelly summarizes Widodo's foreign policy rather well. "It is primarily a function of his domestic agenda, which focuses on reasserting the authority of the state and on increased investment in maritime affairs. Despite their domestic focus, these policies will create greater tension with Indonesia's neighbours as Jakarta pushes issues of sovereignty, particularly in the maritime domain, in a way that impinges on what its neighbours view to be their own sovereign prerogatives."<sup>133</sup>

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<sup>131</sup> Weatherbee, *Understanding Jokowi's Foreign Policy*, 1 – 14.

<sup>132</sup> Joko Widodo, 'Opening Indonesia: A conversation with Joko Widodo,' *Foreign Affairs* 93:6 (2014), 56 – 61, 61.

<sup>133</sup> Aaron L. Connelly, 'Soveriengty and the Sea: President Joko Widodo's Foreign Policy Challenges,' in *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 37:1 (2015), 1 – 28.

According to Sukma domestic politics in Indonesia have always had a profound impact on the foreign policy agenda. Therefore he argues that it is no surprise that the introduction of democracy at home had a significant impact on the interest of Indonesia abroad. In 2003 Indonesia had began to seek like-minded members of ASEAN to adopt democracy and human rights as regional ASEAN values. This stance was also underlined by the foreign minister at that time, Wirajuda, who stated in 2005: ‘We have to reflect democracy in our region. That is why we are active in promoting democracy within ASEAN.’<sup>134</sup> According to Sukma this was a contrast to Indonesian foreign policy position under Suharto, Indonesia now intended to project its internal democratic values across their own national border.<sup>135</sup>

If we take Sukma’s argument about Indonesian foreign policy being a reflection of domestic politics, what becomes evident from Widodo’s *Visi-Misi*? We are established the fact that the notion of democracy is absent from the outline of his foreign policy. Diplomacy would be employed for domestic welfare. Therefore we need to look into domestic politics of Widodo on the subject of democracy. Is there no emphasis on democracy in his policy outlines at all?

Thomas Power and Eve Warburton researched the process of Indonesian democracy since the fall of the Suharto regime. Their conclusion is that within the scholarly debate there is a consensus that democracy as a whole, in Indonesia, is in decline. They identify several indicators: rising populism, growing intolerance, dysfunctional institutions, and deterioration of civil liberties.<sup>136</sup> Ian Wilson examined the 2014 elections, ultimately won by Widodo, on the anti-democratic stance of some of Widodo’s opponents. He concludes that about 30% percent of the electorate is in discontent with democratic institutions, and that Widodo main opponent has very openly been against democracy. Urging his supporters use their democratic voting right in order to abolish it.<sup>137</sup> In an interview with the Council on Foreign Relations, Widodo did make some remarks about democracy and how he wanted to improve it. “I will continue to support the work and maintain the independence of our Corruption Eradication Commission. But first and more important, we need to introduce bureaucratic reforms and consistently monitor the problem.”<sup>138</sup> If we take The Economist’s *democracy index*, what is said about Indonesia?

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<sup>134</sup> Rizal Sukma, ‘Do New Democracies Support Democracy? Indonesia Finds a New Voice,’ in *Journal of Democracy* 22:4 (2011), 110 – 123, 110.

<sup>135</sup> Ibidem, 111.


<sup>136</sup> Thomas Power and Eve Warburton, “The Decline of Indonesian Democracy,” in Thomas Power and Eve Warburton (eds), *Democracy in Indonesia: From Stagnation to Regression?*, 1 – 23 (Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2020), 2.

<sup>137</sup> Ian Wilson, “Resisting Democracy: Front Pembela Islam and Indonesia’s 2014 elections,” in Ulla Fionna (ed), *Watching the Indonesian Elections 2014*, 32 – 40, (Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2015), 39.

<sup>138</sup> Widodo, ‘Opening Indonesia: A conversation with Joko Widodo,’ 61

There are doubts that Indonesian policies have raised the quality of democracy in Indonesia, especially since 2015. Indonesia is ranked a ‘flawed democracy’.<sup>139</sup> According to Grzywacz the decline of democracy is partially associated with the presidential term of Widodo, who has been deemed less democratically orientated than his predecessor Yudhoyono.<sup>140</sup> The figure underneath exemplifies the decline of the democracy narrative in Indonesian politics, showing the decline of democracy mentioned in official speeches by either the President or the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Figure 4.1 Democracy in official speeches until 2018.



Source: Anna Grzywacz (2020).<sup>141</sup>

This reflects the fact that it is difficult to find speeches by Widodo that address the quality of democracy in Indonesia or democracy promotion outside of Indonesia. As the most recent *Democracy Index* indicates democracy in Indonesia has been in decline since 2015. If we adhere to the notions of Sukma about foreign policy being the projection of domestic politics in Indonesia, it becomes hardly undeniable that the role of Indonesia as a democracy promotor in

<sup>139</sup> The Economist Intelligence Unit, *Democracy Index 2020: In Sickness and in Health?* (London: The Economist, 2018), 28 – 29.

<sup>140</sup> Anna Grzywacz, ‘Democracy in Indonesian Strategic Narratives. A New Framework of Coherence Analysis,’ in: *Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs* 39:2 (2020), 250 – 269, 251.

<sup>141</sup> Ibidem, 258.

the region and internationally is declining, if not absent. What the graph also shows is that the LSE speech by Yudhoyono in 2009 was only the beginning of a much more intensive role of democracy in official speeches both at home and internationally, therefore it is likely that his LSE speech contained the most prominent policy goals of his government until 2014. The three roles identified within the speech of Yudhoyono were Indonesia as a democracy promotor, bridge-builder and regional leader. The roles that can be distinguished from Widodo are that of intermediate in the SCS, regional leader in security issues and becoming a maritime nation.

The difference between the roles taken by Yudhoyono and by Widodo lies in the scope as well as the substance. The first thing that must be highlighted is the absence of a democracy narrative in Widodo's roles. In relation to the scope of the roles Yudhoyono seems to be more internationally orientated, his speech included the 'West', the Islamic World, the Global South, ASEAN, China, Russia, etc his vision for Indonesia was global. This internationalism from Yudhoyono is not evident in the vision and roles that Widodo allocates to Indonesia. Widodo's focus is much more regional, keeping the role of regional leader, but narrowing it down to security issues and economic prosperity.

#### **4.1.3 A Constructivist Approach.**

Within this paragraph the focus will be on both Yudhoyono and Widodo from a constructivist approach. Meaning we will dissect their foreign policy, Yudhoyono's from his LSE speech, and Widodo from literature and his *Visi-Misi*. As has been done throughout this research the focus will be on values, identity, ideology and legitimacy. In relation to values promoted by the US and EU this can be more easily done for Yudhoyono's presidency than for Widodo, as Yudhoyono compared Indonesia on the international stage. Therefore Yudhoyono will be used as leading and differences will be mentioned in relation to the US/EU and Widodo.

In order to gain legitimacy in the international sphere Yudhoyono described values to Indonesian democracy such as freedom of press, multi-party system, regular elections, moderation and tolerance. This aligns, partly, with Huntington's important value of freedom attributed to democracy and the importance of regular and fair elections.<sup>142</sup> In Widodo's interview in *Foreign Affairs* he 'only' emphasised the notion of battling corruption in Indonesia's democracy, although anti-corruption is an important aspect of a vibrant democracy is it not the only perspective. However, it fits within Widodo's narrative of welfare for Indonesians first, and reforms or international orientation only when this is beneficial for

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<sup>142</sup> Yudhoyono, "Indonesia: Regional Role, Global Reach", 2.

Indonesians. Therefore his values and legitimacy are not being linked within the international stage but on Indonesia as a strong maritime nation, economically thriving and security provider, whereas Yudhoyono wants to find Indonesia's legitimacy and values as a democracy in international acknowledgement, both global and regional.

However, this does not mean that Yudhoyono did not have a distinct Indonesia vision. He emphasised the differences between the 'West' and Indonesia in the example of Myanmar. "I notice that in the West, discussions on Myanmar tend to focus on the 'democracy' aspect."<sup>143</sup> This is not the approach for Indonesia, that tends to focus more on national unity and territorial integrity. He further emphasises a distinct Indonesia identity that is shaped by their history as a attractor of 'Western', Islamic and Asian influences throughout its history. Yudhoyono shapes Indonesian identity as being distinct, but having enough interfaces to be able to collaborate and function as a 'bridge-builder' in the world, also on the issue of democracy. From Widodo's narratives Indonesian identity is formed much more in nationalistic terms. His emphasis is on national history and Indonesian geographics, emphasizing Indonesia as being a maritime nation and embed this notion because of Indonesia as an archipelago and historical seafaring nation.

Both president do have a common identity within their foreign policy, that is that Indonesia is the natural leader in Southeast Asia and ASEAN. This has been evident from Suharto onwards. However, as Weatherbee also argues it is commonly felt that this regional leadership identity is less than under Yudhoyono.<sup>144</sup> Indonesian identity and ideology in the field of foreign affairs are influenced by its history in international relations dating back to the time of Mohammed Hatta which since guided Indonesian foreign policy. According to Hatta foreign policy should be "*bebas dan aktif*" (independent and active). It meant that Indonesia should be proactive and participate in shaping political, strategic and economic environment both regional and international. It mandates that, following Weatherbee, that depending on international conditions and Indonesia's capabilities, foreign policy should serve in a pragmatic, flexible, accommodative, or assertive way.<sup>145</sup>

#### **4.2 *Indonesia in the Context of World Order.***

In chapter two the changing world order has been examined. The main conclusions that were drawn from this chapter were that the liberal international order after the end the Cold War politics, spurred because of US hegemony and the Transatlantic relation with Europe. An

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<sup>143</sup> Ibidem, 5.

<sup>144</sup> Weatherbee, *Understanding Jokowi's Foreign Policy*, 5.

<sup>145</sup> Ibidem, 4.

important aspect of the liberal international order was the emphasis on liberal democracy. Huntington and Fukuyama were already mentioned as the two scholars whom saw liberal democracy as the ‘final’ form of government that would spread across the globe in waves. However, with a focus on values, identity, ideology and legitimacy from a constructivist perspective there has been a rise in varieties on what these concepts entail and how they are challenged. A wedge has been driven in the Transatlantic relationship on normative power, trade and security interests. The US and the EU, it can be argued, are reevaluating their relationship, as well as their connectiveness with other regions in the world, especially in the Indo-Pacific.

Before we dig deeper into the role of Indonesia within the current world order, how was their role shaped, historically, within the world order after the end of the Cold War? It has already been discussed how Indonesia organised the Bandung Conference which established the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). This cooperation between nations stipulated that members would not choose sides between the US and Soviet-Union during the Cold War. From a balance of power point of view smaller states would indeed have to manoeuvre carefully between two major powers. During the Cold War there have been many anti-American and anti-Western sentiments in Indonesia, a period in which Sukarno attempted building a better relationship with China. This situation turned the moment that Sukarno was succeeded by Suharto. During his presidency anti-Chinese and anti-Communist sentiments grew stronger and the ties with China were frozen, while the relationship with the US became more important. Although the 21<sup>st</sup> century saw the rise of popular protest against the US during the Bush administration, this was not translated into policy changes. At the same time the ties between Indonesia and China saw an upward trend with the signing of multiple partnerships in 2005. However, Indonesia opposed China during the formation of the East Asian Community (EAC). In contrast to China, Indonesia insisted on a more inclusive conception on who could join, such as Australia, New Zealand and India.<sup>146</sup> The fact that these three countries are democracies could be strategically important for the liberal international order with an emphasis on liberal democracy. It can be concluded that Indonesian foreign relations can be described as the struggle between going West or East?

That question can be somewhat repeated nowadays, is Indonesian foreign policy favouring the West or the East? In order to answer that question in relation to democracy and the presidents Yudhoyono and Widodo the primary sources can be of use. The conclusions drawn from the primary sources were that both presidents stand in the Indonesian tradition of

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<sup>146</sup> Novotny, ‘Torn Between America and China’, 3 – 8.

*bebas dan aktif*. However Yudhoyono and Widodo differ in approach. Yudhoyono presented his “million friends, zero enemy” in a regional as well as an international context while maintaining a distinct Indonesian vision on the values, identity, ideology and legitimacy underlying his foreign policy. He actively wanted to actively participate regionally and internationally searching for common ground, while remaining unique and distinct. A good example is his explanation of Indonesian democracy in relation to the West. Although he attributes many values in the Indonesian democracy that are deemed essential in the Western perspective of a liberal democracy, he also stresses the importance of his initiated Bali Democracy Forum in 2008, a platform for democracy promotion in Asia in which nothing is obligatory and participating countries can stipulate their own path to democracy. The notion of ‘own’ in this perspective can be interpreted as independent of Western influence, for example European democracy promotion directly in a country’s civil society. In section 4.3 Indonesia’s role as a democracy promotor will be elaborated on more deeply. Within this section the importance lies in the fact that Yudhoyono uses democracy to gain legitimacy, reshape Indonesian identity and create a distinct but overlapping ideology with the liberal international order.

Widodo on the other hand focusses his foreign policy much more on the national and regional context. Interesting is the formulation of Indonesia as a maritime nation with a great seafaring tradition, as opposed to Yudhoyono’s notion of Indonesia as a nexus for Arabic, Chinese and European traders. In leaving these groups out of his Indonesian identity construction the emphasis is more on the national and Indonesia as ASEAN’s natural leader.

#### **4.3 *Indonesia and Democracy Promotion.***

Within this section democratic development in Indonesia will be compared to other nations’ trajectories of democracy implementation. The main goal of this section is to determine whether or not Indonesia, especially Yudhoyono’s international democratization agenda, is unique or if it is the normal path for new democracies.

Ted Piccione researched if rising democracies became more willing to support democracy in other countries? His finding supported the idea that there is a direct correlation between a country’s internal democratic development and its support for democracy abroad. In Indonesia the transition from an authoritarian regime had been accompanied by a reorientation in its foreign policy. From a rejection of international norms of democracy and human rights as

incompatible with ‘Asian values’, to a leader in promoting such principles.<sup>147</sup> As has already been discussed, this promotion is evident within Indonesia’s stance in the discussions around the ASEAN Charter and in its efforts for the BDF. From this perspective Indonesia indeed follows the trajectory outlined by Piccione. It also shows that Indonesian democracy promotion is regionally. Outside of its own backyard, Indonesia has been less willing to take the initiative, either rhetorically or with action. This became evident during, especially in the MENA region. During the Arab Spring Indonesia was not ready to share its experiences unless when asked and was cautious in the UN when there were discussions on Syria.<sup>148</sup>

The surge in mentions on democracy after 2004 (figure 4.1), keeping in mind the correlation between democracy at home and democracy promotion by Piccione, can indeed be aligned with domestic issues on democracy. Between 1999 and 2004 Indonesia had four Presidents, while the length of a term a President can serve is five years. During this period Indonesia struggled with the rise of political Islam, internal conflict, human rights abuses committed by its forces. However, at the same time it began to project its democratic credentials abroad as a way to restore its reputation as a politically stable and economically interesting nation.<sup>149</sup> In other words, although Indonesia does fit within the pattern of Piccione’s correlation between domestic development in democracy and democracy promotion, the internal democratic standard does not have to be stable. Setting the right example first, does not seem to be necessary.

Did the democracy promotion agenda of Indonesia alter the traditional *bebas dan aktif* foreign policy strategy? The active rhetoric within ASEAN and the initiative of the BDF show that Indonesia does pressure, although not directly, their regional counterparts to also engage in democratic reform. This is also underlined by Piccione. However, as has been shown before both initiatives remained rhetorically and non-interference remained the norm within ASEAN as well as in the BDF. Therefore I would argue that in terms of democracy promotion the tradition of *bebas dan aktif* remains valid. Piccione does point towards the Indonesian stance outside of ASEAN or the BDF as a continuity of *bebas dan aktif*. He argues that within the UN, Indonesia’s tradition of non-interference in internal affairs remains strong. Within the UN Indonesia avoids voting for resolutions that can be interpret as a critique, regardless of the

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<sup>147</sup> Piccione, *Five Rising Democracies and the Fate of the International Liberal international order*, 64.

<sup>148</sup> Ibidem, 65 – 66.

<sup>149</sup> Ibidem, 192 – 195.

violations at stake. On resolutions about human rights situations in various nations such as Belarus, Cuba and North-Korea, Indonesia voted no or abstained.<sup>150</sup>

In sum, Indonesian democratic development had a direct influence on how Indonesia framed its foreign policy. Democracy promotion became an essential part of policy as is, according to Piccione, normal for new democracies. This became evident through ASEAN and the BDF initiative. The experience of Indonesia with the democratization process and the international support it received, made Indonesia more open to suggesting reform mechanisms for others. However, in the international liberal international order, it had a distinct Indonesian style, of *bebas dan aktif*. The historical experiences of Indonesia weaken, or perhaps constrains, Indonesia in supporting a strong international order.

In this sense the Indonesian foreign policy tradition is still a continuation of *bebas dan aktif* and *Pancasila* as outlined by Hatta and Sukarno. Suharto and his New Order Regime also went back to these two principles and based their foreign policy on what Suharto believed the right interpretation. Suharto used the ideologies for promoting Indonesia economically, in order to be able to push for social reforms domestically. Therefore, I would argue that Indonesian leaders, whether authoritarian or democratically elected, use their foreign policy very pragmatic for domestic goals. The idea of Yudhoyono to open Indonesia to the world made sense because Indonesia needed to present itself as a new democracy in order to receive aid and make progress as a democracy. It therefore also promoted democracy regionally. Widodo on the other hand sees economic progress as a catalyst for domestic social justice and focusses not on democracy promotion, at least not as personally as Yudhoyono did. Both President, however, use the ideology of *bebas dan aktif* and *Pancasila* for their respective foreign policies. The degree of being independent and in what area this independence is most prominent is dependent upon the goals of the respective government. Following this logic, the democratic Presidents Yudhoyono and Widodo are not that different from Sukarno or Suharto. All of these presidents were pragmatic in their connectiveness to the world outside of Southeast Asia, especially when it served their domestic interests, foreign policy was deployed either for finding a voice in international politics, democracy promotion or economic gains.

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<sup>150</sup> Ibidem, 206 – 207.

## 5. Conclusion.

This research has tried to show the dynamic between world order and Indonesian foreign policy, especially on the issue of democracy promotion in relation to two Indonesian presidents, Yudhoyono (2009-14) and Widodo (2014-19). Through the use of secondary sources, literature, and official documents by the two presidents, a speech, interview and policy outline, Indonesian foreign policy has been examined and compared. Constructivism has been the theoretical framework for examining world order, democracy promotion and Indonesian foreign policy. Within this framework of social relations much attention has been given to the following concepts; values, identity, ideology and legitimacy. This framework was more suited to explore the ideational, instead of the material world of international relations. In hindsight, it was hard to distinguish the two worlds because of the interaction between the two. Afterall, ideas are formed within the material world and rarely outside of it. As a consequence, the material world had to be implemented in certain parts of the thesis. However, it did not become overwhelming or made me lose sight of the ideational aspects. The goal of the thesis was to examine Indonesian foreign policy in the context of the ‘changing’ world order, a order which focus has shifted towards the Indo-Pacific. This is the region in which Indonesia presents itself as the natural leader of ASEAN in Southeast Asia, the re-emerging state of China and where the leaders of the liberal international order, the US and EU, have economic as well as security interest. Much scholarly attention within this region has focussed on realism or liberalism, however this thesis has used constructivism. Thereby having less attention for the material structure of relations, but more on the social structure of the interactions between the states. The main question was formulated as follows, *how does the changing world order influence Indonesian foreign policy, especially when focused on democracy promotion and Indonesia’s ‘position’ in the world order?*

The main conclusions brought forward were that all actors active within the Indo-Pacific have formulated their identity in different ways. The constructed identities, US exceptionalism, EU exemplary function, ASEAN non-interference, and Chinese ‘centre of the earth’ all have their own formulated values, ideologies and legitimacy claims. From the perspective of the current liberal international order, the Indo-Pacific with a constructivist approach, is not a homogenous region. Therefore I argue that from a realist perspective, with the focus on military and economic size, the shift of attention can be explained by the economic gains in the region. It is indeed the fastest growing region in the world. The fact that the US’s strongest rival, both economically and military, China is a close neighbour makes this region extremely relevant for

US and EU foreign policy. However, the ASEAN nations are in the middle of this great power rivalry. From a liberal perspective it can be argued that open-markets are the pillar of economic prosperity of the region. Both regional as well as global, nations want to protect their economic interests.

However from the perspective of constructivism the relations are much harder to examine. Democracy promotion has been used to understand the regions social constructs in line with values, identity, ideology and legitimacy. The promotion of democracy, especially liberal democracy as understood by the US and the EU is a good example for all four concepts. Liberal democracy has been understood in various ways, but within this research the main focus was on freedom, open-markets, free and fair elections and democracy promotion strategies. From this chapter it has also become evident that US focus on democracy promotion in relation within (potential) allies is not as important. Not only because the US highlights their security and economic interests, but also because US exceptionalism has also been interpreted locally as US ‘exemptionalism’, meaning that the US does not play by its own rules, unilateral. For the US having a common security or economic interest has a higher priority than democracy promotion. In the case of the EU, it became evident that there is a lacking structure for democracy promotion. Meaning that even if they have the will to do so, the EU does not have a constant apprehensive idea of how to do so. This, however, is not fully the ‘fault’ of the EU. The members of ASEAN keep adhering to their ‘sacred’ non-interference. Meaning that members can not interfere within the domestic politics of another member. EU’s democracy promotion has always focussed on strengthening the civil society from which they believed a strong democracy could form. Within the context of ASEAN such interventions within the domestic sphere are not appreciated. Although rhetoric from the ASEAN members in the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century became more focussed on democratic transitions, the region has actually declined in democratic indexes and ‘real’ action has been absent. Also due to the non-interference norm. Although a large part of the region has, at least in rhetoric, proclaimed to be pro-democracy, the actual democratic foundations are weakening in the Indo-Pacific. The liberal international order does not yet have the right answer for this problem. The region itself does not want to be divided along the lines of democracies and non-democracies and interfere in each other’s domestic affairs. There is a strong emphasis on the ‘ASEAN Way’ of non-interference among its members in relation to each other but also in relation to the great power rivalries of China, the US and the EU.

There are many differences between the presidencies of Yudhoyono and Widodo, especially on their outward focus. Yudhoyono being much more internationally focussed, while

his successor Widodo is more inward looking. Both portrayed Indonesia as the natural leader of the region and thus ASEAN. Although Yudhoyono portrayed his foreign policy and personal interest in the international arena, the analysis of his speech also saw the values of non-interference and independence come up frequently. This has been dubbed the ‘Indonesian Way’. However, the themes of non-interference and independence are more evident in Widodo’s foreign policy. He puts more emphasis on Indonesian identity as being distinct and home-grown without the influence of international actors prevalent in Indonesian history since the 14<sup>th</sup> century. Yudhoyono puts more emphasis on these historical ties with the Arab World, China, and European powers. Widodo ‘only’ mentions the great seafaring tradition of Indonesia, without the relation with external powers. In terms of legitimacy both president also differ. Yudhoyono comes to legitimization of his policy by stressing the historical ties, Indonesia’s road to democracy and the trajectory of Indonesia to an economic power. On the other hand, Widodo, does not legitimize his position at the hand of democracy, not internationally, nor regionally. It was Yudhoyono whom put the idea of democracy promotion on the agenda of ASEAN and formed the BDF. What I take from this examination is that although both president differ in the gradation of international cooperation and visibility, Yudhoyono emphasised Indonesian accession to the liberal world order, remaining distinctive, but actively engaging. However, Widodo puts more attention to the economy promotion foreign investment, but engaging less in world order politics or democracy promotion. Where Yudhoyono was very active personally in the international bodies and the BDF, Widodo pays much less attention to these events. The amount of mentioning’s on world order or democracy have dropped significantly since Widodo became president. However, this does not mean that they are completely different. Both presidents stay within the tradition of *bebas dan aktif*, and the Non-Aligned Movement, as well as the ASEAN norm of non-interference. Interesting is that all these groups and values were established in the period of decolonization and Cold War politics. This means for a large part that they were set-up to come loose from any great power or their rivalries, that had influenced these nations for so long. This relation is somewhat different with the US which actively promoted anti-colonialism since Woodrow Wilson and through Franklin Delano Roosevelt.

Coming back to the main question of this research *how does the changing world order influence Indonesian foreign policy, especially when focused on democracy promotion and Indonesia’s ‘position’ in the world order?* I would argue that the main characteristics of Indonesian foreign policy, which were derived from the period of decolonization and Cold War politics are still the driving force of foreign policy under Yudhoyono and Widodo. This

becomes evident from Yudhoyono's "million friend, zero enemy" strategy and Widodo in his interview with *Foreign Affairs* also stated to be a mediator between great powers. Both stress their independence, but their activities within the world order differ. Where Yudhoyono was internationally and regionally focussed on democracy promotion, Widodo is more concerned with economics and foreign affairs for the welfare of the Indonesian people directly. The fact that Yudhoyono was the first president to complete a presidential term in the newly established democracy has for sure contributed to his desire, also personally, to present this image of a successful democracy to the world, hoping that it would open new 'doors' to the West, use it as a tool for regional leadership, but keeping it formulated in a unique and distinctively Asian way, in line with his 'million friends, zero enemy' strategy. This is also in line with 'Western' thought at the time, of Fukuyama and Huntington, that saw liberal democracy as the final concept of government and spreading through waves bringing open-markets, security and peace. However, the past twenty years have shown a decrease in democracies, both in relatively new democracies as well as those thought to be firmly established. The US and the EU seem to have realised that their interests are more in security and open-markets without liberal democracy or not having a fitting strategy for establishing liberal democracies and is sometimes not even wanted. The re-emergence of China has given this dynamic another dimension, cooperation on the level of economics or security is deemed more important than incorporating nations within the liberal international order, the material side is more relevant than the ideational. This seems to be evident in Widodo's foreign policy, emphasis on security, sovereignty and economic gains, and a national identity, with emphasis on non-interference. But, what also became evident and is very important from constructivist perspective is that values and identities can be reshaped to be able to find common ground exemplified by ASEAN and the EU. However, colonialism and the Cold War have left their mark on the values, ideology, legitimacy and identity of Indonesia, ASEAN, China, the US and the EU alike. Coming to terms with this past requires the rethinking of social constructions between them. Again, the re-emergence of China gives this rethinking a new dimension.

What has become evident from the perspective of the liberal international order is that in the Indo-Pacific liberalism does not necessarily entail having a liberal democracy, cooperation for economic gain and security interest is enough to legitimize actions despite of differences in values, identity and legitimacy. Therefore Indonesia's engagement with this order is dependent on the personal interest of their leaders, in the case of Yudhoyono and Widodo, but both remain independent and active in different fields. But there is no significant change between the two presidents in Indonesia's position within the world order, except the

transformation to a democracy. The fact that Yudhoyono has emphasised this matter on the international and regional level shows that for a new democracy it might be natural to present it as a way of good governance at home as well as abroad. The democratic backsliding of Indonesian democracy since 2015 shows that the trajectory of becoming and remaining a democracy is never a exponential line, but rather a constantly fluctuating line. This is true for Indonesia as well as other new democracies and the older the liberal democracies of the US and EU and. The social relations between these nations and their regional bodies are, however, fluid and not fixed. That is why constructivism remains an important perspective for examining and analysing the relations of states over a longer period of time. This research hopes to contribute to the discussion on the importance of the social world an interactions between all actors in the Indo-Pacific instead of a predominantly material interest.

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