Graduate School of Development Studies

**A Textual Framing Analysis of Palestinian Factional
Journalism Prior to the 2007 Hamas-Fatah Military
Conflict**

A Research Paper presented by:

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in partial fulfillment of the requirements for obtaining the degree of
MASTERS OF ARTS IN DEVELOPMENT STUDIES

Specialization:
**International Political Economy and Development
(IPED)**

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The Hague, The Netherlands
November, 2010

This document represents part of the author's study programme while at the Institute of Social Studies. The views stated therein are those of the author and not necessarily those of the Institute.

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List of Acronyms

CDA	Critical Discourse Analysis
EU	European Union
EUB	European Broadcasting Union
ICRC	International Committee of Red Cross
IMF	International Monitoring Fund
IPE	International Political Economy
PA	Palestinian Authority
PLO	Palestinian Liberation Organization
RPG	Rocket Propelled Grenades
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNRWA	United Nations Relief and World Agency
US. USA	United States of America

Abstract

This comparative study of journalistic practices in Palestine combines 'strong objectivity' and media analysis techniques to evaluate the framing narratives of two factional newspapers; *Al Karama* ('Dignity'), published by Fatah, and *Al Resalah* ('The Message'). Each is shown to have used different religious and political narratives to frame issues of financial reform, corruption and military aid, as well as coverage of key events leading up to the civil conflict of June 2007. The concept of factional journalism is shown to have a great deal to offer in increasing understanding of the influential role and responsibilities of print media in highly polarised conflict situations. The research data has been gathered first-hand and may serve as source material for other research into factional journalism in future.

Relevance to Development Studies

International community turned a blind eye to atrocities committed within Palestine, partially due to guilt and partially due to pressure. This continues to cost the European Union and United States diplomatically and economically. Factional journalism within the Occupied Palestinian Territories directly impacts how the rest of the world sees the conflict. In a house divided, the pettiness of personal agendas out-weigh the necessity for truth, further skewing the impressions of the region and extending the occupation and precipitating conflict. Ultimately each nation pays diplomatically, morally and economically through protracted wars in the region, continued unrest, intellectual bankruptcy and missed economic opportunity. By focusing on factional journalism, the story emerging from the occupied territories can significantly contribute to global understanding of the issue and therefore pave the way toward resolution, peace and prosperity, thus creating the essential components and conditions necessary for the successful implementation of contemporary developmental approaches.

Key Words: *Al Resalah, Al Karama*, Factional Journalism, Strong Objectivity, Standpoint Epistemology, Power, Knowledge, Truth, Media, Conflict, Representation, Palestinian context.

Truth is relatively
when blood mixes with blood
in its night

The faces of truth
(Mahmoud Darwish, 2009: 66)

Acknowledgments

Each path in life commences with a first step. Fifteen months ago I began this project, knowing it was important but I was not certain as to its outcome or the ultimate direction it would take. Bias in reporting on the Middle East and its effects on global events has been well documented internationally. However, no journalist or researcher has questioned the effect of bias originating from within competing agencies with control over the press and the ultimate effect this has on global understanding of events.

Palestine represents a little strip of land well removed from Europe and the rest of the world, yet was throughout history a central spoke in the wheel of progress. The region has remained this way for thousands of years. At times, often for centuries, the region is quiet. At other periods like today, it is a simmering stew of political power plays, religious fundamentalism and conflict complicated by the agendas of people not present in the region. Then, the alleged wisdom about the region originates from without rather than from within.

I decided to study Palestinian journalism from the inside. Even as a Palestinian journalist, what I discovered at times shocked me. I noticed a trend I call 'factional journalism', or the process of using the press to promote a political party's position and agenda over another party's, often through the withholding of critical information which could be of benefit to the local community and to the world at large. This manipulation serves to perpetuate conflict rather than open the pathway toward resolution. In the end, everyone loses. History shows that societies grow and mature exponentially in times of peace, but slowly descend toward self-destruction when engaged in perpetual war. This retards intellectual and cultural growth as well as commerce, science and opportunity locally and internationally, thus making a study of factional journalism within Palestine of consequence to the world at large.

Like all worthwhile endeavors, the creation of this paper could not have occurred without the support, assistance, advice and mentoring of many people. No words can adequately express my gratitude, but I'd like to acknowledge some of the people who have assisted me on this project.

Helen Hintjens, without her efforts this paper would not have seen the light and whose talent for organization assisted me in structuring this paper.

Rosalba Icaza, my second reader, Noam Chomsky, John Pilger, and United Nation's Special Rapporteur Richard Falk, all of whom were invaluable in their remarks and insights into the issue of factional journalism.

Chapter 1
Introduction

1.1 Introduction

This is a comparative study of two 'factional' forms of print media , Fatah's *Al Karama* (The Dignity) and Hamas's *Al Resalah* (The Message), and their coverage of key events leading up to the civil conflict in June 2007. The study aims to show how each newspaper chose to frame issues of financial reform, corruption and military aid, thereby clarifying what 'factional journalism' means in practice, illustrating its coherence as a relatively unexplored concept in the study of global media. I hope to demonstrate how religiously and politically driven dimensions of media representation have functioned prior to the onset of specific violent conflict. The topic is especially important in light of increasing understanding of the influential role and responsibilities of media in highly polarised conflict situations such as this one. Another dimension of this study is the ethical dilemmas within the journalistic world covering such conflicts. The concept of 'strong objectivity' is combined in this study with media analysis techniques, providing a lens through which journalistic practices in Palestine are analysed and evaluated. Documents used in this study are not generally available, and one of its contributions is to have collected together a body of evidence about 'factional' journalism that could be of use for other scholars.

1.2 What is Factional Journalism?

There is no established definition of 'factional' journalism. This study aims to contribute to this void at the conceptual level. The word 'factional' is derived from 'faction' which is a section or group of people connected by a shared belief or opinion. Webster (2003) defines a faction as 'a party or group that is often contentious or self-seeking'. Although both Hamas and Fatah are political parties in their own right, the international media consistently referred to their fighting in Gaza prior to 2007 as 'factional' fighting. Usually no explanation of the term 'factional' was offered. If Palestinian journalism is factional, this reflects the way it is affiliated, funded and controlled by the two main parties and their leadership.

Other and more useful definitions of 'faction' include that of Harold Lasswell (1931: 49), who defines a faction as: 'any constituent group of a larger unit which works for the advancement of particular persons or policies'. The work of Ralph Nicholas (1965) is also relevant to defining factionalism. It gained wide acceptance as a serious attempt at a sociological or anthropological definition of the phenomenon of factionalism in peasant societies. For Nicholas, factions are political conflict groupings that are provoked into a sense of self-identification behind a particular leader. A faction differs from other political institutions or

forms of organization in that leadership plays the critical organizing role, over and above other formal political divisions. As 'a political activity or phenomenon', factional conflict involves 'organized conflict over public power' (Nicholas, 1965: 52) with struggles over control of human and material resources.

For the purposes of this study, the characteristics of factions are distinguished from political parties as such, both 'progressive' and 'conservative' ones. Unlike factions, political parties are generally adapting to political tendencies, and 'purport to represent distinct interests within the public, rather than interests of their leadership', narrowly defined (Nicholas, 1965, 53). By implication, factions do the reverse. As Al Ghudrah (2005) has stated, factional journalism may even have more influence on public opinion than a political party. When the distribution of newspapers is interrupted by Hamas or Fatah, each side still spreads its news through the Internet. This study focuses on the printed media chosen.

In an open pluralistic society, both politically affiliated and independent journalists function. This situation is absent in politically polarised Palestine, since 2007, under the persistent state of emergency stemming from Israeli occupation and blockade. The factional conflict backdrop for this study analysis on news reports also needs to be clearly viewed within the wider global agenda of the so-called 'war on terror'. Prevailing violence in daily Palestinian life is also viewed as expression of resistance against colonial or imperial occupation (Chomsky, 1983, see also Tawil-Souri, 2009; Gregory, 2004; Zureik, 2001; Gerner, 1994; Harlow, 1987).

Factions grow as sub-cultural products. Though Fatah and Hamas both belong to the Palestinian culture, each has its own cultural milieu – essentially a religious one for Hamas and a secular one for Fatah. Each has its own 'set of discourses, stories, images, spectacles, and varying cultural forms and practices that generate meaning, identities, and political effects' (Durham & Kellner, 2001: 6). Palestinian society, like others, is vulnerable to texts and images that divide public opinion. Factional journalists may be quick to use these popular idioms in reporting, since: 'cultural texts are saturated with social meanings; they generate political effects, reproducing or opposing governing social institutions and relations of domination and subordination' (ibid).

The manipulation of language in 'factional journalism' seeks to arouse conflict, stress and even violence among readership. Deep critical observation of contemporary journalism in most countries shows that neutrality and objectivity are not valued as central goals. When journalism is embedded in wider societal schisms it can resemble 'hate journalism'. Scholars of contemporary media in conflict situations question how the role of factional journalism can be

understood, and counteracted, in polarised situations dominated by political factions (Al Suhbaki, 2004).

Some (Bo Hamalah, 2005) argue that many journalists are 'prisoners of those struggling' within political parties, or factions, and are required – with few choices open to them - to defend, daily, the thoughts of their political paymasters (known as 'paycheck' in Gaza). In a factionalised media context, hard choices have to be made, including elaborate efforts to justify 'slips of the tongue' made by respective leaders. In such situations, journalists 'use words as means of struggle'. In order to promote peaceful outcomes, journalism requires a high level of press freedom, imagination and the ability to persuade public opinion in constructive directions (Bo Hamalah, 2005).

This suggests that factional journalism is both an expression of ideologies of party factions, and a tool of justification and reparation of outcomes, including violent actions. Such journalism seeks to maintain existing support for political leaders and recruit others to the 'cause': ultimately, to manipulate the perception of what is presented as news to the public, but serves, in fact, the interests and agendas of a single faction. I mean to show how factional journalism manipulates words and images to persuade the reader. It will be suggested that any journalist working in a factionalised media context must be aware that publishing daily news without including comment and opinions of political party leaders will render their reporting politically unacceptable.

1.3 Contextual Background

Under the Oslo Accords of 1993, between the Israeli government and the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), media and religious agreement was reached by political leaders themselves, to end incitement in order to reduce criticism of government policies. Hamas media activists were arrested by the Palestinian authorities in a clampdown. From 1999-2002, Hamas's *Al Resalah* newspaper offices were shut down for many weeks. This created the basis for today's 'factional' situation. Prominent Palestinian journalist Nabil Al Khateeb said in 1995 that propagandist political discourses have basically been justified from the 1970s onwards, because they were mainly aimed at the Israeli occupation. The centrality of 'loyalty' values in the struggle against Israel may help to explain what Al Khateeb sees as: 'the political discourse of nowadays', or 'propaganda which does not help even those creating it. On the contrary, it harms the Palestinian Authority' (Al Khateeb, 1995:29). When local factional media echoed leaders' statements, previously, regarding weapons that can wipe Israel off the map, for example, these statements could not be publicly questioned. National journalism plays a central role in prioritising issues for discussion in the media.

Recently, a serious study stated that factional journalism may be a determining factor in escalating violent conflicts between Hamas and Fatah (Abu Shawish, 2008). Abu Shawish reports that 87% of Palestinian refugees interviewed, both within Palestine and in the diaspora, felt that factional journalism coverage in the month of June 2007, had significantly contributed to the deepening political divisions that preceded political inter-factional violence in June 2007 (Abu Shawish, 2008). In 2008, this finding was supported by an online poll conducted through the Palestinian news network website *Ekhbarya*t, shows that 51% of Palestinian journalists agreed that the Palestinian media played a negative role in the internal crises of the previous few years (survey 20-27 August 2008). In the same survey, only 26% found the media's role insignificant, and 22% responded that they were not sure (Ekhbaryat, 2008). Although not a reliable source of information, online polls suggest a widespread understanding that the media may be 'part of the problem' in the Palestinian context.

1.4 The Focus of This Research

This is a comparative study of the role of media in conflict situations, which is deeply embedded in its own international political economy of warfare and state security policies. The politics of media representation is important for anyone interested in the global commerce of ideas about war and war-making. This research aims to examine the role of a highly politicised set of internal media narratives within a global communication concerning the internal Palestinian conflict.

Political divisions may have been worsened by factional journalism, with the continual factionalism of the press and Internet media, among others, amounting to a form of 'mutual harassment'. The starting point for this study is a concern that once lies and false accusations become a normal method of reporting, as if they were established 'facts', then the role of journalist is more to intimidate, persuade and recruit than to just inform. This implies deterioration in quality journalism. During the selected period of this study (January-May 2007), the press media in Palestine generally reported on military aid, as well as on news of violent incidents e.g. in hospitals, ministries, mosques, schools and security installations. This five-month period is relevant because it represents the media split and escalation before the military confrontation (Abu M'olaa, 2009). It is also an important period for close comparative analysis because, if indeed factional journalism used irresponsible and abusive invective, then how can this be connected to the violence that followed? This study suggests that factionalisation is the connecting thread. Comparative analysis provides 'an important check on the generalisation implicit' in factional journalism (Bendix,1963:535). This will be applied more in chapter 4 than in chapter 5.

The Hamas-Fatah internecine conflict, of several years, intensified significantly in 2007. In this study I outline and scrutinise the reporting over the selected period (January-May 2007) by *Al Karama* and *Al Resala* newspapers, controlled by Fatah

and Hamas respectively. I consider each paper's party political or factional position, and analyse how each newspaper reports the conflict, possibly seeking to influence their readers with 'factionalised' news reports in the run-up to the onset of violence in June 2007. I will discuss how both Fatah's *Al Karama* and Hamas's *Al Resalah* newspapers represent the Palestinian internal conflict, in particular, focusing on three key issues: (i) the financial reforms (ii) corruption and (iii) military aid. This is not a random choice, and the topics are closely connected and relevant to International Political Economy. In addition, both finance and security can be seen as critical contentious issues behind the build-up towards military confrontation between Hamas and Fatah.

Military aid which funds conflict, plunder and diversion of both military and humanitarian aid by warring parties, and siege-breaking have not been central themes for international relations or international political economy (IPE) scholars. However, assuming military aid is pertinent to security studies, there have been several contributions to IPE linking the interrelationship of IPE and security. In the last fifteen years, IPE scholars (see Duffield, 2001; Reno, 1998; Berdal and Malone, 2000; Ballentine and Sherman, 2003) have linked the political economy to contemporary conflicts. Other IPE scholars have linked the influence of the global economy on local conflicts, such as Hamas-Fatah and post-conflict reconstruction processes. Such conflicts as seen by Jung in his book *Shadow Globalization, Ethnic Conflicts and New Wars: A Political Economy of Intra-State War*, (Jung, 2003: 3-5), even though local conflicts may appear to be just a minor issue on the global agenda. Whether in Lebanon, former Yugoslavia, Iraq or Somalia, such wars are still 'intimately' globalised, not only through UN or international actors interventions, but also the political economy of war-revenues coming from local human resources, as well as 'ties to formal and informal global [financial] market' networks and foreign military and humanitarian aid, as well as diasporic donations.

There are important links between the press's mediation of the Hamas-Fatah conflict and the concerns of international political economy. Andreas (2004) notes that military success or failure depends not only on military and armed capacity, but on a range of other resources. Media is one of those resources, and is a highly globalised business. This is not as apparent in the Palestinian context of the printed press, but is the backdrop to their choices of ways of presenting the news. Journalists too can be among the 'nouveau riche elite' that emerges from war. The selected three thematic media issues of this research are largely inspired by IPE conflict thinking. Each theme is explored in relation to the others, since they form a 'nexus' of news around the selected period of January-May 2007, prior to the onset of the Hamas-Fatah violence.

Following their electoral success in January 2006, Hamas promised to challenge corruption through 'change and reforms' and bring an end to Palestinian Authority

(PA) misuse of funds. Issues of financial governance were prominent and linked to military aid through a process of factional polarisation. Moreover, even when there is apparently a 'close linkage between illicit economic activities and armed conflict, the relationship is often more complex and ambiguous than it may at first appear' (Andreas 2004:651). The connection of PA with the West has provided 'the political rationale for an influx of US military aid and advisors and a blurring of counterinsurgency' (ibid) in order to counter the Islamic steam of Hamas.

1.5 Key Research Questions

From a theoretical and ethical perspective, selecting two Palestinian newspapers in this way provides a useful perspective on what is called the problem of 'standpoint epistemology' and 'strong objectivity'. These concepts will be explained more fully in Chapter 2. The key focus, therefore, is on the politics of representation within Palestinian factional journalism, specifically. My main interest is to examine each paper's news reporting in terms of its assumed objectivity. I consider how each paper's accounts of certain key issues favour one political party over another. I deepen this analysis by examining, where possible, readers' reactions to the stories included in the study. There are two *central closely inter-connected research questions:*

> How can 'factional journalism' as a concept help explain ways in which the Palestinian media contributed to violent conflict between Hamas and Fatah in 2007?

> In particular, how do frames and modes of representation used in the news reporting of Al Karama and Al Resalah produce the 'factional' quality of Palestinian journalism?

Sub-questions

> How are a number of key issues (corruption, reform and military aid) represented in the two different news sources; in other words, what does each paper choose to emphasise and omit in relation to the news (framing, focalisation and categorisation)?

> How does coverage in these newspapers relate to codes of ethics for journalism (especially in relation to the Palestinian Journalists' Code of Ethics in Appendix I)?

Overall, the work is motivated by a deeper concern, which informs, but cannot be handled in depth in a short dissertation of this kind. This concern is with the roles

and responsibilities of the media and of journalists themselves, in conflict situations like the one in Palestine, where 'factional' elements are involved.

1.6 Ethical Considerations: The Position of 'Strong Objectivity'

As a practicing Palestinian journalist, who has lived in Gaza during the period my research covers, including prior to the Hamas takeover in January 2007, and beyond May 2007, I am able to contribute experiential knowledge about debates that took place during that period and dominant social practices at the time. This helps set the context in which the articles to be analysed were written. Writing for Western newspapers and magazines also provides a vantage point that makes it possible to consider Palestinian journalism somewhat more critically, as well as being able to identify with both the journalists writing for *Al Karama* and the *Al Resala* newspapers. I can also sympathise with the readership, having been in their position. Furthermore, since I regularly review global news media as part of my work, I consider factionalism present to some extent in all print media sources. Part of the reason for this is the news sifting processes, made easier by new technologies.

In addition to the theoretical research (elaborated below in chapter 2), my experiential knowledge, on the basis of notes written at the time, will be drawn on. Experiences of colleagues are formally documented for the first time, as well as tapes of my own interviews at the time of the clashes, and material from my electronic network of professional contacts. All help to aid recall of the context of the news reports, and supplement academic studies and the newspaper material. These sources will be the main primary sources for this research.

1.7 Chapters Outline

I begin with a theoretical overview concerning the role of journalism in factionalising truth, knowledge and power and the way such role is scrutinised, particularly with regard to 'strong objectivity' and 'standpoint epistemology. I will consider the specific aspect to the political context in Palestine and link it to the background of factionalism in Palestinian journalism, within the limitations of the study. Different methods in the research methodology will be defined, along with the driving force analysis techniques, framing, categorisation and focalisation. In chapter three, I will outline a brief political history of Palestinian journalism from the 19th century to the present day, including the rise of factional journalism, illustrated by the rise of *Al Resalah* and *Al Karama*. Chapter 4 will examine comparatively two 'factional' forms of media production as contained in selected articles from the two newspapers, in relation to three selected issues of corruption, financial reform and military aid. Chapter 5 then reflects on how strong objectivity help to understand and elaborate on the concepts of 'factional journalism' of Chapter 4. Chapter 5 further nuances the role of factional journalism in hastening violent conflict. Chapter 5 also considers religiously-driven dimensions of

factional media representations, prior to the onset of a specific violent conflict in June 2007. Throughout the study, Hall's (1997) media representation theory is used, along with other elements of critical media analysis.

1.8 Concluding Thoughts

Key concepts including 'factional journalism' have been introduced, as well as research questions and the central focus on corruption, financial reforms and military aid. I have attempted to justify the relevance of these selected topics for an International Political Economy approach, using two news publications set in the broader Palestinian context. I have proposed the importance of factional media in the formation of public political and religious opinion in Palestine as in other polarised situations of violent conflict, in order to establish a concept for factional journalism that can be used for this study and possibly by other scholars in future. I address ethical considerations throughout this research. In the next chapter I will attempt to add support to my argument, drawing on relevant research on the 'factional media' in Egypt and Lebanon, in order to elaborate my own model.

Chapter 2
Media Representation in Palestine: Factionalising Truth, Knowledge and Power

2.0 Introduction

This chapter explores the politics, representation and journalistic practices relevant to factional journalism in Palestine, and their historical and contextual background. It constitutes the basis for analytical work in later chapters on the selected research newspapers, *Al Resalah* and *Al Karama*, prior to the June 2007 Fatah-Hamas military confrontation and between January and May 2007. This was a relatively peaceful period in terms of inter-Palestinian confrontations. However, the inflamed language used by factional journalists during this time, as will be argued later in chapter 4, can be seen to have heightened tensions prior to direct military confrontation in June 2007. This chapter explores the background of both the political context and factionalism in Palestine. It also provides some reflections on the fieldwork and restricted access of materials. Research methodology and techniques analysis (framing, focalisation and categorisation), along with key concepts of 'strong objectivity' and 'standpoint epistemology', will be fully introduced as the structural backbone of this research.

2.1 Background to the Political Context in Palestine

This internal conflict is not the only one in modern Palestinian history. Scholars and journalists have seen and framed the Israeli-Palestinian conflict from many different angles in order to gain a cohesive understanding of the motives and actions of the protagonists (e.g. Ruigrok *et al*, 2009; Finkelstein, 1995). In their pioneering research on news values, Galtung and Ruge (1965) suggest that the occurrence of conflict may add more meaning to the country and its people. However, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has encountered so many obstacles to finding a resolution, that it seems as if peace between Palestinians and Israelis will remain a hope rather than something that will soon come to fruition. Neither two-state nor one-state solutions are seriously considered by Israel (Tilley, 2005). The occupation is characterised by incessant – if uneven – violence by both parties.

After the death of President Arafat in 2004, Palestinian elections were called in January 2006. Fatah was still prominent, but Hamas stood for election also, and vowed to disassociate itself from corruption, under the motto 'Change and Reform'. Fatah's reign in the PA was regarded as corrupt, frustrating suffering Palestinians, 'turning the proto-state into an instrument of party patronage and brutal domination' (Brown, 2010: 42). In 2006, this frustration and desire for reform gave Hamas an overwhelming majority of seats in the Palestinian Legislative Council, making them responsible for forming a new government, and

Hamas rejected the proposition that Israel should be an exclusively Jewish State. Consequently, Hamas was declared a terrorist organisation, with the approval of Israeli Prime Minister, Ariel Sharon. US and EU response to the undesirable election results, was to cut aid to the Palestinians. Effectively punishing the government they had chosen (Tamimi, 2007).

An international outcry followed over worsening humanitarian conditions in the Hamas-controlled Gaza Strip. Two-thirds of the Palestinians in Gaza were living below the poverty line, with serious shortages of life-saving medicines, food, electricity and gas 1.2 million of 1.5 million people were surviving on aid provided through UNRWA (ibid).

By early 2007, a Fatah-Hamas dialogue had started in an attempt to prevent what both referred to as 'media escalation' of the conflict. Locals and intellectuals tried to reinforce the peace process, and a Mecca National Unity Agreement was signed by Mahmoud Abbas and Khalid Mishal, for Fatah and Hamas respectively, in March 2007. However, even though in PA budget discussions, where Hamas members were also present, both parties agreed to share power in a unified Palestinian government, and, even though Saudi Arabia pledged to support this government and pay salaries for PA employees, peace had already broken down by June 2007. Internal fighting between the military wings of Fatah and Hamas began and, over a few days, dangerously violent inter-factional fighting broke out (Brown, 2010). The result was that Hamas defeated Fatah in Gaza, first in ballots in 2006 which was followed by a (relative) military victory in bullets, in 2007. Thereby taking complete control of the Strip's security institutions and compounds. Fatah remained more or less exclusively in control of the West Bank. Hamas called this period the rebating war and is considered by Hamas leaders as 'a coup against Palestinian democracy' (Rabbani , 2008:70). In terms of loss of life and injury during the Hamas-Fatah military conflict, which lasted from 7 to 15 June 2007, 118 people were killed and more than 550 were wounded (ICRC, 2007).

As the leader of Fatah, President Mahmoud Abbas immediately dissolved the Palestinian government of which Hamas was a part. The government headed by Hamas thereby became illegal. In the West Bank, a new government was installed with a large majority from Abbas's Fatah party. Prime Minister Salam Fayyad, a Texas University alumnus who previously had worked closely with the World Bank and IMF, was favoured by the US administration. He was internationally respected for his liberal ideas and because of his acceptance of the idea that an 'approach to governance is anchored in the belief that governance could be improved under continued occupation' (Brown, 2010: 42). However, for most Palestinians this represented an unacceptable compromise (Zanotti, 2010; Brown, 2008), sacrificing Palestinian self-determination for relative freedom within a perpetuated state of illegal occupation.

2.2 Background to Factionalism in Palestinian Journalism

Polarised political conflicts, particularly virulent between Hamas and Fatah, reached unbearable levels of violence amidst an already horrifying existence for the residents of Gaza in particular. Moderation and open dialogue were all but abandoned. This is reflected in the interpretation of the 2007 break in the already fractured governing partnership between Hamas and Fatah. Seen from an Islamist viewpoint, it is a matter of 'right' and 'wrong' as opposed to the more secular viewpoint of Fatah where it is seen as 'a coup'. Both sides have their own contested narratives. But on one issue there is total agreement - a shared and visible fact in both the Gaza Strip and West Bank - that human rights have deteriorated. Freedom of expression has become restricted, with a profound effect on the practice of factional journalism and its coverage of events, particularly armed conflicts. Both audience and media broadcasters expected factional journalism to be the insider for news. This turned party-affiliated media outlets into the only sources of news, as the independent press was restricted to limited coverage of the armed conflicts at the time. Locally, the geographical division between Gaza and the West Bank has widened proximity between Palestinians due to media coverage as never before. Similarly a study (Kaid et al, 1993), of five newspapers' coverage of the Gulf War, pointed out that media coverage, news framing and the news selection of the Gulf war influences proximity between people.

The polarisation between the political factions in Palestine and the restricted freedom of expression also created divisions in the public. I highlight this further when focusing on the printed press of factional media. Both papers had their embedded reporters on the ground, positioning themselves opposite each other during the conflicts. This is vital to point out as both *Al Resalah* and *Al Karama* contributed to, and influenced, the information of today, as well as enhanced the existing reality of the division between Hamas and Fatah, as both are quoted internationally. Generally, Palestinian media is as diverse as Palestinian society at large and there is now a growing body of research on the diversity of the Palestinian media by a number of scholars in communication studies (Bishara, 2010; Tawil-Souri, 2009; Matar, 2007; Jamal, 2000). Any medium that is bound to a specific location – typically the territorially-bound printed press - is only as free as its immediate society.

Most Palestinian researchers, intellectuals and journalists tend to agree (in conversation) that the media contributes to the fuelling of violent conflict, where media has become Palestine's biggest export, with no economic gains (Tawil-Souri, 2009). Similarly in Lebanon's factional media where the Shiite and Sunni tension are represented 'most clearly' (Lamloum, 2009:364). Other example relevant to this research is the comparative research on Egyptian factional newspapers; *'Mayo', 'Al Wafed'* and *'Al Ahali'*, and their coverage of the terrorist bombings in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. The study showed the problem of terrorism can be caused by

misunderstanding of principles, or varying interpretations of religious texts (Sad, 1993) the case of Palestinian factional journalism, interpretations of events are regulated by press releases issued by political leaders. A recent study showed that 92% of examined journalists agreed to larger extent that the terminology used by Palestinian media contributed to fueling the violent conflict (Miftah, 2010).

2.3 The Fieldwork Process: Restricted Access

The divide between *Al Resalah* and *Al Karama* also embodies the unresolved conflict between Hamas and Fatah. I was faced with the initial obstacle of obtaining sensitive material that neither faction wanted to release. This material has rarely been studied as a segment of the Palestinian media. While in Gaza, I approached the Hamas office for copies of the papers covering the first half of 2007. Unfortunately, these documents were no longer available, as both electronic and paper archives were destroyed during Israel's Operation Cast Lead attack on Gaza. The Hamas-affiliated newspaper *Al Resalah* had been hit by two Israeli missiles in January 2009 (EBU, 2009). The same air strikes targeted Al Rantisi Printers, a commercial firm that publishes *Al Resalah*, leaving the archived documents in flames and the electronic archives in ruins. Securing these documents from the West Bank would have been a possibility, until I learnt that the PA issued a decree banning the distribution of *Al Resalah* in the Occupied West Bank. Similar restrictions were imposed on *Al Karama* by Hamas in Gaza.

People, both on the official and unofficial levels, in ministries, colleges, schools and civil society organisations helped in finding the materials needed. Archives are missing and there is no central national archive. So, much of what I obtained was lent for a short time, to be hastily scanned before being returned; a difficult task with unannounced, frequent power-cuts. These are essential elements of an on-the-ground research project based on a war/conflict and occupied zone. There was no ordinary library or access to well-stored relevant information. One of the people I contacted, Mr Ahmed Oudeh, was a former editor of *Al Karama*. He stated that 'during a military conflict or takeover, newspaper archives just disappear or get displaced' (Fieldnotes, 16 August 2010). He denied a previous connection to the newspaper and currently holds a position as a reporter for a US-based Arabic radio station.

I finally managed to obtain over forty reports from the two newspapers, all published in the first half of 2007. These articles covered a variety of topics, which were narrowed down to those that focus on financial reforms, corruption and foreign military buildup for both sides (Fatah and Hamas). For the purposes of this research paper, six articles from each newspaper were selected for more in-depth analysis in order to assess the important of 'factional media' representations of the clashes in 2007.

2.4 Research Methodology

Different methodologies of politics of representation and media theories (framing, categorisation and focalisation) are used in examining journalistic practices of the two newspapers. As a framework for this research, the notion of 'strong objectivity' will be examined in relation to the news articles of both publications. Rosen's (1993:53) view is that journalists marginalised within their communities may, in general, have to 'abandon the notions of objectivity'; an approach that will enable stories otherwise unpublished to get on the news again. 'Strong objectivity' is applied in combination with Public Journalism, which 'begins with a consideration of what will improve public life, rather than what will make a good story, and it implies a commitment to solving community problems beyond the publication of one story or series' (Voakes, 1999: 759). In this respect news-making involves a rather complicated process of 'mediation and negotiations between reporters, political figures as well as elites' (Mills: 2003:73). Fraely and Roushanzamir (2006:125) argue in favor of different approaches to producing news coverage. They propose the concept of Critical Media Consciousness, which involves a broadening of media literacy and aims to create a balance between media participation and social participation in order to empower the more marginalised groups in society. This can be a relevant basis for conceptualising factional journalism in chapter 5.

2.5 The Changing Role of Media: a General Problem?

Putzel and Van der Zwan (2005:5) state that media can cause the destabilisation of politics, as is seen in many developing countries. On the other hand, donors can spread information through media concerning democracy, human rights, civil participation and good governance. Hyden and Leslie (2007:7) showed that there has been a 'paradigmatic shift' in the active role of the media in new projects which differs from old methods of the 1960s when the purpose was 'just to observe and report on' the development of the situation. In their privileged positions, these observers remained detached, neutral democratic observers. Since then, there has been increased acknowledgment of the media's increasingly active role in obtaining and developing news.

Media personnel are often caught in the middle of factional journalistic conflict, and labelled, due to the media's nature and emotive presentation. This can border on hate-media, losing the objective context and background (Ruigrok 2005, Meyer et al, 1996; Dimitrova , 2006).

Media has always been used politically and militarily by bodies to advertise intent. Likewise, the Israeli military uses local media channels, breaks through radio frequencies, hacks into websites or pays for advertising space, to convey threatening messages to the Gazan people. During the Gulf War, the media was frequently used by belligerent nations to advance their own interests and legitimise war. Israel has placed advertisements in Palestinian papers, announcing financial

incentives for information pertaining to the capture of captured Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit. More public manipulation of the media is noted in Zarkov's study on the former Yugoslav Republic. Zarkov shows that the direct and intensive engagement of the media contributed to the production of both 'the media war' and the 'ethnic war'. She states that the media war 'started long before the actual fighting was even conceivable, and its traces are present to this day', although the 'ethnic war' had been there for a much longer period prior to the influx of the media (Zarkov, 2007: 2-3).

2.6 Key Concepts: Strong Objectivity and Standpoint Epistemology

Hall's (1997: 42) constructionist paradigm of media representation is used in analysing the terminology of both publications, in combination with Harding's (2005) and Durham's (1998) sophisticated theoretical standpoints. In this section, the traditional notion of strong objectivity is combined with standpoint epistemology. The latter is seen from a feminist perspective, taking into account the distance between the lives of ordinary women in their communities and dominant discourses (Harding, 2005: 222; Harding, 1991). The birth of standpoint epistemology originated in feminist critiques of strong objectivity, which views journalism primarily as a reconstruction of actual events in people's lives. Strong objectivity suggests that journalists should bypass the dominant discourses, and representations of 'truth', and that journalistic reporting should be approached from the vantage point of marginalised groups (Harding, 1991). Strong objectivity thus produces alternative standpoints in terms of news coverage. This serves to 'deepen the critique available from the standpoint' of disadvantaged groups, and allows 'for a critique of patriarchal ideology' (Hartsock, 1997: 368).

The feminist approach can be taken further. Durham, borrowing from Harding, and from the sociologist Mannheim (1952) about models of knowledge production, states that those placed in an 'insider' position in the dominant social order are the ones who almost exclusively gather and analyse information about other people, both insiders and outsiders in relation to the dominant social order. This information is then presented as if it were 'truth' or objective facts (Durham, 1998). Durham thus shows that strong objectivity is a 'system of journalistic self-evaluation', as journalists would approach reporting from the perspective of the marginalized groups, in order to counterbalance the dominant vantage point of the mainstream news outlets (ibid: 138).

Standpoint theory proposes 'a reconceptualisation of objectivity' that offers maximisation of reflexivity, where the intention is mostly to represent 'ways of different social locations of race, gender, class, sexual orientation' (ibid). This type of approach will ensure the involvement of all levels of community.

Other scholars, such as Spyer (2005), similarly argue that in contexts of war or conflict, transparency is not possible, for example when journalists serve in war zones. In the case of Maluku in Indonesia, Spyer explains how she feared that journalists realistically presenting the harsh details of the living conditions of people caught up in conflict areas might even add fuel to the fire of violence, by eventually harming the population through inflaming public feelings even more. What this suggests is that the alternative to 'factional' or 'embedded' journalism in war is no simple or easy matter. Even so, arguably strong objectivity is still globally recognised as creating journalistic reporting of much higher quality (Donsbach and Klett, 1993; Streckfuss, 1990; Schiller, 1981). 'Standpoint epistemology' is thus a way to avoid 'the intellectual quicksand of relativism and the indefensible territory of neutrality and detachment' (Durham, 1998: 126). So is strong objectivity, informed by ethics of Public Journalism. With absolute neutrality being impossible, journalists should also be careful not to exaggerate the message of the marginalised, creating another type of bias in reporting.

2.7 Framing, Focalisation and Categorisation: Techniques of Analysis of Texts

As introduced earlier, a set of theories of critical discourse analysis will be explored in this chapter. This will include framing, focalisation and categorisation. The three theories are combined for their relevance in analysing the dominance of news texts, (i.e terminology used in factional journalism), and thus to identify the political power of texts. This will serve Stuart Hall's (1997) media representation theory, which is used to pin down actors, organisations, and actions in the selected reports.

Framing, as defined here, centrally organises the textual materials to provide context, emphasis and elaboration of a topic (Tanked et al in Papacharissi and de Fatima Oliveria 2008: 54). Framing illustrates the core views within texts. The problem for this research is to solve the dilemma of deciding what the 'validity of knowledge' is and how the journalistic voices 'have a bearing on what is made known' and thus also on what happens (Durham 1998:134). An even more useful definition is provided by Entman (1993), for whom framing involves the way in which:

> …to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described (Entman, 1993: 25).

Media theorists thus generally describe framing as a tool of analysis that is focused on two levels: (i) newsmakers (especially journalists) and (ii) audiences (or receivers). This study operates in the spaces between these two levels, something that is often neglected in standard analyses of media framing of the news (e.g. Neuman, et al , 1992; Cappella and Jamieson, 1997).

In this paper, therefore, I attempt to combine both how news is presented, and how it is perceived, interpreted (and even acted on). It is important to note that: '(t)he use of different, but logically equivalent words or phrases' creates 'considerable change in the preference of the audience when the same issue is being produced and presented in different vocabularies'(Druckman 2001: 228). A pioneering studies of media framing showed how newspapers used terms like 'rescue students' and 'sacrificing other people' to refer to the same event (Tversky and Kahneman: 1981). Like other studies of media framing, this study is concerned with a specific 'subset of potentially relevant considerations' (Druckman 2004: 627). The study also involves what Entman (1993) refers to as a method of choosing and emphasising the features of a specific issue, so that the audience is in a position to evaluate or link the protagonist to this issue. The study of emphasis framing studies outlines awareness of new frames:

> those rhetorical and stylistic choices, reliably identified in news, that alter the interpretations of the topics treated and are a consistent part of the news environment (Cappella and Jamieson, 1997:39-40).

Another element of textual analysis, focalisation, complements and builds on framing. Focalisation too is a recognised tool of critical media analysis. As defined by Meijer (1993: 375), focalisation is seen as 'the connection between the subject of vision, and that which is seen' in the work of the journalist, author or even photographer in each piece of work/image, providing us with the material from a very specific vantage. This approach can be useful to identify hegemonic masculinity in new coverage of both newspapers.

Finally, categorisation is a form of powerful classification commonly used in the Palestinian factional media, and simply involves the creation of categories, e.g. 'victims' and 'perpetrators', 'self' and 'other', 'us' and 'them'. The importance of categorisation for media analysis in relation to conflict and 'factional' journalism is that it can ignite an already polarised public and prepares the way for future justifications for military, economic and social actions (Leuder et al, 2004: 262).

With wars and natural disasters, different forms of categorisation can contribute to the response, by inviting (or not) a humanitarian response in the form of intervention. This was the case, for example, in post-Tsunami news reporting, and in more recent flooding in Pakistan. On the international front, McMulty (1999) factually showed the essential part media played in using ethnicity to turn the Rwanda conflict into genocide. As such, the media has become an ally to the power politics that fuels conflicts; this is what is known as 'hate media' (Pavlakis, 2008; Chalk, 1999).

Originally, I considered using Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) theory to examine factional journalism to uncover the subtle or hidden meanings embedded within ideological language (Huckin: 1997:79). However, early attempts showed that using CDA did not produce helpful results in relation to the central concern with 'factional' journalism in Palestine. Since CDA would involve scrutinising every word and its connotations, it proved to be very time consuming and not that effective and inaccurate.

Literal translation from Arabic to English meant subtle meanings within the colloquial phraseology would be lost or misinterpreted. In the media texts, many local regional phrases are used. This seemed to be one characteristic of some factional journalism in the Palestinian context. Metaphorical language is common, and is particularly difficult to interpret using CDA, which relies on literal interpretation. For example, *Al Karama*, when reporting corruption within Hamas, uses a variety of terms such as 'looting', 'scam', 'fraud', 'dishonesty', 'lies', 'cheating', and 'deception'. These words have different interpretations in Arabic and English; the Arabic word 'T'adlees' is a serious form of 'cheating', and has religious connotations referring to the Devil and Hell. Whilst this term is not appropriate to media reports claiming to provide 'the news', it is difficult, if not impossible, to translate this connotation into English. 'Mockery' would be the closest, but still not precise, translation. In view of this kind of problem, it was decided early in the research process that CDA would not be applied unadapted, given that it would lead to additional confusion for the reader.

2.8 Concluding Remarks

This chapter first examined the Palestinian background in the context of the relationship of local media to growing political power struggles between two competitive political factions, and showed how each is roughly aligned with broader global powers. After elaborating on 'problems of access' in the fieldwork, the chapter drew connections between strong objectivity and standpoint epistemology, and their relationship to the notions of Public Journalism and Critical Media Consciousness . Three central techniques of text analysis i.e. Framing, Focalisation and Categorisation were introduced in relation to Hall's (1997) wider approach to the politics of representation in the media, to examine language used in both publications. In the next chapter, a brief history of factional journalism and background on both *Al Resalah* and *Al Karama* will be fully explored.

Chapter 3
The Process of Factionalisation of the Palestinian Press

3.0 Introduction

Here I present a general introduction to Palestinian journalism, factional journalism and more details on the *Al Resalah* and *Al Karama* newspapers, with a goal of positioning both newspapers relative to the Palestinian socio-political context. I then consider the Palestinian Code of Ethics under the Palestinian publication law of 1995.

Both newspapers coverage will be analysed using 'strong objectivity' to illustrate how Al *Resalah* and *Al Karama* counter, or do not counter, the hegemonic view on reconciliation and peace, with political bigotry towards the marginalised groups. Translation will be as accurate as possible and, at times, literal, in order to retain the character of the colloquial language answers. Journalists names will be included as part of the examination process.

3.1 Historical Background: The Palestinian Press

Printing came to Palestine as early as 1830, introduced by a Jewish man, Nassim Baq, who saw that printing, in the pluralistic Holy Land of powerful monotheistic religions, Christianity, Judaism and Islam, was vital to expression of views (Taryan, 2009; Adeeb, 1961:144). According to Taryan (2009), Palestinian journalism came in five stages:

1) Its inception under the Ottoman period from 1876 to 1918.
2) The British mandate period from 1918 to1984.
3) The Jordan-controlled period of the West Bank and the Egypt control period of Gaza from 1948 to1967.
4) The Israel-controlled period from 1967 to 1994.
5) The Palestinian Authority period, since 1994.

The Palestinian press emerged with two major newspapers in 1876; *Al Quds Al Sharif* (The Noble Sanctuary), and *Al Ghazal* (The Deer). Both were published in Arabic and Turkish and printed under first the Ottoman and then the British Empires (Taryan, 2009; Al Akkad, 1966:80). Both papers focused mainly on publishing informative pieces for the Palestinian public, about tariff systems and tax regulations of the Ottoman Empire. In 1907, *Al Taraqqi* was the first Arab language newspaper to be produced, printed and distributed from Jerusalem.
As the Palestinian National Movement emerged, this contributed to journalism as a profession which gained popularity and prestige. From 1919 onward, around the

time of the Balfour Declaration, journalism was seen as a way for the National Movement to wield power.

As journalism grew, the number of newspapers in circulation grew, continuing until the 1930s (Al Akkad, 1966: 93). Along with this competition a substantial press corps developed, reflecting the rising status of Palestinian journalism, and the wider reliance of the highly literate population, as now, on newspapers, including what I term 'factional journalism'.

History shows that Palestinian print media and journalism flourished politically and along factional lines. In 1939, Polis Shadah, a Palestinian journalist, established the *M'erat Al Sharq* (Mirror of the East) bi-lingual newspaper(English and Arabic) described by historians as having one of the largest circulations at the time. Its editorial team included leaders of the Palestinian National Movement, Ahmed Al Shukairi and Akram Zeter (Al Akkad, 1966: 93). More independent political journals started to follow *M'erat Al Sharq*, including the political and literary magazine in 1919, *Beit Al Maqdes* (Jerusalem), established by journalist Bandal Elias, (Al Akkad: 93). Records show that during the period of 1919-1948, about 1,241 newspapers and magazines were published. Of these, forty-one were in Arabic, owned by foreigners, and five in foreign languages, owned by Arabs (Taryan, 2009). During the same period, political parties relied on the press and readership as means to shape public opinion, (ibid). To counter this, Israeli groups started their own print media of Arab language papers, *Al A'mel* (The Worker) and *Hqeqat Al A'mer* (The Matter of Fact), both published by Israel's Labor Party.

Wider reliance on newspapers facilitated the emergence and growth of factional journalism in print media. Initially it began as the most effective way of spreading the agenda and ideology of the National Movement; the relatively unified messages from the early 1920s to the 1980s. But, by the 1990s, it started to give way to factionally divisive press media filled with a mixture of fact and fiction sometimes mutual incompatible. Occasionally, the press media showed overlapping of 'worldviews' on the problem of Palestinian liberation and oppression.

The silencing of the Palestinian National Movement in 1939 resulted in the regression of Palestinian journalism, especially during the repression that followed the British Mandate. In Palestine, repression continued until the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948, when most of the oldest Arabic-speaking newspapers were shut down. The only exception was*, El Etihad* (The Union), supporting the Israeli Communist party. Records show that under the control of Israel, in 1967, a new newspaper, *Al-Yaoum* (The Day), was allowed, in Arabic from Yafa (ibid). It was edited by a fluent Arabic-speaking Israeli, Michael Assaf. As in Palestinian factional media, Israel tried to replace the Palestinian papers with Israeli papers, as with *Al-Youm* which shared the editorial office with *Dafar*, a paper representing the views of the ruling Labor Party in Israel. Israel's awareness of the importance of controlling the media moved the state in 1967 to allow a new version of *Al-Naba*

(The News), an Arabic language newspaper, and a paper shunned by the public (Khalili, 1991).

Following the June 1967 war, press freedom faced oppression and harassment by Israel (Taryan: 2009), and Palestinian journalists were in a state of bewilderment and confusion. The Israeli occupation authority was aware that not allowing Palestinian journalism to flourish opened the door to underground newspapers. In 1967, the journalist, Mahmoud Abu El Zalaf, was granted a license to start *Al Quds* newspaper (Jerusalem), which remained the only independent Palestinian newspaper for many years. It began as a merger of two old newspapers, *Al-Difa* (The Defense) and *Al-Jihad* (The Holy War), published under Jordanian rule and therefore loyal to Jordan. *Al Quds* is still printing today; it is widely read and considered to be independent. However, after the Hamas-Fatah conflict in 2007, the Hamas de facto government in Gaza banned distribution of it in the Gaza Strip, accusing it of anti-Hamas news coverage. It remains banned, to this day, in the Gaza Strip.

3.2 Positioning of Palestinian Political History

Israeli censorship presented a dilemma for Palestinian journalists. Readers were presented with a different media discourse than that on offer before the Israeli occupation, one whose words served the Israeli policy (Najjar, 1992). Alternatively, the media adopted a form of selective censorship, by focusing on international news, rather than reporting on local regions of Palestine. Due to the detentions of many journalists and cases of deportation, a new pattern of journalism emerged where some journalists, and their families, were threatened for investigating certain political issues. Some had good relations with Israeli journalists and would send their news-worthy articles to them, to be published in foreign languages, to save their own skin, as printing in Arabic would endanger their own lives, (Khalili, 1991:12-13). This left many journalists in a personal (moral), professional (ethical) and cultural (identity) dilemma. Independent or factional journalists face similar dilemmas between the need for personal integrity and the need to avoid 'creating anger in his political party and leadership' (Al Ghanam, 1977:21).

The establishment of the Palestinian Authority gave the press a new platform. Thus, a Palestinian publication law was initiated in 1995. Before that a large number of newspapers, reflected the views of the Palestinian Authority. One of these newspapers was, *Al Hayat Al Jadida*, headed by editor Hafez Al Barghouti and director Nabil Amro, advisor to President Mahmoud Abbas. Hamas then banned the paper's distribution; the ban is still in place today. Hamas's *Al Watan* was shut by the Palestinian Authority in 1994, along with *El Estiqlal*, the factional newspaper established in 1995 by Islamic Jihad, along with other factional print.
Factional journalism was understaffed during the 1970s and 1980s, due to the emigration of many qualified factional journalists to more liberal and independent newspapers. Some of the journalists established newspapers outside Palestine, such as *Al Sharq Al Jadeed* (The New East) published in London in 1973 by

Abdelwahab Fatal and *Al Yaoum Al Sabe'a (*The Seventh Day) in 1984 in Paris by Belal Al Hassan (Taryan, 2009). Several journalists became bored or frustrated with political restrictions imposed on them by their party's media and looked elsewhere for work, moving to more liberal newspapers, where they also offered better working conditions and higher pay. Unemployment in Gaza affected new graduates at schools of journalism, where many worked as interns and many ended up working for factional newspapers or websites in either Gaza or the West Bank. This tied them to politically radical or fundamental religious values and promotions, from which they may, otherwise, have kept a distance. Practices and behaviors differ between Islamic movements, such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad in Palestine and the Justice Turkish Party, for instance. All of them have an Islamic base and differ in their politics and perspectives, as reflected in factional journalism.

3.3 The Emergence of Factional Newspapers: The Case of Al Karama and Al Resalah:

Al Karama newspaper

Not long after the return of the Fatah leaders, headed by Yasser Arafat, in 1995, *Al Karama* newspaper was established. It began as a weekly newspaper, issued by the Palestinian National Liberation Movement—Fatah, through its Media and Intellectual Resource Unit — and focused on Palestinian internal affairs as well as Arab international issues. Its first editor-in-chief was Diab Al Louah.

Political and advertisement fees financed 65-75% of the newspaper (*Al Karama*.ps). In 2001, former president Arafat prohibited the paper from taking paid advertisements from sources other than Fatah or the Palestinian National Authority. The paper survived a tight economic period but, following Arafat's death in 2005 and the economic, political downturn, the paper had to close down temporarily. In 2006, it was published again and, since then, 5,000 copies are printed at its head office in Gaza, of which 2,000 are sent to the West Bank, leaving 3,000 distributed in Gaza (*Al Karama*.ps). The paper has been cited in several independent publications as the only insider-paper reflecting Fatah and the inner circles of the Palestinian Authority. Following Hamas's takeover of Gaza in June 2007, Hamas arrested some of the journalists working for *Al Karama*, or imprisoned those for working for Fatah-affiliated media, following an announcement by the Minister of Interior in the Hamas *de facto* government (Maan News). This led to *Al Karama* not naming their editorial board or journalists on their website.

Al Karama (2010) aims to express the views of the Fatah movement on national, regional and international issues, and 'shed light on crimes committed by the Israeli Occupation, against the Palestinian people'. Additionally, it gives broad coverage on issues such as lawlessness, and administrative and financial

corruption. The paper states among its aims the determination to reveal and follow up internal and international issues that may be difficult for other media outlets to tackle; its work is therefore seen as 'aiming to present the real image' to the public (*Al Karama*.ps). That was the case until the 2007 Hamas-Fatah conflict when Hamas took control of its head office in Gaza. Thereafter, the paper had to stop for a year and continued only electronically, from the West Bank.

Al Resalah newspaper

The Islamic Resistance Movement of Hamas started its factional media output before the printing of *Al Resalah*, with periodic political magazines. After the Oslo Accords in 1993, the Hamas newspaper was banned by the Palestinian Authority and the movement had to consider different options to spread its ideology and vision. So, it started the Hizb al-Khalas al-Islami (Islamic National Salvation Party), licensed by the Palestinian Authority; which was followed by the *Al Resalah* newspaper. These reflected the Hamas ideology, as did *Al Watan*, (The Homeland), whose license was withdrawn by the Palestinian Authority in 1996, two years after it started.

Al Resalah began in 1997 as a daily newspaper, then temporarily went out twice a week. The aim of the paper was to 'carry forward the national and Islamic concerns' *(Al Resalah*.net). Considered to be a religious paper, it states on its website 'that it attempts to show Palestinian people the truth and to help in forming a rightful public opinion' (*Al Resalah*.ps). Initially, *Al Resalah*, despite its politics, carried interviews of members of the opposite party, Fatah. One was with the Supreme Court Chief Justice, Qusai Abdullah, who was then demoted, as a result (Mussa, 1998).

For the past ten years of Intifada, the paper published some editorials by Hamas leaders including, among others, the now-assassinated leaders Dr Abdelaziz Al - Rantisi and Ibrahim Al-Makadmeh. The paper was shut down several times by the Fatah-dominated Palestinian Authority, for between 3 to 6 months at a time. In April 1999, the editor-in-chief, Dr. Salah Al-Bardarawil, and journalist Wissam Afifah were arrested following the publication of an investigative report on the case of a Palestinian tortured to death in the Palestinian Authority prisons (*Al Resalah*.ps).

Al Resalah, banned in the West Bank, publishes around 10,000 copies which are distributed mostly in the Gaza Strip. Journalists who ignore the ban in the West Bank risk imprisonment. Apart from commercial, political advertisements, its main financing comes from the Islamic Salvation Party.

As stated on its website, the paper aims to 'spread political awareness' among Palestinians, and attempts to spread the word of 'conscious and enlightened Islamic thinking to clarify the true image of Islam away from misrepresentation

and distortion' (*Al Resalah*.ps). The paper considers itself as part of the 'liberation and resistance' against the Israeli occupation, and, like *Al Karama*, declares itself to be struggling against corruption and favouritism.

3.4 Lack of Code of Ethics

The factionalism of *Al Resalah* and *Al Karama* is illustrated best by the fact that neither, as yet, has established a code of ethical conduct. Both papers are either not aware of the code of conduct, or are deliberately avoiding such regulations. This will restrict and affect the study and analysis of this research. As an alternative, I have included the Palestinian ethical code of conduct as a baseline, as both registered newspapers have to operate under this, according to the Palestinian publishing law of 1995.

Overall, the impression is that both newspapers seek to voice Palestinian public opinion, in order to protect the Palestinian national project— with claims of accuracy, professionalism and presentation of the true voice, on unique issues.
Former Minister of Media and Information, Dr. Mustafa Al Barghouti, stated that factional journalism has contributed greatly to igniting internal fighting, through its method. He said that 'it would have been more worthwhile for factional journalism to identify the reasons behind the untimely dispute within the Palestinian arena, showing reasons and motivations, and shedding light strictly on that, with neutrality and objectivity. To the contrary, both Hamas and Fatah media abandoned professional foundations, and used inflammatory terminology. For example when one party is called a 'coup-er' that in itself is incitement...to push the public to act against that party; we have always called for neutralization of the mass media in the internal conflict'. (Fieldnotes, 10 August 2010)

3.5 Conclusion

Here, I began with the most obvious history of Palestinian journalism to establish a basis for introducing the positioning of Palestinian political history, and to provide the reader with a background to Palestinian journalism, linking the rise of factional journalism to the emergence of both Al Resalah and Al Karama, which are the main focus of this study, eventually providing historical background to help in analysing coverage of both newspapers in the next chapter.

Chapter 4
The Practices of Factional Journalism: Themes and Texts in Al Karama and Al Resalah

4.0 Introduction

In this chapter, twelve news reports, six published by the *Al Resalah* and six by the *Al Karama* newspapers over a five-month period, are examined. In two examples, the orientation of the more independent *Al Quds* newspaper is compared on similar issues. This study aims to show how media reporting fuelled the week-long, deadly military conflict between Hamas and Fatah. These reports thus seem to pre-shadow the final split in Hamas-Fatah collaboration. This meant two governments for one state, recognized neither by Israel nor the international community. The UN still uses the term 'Palestinian territories' to refer to a population and a territory under occupation.

Of the twelve reports in this chapter, six are fully translated in Appendix II. I chose to translate them with specific quotations that best illustrate central points for analysis. Wherever a report was published in *Al Resalah* and had a corresponding report in *Al Karama*, I tried to ensure that both sides were equally represented in terms of article length and content on that issue. I have included the names of journalists wherever the article is attributed to an individual. However, out of twelve reports, only three are attributed to journalists. The articles in Appendix II are unabridged. The analyses are given in the form of examples.

This chapter also examines to what extent *Al Resalah* and *Al Karama* prioritise a focus on marginalised majorities ('strong objectivity'). This is linked to the degree of reinforcement of divisions between Palestinians in the two territories. Research has shown the substantial influence of journalists' subjective beliefs in different regional conflicts (Patterson and Donsbach, 1996; Flegel and Chaffee, 1971l; Donsbach, 1997; Hagen, 1992). It should be noted that the selected news reports are based on incidents and media coverage that cannot be proven to be accurate or even incorrect, particularly as three years have passed since 2007. The ways in which language is used, and how this frames, categorises and focalises the conflict so as to privilege violent solutions to a political conflict, will be highlighted in the text. Although no 'objective' news on the matters reported is available, reference to *Al Quds* news reports in parts of Chapter 4 reflect its status as a 'non-factional' paper.

The twelve reports are divided into three main sections, focusing on framing, focalisation and categorisation, in relation to ethical codes. The first section is on corruption, the second on the closely connected question of financial reforms, and

the third section is on military aid. Each section expands from simple examples to more complex ones. The first section on corruption ends with a brief analysis of two 'boxes' containing key elements of representation in each newspaper, according to the politics of representation approach as outlined by Stuart Hall (see Chapter 2.) Two boxes are similarly presented in the final section on military aid. To follow the chapter's argument, translated articles are in Appendix II. All the articles analysed are indicated in bold, and those translated are also underlined.

4.1 Corruption

4.1.1 Framing: the Case of Rashid

The first article in Appendix II concerns corruption and discloses the name of a businessman who carried out what **_Al Resalah_** (**23 April 2007:11**) claims are 'scam and fraud operations'. Included are scanned copies of 'fraud checks' written in English (Arabic is the official language of banking in Palestine). Hamas is thus associating corruption with support from the US or UK, the main allies of Fatah. Furthermore, in trying to frame an image in the public's mind, the article fails to provide any evidence for alleged links between the businessman and other PA officials. The whole argument is framed to provoke the question of why the PA security establishment would arrest a business associate. The answer is that there is a 'corrupt coterie' within Fatah.

Al Karama (**6 May 2007:7**) responded some weeks later with a report aimed at embarrassing Hamas by denouncing _Al Resalah's_ poor journalistic practices. _Al Resalah_ is accused of viewing the 'scam operations' through 'narrow factional agendas'. _Al Karama_ then provides a counter-narrative for the arrest of the 'alleged' or 'so-called' corrupt individual. News frames in _Al Resalah_ and _Al Karama_ reports have been designed to 'penetrate the consciousness of a mass public that is minimally aware of most specific issues and events'(Entman, 1991:10).

4.1.2 Framing: Millions of Dollars

Factional journalism will often frame a subject as unimportant with a low word count, thus reducing mass awareness by giving the subject less coverage (Entman,1993). In one article, Fatah's former investigative reporter, Moheeb Al Nawati, attacked the Palestinian Prime Minister and Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh (**_Al Karama_, 7 January 2007:5**). Haniyeh was accused of forgetting the exact amount of money collected on his last trip, 'whether 35 or 32 million dollars'. This article accuses Hamas of corruption and 'looting hundreds of millions of dollars', giving an ambiguous argument rather than providing any evidence.

Al Resalah (**8 January 2007:11**) responded to _Al Karama's_ attack the following day, in less than 100 words. The response was entitled _'The Government Denies the_

News of Bringing Money with Haniyeh'. The brevity of the response seems to attempt to diminish the prominence of this particular issue. In contrast, on the same day, *Al Resalah* carried a lengthy article, with cartoons, alleging corruption within Fatah. Although these two articles were not among those selected, this exchange shows a weakness in both *Al Karama*'s original accusation, and in *Al Rasalah*'s response. Each report seeks to undermine the credibility of the other side.

The more independent newspaper *Al Quds* published an article during the studied period on related questions of corruption (**Al Quds, 16 April 2007:34)**. It did not personalise the accusation of corruption or use provocative words. The *Al Quds* article based its article on a World Bank report, and on interviews with 401 Palestinian organisations (including businesses). The report was quite precise in its wording and in allegations of misuse of resources. It discussed prospects for improving what was referred to as 'minor corruption' in financial issues, comparing corruption, investment and growth in Palestine with other Arab states.

4.1.3. Categorisation: Ours and Theirs

In another selected article in **Al Karama (6 May 2007:7**), the use of divisive categorisation is clear; 'the looting and destruction of <u>our</u> national economy' (author's underlining). The much-used word 'our' seems designed to reinforce two separate categories - Hamas and its 'militia' on one side, and everyone else on the other. When *Al Karama* writes 'our', it refers to the whole Palestinian national economy, a categorisation that lays a claim beyond Gaza. Later on, this article brings up the 'victims' who are in the majority. This further reinforces the distinction between two opposing camps, 'them' and 'us'. 'They' tend to be nameless 'lying mouths and voices, which stand in corners, in the pulpits of the mosques'. A complex situation is thus reduced to a matter of 'good' versus 'evil' (Leuder et al, 2004).

A selected **Al Resalah (1 February 2007:2**) news report similarly identifies 'us' and 'them', using statements from the Hamas military wing, the Al Qassam Brigades. It creates the image of two armies, the 'Dahalan army' and Fatah, funded by Israel and the US, and members of Hamas and Al Qassam. *Al Resalah* refers to the Al Hedayah mosque massacre, well known to all Palestinians, to reinforce the categorisation, showing how even Imam Hamas leaders are targeted. The following **Al Resalah** headline **(22 January 2007:11**) is similar: 'Those Who Attempted the Coup Are Attacking the Government to Defend their Financial Corruption'. *Al Resalah* uses controlled and highly rhetorical Arabic to question the honesty of the 'coup stream' (i.e. Fatah). The article suggests: 'the easiest way to attack others is self-projection'. This is not a crude counter-attack. Scholars such as Hroub (2008) have recognised that media discourses used by Hamas have become more rational and less overtly critical. However, a close reading of this article also shows that the 'them' is pervasive in the text. Directly and indirectly, 'they' are nameless, yet much more often represented than 'us'. The headline is an

example, referring to Fatah without name. The strategy of discrediting political opponents runs through categorisation of both newspapers' reports, but in quite different ways. Yet in both cases, little evidence is ever given for accusations against 'those others'.

Similarly, *Al Karama* has established a strategy to discredit the opposing political party. Unverified accusations and dubious incident reports, a spattering of name-dropping but anonymous sources, are used to validate the propaganda. An ***Al Karama* (6 May 2007:7)** report failed to follow up accusations of corruption, instead creating an exaggerated image of corruption in Hamas. This report violates article 24 of the Palestinian Code of Ethics, by portraying another party as corrupt and calling for public legal action against it.

Focalisation underlines the perspective reports take, in order to understand the conflict situation and the 'distribution of power in the story in the story: who sees, who speaks--and who is seen and spoken of" (Meijer, 1993: 376). In the zone in which both newspapers operate, representing the only two conflicting parties, other political factional voices are absent, including the voices of independent journalists. Hamas and Fatah have used their media to exclusively position their own narratives, to represent all Palestinians.

In comparison, people's issues were addressed more often and consistently in *Al Quds*. For example, *Al Quds* covered the issue of finance by naming all the different parties (Arab states, Hamas, Fatah, Israel, USA, EU and others) in the headline (***Al Quds* , 16 March 2007:1**) as it reported on national unity government discussions and aid to Palestinians. Unlike factional media, *Al Quds* stated that the 'EU is studying [the possibility] of channeling aid through Minister of Finance Fayyad'. This news was reported professionally by stating who said what, when, where and how. This specificity has been absent over the same period amongst factional media.

4.1.4 Corrupt Coterie vs Conspirers

As Hall argues, identifying such terms shows: 'the way in which language is assumed to be subordinate to and in the service of the world of fact' (Hall, 1997:220).This section on corruption applies Hall's (1997) media representation, particularly the use of language in representation to convey meanings. Hall distinguishes three basic representation models: (i) Intentional (ii) Reflective and (iii) Constructive (ibid:15). *Intentional* representation assumes words mean what the writer intends them to mean. Particularly in Palestinian factional journalism, a journalist may use words to persuade the reader to accept his factional leanings without question. *Reflective* representation assumes that words merely reflect existing common meanings, and *constructive* representation assumes that word meanings are contextual; they change over time. Thus, culturally-rooted meanings of terms are vital to understanding the production of factional media representations, for example here in relation to corruption.

This sections highlights the most frequently used words in reports by *Al Karama* and *Al Resalah* referring to corruption in both Hamas-led and Fatah-led government and institutions. Words have been divided according to six different categories: action, nouns, adjectives, actors, organisations, and objects.

Box 1
Al Karama **(25 February 2007:13; 6 May 2007:7) on Hamas corruption**

Actions: deliberately mislead, looting, scam, dishonesty, defrauding, deception, mockery, pillaging, cheating, destruction (of our social fabric), destruction of national, industry, planting the seeds of discord and enmity, committed suicide, urge (officials), adhere (to religion), raise suspicion, turns a blind eye.

Nouns: fraud, slogans, propaganda, public opinion, collaborators, hearsay, crime, criminals, lies, Hamas corruption, dirtiness, victims, citizen rights, people, scandal, crime, mouths, scapegoat, voices, ethical procedure, personal violations, scam, dishonesty.

Adjectives: jealous (conspirators), lying, heinous, innocent, flawed and irresponsible (methods and practices), legal, forbidden, permissible, economic (bleeding), naïve, non-Palestinian (agendas), hungry, shameful actions.

Actors: current Prime Minister, Deputy Minister, Attorney General, Security members, swindlers, corrupted people, gangs.

Organisations: The Islamic University, Treasury House of Muslims, Muslim Brotherhood, Ministry of Interior, Taxes Authorities, Police, General Palestinian Intelligence, Executive Force, Ministry of Finance, Palestinian Authority, organization structure, Near East [investment company].

Objects: American-made Marlboro cigarettes, 35 million dollars, 86 million dollars.

Box 2
Al Resalah **(23 April, 2007:11; 22 January 2007:11) on Fatah corruption**

Action: abusing funds, stealing (documents), kidnapped, fled (abroad), buy and sell, transfer the money

Nouns: businessman, (Abbas) power, (Israeli) occupation, (American) aid, Zionist-American, "Change and Reform", senior officials, corrupt coterie, election, scam, embroilment, fraud operation, investigation, siege, bullies.

Adjectives: stolen money, forgery, corrupted (financial capitals), financial (corruption), riots, corrupt.

Actors: Dahalan , The Zionist Prime Minister , Ehud Barak, Mahmoud Abbas, American General Dayton, Condoleezza Rice, Ministry of Finance, parliamentary group, security forces.

Organisations (and states): PA, Jordan, PLO, American Administration, The Higher Council for Media and ministries', Presidential Guard, Land Authority, Ministry of Interior.

Objects: tax revenues, one hundred million dollars, 6 thousand shekels, donation money, 200 cheque books, 96 million shekels, budget of Hamas, Israeli security, money and scam.

The words underpin the factional use of language by the Palestinian media today, and language brings facts into being (du Gay, 1994). The words used by Hamas and Fatah to describe corruption are very similar. In each case, words serve visibly to frame the 'facts' of an incident or news story. A sample of the actions described in the *Al Karama* reports helps to illustrate this point. Words like 'looting, scam, dishonesty, defrauding, lies, deception, mockery, pillaging,' are the most commonly used. They clearly turn Hamas into the 'bad guys' of the news. Other terms like 'American-made Marlboro cigarettes', '35 million dollars' and '86 million dollars' serve to depict Hamas as hypocritical, contradicting Hamas's self-proclaimed practices. By emphasising American-made products, *Al Karama* ascribes double standards to Hamas's religious values. Such accusatory terminology has been largely absent in the more independent media newspapers, such as *Al Quds*.

Al Resalah appears more cautious than *Al Karamah* in its choice of words and, consequently, more sophisticated. Less overt 'hate speech' is apparent in the *Al Resalah* reporting, at least in the examined texts. For example, among actors named, Dahlan, a controversial Fatah figure, is associated with corruption. This implies, without crudely stating, his close associations with Israeli and American figures; simply giving the name of a controversial Fatah figure can be enough to associate corruption with Fatah and its allies. For Hall (1997), journalistic practice is seen as a method of producing meaning out of common, existing modes of representation. Perhaps in the case of the Hamas paper, selective name-dropping can be understood in this way. Depicting or describing events can convey more than the information itself. In selection and omission of words, *Al Resalah* offers a 'reality' more subtle – but no less factionalised - than the depictions in *Al Karamah*.

4.2 Financial Reforms

Unlike corruption, to which it is closely related, the issue of financial reforms can be viewed as 'technical'. This may be why relatively few reports refer to financial reforms, important though they have become, without linking them with corruption in some way.

4.2.1 The Files Thief?

In the selected reports, financial reforms link with corruption. Many events that concern people's daily lives are not reported (Hartley, 1982). Initiatives and creativity are rarely reported. The earlier case of Rashid Al Bazari (4.1.1) also illustrates financial reforms. ***Al Resalah* (23 April 2007:11**), mentioned previously, presents what is called a 'scam' or 'fraud' committed by a Fatah businessman. *Al Resalah* claimed that he was supported by PA officials. The article may appear concerned with national economy and financial reforms, but in-depth analysis suggests otherwise. The article is attributed to an anonymous Nablus correspondent. The framing of attention is the businessman and the 'uncovering

of his fraudulent methods'. However, the story seems less concerned about revealing one man's corruption than about the general Hamas accusations that Fatah as a party is not doing enough to promote financial reforms. Most sources cited in this article are referred to only as 'citizens', or unspecified 'sources'. No identifiable individuals are quoted in the report, even though it claims to be an 'interview'.

Furthermore, the reporter presents financial reforms by defining a problem (Entman 1993; Entmann, 2007). More than half the report covers how those investigating fraud on behalf of the Palestinian authorities in Bethlehem were mainly concerned to cover up evidence of how scams were organised. In this scenario, *Al Resalah* used a prominent Fatah official to confirm this version of the story as a 'cover-up', but also to offer a 'causal interpretation' of the events (Entman, 1993:52). Nameless officials are blamed for covering up cases of 'stolen files'. Al Tamarri appears to have granted an interview that is then used, in a sophisticated but factional manner, to undermine the Fatah authorities' position on financial reforms. The article fails to link 'scam and fraud operations' directly to the PA and Fatah movement, since Al Tamarri does not give any names. It is useful to quote the article:

> Concerning the burglary of the court and stolen files of some cases pending elimination, Al Tamarri said in press statements: the court has not been broken into, but has been opened to steal such files. ***Al Resalah* (23 April 2007:11)**

This report seems to appear relatively objective, apparently based on an interview with a relatively well-known 'insider'. Yet the interview has been manipulated to serve narratives that Hamas wishes to produce. Fatah is presented as not serious about working on financial reforms. The unspoken implication is that Hamas is serious about financial reforms, whereas Fatah authorities do not deserve to be viewed as part of a national coalition or unity government.   No other sources or evidence are cited. Only Rashid Al Bazari is identified by name among the 'accused', although his case is still under investigation. Regarding focalisation, therefore, the article shows (focalises) events in a way that fits with the factional media's desired depiction of events.

Under Article 6 of the Palestinian Code of Ethics (see Appendix I), publishing names and photographs of people about to be prosecuted, or undergoing investigation, is prohibited. *Al Resalah* has breached the code in this report. Names of those apprehended for possible corruption are made public, without reference to specific and credible sources. In line with the notion of Public Journalism, financial reforms reporting should inform the public on this complex, quite technical issue. Instead, for ambitious journalists, linking financial reform to corruption makes this a good news story. There is no 'commitment to solving community problems' (Voakes, 1999: 759) through story selection.

4.2.3 Focalisation: the Pilgrim case

In what is supposed to be an article written by a well respected journalist about financial reforms, the article *'Government of Reforms or Stealing Money?'* **Al Karama (7 January 2007:5)** is also of interest. In particular, it is framed through quite explicitly religiously-driven discourses, referring to what Hamas claimed in the budget were funds spent was on the 'needs of ministers and members of parliament during their pilgrimage'. In his article, the journalist refers to a famous proverb of prophet Mohammed; to be a 'pilgrim is for those who can afford it'. He adds that it is a: 'shame that the government with its ministers and legislative council are able to make the pilgrimage whilst the rest of the people are hungry'. The journalist plays the focaliser: factional media here plays a role in urging people to engage with monitoring public expenditure.

4.3 Military Aid

4.3.2 Framing: the Case of the Islamic University

A more serious incident was the attack by the Mahmoud Abbas presidential guard on academic buildings, resulting in the burning down of the Islamic University library in Gaza City. **Al Karama, (3 February 2007:10)** justified the attack on the Islamic University with the headline ' *Weapons, Explosive Devices and Passengers Suitcases Inside the Islamic University'.* Without citing sources, it claimed that the university had hidden stores of weapons and ammunition to be used against Fatah/PA institutions and that the presidential guard captured ten 'militants' hiding inside the Islamic University. The report states further that 'six of them were Iranian nationals, and one was non-Arab' and '1,432 automatic guns, along with approximately 200 explosive devices, 120 'Yassin' and RPG [rocket propelled grenades] were found' inside the campus. This type of framing of military aid can be explained by 'relations of power' through the lens of framing media theory, involving more than one aspect of 'selection and salience' (Entman 1993: 52); it also aimed to 'select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text'. In both examples above, *Al Karama* and *Al Resalah* both chose to 'promote particular problem definition, casual interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described' (ibid). Though this is no longer news, at the time it happened, it was quoted in several local and international papers.

In a separate report, **Al Resalah (2 May 2007:6)** denied *Al Karama's* claims, denouncing them as 'lies and deception'. **<u>Al Resalah (8 February 2007:2)</u>** used a similar counterattack method when referring to information based on equally unknown sources, mentioning 'unlimited financial support from America, with the latest promise of 86 million dollars' to Fatah with an aim to 'stir unrest, create a

civil war situation', then use the weapons in a coup to overthrow Hamas in Gaza. In a divisive move, the report also named two categories of agent within Fatah.

4.3.3 Categorising Military Camps?

In *'Hamas' Executive [Force] Is Getting Ready for More Violent Clashes?*, **Al Karama (22 April 2007:6)** positions the public for the possibility of a new stage of clashes between both parties, according to unidentified 'observers'. Such rumours would exacerbate public tensions in an attempt to delegitimise the Hamas legislators. Categorisation is used here 'to accomplish something other than just categorising' two camps (Leuder et al, 2004: 244); it prepares the ground for justifying future actions, i.e. the expected confrontation in June. The report asks: 'where will their 'Executive' Force lead the Palestinian public on the street? Surely the answer is present in the minds of each Palestinian, especially those who became an orphan (sic) because of such a repugnant force' (author's underlining).

Such rhetoric legitimises pending violence by making it a call for justified revenge. The report appeared to address public expectations and fuel its fear in the headline, framed as a question despite the main voice of the text. It refers to 'sources within the Hamas Executive Force' without naming any. Its literary theme attempts to delegitimise the Executive Force and calls for public action against it, accusing it of doing the work of policing while lacking, 'the minimum understanding of police studies'. *Al Karama* attributes statements to Member of Parliament Dr Mahmoud Al Zahar, one of Fatah's most hated Hamas leaders, ironically referring to him as a medical doctor who does not know enough about security studies. The report seems to call for public action (Leuder et al 2004) against him for statements on the Fatah proposal to establish a new security council in Gaza. It seems here that *Al Karam*a selects those who speak directly, but most of the remaining text is attributed to unidentified sources, thus undermining its credibility as well as its professionalism.

4.3.4 'Twisted Devil-like' vs. 'Coup Stream'

Linking Hall's representation theory with Leuder et al (2004) may explain **Al Karama's (11 February, 2007:10)** headline *' Hamas Terrorism Peaks tin Madness'*, relating to an attack on a 'Labour's Voice' radio station. This article is framed so as to gain public support for Labour against Hamas in the Gaza Strip, who allegedly employed 'the same method as the primitive Tartars, whom history records burned down the historical library of Baghdad, as a continuation to the occupation's role in starving Palestinians and cutting all sources of livelihood'. The article accuses Hamas of completing Israel's work by 'invading properties' and by 'exploding, burning and stealing the transmitters and turning the radio station into a pile of ruins'. Words like 'Iran' and 'non-Arab' aim to show Hamas is funded and linked to outsider-agendas. The vocabulary here being used serves to heighten

the creation of a state of panic through the media (see also Zarkov, 2007; Seaton, 1999; Sofos, 1999). Categorisation here serves more to create orientation 'towards the production of social effects' (Bourdieu, 1994: 220). Such media activity can help to produce the reality of political divisions. Examples of military aid and ammunition provided to Fatah, as claimed by Hamas's *Al Resalah* newspaper, are provided in Box 3.

Box 3
Terminology used for military aid in *Al Karama* (22 April 2007:6*)*; (11 February, 2007:10) and (3 February 2007:10)

Action: planned coup (a conspiracy), kill, smuggle, violated (the sanctity), clashes, wounded, burning, bombing.

Nouns: criminals, dealers, violent, regionalism, shooting, factionalism, starvation, their grenades, kidnapping, blood suckers.

Adjectives: twisted devil-like, narrow partisan, bloody (stream), explosives, repugnant (force), primitive (Tartars), Iranian (nationality), unlawful, terrorist (force), black militia, death squads.

Actors: Minister of Foreign Affairs, Reform and Change [Hamas], Minister of Interior Said Siam, Mahmoud Al Zahar, killers, non-Arab.

Organisations (countries): Iran , customs, Hamas's Executive Force, Al Zahra Bark, Yassin [missiles], Regional Security Council, Hamas government, Al Qassam brigades, casualties, Palestinian, Arab territories, labour voice radio.

Objects: private and public prosperities, suicide, innocent children, deferred checks, live ammunition, police studies, grenades, Al Nussirat refugee camp, factional agendas, Mecca agreement, military expert, missiles, slogans, military arsenal, Merkava tank, fake names, 200 grenades, 1432 guns, 120 RPJ and Yassin missiles.

Box 4
The terminology used for military aid in *Al Resalah* (1 February 2007:2) newspaper

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Action: control, guard, transporting, reinforce, promise, murder.

Nouns: weapons, aid, ambulances, trucks, caravans, Rafah crossing, light weapons, new force, assassinations, massacre, Zionist forces, civil war, fitna/lure.

Adjectives: coup-stream, military, stacked with weapons.

Actors: William [Elliot] Abrams , Mohammed Dahalan, President Abbas, militias of Fatah, Officer Alistair Cook, Condoleezza Rice, Mujahdeen, Zionist Prime Minister, leaders, Zionist-political Advisor, war princes.

Organisations (countries): American National-Security, British Intelligence, Egypt, Ansar [security compound], Preventive Security, Fatah movement, Islamic movement, Al Qassam Brigades, Al Aqsa Brigades, Arabic and Islamic countries, The Executive [Force], Al Hedayah Mosque, United States.

Objects: Kalashnikov guns, boxes of weapons, heavy armaments, RPG's [Rocket Propelled Grenades], ammunition, Rafah crossing, Yediot Ahronot, Zionist newspaper, 12,000 members, telecommunication devices, vehicles, bulletproof vests, new jeeps, 300 Shekels.

In Box 3, phrases like 'fighting', 'planned coup', 'bloody stream', 'coup stream', and 'murderers', refer to several incidents covered by this publication. These words are utilised to link protagonists to the events reported on by the media. Media frames are here 'central in how individuals cognitively comprehend and file events, and as such, are an important determinant of how a news story is told, especially in times of conflicting accounts and factual uncertainty' (Papacharissi and Fatima Oliveira, 2008: 53).

Occasionally, both newspapers rely on foreign words and associative slogans in their original language. For example, in *Al Karama's* news coverage the use of foreign names applies to types of military equipment, like US made M16s, which refer to US military support, and other types of weapons such as 'RPG's, being directly linked to Iran and Syria. The '120 Yassin', a Hamas-invented missile, is linked to the Islamic University in Gaza. Box 3 also sheds light on the relationship in *Al Karama* between 'subject', and 'object', (Meijer 1993), in this case, Fatah and Hamas.

Hinting at links gives the reading public the required associations, and this is apparent in both newspapers. In *Al Resalah*, we can see how certain names linked together can produce a certain effect: 'American General Dayton, Condoleezza Rice, British intelligence officer Alistair Crooke…William [Elliott] Abrams and European donations'. Together, they link the US, UK, and EU, with military aid to the PA and Fatah. This supports Hamas's argument by creating in the reader's mind a suspicion of a conspiracy between donating powers and the PA, with Fatah, against Hamas. Words in Box 4 serve the purpose perfectly. It seems that what *Al Resalah* wants to arouse in the public through its discourse is awareness of foreign military aid as facilitating and 'igniting civil war'. The focalisation in Box 4 helps to 'determine…the distribution of power in the story' (Meijer, 1993: 376), and this helps us better define and better understand the dominant subject and object perspective of the news reports. Focalisation thus helps determine which side readers take in the story.

4.4. Concluding thoughts

This chapter presented a selective and comparative analysis of twelve newspapers reports from *Al Karama* and *Al Resalah*, using a number of different media analysis techniques and theories. In addition to detailed textual analysis, two other articles from the relatively independent *Al Quds* newspaper have helped to highlight the 'factional' reporting in the two other newspapers. The notion of strong objectivity was also used to critique the factional journalism approach. The next chapter elaborates and re-conceptualizes factional journalism in the light of the analysis presented so far in this study.

Chapter 5
Key findings: Re-conceptualising Factional Journalism in Palestine

5.1 Introduction

As chapter 4 shows, both *Al Resalah* and *Al Karama* published text on the three selected topics that differed in some important respects, but remained caught in a 'factional' logic of reporting. Following Hall's media representation theory, *Al Resalah* used more rhetorical and literary language in their framing, while *Al Karama* tended more toward colloquial and slang forms of Arabic. Both framed their headlines in a prominent manner to draw attention to the guilt of the other side. The analysis of the previous chapter thus allowed for a deeper understanding of the variations within factional journalism. The focus remains on the framing, focalisation and categorisation in the selected articles, but, in relation to strong objectivity, the question of how 'factional' reporting influenced violent clashes between Hamas and Fatah in 2007 will now be examined further in this chapter. This makes it possible to re-conceptualise factional journalism, returning to some of the central questions as expressed in Chapter 1. The aim of this chapter is to deepen and bring together the various elements of the analysis, before moving on to a brief conclusion.

5.2 Content Analysis: Revisiting 'Strong Objectivity'

This chapter revisits the central questions, and examines the methodology for text framing analysis to understand how modes of representation and frames are used. The findings allow for further research on the background of editorial decisions in framing, and placing news reports. What gets reported is dependent on criteria known as 'news factors'; in factional media, this criterion does not apply; what is more newsworthy is what could harm the other political party.

Each of the 12 examined news reports could have had multiple themes assigned to it, and these became visible through the inter-linking of topics in the articles, including corruption, financial reforms and military aid, all linked by a monetary theme. These connections proved useful for identifying modes of framing and for using Hall's representation theory. In reports covering military aid, categorisation was best illustrated by both warring factions dividing the conflict into two broader camps i.e. Fatah, US and Europe on the one hand and Hamas, Iran and Syria on other. Following a concern about strong objectivity, arising out of critical media consciousness, as mentioned before, marginalised groups were rarely mentioned in any of the 12 selected reports. The comparison with the more independent *Al*

Quds highlighted that the underdog had a better chance of media attention in non-factional journalistic reporting. Factionalised media platforms thus offer disadvantaged and marginalised groups even less chance than usual to voice opinions on issues like corruption and military conflict. Following strong objectivity's basic principles, it is especially in conflict situations like that in Palestine that the most marginalised should have their voices represented, being hardest hit by violence and conflict.

Both the selected 'factional' newspapers neglected the majority of the population of underprivileged Palestinians, with the selected articles reporting only on the opinions, thoughts and realities of the political elites. The daily concerns and worries of the majority of the poorer Palestinians caught up in a series of violent conflicts were mostly invisible. Corruption, for example, is an important topic for discussion among the public; and it was PA corruption that first caused the Hamas electoral victory (Brown, 2010). Despite this, what 'ordinary people' think about corruption issues was simply not reported by either side.

The notion of Critical Media Consciousness was first discussed in Chapter 2, and is relevant to where factional media covers an issue as important as corruption, yet fails to create any balance between media participation and social participation (Fraely and Roushanzamir 2006: 125). Elites – even when they are being accused of malign acts – are given attention, whilst marginalised groups are simply left out of the picture. This can be seen as a general tendency for all media, factional or not, but it is a tendency that seems to be reinforced by competitive political power struggles which focus journalists' attention more and more exclusively on the political elite of the 'other side' and their allies as chosen 'hate figures'. There were some interesting contrasts and overlaps between *Al Karama*'s and *Al Resalah's* use of language. However, *Al Karama* was furthest from *Al Quds,* in this sense.

A central question of this research related to notions of objectivity, and in this both papers claim to be 'biased to truth' but, in practice, their reporting tended to reveal factionalised editorial decisions that aimed at serving narratives of each political party. Selective truth was reported, ignoring wider strands of public opinion in the process. In light of the analysis of the twelve news reports, both newspapers represent a 'regime of truth' that uses few reliable, or verifiable sources. No report addresses issues from the perspective of marginalised groups, and even their opinions are absent from the examined reports. What the papers did rally around were issues of security, the future of the Palestinian Territories, along with the discussions on foreign aid from USA, UK, Europe, Iran, and Syria.

Both newspapers' violation of ethical codes makes the term 'factional journalism' more than simply a derogatory term. It is important to untie the concept from its purely negative connation and to reconstruct it into a theoretically workable concept that can allow for further analysis of how conflicts like that between Fatah and Hamas may affect journalistic practice. This study's contribution to the state

of knowledge can only be confirmed if further independent empirical research and contextualisation is carried out in a broader conceptual or theoretical context.

What this shows is a repetitive framework of dualism, always underlining the hatred between, 'we, the good guys' and, 'them, the bad guys'; an aggressive journalistic strategy inevitably leading to violence. (Leuder et al, 2004: 262). Both factions also turn a local conflict into a universal one, through moral-regulation attempts to normalise specific forms of historical and social local behaviours as universal. This enables the justification of the Hamas and Fatah presentation of the conflict as something 'inevitable': both factions have the power to consider and justify their actions as 'true', simply because power enables them to establish their own interpretation of 'truth' that complements their factional goals.

The three issues selected in this media analysis, particularly military aid and western donors favouring one political party over another, show in the context of military conflict and the severe shortages of resources where aid 'represents a substantial resource, or spoil, that consequently can develop into the subject of violent competition' (Gundel, 2003: 5). Such aid becomes part of the 'political economy of violence', causing the deep divisions between the two political parties.

Applying the theory of Meijer (1993) to *Al Resalah* and *Al Karama*, I find that, throughout the twelve reports, it is the masculine perspective that is constant in presenting facts within the local cultural framework inside a masculine-dominated society. Men seem to be seen as legitimate news sources whilst the feminine perspective or voice is ignored. The word 'him' is frequent in the examined work, with 'her' virtually non-existent. The views of feminist authors describe this as hegemonic masculinity (MacKinnon, 2003; Beynon, 2002). This is very apparent in factional journalism, though not unusual, as war studies show (Janson, 1994; Newsinger, 1993). But we can establish a definite gender bias within this specific factional journalism, whether it is deliberate or just inherently subconscious in the culture/society under scrutiny. This remains an interesting question for further studies.

Examination of the *Al Karama* and *Al Resalah* reports shows that 'reporters don't necessarily make the news. Rather, their sources, organisations and other frameworks in which they operate to 'manufacture' news and thus invent reality' (Carruthers, 2000:17). The general accusatory tone of invective is similar in all articles, as are the startling factional differences in descriptions of the same events.

Bias in reporting is obvious, and transmitted through the sensationalist or 'hate media' approach. Framing headlines is perhaps sensational, by adding emotional impact to the narrative of both papers, i.e. *Al Resalah's* strict politically-driven discourse and *Al Karama's* religious-driven discourse, which will be elaborated upon later in this chapter. Idealistically, the factional text in both publications perhaps appears more like an invitation to engage more with one political party and delegitimise the other (Leuder et al 2004; Entman, 1993).

By the absence of other smaller factional parties in the discourse of the twelve reports, Fatah and Hamas have been able to narrow their media coverage focus to what suits their cause best, and what highlights the faults of the other party regarding scandal, financial corruption and the misuse of funds in governmental institutions. This may provide both with an opportunity to blame each other, utilising abusive terminology, for such topics as planning a coup, relying on foreign military aid in order to overthrow the other and abuse of funds. In both publications, both parties were vitriolic in their accusations of each other whilst providing little factual evidence to support their accusations, creating a public liability open to violence (Hall, 1997:25). Factional reporters' narratives can, instead of providing unbiased information, choose to repel questions to perhaps narrow the readers' understanding, reduce criticism and leave people more dependent on party discourse, where independent journalism prompts the reader to form their own critical opinions.

5.3 Religiously-Driven Discourses?

The importance of religious language has not emerged as expected. In the examined *Al Resalah* and *Al Karama* reports, media discourse rooted in religion is often used to affirm, through 'causal interpretations', and to present, through 'treatment recommendations' (Entman, 1993:52). Thus, a report of *Al Karama*, (2 February 2007:3) talks about corruption done in the name of prominent Muslim figures from the Islamic era like 'Omar Ibn Al Khattab', and uses religious symbols including the 'Quran', 'prophets' and 'companions' in discussion of corrupt practices of the Hamas–led government. Such interpretations themselves may be seen as 'corrupt', inciting certain 'treatment recommendations' (Entman, 1993), such as overthrowing Hamas. (Leuder et al 2004: 262). Another example from the same report reads, 'May God, help the owners of this company, which fell victim to the irresponsible practices based on fraud, scam and allowing what is, by religion, prohibited'. It may appear to be persuading the average reader that religious norms confirm that what Hamas is doing is not acceptable. The emphasis on words like 'Allah' and the use of religion aims to bind such familiar ideas with familiar cultural and religious symbols (Entman, 1993; Phalen and Elgan, 2001) that the average reader can easily relate to, perhaps providing a sense of urgency for action. In another report, though not among the selected ones for the study, in *Al Karama* (11March, 2007:6), the sub-heading reads: 'Expiation and Fatwas for Killing.' The report cites a proverb by Prophet Mohammed, to contradict the supposedly religious practices of Hamas. This may demonstrate that the examination of factional journalism is effective in analysing political party discourse.

Al Karama, which purports to represent the more secular party, appears to use the most conservative religious language and symbolism, possibly to recruit readership from the opposing party. A paradox which this study has opened up,

but was not able to explore, was why religious language seems more common in the reporting of Fatah's 'mouthpiece' *Al Karama* than in *Al Resalah*, the official 'mouthpiece' of an explicitly Islamic and religious party, Hamas. This is an interesting paradox that could be a focus for future research.

5.4 Concluding Thoughts

This chapter has built on the mainly textual analysis methods used in Chapter 4, and has attempted to show more consistently why the exclusion of marginalised groups may be a distinct feature of factional media discourses. The purpose of this chapter has been to allow for deeper reflection into how 'strong objectivity' and 'regimes of truth' relate in the reporting of the selected press media. In each case, views that favour the powerful and their end goals were found to assign all problems to an identified set of 'enemies', centred on the opposing faction or party. Marginalised, or underdog, groups had little chance to escape the influence of these factionalised power-knowledge-truth regimes, unless they had access to more independent sources of news, such as *Al Quds*, for example. Some brief conclusions follow in Chapter 6.

Chapter 6
Conclusion

This is a comparative study of two 'factional' forms of media production, *Al Resalah* and *Al Karama*, (Hamas and Fatah papers respectively). The study attempted to conceptualise and test factional coverage of twelve selected news reports in the run-up to the violent conflict between two factions in Palestine in 2007. A key finding of this research, from the view of standpoint epistemology, was that claims of professionalism, objectivity and respect for 'truth' are exaggerated, as shown by the absence of interviews of marginalised groups, who are caught in the middle. In all examined reports, unlike the selected samples of the more independent *Al Quds* daily, the more myopic the focus on the faction, and on beating the other party by any means, the less the focus on the ordinary readership and their daily sufferings. The narrower the factional focus becomes, the wider the division in the project of national unity grows. This suggests how effective factional journalism is, in understanding highly polarised conflict.

The conceptual part of the study starts with notions of factional journalism, which are contextualised within broader theoretical approaches to media 'framing', 'focalisation' and 'categorisation', all of which form part of the critical media approach used to explore the politics of representation. Throughout the first chapters, both the idea of objectivity and its relevance to factional journalism are problematised. Instead, the notion of 'strong objectivity' is made central and linked to standpoint epistemology as a more realistic analytical perspective through which to understand the factionalisation of the Palestinian media. Since objectivity and 'truth' are questionable, or even impossible to achieve without bias, a conflict of interests can be seen, in the commitment of journalists to uphold the professional and ethical standards of their profession. This proves difficult in a context where political factions and leaders set the tone and dictate the agenda of journalists and editors. On the other hand, even in such a context (or perhaps especially) this study suggests that journalists need to take their responsibilities to maintain professional standards and ethics seriously, and that includes reporting on the concerns of ordinary Palestinians, women and men alike.

The empirical part of the study examines the Fatah-Hamas factional conflict, placed in the context of Palestinian history and political developments, as well as internal strife. This research showed that the notion of factional journalism can be an effective tool in analysing discourses of the two respective factions. A close review of the dates of the selected reports suggests that only during March 2007 was there a ' relatively' peaceful period in reporting. This was the month of power-sharing under the Mecca agreement. This showed that both papers could adhere to the Palestinian code of conduct when required. What also emerges from the empirical part of the study is that at least one of the papers involved uses

language that is not so characteristically 'hate' language. These two findings help suggest that the Palestinian media is not as structurally factionalised as might have been feared before this study was conducted. Clearly media remains a vital tool in the wider political and power struggles between factions, but its reporting styles can be tailored and adapted to suit current 'enemies'.

What the study sought to illustrate, within a certain format, was the role that factional journalism can play when frames are selected in the news-making process and contribute to legitimising violence. The study tried to illustrate how meanings were conveyed, through the ways in which news stories were framed, focalised and categorised by journalists. Through the analysis carried out in Chapter 4, the text of the news reports were broken down and analysed. The selection of twelve articles helped to show how frames of reporting were determined by audiences' prior understanding, and could be expected to produce desired responses by manipulating readers. Journalists were shown to be composing their frames of news reporting to produce specific meanings and (predictable) reactions to events. What is absent from the story can, by its absence, represent an important aspect of the special frame that the text conveys, and this was illustrated in Chapter 4 in relation to articles around linked themes of corruption, financial reform and military aid. Factional animosity was found in the language and construction of printed news articles of both newspapers. The same factional animosity was apparent across the ministry websites of both sides, but these were not the focus of this study. Also out in the streets among the publics involved, factional divisions, involving verbosity rather than established or reliable facts, are apparent, but studying these was also not the focus. Similarly, websites of both newspapers studied strongly contributed to factionalising political divisions by using similar language. This opens a wide portal for future scholarly examination of a wider set of media materials from both sides.

For this reason, it would seem that there is a strong case for suggesting that the role of 'factional media' needs to be studied further. It could also be studied more systematically in relation to less factional forms of media, an example of which was *Al Quds,* used briefly in Chapter 4 for this purpose. It seems apparent that the Fatah-Hamas factional conflict spilling over into their respective media is doomed to keep national-unity negotiations deadlocked. It would be interesting to see to what extent the concept of factional journalism can help understand what takes place in relation to the role of the media in a wider Middle Eastern political-religious context. Understanding better the changing framings, categorisations and focalisation within news reporting, and within images and new Internet and satellite media, seems an important future research agenda, in relation to critical approaches to conflict studies.

Appendices

Appendix I

The following is the translation from Arabic language by the researcher.

Palestinian Journalist Syndicate
Code of Ethics

We hold as a belief, the role that national journalism has played across the stages of the struggle of the Palestinian people, in expressing their hopes and sharing in their pain and as a support to its great movement for national liberation and emancipation from all forms of exploitation and oppression. We consider the importance of journalism, in participating in the process, of national construction, and, its ability to deliver its eternal message, in protecting the domestic, national and civilization capabilities and achievements. This reflects the importance and gravity of the responsibility which journalism holds by being a true mirror for the views, hopes, pains and culture of the Palestinian society, as a tool of guidance, mobilization and leadership in serving the structure of the foundation principles and values which have been enshrined by the Palestinian people through the long struggle, in addition to the leading role of journalism on the cultural, media and development fronts. Departing from the fact that journalism should remain a strategic weapon in the hands of people and for the sake of the freedom of homeland and the citizens, as well as a fence that protects rights and private and public freedoms, through social solidarity which achieves journalistic freedom, and such freedom should be a natural sacred extension of the freedom of the people.

We the Palestinian Journalists declare the following:

Journalism does not only derive its conduct from its quality, but from the honour of the goal which the published word and image serves. Furthermore, the honour of commitment to journalistic work is not complete unless it is elected independent from all sources of custody, censorship, directing, containment and deviance. Thus, the independency of journalism in its role and from the perspective of social responsibility, for the sake of people under censorship, is only the first condition for noble and responsible journalism.

Apart from this perception and loyalty of journalists, to the blood of the noble martyrs, the sacrifices of our people and their aspirations for a shining future, all must meet their responsibilities which hold the journalist in his apparent

behaviour, and practice of the principles of code of conduct, honesty, transparency, creditability, ethics and traditions of the profession.

We undertake and declare:

1. Our complete commitment by general Palestinian laws, including the documented Declaration of Independence, issued in 1988 in Algeria, the Palestinian Publications and Publishing Law, international norms and charters which rely on the structure of principles accumulated from the active participation to intellectual development and cultural heritage of the Palestinian people.

2. To defend the freedom of press as emphasis on the right of public to be aware of facts and express their views freely, guided by the principle, that the right to knowledge is a basic human right.

3. Complete commitment to obtaining information and facts through legal ways, and to transfer them to the public with creditability and honesty in order to protect journalism from any type of deviation from the code of conduct and from harming national interests.

4. To avoid publishing unreliable information or distorting reliable information, or attributing statements of practices to a person or a group without verifying its source.

5. Complete commitment to support judicial justice, independency and sovereignty in publishing information on open investigations, ongoing trials, and not to takes sides against accused persons in a criminal prosecution, or litigants in civil prosecutions holding no prejudice toward the right of the press to cover events from the public view.

6. To commit to not publishing names, or photographs, of accused people, or those brought to trial, for the sake of their privacy, their future and to facilitate their reformation and return to their community.

7. To avoid publishing any news, or images, which contradict the morals of the Palestinian people.

8. To not abuse the profession by illegally obtaining personal privileges of any type, whether material or moral.

9. To commit to publishing the correction of news that has been previously published, without violating the rights of the journalist.

10. To completely commit to objectivity in all that we write and publish, and specifically remain objective in any criticism related to public figures.

11. To completely commit that all published advertisements are in accordance to the general principles and values of the society and the message of the media, and is consistent with this code of ethics document.

12. To professionally and morally commit to separate journalism work from advertisement and we undertake our commitment not to dedicate our work in favor of advertisements.

13. To commit, when publishing advertisements of foreign bodies, to making sure that they are in accordance with the national interests, regardless of the advertisements, or for direct or indirect aid from donor countries and organizations.

14. To differentiate between editorial journalism material, and local or foreign advertisements, with the intention to protect the reader from misleading description.

15. To limit and organize publishing advertisements in newspapers and the mass media in which we are working, in accordance with the needs and circumstances of the Palestinian society, which is struggling for national liberation. And to end economic exploitation and monopolism, regardless of its source.

16. To completely commit to respecting the copyright of authors and writers of work we publish and to be aware that when we quote other sources, we must refer to those sources.

17. To completely commit to journalistic integrity and to maintain the privacy of the profession by rejecting any type of pressure to abort it. Alongside the special secrets of every journalist is the core of secrets of the profession. Revealing such secrets is not permitted, because they are protected by the rule of law.

18. To comply by not making any statements or practicing any acts which may prejudice to the status of the journalist within the organization for which he is working; including professional, functional or living conditions, with the exception of cases violating the law or which conflict with this code of ethics document.

19. To completely commit not to deal or work for any journalistic or media organization that has illegally fired a journalist , before guaranteeing his full rights in accordance with the written document by the syndicate of

journalists, as a frame reference to the freedom ,dignity and rights of journalists and members.

20. To respect private freedoms and not take photographs or record people without their permission, in case that should conflict with the public interest, unless in the following fields such as revealing crimes against, or damages to public health, or threats to national and regional security.

21. To recognize the right of the journalist to express views, regardless of the difference in intellectual and political interpretations, as long as this expression is in accordance with the law and national interests.

22. To completely commit to laying out all available facts, information and data to the public, to emphasis the right of the masses to know fact and be aware of it.

23. Not to publish the name, photographs, or personal details on mentally ill or drug/ alcohol addicts or those who donate their body parts, without their agreement or the permission of their families, unless there is general interest in publishing and in an appropriate form.

24. To completely commit not to publish anything, which might cause incitement, encourage discrimination based on race, origin, color of skin, religion, sex, profession, physical and physiological disability. These topics are not to be mentioned, unless objectively related to the published topic.

25. To completely commit that journalists should not work in additional professions, which might distort the message of journalism, create fear or appear to the public as a conflict of interests, or exploitation of interests and description of the public.

26. Not to publish news reports, or articles from any form of media, which is already in the name of a journalist, or deliberately change the content without the prior permission from the journalist.

27. Journalists who are proved to be violating the code of ethics of journalism should be fired from their work as well revoking the journalists' membership of the syndicate.

28. To completely commit to solving problems and professional arguments occurring between journalists themselves, through the council of the syndicate or any other party that the syndicate authorizes to solve that problem.

29. In cases of personal sadness or trauma, those journalists should not take an assignment of asking questions in a type of manner lacking tact, consideration, empathy or without consideration for feelings.

30. To completely commit to not conduct interviews, or take photographs of children in topics related to physiological effects which might reflect negatively on the child, or other children, especially in cases of humiliation, or sexual crimes. In all cases, if they are victims, defendant or eyewitnesses.

31. Not to abuse the position of journalist directly or indirectly to gain personal benefits contradictory to the ethics of the profession.

32. To completely commit to not abusing, or misleading, trainee journalists into doing any work outside of the framework of the profession and to provide them with appropriate training in accordance with the rules of the profession, and to offer them compensations for the work they do.

33. To completely commit to not provide foreign press and media organizations with any information, or journalistic material, whether oral, written or video-taped, this could harm national security, or national characters.

34. Priority of work and cooperation should be given to Palestinian journalists and Palestinian press and media organizations in conducting any work or service in the field of the profession.

35. To completely commit to be in solidarity and empathy with colleagues for the sake of protecting and maintaining the dignity of the journalist and the ethics of the profession according to the needs and as the Syndicate see fit.

36. To completely commit to using Palestinian and Arabic idioms and vocabularies for historical, cultural, geographic and political names in journalistic work in the manner it serves the national and regional interests.

37. To deal with all Arab journalists within the same professional and functional criteria and measures as dealing with Palestinian journalists.

We the Palestinian journalists swear by Almighty Allah to be the most loyal trustees, in our absolute and complete commitment to all the articles in this code of journalistic ethics on the basis of national and domestic responsibility, and in accordance with the principles of respect and fair competition for the sake of general interest, and to adhere to the Arab media code of ethics, Arab solidarity code of conduct, and the code of conduct of the Union of Arab Journalists. On the basis of what we have declared, God is our witness.

Appendix II:

The transcript parts of the following are translated pieces published on Al Karama and Al Resalah from Arabic language by the researcher. It should be noted that for the sake of accuracy, the translations have been kept as close to the literal Arabic text as possible. The dense expressions can reflect what is found in the original text.

Al Resalah: Page 11

Date: 22 January 2007

Abbas's Officer Expenses Has Reached Approximately 96 million Shekels

Those Who Planned the Coup Are Attacking the Government to Defend Their Financial Corruption.

Al Resalah/ Fayez Ayyoub Al Sheikh.

The coup stream the Fatah movement is back to trying to heat up the Palestinian arena through many reckless accusations against the Palestinian government, especially concerning finances. It has described it as failure, unable to take responsibility and abusing funds for factional interests, while at the same time the Palestinian government is trying to bring as many donations and other monies, as much as possible, from Arabic and Islamic countries, in order to alleviate the difficult economic and living conditions that the Palestinian people have been enduring due to the siege imposed on them, in which this coup stream is taking part [in the siege] along with the Zionist American fronts.

As usual, the most visible statements, came from Mohammed Dahalan, who's accused of leading the coup stream in his interview with the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), when he accused the government of attempting to carry out a coup against the Palestinian political system and it represents failure, claiming that the donation money which comes to the [Palestinian] Authority and the Palestinian people goes discreetly to the treasury of Hamas, according to his claims. In response to such strong statements, Dr. Salah al- Badrawil, spokesman of the 'Change and Reform' Parliamentary Group emphasized that all practices and statements coming from Mohammed Dahalan and his coup stream aim to make this government incapable, that the election which got Hamas into governance was a dubious election, and that the people have to change their choice. He says: they are going the easy way for a coup; this way is based on inciting the Palestinian population to carry a coup against its choice. He states that

he is not surprised by such statements coming from him [Dahalan], or any other spokesmen who fill their pockets from his [Dahalan] budget.

Concerning the claims of Dahalan that the donation money coming to the Palestinian Authority goes discreetly to the budget of Hamas, al- Bardawil replies that: this is part of the self-projection which Dahalan and others like him are suffering from, because it's known that Dahalan has amassed a large wealth using this method. Therefore, the easiest way to attack others is the self-projection, as he does, adding, that a large amount of money which they collected in the past, and still collect, goes to personal wealth in order to fund "gangs" in order to build a force around each leader. Thus, he is attempting to export this work or this style of Hamas movement.

One Hundred Million… Conditionally

The Zionist Occupation Government transferred one hundred million US dollars to the President of The Palestinian Authority, under Mahmoud Abbas; tax revenues which go back to the Palestinian Authority, ended with the occupation authorities after Hamas won the Palestinian elections. This transfer [of payment] comes according to the agreement which The Zionist Prime Minister Ehud Barak reached with the President of The Palestinian Authority in the meeting held between both of them a few weeks ago in the house of Olmert in Occupied Jerusalem.

Scheme to Enhance Abbas's Power.

The office of the president of the Occupation Government announced the transfer of one hundred million dollars, revealing that this transfer is to support the forces of Mahmoud Abbas, in addition to cover what he calls humanitarian needs, with the condition that the money be transferred after Palestinians give a guarantee to him that this money will not go to the elected Palestinian government.

Furthermore, the Occupation's Government has conditionally allocated the use of the money transferred to the head of the [Palestinian] Authority only to two fields. That is to strengthening the power of the Presidential Guard of Abbas, and to fund needs specified by the office of the president of The Palestinian Authority. Also the occupation's government has banned the use of this money to pay wages, to be used only for the activities of security forces that come under the direct control of Abbas; this is with the hope of enhancing the coup stream against the Palestinian government. Such Zionist conditions correspond with the plan put by American General Dayton, which was adopted by the American Administration, calling for enhancing the power of the President of the Palestinian Authority, Mahmoud Abbas, encouraging him to carry out clashes against the Palestinian government and Hamas movement. Meanwhile, the Zionist Prime Minister

promised The State Secretary, "Condoleezza Rice" on her last visit, that he will work to implement his promises to Abbas, among them to transfer the money to the presidency of the [Palestinian] Authority.

Presidential Expenses is 96 Million.

This comes at a time when informed Palestinian sources reveal that the expenses of the office of President Mahmoud Abbas have reached around 96 million shekel. This exceeds the amount of total expenses for several of the ministries combined, indicating that such expenses are not subject to any financial or administrative mentoring from the Ministry of Finance, in a time when the Palestinian people are living under siege for the past 9 months continuously.

The sources have confirmed that the expenses of the president's office is equal to 2 million dollars per month, criticizing the case of a singular approach of the presidential office in a time where there is no monitoring of revenues or expenses, according to specifications of the law. The sources have censured the singularity of the Palestinian Liberation Organization [PLO] and Presidency for withholding information on the extent of its revenues, and indicated that the Palestinian government and Ministry of Finance has no information on that, and it asked the sources to put an end to this and follow the administrative and financial policies. Also, to reduce the expenses of the president's office, Palestinian Liberation Organization and The Higher Council for Media to equal that of the expense amounts of several other ministries.

Through Rafah Border Crossing

Sources: Weapons and Military Aid Arrived to Dahalan and The Presidential Guards

Rafah—The Palestinian Center for Media

Palestinian security sources have confirmed that trucks loaded with weapons, military aid and ambulances are getting ready to discretely enter during the next two days in the evening, entering the Gaza Strip through the Rafah border crossing (between Egypt and Gaza Strip).

The sources say that many trucks loaded with caravans, ambulances and boxes are waiting on the Egyptian side of the Rafah crossing border, which is under the guard-control or Presidential Guard [of President Abbas], and is ready to enter Gaza, [the same sources] have mentioned that ambulances have been used in transporting boxes of weapons through the crossing since the start of the current month, among them heavy armaments.

The sources have added that other trucks have made it through the crossing, and other [crossings], into Gaza Strip, and they are stacked with weapons and ammunition, which had been loaded at Ansar and Preventive Security, which are under the command of chairman of the [Palestinian] Authority, Mamboed Abbas. As RPG's [Rocket Propelled Grenade] were distributed among several groups of those who are known as coup-stream from "Fatah" movement to reinforce their existence forcefully in the Palestinian land.

The same security sources have emphasized that the support comes directly from Mohammed Dahlan [US ally], who is being indicated as one of the top leaders of the coup-stream and presidential guards, with the aim to strengthen their armament in the face the Islamic Resistance Movement of "Hamas" and the Executive Force of The Ministry of Interior, as decisions have been made to target any member of Al Qassam Brigades or The Executive [Force].

One of Fatah's leaders has revealed to a Zionist newspaper, that Mohammed Dahlan has established an army of his own, consisting of 12,000 members, aiming to enhance his stream in confronting the Palestinian government lead by the Islamic Movement of 'Hamas'.

According to the same leader, who gave statements to 'Yedioth Ahronoth' newspaper, it was stated that such armies will be funded from European donations through the office of President Mahmoud Abbas, as the United States will secure the necessary equipment through light weapons, vehicles, bulletproof vests, telecommunication devices and others.

The leader in "Fatah" said: "we are currently examining each individual candidate for the new forces", indicating that even if, "the candidate has a brother who supports the Hamas movement, he won't be accepted in these forces". He claimed that new jeeps and other vehicles will arrive from Egypt to Gaza in the days to come.

The newspaper mentioned from who it described as 'the men of Mohammed Dahlan' that the intention is that the new force will gather all the militias of Fatah to be under the control of the new leadership. [The paper] added, according to Zionist-political sources that Israel will allow the aid to come through to Dahlan's new army. Along the same lines, the militants who are affiliated with the coup stream, have carried out a series of murder operations and assassinations against leaders and members of the Islamic Movement of "Hamas" and it's military wing Al Qassam Brigades, in the past days, in addition to committing a massacre at Al Hedayah mosque in Gaza Strip.

This new move comes as implementation of the American scheme, which was revealed lately by British intelligence officer Alistair Crooke that William [Elliott] Abrams, advisor of American National-Security is administrating such a scheme, which aims to collapse the Palestinian government, which is lead by The Islamic Movement of "Hamas", leading to an igniting of civil war.

Corruption In The Treasury House of Muslims.

The Government of "It's for Allah" Repays its Debts from The Money of Confiscated Cigarettes.

Since the nomination of the Hamas movement and its rise to power, even hearing prior to that, a lot about change and reform, and the time of Ibn Al Khattab, God Bless Him, and the government that governs by the Quran, thus, the Islamic movement paid lip service that it is betting on "rational government" of piety, working for Allah and the Quran. But that it quickly disappears when dark secrets are revealed in many corridors of the ministries, such as the ministry of health, ministry of interior—and who knows where, and who else within the promoted hierarchy, which we expect to see at a higher level of rationalization. But its amplification has increased, and therefore, the talks will be longer and longer. But here we only talk about the incidents of corruption and this time it's about the Ministry of Finance and its 'hero' the Deputy Minister and Director of his office, besides other "compressors".

The unveiling is a coincidence.

It was a coincidence when noises were heard in the building of the Ministry of Finance, in the compound of ministries, located east of The Islamic University in Gaza City, and when security members arrived to check what was going on, it was revealed that there are three owners of famous companies in Gaza City, who are importing electric equipment to the ministries of the [Palestinian] National Authority, and after noises were heard those mentioned above were approached by security members who attempted to open a number of sealed-boxes. It was found that the boxes contained Egyptian made "Cleopatra" cigarettes.

Scam and Fraud.

Following some verbal altercations, the security members found out what was inside the boxes after the Minister and Deputy Minister refused to see them, about the boxes of "Cleopatra" cigarettes. When the truth was revealed it was labelled cheating, procrastination, scam and fraud, and the story summarized that the importing company involved, recently delivered electronic equipment and devices to the Ministry of Finance worth (14.5 million Shekels), and (10 million Shekels)which was refunded. The remaining short-term debt is (4.5 Shekels). And when the company repeatedly demanded the required debt of the Ministry of

Finance, it gets only procrastination and avoidance from the [ministry] of Finance. After considerable efforts the issue reached the level of expected solution from the ministry.

Exchange Deal of Forbidden vs. permissible.

The Ministry offered the company a solution to obtain the remaining debt and the solution was summarized by the company taking huge amounts of cigarettes, considered "forbidden" instead of taking the money. This became evident, as the company was forced to accept after trying all other attempts to get their money owed, but the faith of this company has been faced by the cheating of "The Treasury House of Muslim", as the contract and the signed documents appeared to be legitimate. Though this is the right of the ministry, but the bidding concerned the real cost of American made "Marlboro" cigarettes, in the oral agreement at (6.5 shekels), but in the contract was (9 shekels) to ensure the additional cost on the company. Eventually, the bidding was given to the same company, which got large quantities of cigarettes which were supposed to be opened and officially destroyed previously, during the last government, according to the representatives of Ministry of Interior, Attorney General, Taxes Authorities and Police, instead of being sold to the public. But 'cigarettes' have become permitted during the time of our divine government.

Legal Fraud?

Readers might be confused by the idea of such as a thing as legal fraud? And here we say yes there is, because it happens when one of the parties in the agreement is ignorant of the provisions of certain laws, or puts, unknowingly, his absolute trust in the wrong hands. That is considered fraud committed innocently, that is legal and practical. This is what happened when the company was not offered a sample of the cigarettes before signing a contract, and the ministry did not adhere to the verbally agreed price. Here the saying "the law does not protect fools" comes true. Thus, the Ministry of Finance of Hamas has practiced fraud on this company, which gave it absolute trust, and the case is still pending, without any resolutions. Now there are talks that the company went to the Attorney General to find a way out for this plight, but we will repeat again the saying "the law does not protect fools". May God, help the owners of this company which fell victim to the irresponsible practices based on fraud, scam and allowing what is, by religion, prohibited.

Report 4:

Al Karama : Page 6
Date: 22 April 2007

"Hamas's Executive" [Force] Is Getting Ready for More Violent Clashes..??

Al Karama—a reliable informed source from "Executive Force of Hamas" has revealed that the Force has started to train its members, who are supposed to support the Palestinian Police, as the former Minister of Interior Said Siam has said, though this Force according to experiment lacks the minimum understanding of police studies, and the evidence is what the citizens hear and see around the clock starting from unlawful kidnapping, by-passing the laws of The Force by opening fire on feet as well as direct shooting, and training in the use of grenades, explosives and live ammunition, which became apparent through the numbers of badly-wounded cases during the training of the members of this militia, where it ended lately with a number of casualties in the location of The Force at Al Zahra bark, which is located east of Al Nussirat camp, in the middle of The Gaza Strip. This location was taken aggressively by the Force, by taking the land, wood and playground equipment(seesaws) of children inside it as military cover, apparatus for training. A "Yassin" explosive device directly wounded three of the members of The Force by mistake. The increase of numbers of killed and wounded opens up questions on the purpose behind such training with missiles, grenades and live ammunition?

Getting Ready for Maybe the Next Stage

According to observers such training has no explanations but one and that is to get ready for the clashes, expected and prepared for, by the bloody stream inside Hamas movements. Especially those who are against Mecca agreement which clearly caused a split inside the lines of the movement, and its landmarks, leaving little interpretation, through the statements of Minister of Foreign Affairs at the former Hamas government, Dr. Al Zahar, while giving confidence for the coalition Palestinian government. Such theory can be enhanced through the last extreme criticisms about forming a Regional Security Council, and that there should be a clear study on how to form such a council, especially under the current circumstances within the Palestinian Arab territories. As Al Zahar "the medical doctor" military expert stated, it's supposed to be national security council, because the regional security council talks about regionalism, and our regionalism is Arab regionalism and not Palestinian. Therefore, the name needs to be revised. Now we are asking Dr. Al Zahar, where is the Arab depth that you have been talking about when the siege started?!

Al Zahar clarified that the members of the Security Council [should be] characters of government and not affiliated to [political] factions, and such characters should have a relationship with the government and the [Palestinian] Authority. Therefore, the minister of interior, or minister of foreign affairs and the prime minister should appoint who appropriately fits the position. Although, those that Al Zahar mentioned are not people with experience in the field of security "but the detestable factionalism".

The Participation of Executive [Force] in The Council

As for the participation of the Executive Force in the Council, he answered: The Executive Force is an executive instrument, and only those in charge, Minister of Defense, Adviser of National Security, and specific ministers would take part in it, but specific sectors of security and executive departments are excluded. As for his refusal to take part in the council, Al Zahar said that he is not a governmental official and he is a member of parliament, therefore, he can't fix a fault by replacing it with another fault. Though the fault which is ongoing from statelessness and the use of weapons has increased by Al Zahar, as he is a member of the bloody stream by forming what supposedly supports Hamas and its Government Force, under fake names and slogans. The members of these militia can quickly turn from the lines of the Force into the lines of Al Qassam [Hamas military wing], by just switching the logo to one of the Brigades on his shoulder, so where is the security of the citizen? Where is the commitment for the homeland and the law? Such behaviour reveals the lies behind Al Zahar's allegations and others who are attempting to give legitimacy to such factional militia which operates on very narrow factional agendas.

Removing the Factionalism Protection.

Removing the factionalism protection was one of the positive aspects of the Mecca Agreement, though Hamas has accused others of not committing to such an agreement. The Palestinian people are fully aware of the tricks of such an extremist stream, which is giving full protection for killers, such as when officer of Preventive Security Orfah Nawfal was kidnapped and killed. A well as scores of members of Fatah who were kidnapped, and the killing of Rami Srour, one of the bodyguard of Sameh Al Madhoun in the north of Gaza who was killed by a sniper and RBG. In addition to that, Hamas has declined to take responsibility for the killing of a Preventive [Security] officer inside the sanctuary of Nasser hospital and it denies the killing of Preventive [Security] officer Mohammed Shadah and Hesham Faraj Kaware'a as revenge for the killing of both Bassam Al Farra and Mohammed Al Ghalban who were responsible for the killing of his [Kaware'a] brother on the night of the feast, and many others too numerous to mention here. Hamas in these cases has granted factional protection to the killers. On the governmental level, Minister of Interior, Hani Al Qawasmi has taken part in this by smuggling one of those accused of the murder of the head of Intelligence, in

the North of Gaza provenances Mohammed Al Mosah. Finally, a question that is unavoidable in itself, where will their "Executive" Force lead the Palestinian public on the street? Surely the answer is present in the minds of each Palestinian, especially those who became an orphan because of such a repugnant force.

The First Scam Operation of Its Type in Palestine And The Embroilment of a Businessman in It.

Nablus—Our Correspondent

While the Palestinian government is working on implementing the security plan which aims at imposing law and implementing order in the territories of the Palestinian Authority, still hands spread corruption and the latest was a fraud operation by the Palestinian businessman from Nablus, Rashid Al Bazari.

The incident of Rashid Al Bazari is considered to be the first of its type in Palestine, especially, it has revealed, the corrupted financial capitals in this country, and showed how investors with Rashid Al Bazari have stolen money, by using riots and bullies, from the citizens, on the pretext that they are wanted [by Israeli security] or else.

Citizens in the city of Nablus have spread several names of people who used to invest their monies which were alleged stolen by Rashid Al Bazari. Sources have confirmed that Rashid could not commit such acts without the support of corrupt senior officials in the Palestinian Authority. All fingers of accusation are directed toward the alleged Abdelelah Al Atriah, who used to work as director general in the Ministry of Interior in Nablus as well as others in a corrupt coterie who fled abroad after the arrest of Rashid, among them are some who resident in Jordan.

Citizens have expressed their satisfaction at the revealing of the money scam, fraud and then the arrest of alleged Rashid. Some people began to sing a song composed in 'honour' of alleged criminal Rashid, saying "Rashid is being coddled on the shore of the water", while others have found jokes to express their extreme happiness at his arrest.

Rashid used confusing methods in committing the fraudulent scam on citizens. One was by obtaining 200 cheque books, equivalent to 6 thousand Shekels from International Bank of Palestine, whose director was later fired. [Rashid] used to buy and sell with these cheques, scores of times.

Rashid and his wife also hold American nationality, and his wife travelled to America carrying all the cash, stated informed sources. Rashid was arrested while travelling over the King Hussein Bridge.

In another report, citizens of Sailat Al Daher village, south of Jenin found the dead body of Izzat Rashid Hassan Al Bazari, (55 years old) and citizen from Bazarya village, north of Nablus. Citizens says that the murdered Izzar was a school teacher, and was kidnapped by militants nearly a week ago, following the scam, fraud and blackmailing incident carried out by his son Rashid.

The Palestinian Intelligence Department has accused the citizen Rashid, who is a Palestinian businessman, of fraud on Palestinians in general and Nablus people specifically. The Palestinian Intelligence Department is currently holding him for investigation of alleged money crimes.

Palestinian Territories have witnessed several cases of scam, fraud and forgery with the participation of members of security forces in some cases, abusing their legal position to takeover the lands of some immigrating citizens, similar to what happened in Bethlehem, south of West Bank. Last week, the Bethlehem court witnessed several stealing documents and the files of issues that the court is waiting to hear concerning disclaimer property of lands. As on this issue, Salah Al Tamarri, governor of Bethlehem, in a his statement, has refused to give details to preserve the process of investigation, indicating that a few employees in the court are being held and other individuals not working in the court have also been arrested on the case.

Concerning the burglary of the court and stolen files of some cases pending elimination, Al Tamarri said in press statements: the court has not been broken in to, but has been opened to steal such files. Al Tamarri has clarified that there are interventions to stop investigating this case, which started some weeks ago when information came out that special files concerning property of land disappeared from the court. [Al Tamarri] has emphasized on the failure of such interventions to stop the investigation, insisting that investigation should continue to reveal the real embroiled, regardless of their prerogative.

Al Tamarri has revealed that Bethlehem governorate has witnessed fraud in land property since 15 years ago, especially the land that is owned by immigrants, residents of the city. He indicated that fraud processes which are taking place in the governorate occur through several means. Among them is where a citizen falsified agency for land property of those citizens living abroad, he brought a partner along with him to take over this land, and then filed a court case on the second partner to get him outside of the land by the law, introducing the false agency in this case to represent and verify the disputed propriety of the land, and then obtain a court decision that the land is his own, then he would officially register it in the official departments, in accordance with the decision of the court.

Al Tamarri has indicated that the problem of land and property in Bethlehem goes back to citizens not registering all their land space in Tabu [land authority] during the Turkish control era, in order to avoid paying taxes at that time. As for now when it comes to invocation in the Tabu [land authority], it reveals that such land

which is 10 dunms are registered as one dunme for example. As for the continuation of fraud and falsification processes, the Palestinian General Investigation [Department] announced arresting a network of fraud which falsified Tabu [land authority] documents in Al Sheikh Radwan in Gaza City.

Al Resalah Turns a Blind Eye on the Issue of Suicider.
(Maher Abu Daiah)

The Case of (Rashid Al Bazari) is the Second of its Kind and is Not the First!

Al Resalah newspaper, which speaks on behalf of the Movement (Hamas) addressed in issue no. (489) dated (23 \ 4 \ 2007) Page (11), a narrow side from the issue of the detainee (Rashid Izzat Al Bazari) and was based under the title: (Fraud Operation and The First of Its Type in Palestine), according to it's correspondent in Nablus wrote: " The incident of Rashid Al Bazari is considered to be the first of it's type in Palestine, especially, it has revealed the corrupted financial heads in this country..."? Yes! This is what it said literally?

We agree with the paper in the fact that the issue is this operation is a (scam), and we add information to those who do not know that this might be a type of (placing hats, or blaming), whereas those who commit such scam, thieves and crooks themselves, indebted in purchasing goods and selling them for less than the normal price to facilitate the scam and fraud, and this is what happened with Al Bazari and his partners. But we disagree with the opinion that it's the "first scam of its first type in Palestine" as claimed by those turning a blind eye on reality. The newspaper (Al Karama) was the only paper to mention in five news articles dissemination of details of the case of the citizens who committed suicide (Maher Adeeb Mustapha Abu Dayah) from Tulkarem governorate, and the case of the fraud related to the man who committed suicide (Abu Dayah) was the first and largest of its kind in Palestine and, yes, it is not of type (placing hats) as with the issue of Al Bazari, but it's of a type more sinister, more dangerous and more harmful, and that is (money laundering),by individuals, companies and members affiliated with the (committees Zakat) and (Hamas), in the scandal of looting money from innocent citizens, under the pretext of the sale and purchase of (olive oil) and other types of goods. On the basis of the investigation files, of the case, to the prosecutor general (808 \ 2005), it shows that our people have never heard or seen such a thing before, not only in terms of the magnitude of stolen amounts, worth hundreds of millions! But also, in terms of diversity and the multiplicity of ways twisted devil-like and shameful, which have been carried out, and those methods are of (looting), (scam), (fraud), (dishonesty), (defrauding), (lies), (deception), (mockery) and (cheating). There are real indicators that derived from the investigation files which demonstrate the occurrence of such scandal-leaning, the process of looting and the shameful scam (in the name of religion)! The reason: to achieve exactly the class purely and objectives of the narrow factional

party and the result: the looting and destruction of our national economy, especially the economy of the provinces of the northern West Bank, where the Tulkarem district is most affected, including a large number of victims targeted, which resulted in the destruction of homes, lives and jobs of hundreds, perhaps thousands of Palestinian families, as well as looting and pillaging of the capital of companies and national factories and shops.

In addition to the savings of the elderly, orphans and widows of the martyrs [those who killed in the war by Israel] , the destruction of our social fabric, and planting the seeds of discord and enmity and hatred between members of the community and one family.

And the method: the use of the local Palestinian capital in order to kill innocent Palestinians, especially children, as well as bombing private and public properties, by the hands of the so-called (Executive Force) [Hamas police Force], which is outside the customs and law, and which might have been established with the looted money from a group of organization and companies such as (the Near East for Trade and Industry) - (Anabtawi) – Nablus, which planned a conspiracy to loot and destroy our national economy, and which has used and hired a gang of criminals who flout, in our faces, the security of our economy, lead by its agents and representative the (Scapegoat), the one who was mentioned to have committed suicide, and those who are like him, from collaborators, and jealous conspirators, in order to loot the local capital and to smuggle it to known sources, for known reasons, through the companies mentioned above, in return for getting deferred checks, which were returned due to no funds available in the account of the person who committed suicide, as these checks are still in the hands of the affected victims.

This heinous crime is not limited only to this, but it has been extended into attempting to cover up their crime and conceal the evidence of the crime, in order to mislead justice and alienate the rights of citizens, as well as attempting to shrink and evade from responsibility, by placing accusations of (usury) and (greed) and (cupidity) falsely. And all this comes through the lying mouths and voices, which stand in corners, in the pulpits of the mosques, in order to deliberately mislead public opinion, and with premeditation tarnish the image and reputation of the innocent victims, in a desperate attempt to deny the embodiment of individuals and committees of Zakat, who are all known to be allied to the movement (Hamas). This is in order to create an image for the movement similar to pregnancy depositary which is far away from dirtiness. The light of the truth does not hide for the viewers. As the people of the provinces, that have been looted, are still asking: weren't the members affiliated to the movement [Hamas] which prayed for, and buried the body of the one who committed suicide? Didn't they open his mourning house at Al Aqsa—Hamas' affiliated school for three days? Wasn't it that the attendance of the leaders and representative members of the movement and the trustees of the Zakat committees who were more in numbers than the usual number of the senior leader martyrs of the movement? Wasn't the affected

one belonging to them? Didn't the committee of the Zakat in Tulkarem pledge to pay all expenses according to the father (Mustapha Abu Al Deen Abu Dayah) of the one who committed suicide? Didn't the same members of the movement name him (the astute martyr)? And many other questions which raise suspicion in the soul.

As for what the newspaper [Al Resalah] has named (corrupted capital) in the case of Al Bazari, there is no secret that this dangerous statement is (general talk and offensive), because it puts all victims affected by the case of (Al Bazari) in the same mold, even if it's applicable to some of them, but certainly does not apply to all of them. And for justice and equality we say it would have been worth it for a newspaper speaking on behalf of (Reform and Change) to recognize that most of the victims of Al Bazari, are car dealers, owners of companies, exhibitions, businessmen and investors, as well as ordinary owners of capital, not linked to the gangs that stole the money of the citizens, and they are not wanted [by Israel]. Therefore, they have gained their money and livelihood through legitimate means and any claims contrary to are like wooding in the total darkness, and it would have been better for a newspaper that claims to adhere to religion, to seek the truth, accuracy and honesty in transforming the reality, before haphazardly accusing to the majority of the victims, who are in need of someone to stand by them, on the side of the good and righteous people, and who can help in healing and alleviating their suffering. In addition to [helping] look for ways to retrieve their money, they would not need one who would pour oil on the fire, to heal from their plight, by waving through words, hints and falsely accusing them of being among those who own corrupted money.

As far as the papers are concerned and what has been said about the satisfaction of the citizens in Nablus following the arrest of the named (Rashid) and the detection of fraud and scam (the second), and not the first of it's type in Gaza, and trying to promote, as the newspaper said, that citizens have composed a song in the honour of Rashid "Rashid is being coddled on the shore of the water', and some who found jokes to express their extreme happiness..?… Yes! This is what the literal text says.

We say : It is really sad and unfortunate, to be a newspaper of reform and change, that glorifies, encourages and commends the manifestations of happiness and joy, by the accordance of a second national economic disaster? It was supposed to ignore such naïve spontaneous manifestations and absolutely not deal with it; this is if these features have got really as wide as the paper so deluded? It's not correct from a moral perspective, not in any other way, to deal with the misfortunes of others in these using such flawed and irresponsible methods and practices! But no surprise, as the fraud and scam which cause destruction of homes and the loss of long years of hard work, in a time of social reform, is a catalyst for satisfaction as transpires from the words of the newspaper? Then, is it so that looting which results in the killing of innocent civilians, and generations educator, who all the

city people attests to his chastity and probity, and he is the father of (Rashid Al Bazari), is that appropriate place of ridicule and jokes and silly songs? Is this national disaster an appropriate station for fun and disregard for the wealth and lives of people in this shameful way? If this is the case, why is he being glorified and published?

Regarding the claims by the newspaper that Al Bazari was supported by "senior corrupted men in the Palestinian Authority, and one of them is an official in the Ministry of Interior"? We say: The Palestinian Authority since the success of (Hamas) movement in the late legislative council elections and still under the leadership of the current Prime Minister and the entire Ministry of Interior, since the days of Al Barazi, and until the moment he was arrested by the General Palestinian Intelligence was all still in the hands of the (Hamas) government! As if the purpose of these charges is to distort the image of (Fatah) movement, due to the embodiment of some of its members in the case of Al Bazari, then we say: (Fatah) movement is innocent of any person or personal violations that violate the sanctity and property of citizens. Regardless of their position, [Fatah] says there is no one above the law and [we] will not hesitate to hold those who have made mistakes in their responsibility accountable, and call for those who violate to be held accountable for their action, and shall be treated as deserved. But we in return expect the newspaper (Al Resalah) to announce that (Hamas) movement is innocent of any person or personality that violated the sanctity and property of people, as the case of the man who committed suicide (Maher Abu Dayah), regardless of their organization structure. We also expect the individuals involved to be held responsible for their shameful actions and to be brought to justice to get the punishment they deserve.

Will the paper accept such an ethical procedure and stand by the affected victims? And do we expect after consultancy, the council of the paper to finally meet to take the appropriate decisions to support or adopt their just demands? Also, to urge officials to expedite the return of citizen rights and money seized, as well as hold the criminals accountable?

If the discourses and factional Ikhwani [Muslim Brotherhood] propaganda continues to play by repeating the aiming slogans, and propaganda such as (corruption in the Authority) and (we are the solution), we have the right to ask and say: why the newspaper, instead of trapping themselves in a box full of slogans of accusation, doesn't demand officials arrest the criminals claimed to be supporting Al Bazari or others? And why not call to bring them to justice to receive the punishment they deserve, regardless of their political or organizational affiliation? But if the goal is just to turn a blind eye on the reality as in the case of the man who committed suicide (Abu Dayah),while his case is currently under investigation with the general prosecutor—(Anti-corruption department), this raises many questions on the press professionalism of the newspaper which speaks on behalf of (Hamas), concerning its role in this current case and its intention toward the affected victims, and their usurped rights, and makes it incumbent on those who stole to give back to the owners one way or another! The authorities

who are accused of corruption, according to the paper, are the ones who are trying to retrieve usurped rights to their oppressed owners in both the first and the second cases, and now it's [The Authority] which is involved in chasing those embroiled and the criminals who escaped, by delivering them to international police to be handed in to justice!

At the same time as the newspaper accuses senior men (in the Palestinian Authority) of helping Al Bazari, they did not deny the success of (General Intelligence Department) which was the backbone and the core of the Authority, in arresting and investigating Rashid Al Bazari, and delivering him to the Attorney General to complete the legal procedures. As we add to your information that the department [Intelligence] did that in order to stop the worsening of economic bleeding, and to preserve the rights and priority of citizens. For this, the department deserves an honest thank you and appreciation for the services provided for the people of the homeland. Unless the newspaper is specialized only in publishing irrelevant jokes and songs, in honor of thieves and swindlers, and not expressing appreciation to the intelligence department for keeping alert to people's interest, and for its sincere and effective efforts in fighting against the criminals and corrupted people regardless of their political affiliation?

It is the right of the Palestinian citizen to question and say: How long will the series of hiding behind religion, hearsay, reclining on the backs of the poor [using poor people as pretext] and needy, to disregard lives and wealth with the aim of implementing, achieving political-economic and military plans, programs for the sake of non-Palestinian agendas? Is this the best marketing policy that Hamas had to offer? Which has become exposed to the eyes, especially after the crimes of the Executive Force, and the issue of the man who committed suicide (Maher Abu Dayah) as well as other issues of crime and corruption?

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