



Graduate School of Development Studies

**Public policy for the favelas in Rio de Janeiro:
the problem (in) framing**

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Dedication

To Dr Sunil Tankha, for his thoughtful guidance and encouragement throughout this research process.

To the professors at ISS who somehow encouraged me to look at the world through different lenses.

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To my parents and family, who believed in me and supported me in every step of the way. For their love, which is unparalleled in this world.

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List of Acronyms

BOPE	-	Batalhão de Operações Policiais Especiais (Special Police Operations Battalion)
CREA RJ	-	Conselho Regional de Engenharia, Arquitetura e Agronomia do Estado do Rio de Janeiro (Regional Council of Engineering, Architecture and Agronomics of Rio de Janeiro State.
Faferj	-	Federação das Associações de Moradores de Favelas do Estado do Rio de Janeiro (Federation of Favela Dwellers Associations of the state of Rio de Janeiro)
Fecam	-	Fundo Estadual de Conservação Ambiental (State Fund of Environmental Conservation)
FIFA	-	Fédération Internationale de Football Association (International Federation of Association Football)
G20	-	Group of 20
IADB	-	Inter-American Development Bank
Ibase	-	Instituto Brasileiro de Análises Sociais e Econômicas (Brazilian Institute of Economic and Social Analysis)
IBGE	-	Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística (Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics)
IPP	-	Instituto Pereira Passos (Pereira Passos Institute)
OB	-	Observatório de Favelas (Favelas Observatory)
PAC	-	Programa de Aceleração do Crescimento (Growth Acceleration Program)
SESEG/RJ	-	Secretaria de Estado de Segurança do Rio de Janeiro (Rio de Janeiro State Security Department)
SMH	-	Secretaria Municipal de Habitação (Municipal Housing Department)
UPP	-	Unidade de Polícia Pacificadora (Pacifactory Police Unit)
UN	-	United Nations

Abstract

The public policies for the favelas in Rio de Janeiro call attention due to their contradictory nature. While there are some that promote the upgrading and the integration of the favela into the city, there are others that exclude it and try simply to isolate the problem from the rest of the society. This paper aims at finding out the reasons for such a controversial approach. It does so by examining the problem-frame(s) regarding the favela issue through the analysis of four public policies that represent both ways of dealing with the matter. The argument developed in this piece is that the policy controversy is due to the way the public authority perceives the favela; and that this perception is dual. The favela is seen as a place of violence and illegality, a nuisance to society. At the same time, however, it is also considered a reason for collective pride, as it represents many positive aspects of the culture of Rio and of Brazil. The paper suggests that there are three different frames of the favela problem, which reflect the dual way that the favela is perceived by the public authority. It concludes by suggesting that the way out of this policy controversy might be by breaking down the process of stigmatization of the favela and having society recognize it as a legitimate part of the city.

Relevance to Development Studies

The favelas in Brazil encompass a set of problems that appear as hindrances to the freedoms people are entitled to. Therefore, it is important to have a thorough understanding of the favela phenomenon and of the measures being taken to alleviate the problems it involves. It is even more so in the case of Rio de Janeiro, where the approach of the public authority to the favelas seems so incongruous. By examining the public policies for the favelas in Rio, this study can contribute to a more consistent policy practice and thus to the promotion of development in the area.

Keywords

Favela; public policy; policy controversy; frame; UPP; BOPE; ecolimits; Favela-Bairro.

Chapter 1

Introduction

1.1 The research problem

In the city of Rio de Janeiro, one of the issues of highest concern for the public authority is the *favela*¹ problem. It is a very complex matter, as it is associated with a range of other problems that include, but are not limited to, poverty, organized crime, violence, drug trade, land tenure and housing issues. Moreover, the favela problem in Rio relates to the corruption in the police force, to issues of social integration, and to the insufficient State presence in the favelas – in terms of access, control and delivery of public services.

What is very striking is the answer that the public authority has been giving to such a matter. On the one hand, there are public policies that acknowledge the historical perception of the favela as opposed to (instead of as part of) the city, as well as the deficiency of the State action in these areas, and aim at promoting their incorporation into society. Yet, on the other hand, there are policies that regard the favela as a source of trouble for the society, and for that promote its exclusion. In the face of such contradictory approaches, it is very important to disclose how these conflicting views on the favela problem were framed.

This work will argue that the way the public authority perceives the favela reflects on the framing of the favela problem. Also, that this perception is dual: the favela is seen as a source of disorder for the so called ‘formal city’, but also as the core of the *carioca*² culture – as it is historically the place of samba, of soccer and of other important cultural elements of Rio and of Brazil more broadly. In sum, the working hypothesis of this research is that the favela is perceived by the public authority in a dual way, which is reflected in two contrasting frames of the problem, characterizing a policy controversy (i.e. the existence of conflicting and intractable frames).

Thus, by answering the question of how the perception of the favela by the public authority acts upon the formulation of public policies for the favelas in Rio de Janeiro, this work aims at giving a comprehensive account of the policy controversy that underlies the policy discourse on the issue. As a way of achieving this objective, the investigation will look at how those engaged in the policy-making depict the favela so as to understand what they consider to be problematic about it. Also, it will look at the corresponding prescriptions for the problem. Together, the depictions and prescriptions of the favela problem will unveil the narratives told by each frame.

¹ *Favela* is the term used to refer to shanty towns in Brazil.

² The term *carioca* is a Portuguese adjective that refers to the city of Rio de Janeiro.

1.2 The setting

In order to have a thorough understanding of this policy controversy case, it is important to take into account the context in which it is inserted. In this regard, it should firstly be pointed out that Brazil has been seeking, especially during the President Lula's administration³, to promote itself internationally. This can be illustrated by its leadership role in the G20, its participation in peace processes such as the one in Haiti, and its attempts to promote the reform of the UN Security Council. (F. d. Oliveira 2005). It is interesting to note that the official slogan of Lula's administration is 'Brazil, a country of all.' However, the huge inequality – illustrated by the dichotomy of favela/city – clearly does not support the idea of a 'country of all'.

Finally, it should be noted that the city of Rio de Janeiro will host the Olympic Games of 2016 and also be one of the Brazilian cities where the 2014 FIFA World Cup will take place. The significance of this for the object of study presented above is the fact that these events reinforce the need to project a good image of the country internationally. Although the country is known worldwide for its carnival and soccer, it is also known for its socio-economic inequalities.

1.3 Analytical approach and methodology

In order to investigate the contradictory approach to the favela in Rio de Janeiro, four public policies were selected: the wall policy, the Favela-Bairro (Favela-Neighborhood), the *Unidade de Polícia Pacificadora* (UPP or Pacificatory Police Unit), and the *Batalhão de Operações Policiais Especiais* (BOPE or Special Police Operations Battalion). As this work will argue, they represent two divergent frames of the favela problem. In order to appraise them, documents such as speeches, pronouncements, interviews and policy designs will be examined. The analytical tools for this will be provided by Discourse Analysis. More specifically, this work will make use of a critical Frame Analysis approach. In accordance with Rein and Shön's (1994; 1996) Frame-Critical Policy Analysis, it will identify the competing frames in the case of the *carioca* favelas, and also look at the respective sponsors and the forums in which the discourse takes place. In doing so, the 'public authority' will be deconstructed so as to reveal the frame holders, and the political will be context disclosed.

1.4 Scope and limitations

Searching about such a current theme as the one proposed here proved to be a challenge, as some of the studied policies are very recent, and also because the

³ Luís Inácio Lula da Silva has been president of Brazil for two mandates: 2003-2006 and 2007-2010.

sources of information are limited. In addition, given the impossibility of doing field research, this work is based on secondary data, which somewhat limits the possibilities of how to deal with such broad topic (the public policies for the favelas in Rio). The scope of the analysis, then, had to be restricted to the formulation phase of the policy process.

Notwithstanding, this study can be a valuable tool for understanding the reasons for the contradictory measures to mitigate the favela problem, and thus contribute towards a more consistent policy practice in this regard. In spite of the limitations imposed by the type of accessible data, this piece can give reliable indications of such rationale. Its significance relies, therefore, on its potential to shed light on the public policy process regarding the favelas in Rio de Janeiro. This is a matter of paramount importance, as it is about promoting development for a portion of the population that has been marginalized and living often in humble and illegal conditions.

Lastly, it is important to note that this study focuses on the slums of Rio de Janeiro city. Although it is not a phenomenon exclusive to this city or to Brazil, covering the public policy of other slums is out of the scope and of the interest of this study.

1.5 Structure of the work

In what follows from this outline, this work will be divided into four additional chapters. *Chapter two* gives an overview on the favela problem. It provides a comprehensive conceptualization of the favela, presents a historical approach to the phenomenon and the actors involved. It also discusses the answer that has been given by the public authority, and problematizes it. In *chapter three*, the theoretical grounds and analytical framework for the investigation are presented, and so is their relation with the subject under analysis. The latter sets the stage for introducing the working hypothesis. *Chapter four* discusses the perception(s) of the favela and uses the analytical tools presented in chapter three to analyze each of the four public policies mentioned above. In doing so, it offers two model frames that correspond to the two contrasting frames of the favela problem and against which each of the policies is judged. Further, it resumes the discussion of chapter two so as to examine the frame holders and the policy discourse fora, to present the concluding thoughts on the issue of the policy controversy in the case of the favela in Rio de Janeiro. Lastly, in *chapter five* the evidences and arguments presented in this piece are put together to finally attempt to respond to the research question. The chapter concludes by suggesting an alternative way to frame the favela problem.

Chapter 2

Carioca favela: understanding the phenomenon

This chapter aims at presenting the study object of this investigation: the public policies for the favelas in Rio de Janeiro. It will discuss the meaning of 'favela' and give a historical perspective of how it started to be seen as a problem by the public authority, and the present situation on the matter. Also, it will present how the public authority has been answering the favela problem. Last, it will introduce the issue of what this work is concerned with: the policy controversy around the favela problem in Rio.

2.1 What is a favela?

According to McCann (2006), there are at least five hundred favelas in the city of Rio de Janeiro, with great variation in size and level of urbanization. This number can, however, vary a lot according to the definition of favela one considers. For the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE), there are 518 favelas in Rio, while for Pereira Passos Institute (IPP)⁴ there are 752. Such variation can be explained by the different approaches of the institutes to the favela phenomenon.

On the one hand, the IBGE considers favela to be a

subnormal agglomerate, [a] complex constituted by at least 51 housing unities (shanties, houses etc), occupying – or having occupied – until recent time, land of alien property (public or private); arranged, generally, in a disordered and dense way; and, in most cases, lacking essential public services. (IBGE 2010 *apud* Cezar 2002).

On the other hand, according to IPP,

favela is an area predominantly used for housing, characterized by the occupation of land by the low income population, scarceness of urban infrastructure and public services, pathways that are narrow and with irregular alignment, lots of irregular shape and size, and unlicensed constructions, that does not conform with the legal patterns. (Prefeitura do Rio de Janeiro 1992 *apud* Cavallieri 2009:24).

It should be noted that both definitions are somewhat misleading. According to the IPP, favelas that have a regular arrangement - such as Cidade de Deus (City of God) and other planned housing units built by the

⁴ The IPP is the municipal agency responsible for the urban planning of Rio de Janeiro city.

government as part of a resettlement program in the 1960's and 1970's – are not considered to be favelas. Such a characteristic of some favelas (the regular arrangement) is approached by IBGE. However, as the latter only considers favela areas that occupy land of alien property, this concept also does not include the favelas of the resettlement program. Finally, it is interesting to note that in the above-mentioned approaches the definition of favela is – especially in the one by IBGE – in terms of what a favela lacks, of what it is not, instead of what it actually is. This point will be revisited in chapter four.

Given what can be considered failures in conceptualizing favelas, another definition of the phenomenon is needed. The concepts by the IBGE and the IPP will not serve, for the purpose of this work, as background for understanding the problem, as they are not considered to be an accurate characterization of the favela. However, they will be object of analysis later on. A more accurate and also more comprehensive approach of the favela phenomenon is provided by the *Observatório de Favelas* (OB), a non-governmental organization dedicated to research, consultancy and public action regarding the favelas and other urban phenomena.

According to Observatório de Favelas (2009a), the complexity and diversity of the favelas are best understood through a definition that looks at four dimensions, namely socio-political, social-economic, socio-urban and socio-cultural dimension. Firstly, from a socio-political perspective, 'favela is as a territory where the incompleteness of policies and actions by the State is historically recurrent.' (OB 2009a: 96). The favela often lacks the state monopoly of force⁵, and also, in part as a consequence of it, the provision of public goods, such as infrastructure and access to health and education programs, and sports and entertainment facilities. Moreover, there is not enough land and urban regularization policies, and no state guarantee of the favela inhabitants' security. (OB 2009a).

Secondly, from a socio-economic viewpoint, 'favela is a territory where the investments from the formal market are precarious, especially the housing, the financial and the service markets.' (OB 2009a: 96). In the favelas, the underemployment and unemployment rates are relatively higher than in the formal city, and the levels of education, health and access to technology, lower. (OB 2009a). The unemployment rate, for instance, was 12.3% in the year 2000 in the favelas, and 5.4% in the metropolitan area of Rio de Janeiro. (Oliveira et al. 2003).

Thirdly, from a socio-urban angle, 'favela is as a territory in which the housings are mostly characterized by self-construction, without obeying to urban normative patterns of the State.' (OB 2009a: 97). There is a high concentration of housing, and they are usually constructed by the inhabitants themselves, after illegal appropriation of public or private land. Moreover, most of the housing is built in areas of high environmental vulnerability.

⁵ The monopoly of force is considered an essential element of the State by Max Weber (1968).

Finally, from a socio-cultural point, ‘favela is a territory of expressive presence of negro⁶ people (mulatto and black) and indigenous descendants [...], for that displaying plural identities in the material and symbolical realms.’ (OB 2009a: 97). In the favelas different cultural and artistic manifestations take place in the same spaces, showing the capacity of favela people to live well with plurality. In sum, favela is defined as a territory where there is recurring deficiency of State action and formal market investments, where the housing is mostly characterized by illegality and self-construction, and where great cultural diversity coexists.

What can be noticed in the dimensions described above is the huge inequality, the big gap between the favela and the asphalt (i.e. the formal city). The ‘favelas are territories without guarantee of the accomplishment of social rights’, they are a portrayal of ‘the unequal conditions of the Brazilian urbanization, and at the same time, [of] the struggle of citizens for the legitimate right to inhabit the city’ (OB 2009a: 96-97).

Last but not least, it should be pointed out that when thinking about the favela in Rio de Janeiro one has to bear in mind that it is markedly a very heterogeneous phenomenon. The favelas can have hundreds or thousands of inhabitants; can be located on hills, on riversides, or on plains; can have houses and/or apartments; and also have different levels of violence and of state presence.

Attention should be called to the fact that, in contrast with the dominant view on the matter, the favelas in Rio do not always shelter the poorest people. According to the 2000 Census done by IBGE, among the 20% of lowest income population, only 36% live in favelas. The other 64% live in non-special sectors of the city, which can have different urban forms. (Cavallieri 2009: 27).

In order to understand why the features mentioned above characterize the favela, it is necessary to look back and, through a historical perspective, observe how the favelas evolved. Given the focus of this work, attention will be given to the history of the favelas in the city of Rio de Janeiro exclusively.

2.2 The roots of the problem and the breakdowns of the public authority

The origin of the favelas in Rio dates from the 19th century. There are records of the presence of shanties in the city that go back to 1865. (Vaz 1994). The term ‘favela’ comes from the first hill to be characterized as such, namely ‘Morro da Favella’⁷. It was the place where ex-combatants of the War of Canudos (a civil war that happened in Northeastern Brazil in 1896-1897) chose

⁶ According to IPP, 60% of the favela dwellers are black, while 63% of the dwellers of the asphalt are not black. (Pero et al. 2005).

⁷*Morro* is the Portuguese word for hill. It is associated to the idea of favela for the latter being typically constructed on hilly areas.

to settle in the city, where they went to demand from the government recompenses for their participation in the war. They gave the name 'favela' as it was the name of a plant from the region where the war took place. (Pinto 2007).

As argued by Valladares (2000), it was through the media coverage of the Morro da Favella that term 'favela' began to be associated to an image of disorder and perilousness. However, despite the approach of the media, no thorough measure was taken by the public authority to resolve the issue of the favelas that were emerging. It was only in the beginning of the 20th century that these shanties became a matter of concern for the elite groups and the public authority and started to be seen as a problem: a problem of aesthetics, hygiene, and population growth. (Valladares 2000).

Rio de Janeiro was then going through a housing crisis. The population of the city – then the capital of Brazil – was growing, and many people were migrating from other parts of the country in search of jobs and better living conditions. The problem got worse when, due to a rapid spread of diseases such as plague, cholera and yellow fever in the early 1900's, mayor Pereira Passos decided to evacuate the central areas of Rio. For that, he restricted the construction of housings in those areas, while allowing construction on the hills. Moreover, constructions of wood were forbidden on most of the streets in the center of the city, but an exception was made in the case of hills that were not yet inhabited. Such a policy acted, therefore, as sort of an official incentive for the poor to migrate to hillsides of the city. (Vaz 1994). It could be argued, then, that the favelization⁸ was somehow promoted by the government itself.

From 1910 on, the favelization accelerated. In parallel, the repressive approach of the public authority was also intensified. It was in that decade that the policy of forced removal of the favelas was initiated. The government's attempt to solve the favelization problem was, however, unsuccessful. This was because it disregarded the central issues that were propelling the growth in number and size of the favelas: the housing deficit and the structure of the public transportation system (the favelas were being constructed by the poor in the center of the city, because they needed to be close to their work). (Ferreira 2009).

In the 1960's and 1970's, the official policy was to remove the favela inhabitants and to transfer them to other areas in the periphery, which were often already deficient in terms of the provision of public goods by the State. (Pereira da Silva 2009). One example that became known worldwide is the favela City of God.

In the late 1970's, the removal policy gave place to a very different approach by the government, which from then on would seek to formalize and urbanize the favelas in the city. It is worth noting that the public authority,

⁸ *Favelization* is the phenomenon of an increase in the number of favelas.

however, did not deal with the land tenure issue, choosing to cope with the informality that characterized the occupation of the favela areas.

This posture by the public authority of promoting the urbanization of the favela was in vogue throughout the 1980's and 1990's, and remains still. In the 1990's, this government stance was even emphasized through a municipal law (1990) that established the 'principle of non removal of the favelas'; and the Municipal Master Plan of 1992 that reinforced the latter, and launched a housing policy and a range of policy actions aiming at the betterment of the favelas. (Cavallieri 2009: 24).

However, despite the change in the public authority approach towards the favelas from removal to urbanization, the root causes of their growth were still not successfully targeted. As a consequence, in the 1980's and 1990's there was an increasing in the favelization process. For Cavalcanti (1998), the public authority is the primary responsible for such growth, as its 'tolerant and populist stance' resulted in the consolidation and expansion of the informal settlements. (Cavalcanti 1998 *apud* Leitão 2009: 43). The latest figures (from 2000) show that 22.9% of the population of Rio de Janeiro city currently lives in favelas (IBGE 2000 *apud* Castro 2010).

Nowadays, as indicated by Diegues (1998) 'a third generation of favela struggles for affirmation, for the pride of being *favelado*⁹, despite having to live with all the problems such as violence.' (O Globo 26 July 1998). Such attempt at reassurance by the *favelados* is a response to an image that the 'formal city' has about the favela and its inhabitants. As argued above, the favela has been seen as a miserable and dangerous place, one that has no order, no rules, no morals. In the 1990's, due to the increasing power of the drug dealers, it was strengthened the image of the favela as a place of hostility and savagery. (Araujo 2006).

2.3 The 1990's and the latest stigma: violence

As consequence of the economic inequalities and also of cultural and institutional factors – such as the weakening of traditional values and the corruption in the police –, the informal sector employment has grown in relevance in the 1990's, and criminal activities have become for many favela inhabitants a strategy of survival. (Souza 2005). Amongst the illicit activities that rose in relevance, is the participation in the illegal drug trafficking, a problem that is now especially chronic in Rio de Janeiro. As a consequence of the drug trade, there was an astounding increase in violent crimes in the country. (Zaluar 1995: 95). Therefore, in the 1990's, 'the popular spaces, not yet totally free of the stereotype of absence, gain a new stigma: [violence]'. (Araujo 2006: 4). This section investigates further such phenomenon,

⁹ *Favelado* is the word for 'favela inhabitant'.

discussing in detail the network of social relations among the main actors of the favela issue.

The drug trafficking became a social problem in Brazil in late 1970's, when the country was picked by the Colombian cartels and the Italian-American Mafia as a route for the cocaine traffic. Rio de Janeiro started then to play an important role in the transnational drug trafficking, and turned out to be a new consumer market for the drug. (Zaluar 2002a). In the early 1980's drug dealers were already taking control over favela territories in various Brazilian cities, among which Rio de Janeiro was the first one and remains the most critical case. (Souza 2009).

Following Brazil's newly acquired prominence in the transnational drug trafficking, the structure of the business in the country changed: 'a virile cult of guns and of violent exhibitions of power is now the main aspect of the organization culture.' (Zaluar 2002a: 149). The power held by the drug dealers – both *de facto* and symbolic – has, for instance, limited the spatial mobility of the *favelados*, i.e. the favelas became more 'closed' spaces as the transit and access of the people to such areas is controlled by the criminal groups. Furthermore, it has limited the access of the State to the favela territories. Also, it is common for the drug dealers to exert great influence – if not control – over the dwellers' associations, promoting the election of candidates that are engaged with their interests and expelling or even killing the ones that are not willing to cooperate. (Souza 2009).

It is common for the members of the same drug trafficking group to form *comandos*¹⁰, a sort of criminal mutual help networks. Very organized, these criminal crews aim at giving support to its members so as to maintain, regain or establish control over other *comando*'s territory (which can be of one or more favelas). There are varied *comandos* in Rio, among which Comando Vermelho (Red *Comando*), Terceiro Comando (Third *Comando*), and Amigos dos Amigos (Friends of Friends) are the most remarkable. The different *comandos* fight occasionally amongst each other for the power over a specific area, i.e., for the monopoly of the drug trade and the succeeding authority over that territory. (Souza 2009). As Alba Zaluar argues, 'the drug trade has become synonymous with warfare'. (Zaluar 2002: 149).

Understanding the relationship between the drug dealers and the police is essential, for the latter is also an important actor in the complex problem which this work aims to investigate. It should be pointed out, however, that 'the police' are not a homogeneous actor. Not only are there different types of police, but also ramifications and different positions within those; and, very importantly, there are those who do not and those who do accept – or sometimes even press for – bribes that help maintain the drug trafficking structure.

¹⁰ *Comando* is a Portuguese word for this specific type of gang that deals with drug trafficking.

2.4 An important actor: the police

In Brazil there are two police forces in any given jurisdiction, namely Civil Police and Military Police. (Medeiros 2004). The first, known as the ‘judiciary police’, is in charge of investigating crimes after they happen. The Military Police, on the other hand, has as its main function to prevent crimes from happening, by e.g. patrolling the streets. Those two polices have different commanding officers, but are both subordinated to the state government. (Machado and Noronha 2003). Both polices also have special units, the Squad Police. The Squad Police units are better prepared than the common police, as their members go through tough and regular training, and have at their disposal better arms and equipment. In Rio, the military Squad Police is the BOPE.

In Rio de Janeiro there are in total around 45,000 policemen. (Soares et al. 2006: 6). As argued by Soares et al. (2006), their work conditions are precarious and not compatible – nor are their salaries – with the big challenges they confront every day. Moreover, they face the consequences of having the public image of the police institution degrading more and more due to the successive cases of corruption and police violence. Indeed, many are the episodes of police violence¹¹ by both the common police and the BOPE in Rio. An illustration of the violation of human rights by the police force in Rio is the torture and the illegal killing of criminals (e.g. in cases where it is possible to simply arrest them).

Particularly, the relationship of the police with the drug dealers in Rio de Janeiro is twofold. Paradoxically, they fight amongst each other for the ability to impose their rules (the State rules or the *comando* rules) over the favela territories; but they are also, in some cases, partners in an (obviously) illegal deal that helps sustain the trafficking in the city. It is common to have situations in which policemen sell arms and ammunition or are bribed by the drug lords not to arrest someone from their group, to alleviate the police ‘chases’ of drug dealers, or even to intensify the pursuit of rival *comando* groups.¹²

The survival of the drug trafficking in Rio is spurred not only by the corruption in the police, but also by the interaction among the criminal group and the ordinary *favelados*. Once again, the relationship is one of a dual nature. On the one hand, the drug dealers provide assistance and some security to the favela inhabitants. But on the other hand, this means constant conflict (with the police and with other criminal groups) and thus, paradoxically, lack of security for those who live in the favelas.¹³

As mentioned before, in many of Rio de Janeiro’s favelas the monopoly of force does not belong to the State, as they are ruled by organized crime. As a

¹¹ Police violence is understood as acts in which the policeman uses the physical force against other person illegally. (P.M. Neto 1997: 132).

¹² As portrayed in *City of God* (2002) and *Elite Squad* (2007).

¹³ As described in *Abusado: O Dono do Morro Dona Marta* (2003), by Caco Barcellos.

consequence, their populations remain deprived of the provision of public services from the State. What follows is a situation in which those who are in charge of the drug trade become the brokers of that community, and dependence – and many times even gratefulness – characterizes the interaction between the ones in (non-legitimate) power and the ones in need. The drug trafficking chiefs provide the ordinary favela inhabitants with, for example, gas vessels (for cooking), food, construction materials, money, and even basic hygienic products. The reason for such assistance is that ‘criminals must maintain good relations with favela residents because their silence is essential to traffickers to avoid being arrested.’ (Arias 2006: 301).

Arias (2006) argues, however, that the drug dealers cannot be defined as brokers, because they are in fact in the middle of a hierarchical clientelist relationship between politicians and *favelados*. The latter characterize a new form of clientelism in which ‘traffickers dole out portions of patronage benefits as services for their own private benefit and politicians gain votes but not actual support from the population’. (Arias 2006: 302). The social dynamics among the agents involved in the favela issue are therefore of a very complex nature. The drug dealers seek to maintain connections with State actors in order to sustain their business. They can, for instance, ensure that no other politicians come to the favela to campaign during an election process, in exchange for the corrupt politicians building a place for leisure or any kind of facility in the favela space. Also, they can get various benefits from the police in return for money (as indicated earlier). In this way, the criminals can offer some basic welfare to the ordinary *favelados*, helping maintain their support.

For these exchanges to happen, though, it is usually necessary to obtain the support of the local leaders, since the drug dealers cannot freely interact with the State. Therefore, respected people in the favelas – such as dweller’s association leaders – often act like an intermediate between the criminal group and the State agents. Then, together, the support from the favela inhabitants and the bribes to the police allow the drug trafficking group to continue its activities, and to establish a ‘system of localized criminal dominance’. (Arias 2006: 298). Hence, ‘the persistently high levels of violence in Rio’s favelas result [...] from networks that bring criminals together with civic leaders, politicians and police’. (Arias 2006: 293).

Despite the violence and the numerous crimes practiced by those involved in the trafficking against the other favela inhabitants and also against the rest of the society, it is important to bare in mind that the favela-based drug dealers are also victims of the negligence of the State: ‘they are themselves oppressed people who quite often oppress other oppressed people.’ (Souza 2009: 33). Claiming that the drug dealers are themselves victims, however, does not mean in any way that the violence exerted by them is justified. (Zaluar 2002b). Rather, it helps in calling the attention to the necessity of public policies that target the problem also in its roots, instead of only trying to restrain its effects on the other extreme of the causal chain.

2.5 The answer from the public authority

The answers the public authority has been giving to such an alarming situation can be argued to be contradictory to its mandate of protecting and improving the well-being of society, as some of the implemented policies promote the exclusion of the favela and even violate human rights. An illustration of such policies is the one implemented in 2009 by the government of Rio de Janeiro state, which included the construction of walls surrounding some favelas in the city, allegedly in order to restrain their horizontal expansion. The initiative was heavily criticized by the United Nations, which characterized it as a 'geographical discrimination'. (O Estado de São Paulo 06 May 2009).

Another example is the BOPE, a special police unit that makes 'incursions' into the favelas to 'fight' the drug dealers. For that, it makes use of unusual violence and fear. The BOPE officers are even supposed to look scary, which is translated for example in their symbol: a skull impaled with a knife and two pistols.

Furthermore, the contradictory character of the official policies is not restricted to the State's duty of promoting societal well-being. It also refers to the apparently contrasting problem-framing that they unfold when looked at side by side. On the one hand, there are exclusionary policies of constructing walls surrounding the favelas and maintaining a special police unit that often violates human rights in its approach to the favela inhabitants; which disclose a perception of the latter, by the policy-makers, as enemies or outsiders, of troublemakers that do not pertain to the society and should hence be contained. On the other hand, there are also official policies whose objectives are to integrate the favelas into the city, to pacify them, to regularize and provide them with the infra-structure and public goods of a standard neighborhood.

Examples of such policies are the Favela-Bairro program and the UPPs. The Favela-Bairro program was established in 1994 with the aim of implementing infra-structure, public services and social policies. Among its activities are programs that promote professional training, income generation, health assistance, and violence reduction. Moreover, Favela-Bairro also includes measures to improve energy supply, implementation sewerage and piped water systems, street paving, and resettlement of families that live in risky areas.

The UPPs are a type of communitarian police that make its policing activity in such a way as to bring close together the population and the police, and to reinforce social policies in the communities. The UPPs are implemented so as to restore the peace in territories previously occupied by drug dealers and other organized crime groups. (UPP Repórter 2010a). In contrast to the BOPE, the UPP tries to transmit an image of a friendly police.

2.6 The problem in framing

In juxtaposing the four official policies mentioned above as to compare the wall construction with the Favela-Bairro and the BOPE with the UPP, the

discrepancies are so strong that it almost makes them seem opposed to one another. In the first case, we observe the implementation of two special police units that, for their effectiveness, rely greatly on the identities they claim and promote for their own. If closely observed, such identities are, however, virtually clashing. On the one hand, the UPPs, seeking to look friendly, dress in blue and try to promote the idea that they are policing in partnership with the community. The BOPE, on the other hand, attempting to look as frightening as possible, dress in black uniforms with a skull impaled with a knife and two pistols on it; and have as their slogan 'Go and win!', which shows that the favela inhabitants are anything but their partners.

The contrast is also prominent when comparing the Favela-Bairro with the other official initiative to build walls surrounding favelas in Rio. While the former has as its main goal to incorporate the favelas into the city (Cardoso 2002), the latter can be argued to have the exact opposite purpose, that is, to isolate the favelas from the wealthier parts of Rio.

The discrepancies shown above corroborate this work's claim of a contrasting problem-framing by the public authority when it comes to the issue of the favelas in Rio de Janeiro. In deciding what is and what is not problematic about the favela, policy-makers rely upon their perception of what the *favela* means. This meaning is, however, socially negotiated. Policy-makers can thus have a perception of the favela that is in itself paradoxical.

The references that are usually made to the favela communities in Brazil are indeed twofold: they are a reason for the society to be proud, for it being the cradle of *samba*¹⁴, and symbolizing the *carioca* culture and the cheerfulness of the Brazilian people; but they are also the place of poverty and violence, the source of the problems of the city. Accordingly, Zaluar and Alvito (2004) describe the favela as the 'place of the most beautiful views and of the bigger rubbish accumulation, place of the finesse and elegance of so many *sambistas*¹⁵, since always, and of the violence of the most famous outlaws that the city has known.' (Zaluar and Alvito 2004: 8).

This depiction gives some insights of what might be the reason why the official policies towards the favelas of Rio de Janeiro are seemingly so contradictory. Being such inconsistency the object of investigation of this work, the question to which it will try to answer is the following: how does the perception of the favela by the public authority act upon the formulation of public policies for the favelas in Rio de Janeiro?

¹⁴ *Samba* is a musical genre typical from Brazil.

¹⁵ The term *sambistas* refers to those who dance, compose or have any activity related to *samba*.

Chapter 3

A critical approach to policy controversy

This chapter aims at presenting the theoretical tools for the discussion about the proposed object of analysis, namely the policy controversies in the official approach to the favelas in Rio de Janeiro. For that, the concepts of public authority and public policy will be introduced, and the Frame-Critical Policy Analysis approach will be carefully discussed.

In order to understand the concept of public authority, Lund (2006) suggests the breaking down of the concept. As he points out, *authority* is understood as ‘an instance of power which seeks at least a minimum of voluntary compliance and thus is legitimated in some way’ (Lund 2006: 678). The idea of *public* refers to two correlated elements, which gives public authority two meanings: as impersonal administrative procedures in a broad sense; and as concerted action, discussion or struggle in an open, not secret way. More specifically, *public authority* refers to ‘institutions which, in the exercise of power, take on the mantle of public administrative authority (legitimated administrative operations) and in their attempts to govern articulate notions of state varying from their source of power to their antithesis.’ (Lund 2006: 678).

The idea of *public policy* as it is considered in this work is offered by Queiroz (2008). According to the author,

public policies can be seen as the answers that the governments have to give to mitigate or to solve the problems and/or to attend the demands existing in societies, taking into account the objectives and the fundamental rights established in the respective Constitutions. (Queiroz 2008: i).

Having clarified those two concepts that are central for the discussion outlined here, attention should be given to the issue of contradictory approaches in policy processes. A sound and thorough approach for understanding the matter is offered by Rein and Schön (1994). In contrast to mainstream Public Policy, which has instrumental rationality as its core assumption, Rein and Schön (1994) understand policy positions as being based on *frames*, i.e. on ‘underlying structures of belief, perception, and appreciation’ (Rein and Schön 1994: 23).

For discussing policy controversies it is therefore valuable to take a closer look at the meaning of frames. As Rein and Schön (1996) point out, a frame should be understood as a narrative, a combination of generic diagnostic and prescriptive story that guides both the individual’s analysis and practice. More specifically, *narrative frames* are composed by two elements: *framing devices* and *reasoning devices*. While the former indicate how to think about an issue, the latter point to the measures to be taken in its regard. These elements are metaphors, catch-phrases, and other symbolic devices that, together, compose the ‘core package’ underlying a narrative. (Rein and Schön 1996).

The narrative frame corresponds to the analyst's view of the problem-framing. It informs him/her about what the problem is (and therefore what it is not) and about what should be done to solve it. It brings coherence to a policy issue, usually by relying on an integrative metaphor, which allows the frame holder to make the normative leap, i.e. to go from *is* (descriptive) to *ought* (prescriptive). As argued by Rein and Schön (1996), 'such generic narratives offer an integrated account of a policy issue. Frames try to "hitch on" to norms which resonate broader culture themes in society.' (Rein and Schön 1996: 89).

Given that the world is, according to this perspective, a social construction, the other way around is also true. As Béland (2009) argues, ideas, cultural symbols and categories, and discursive frames compose crucial ideational processes that assist actors in giving meaning to the world. Therefore, not only are the frames grounded in norms and on various meanings existing in society at large, but they also contribute to the construction of such norms and meanings.

Because of the tacit nature of frames, in order to study them they must be constructed, that is, the analyst should infer 'from some evidence [...] interpretations about belief and meaning and implications for action to deal with coping and facing.' (Rein and Schön 1996: 90). Frames can be constructed from two types of evidences, which correspond to the different contexts of policy discourse¹⁶: the realm of policy debates and the realm of action. In the first case, they are called *rhetorical frames*, which are 'frames that underlie the persuasive use of story and argument in policy debate'. (Rein and Schön 1994: 32). The evidence that serves as basis for the construction of such frames is policy texts (e.g. speech by politician, critic, policy intellectual etc). To the realm of action correspond the *action frames*, the ones that inform policy practice. The action frames are built through the examining of patterns of actions intrinsic to the practice of policy professionals – which refers both to the design of policy objects, and to the behavior through which they enact the policy. (Rein and Schön 1994; 1996).

It is worth noting that the rhetorical and the action frames held by an actor in a given context could diverge. While rhetorical frames can be 'ideal types', as they belong to the realm of policy debate; action frames, because they derive from concrete policy practice, are likely to be fuzzy, mixed. According to Rein and Schön (1996), despite the potential discrepancy among the rhetorical and the action frame, both, as narrative frames, are diagnostic and prescriptive.

The action frames operate at three different levels, and can be thus distinguished as policy frame, institutional action frame, and metacultural frame. The *policy frame* is the one used to assemble the problem of a given policy situation. The *institutional action frame*, from which the policy frame is derived, correspond to an institution's viewpoints, system of beliefs, routines, mode of argumentation and action etc. Finally, the *metacultural frames* are the

¹⁶ Policy discourse is understood as a 'verbal exchange, or dialogue, about policy issues.' (Rein and Schön 1994: 31).

generic, culturally shared systems of belief of which the institutional action frames are expressions.

As indicated above, policy frames are grounded in institutions. What follows is that

policy controversies are disputes among institutional actors who sponsor conflicting frames. The actors are in contention with one another; the frames they sponsor are in conflict, in the sense that they represent mutually incompatible ways of seeing the policy situation. (Rein and Schön 1994: 29).

Consequently, there is no way to falsify a frame, and a policy controversy cannot be potentially resolved by examining the facts or by reasonable argumentation. As the parties in the dispute are not frame-neutral, there is no objectivity. They can only perceive and make sense of social reality through a frame, as ‘the very task of making sense of complex, information-rich situations requires an operation of selectivity and organization, which is what “framing” means.’ (Rein and Schön 1994: 30). Hence, in a policy controversy each party presents its own story, which carries very distinct perceptions of reality. The stories name and set the features they have selected from reality in frames that are constructed for the situation, composing the actor’s view of social reality. And so, the process of naming and framing defines the problem out of a imprecise reality. In other words, through naming and framing the function of problem-setting is exerted, and thus the ‘normative leap’ occurs. (Rein and Schön 1994).

The process of constructing the frames for analysis can be very challenging at times. A certain policy action can be, for instance, compatible with more than one policy frame. Moreover, it should be acknowledged that the analyst that constructs a frame has himself/herself a given system of belief. One way of assuring the quality of the frame construction is suggested by Rein and Schön (1994):

frame-critical analysts can and should ask whether these constructs fit the data, exploring, for example, whether these constructs account adequately for the things and relations the frame sponsor singles out for attention or selectively ignores, or for the way in which the frame sponsor’s policy story executes the normative leap from facts to recommendations. (Rein and Schön 1994: 36).

When thinking about frames in the policy process, it is also interesting to keep in mind the relationship between frames and interests. Although independent concepts, they correlate: interests are shaped by one’s frames, which in turn are often used to promote one’s interests.

Taking into consideration all the above-mentioned, it can be argued that the public authority’s approach to the favelas in Rio de Janeiro characterizes a policy controversy. On the one hand, the issue of the favela is defined as the lack of physical and social integration – a frame that is reflected in the Favela-Bairro and the UPP policies. On the other hand, the problem is laid out in such a way that the favela is considered to be a source of hassle and trouble for

the formal and allegedly legitimate (part of the) city, which should thus be isolated – a frame of which the BOPE and the wall policy are expressions. The working hypothesis is hence that the policy controversy around the issue of the favela in Rio de Janeiro is a reflection of how the public authority perceives the favelas, which is in its turn twofold: the favela is seen as the place of the poor and marginalized people, the pariahs, the source of the most significant social problems of Rio de Janeiro; but it is also a reason for pride, as it is the core of the *carioca* culture.

In the next chapter, the policy dispute around the issue of the favelas in Rio de Janeiro will be investigated. For that, the concepts and the theoretical approaches presented in this chapter will be essential.

Chapter 4

Favelas in Rio de Janeiro: understanding the depictions and prescriptions of the problem

This chapter aims at finding the answer to the question proposed by this work, that is, to understand how the perception of the favela by the public authority acts upon the formulation of policies for the favelas in Rio de Janeiro. As stated in chapter two, the working hypothesis is that the favela is perceived by the public authority in a dual way, which is reflected in two contrasting frames of the problem, characterizing a policy controversy.

Accordingly, in order to confirm or refute what seems to be the answer to the contradiction in the government's approach to the favelas this chapter will make use of the Frame-Critical Policy Analysis methodology, as shown in the previous chapter. Thus, this chapter will first deepen the discussion of the dual perception of the favela by the public authority and the society as a whole. Secondly, it will present the two frames which the hypothesis makes reference to, and examine each of the four policies to see to which frame they are – if at all – related. Finally, it will present a comprehensive portrait of the analyses of the four policies, and shed light on how they contribute to the understanding of the policy controversy regarding the favela problem in Rio.

4.1 Rio's favelas: pride and prejudice

As argued in the last chapter, the image of the favela portrayed by Brazilian society is dual. On the one hand, the favela is a reason for pride, as it represents important aspects of the *carioca* – and more broadly the Brazilian – culture. On the other hand, it is seen as the cause of social disruption, and for that the favela is stigmatized.

As pointed out by Silva and Magalhães (2007), 'historically, the [favelas] communities were associated with the carnival, with the *carioca* jocularly, with soccer, with samba, and with passions'. (Silva and Magalhães 2007). The samba, for instance, has a direct connection with the favela because of the negro people. As stated by Nogueira (2001), 'the majority of the ex-slaves climbed the hills. And where the blacks have been, there is a seed of samba.' (Nogueira 2001 *apud* Monteiro 2003). Samba schools and carnival blocks, as well as soccer teams, started to appear in the 1920's in the favelas (and also in less wealthy neighborhoods). They consisted in a way of expressing the rivalry among the migrants groups, which had not been integrated into the society yet. Thus, various favelas sought to prove themselves through the carnival parades or the sports competitions between the local teams. (Zaluar and Alvito 2004).

Although the favela is associated with such remarkable elements of the Brazilian culture, it is also perceived by the public authority and the society more broadly, in a very negative way. This social stigmatization is well depicted by Magalhães (2010a), according to whom

what is lacking is this comprehension, by the whole society, that in general has demonized the favela. The favela [is seen] as the responsible for all the urban problems, the favela as the responsible for the violence, the favela as responsible for all the disasters. (Magalhães 2010a).

For Brum (2010), this stigma has been accompanying the favela since its emergence, in the 19th century. It consists in the idea that ‘the *favelados* are black, are lazy, are ignorant [...]’ (Brum 2010). Magalhães (2003) calls the attention to the fact that this prejudice from the society towards the favela can lead to misguided attempts at solving the problem. He argues that some people think the *favelados* are impairing the city and that they should hence go back to the countryside. According to the author, there is a rejection by the Brazilian population of the favela that has endured throughout the century. (Magalhães 2010b).

Moreover, the favela is seen by many for what it lacks rather than for what it has. For instance, as presented in chapter two, the concepts of favela upon which the public authority has been analyzing the problem talk about ‘scarceness’ and things the favelas are ‘lacking’. They also use the words such as ‘unconformity’ and ‘disordered’ to describe the favela. These uses reiterate the already shared idea of absence and alienness, giving the favela a negative image.

It is interesting to note that this alienness of the favela is reinforced by the violence generated by the drug trafficking (as described in chapter two). As it is pointed out by Riley et al. (2001),

the barriers between the favelas and the rest of the city are not just social, based on prejudice and fear, but also physical and the result of drug traffickers erecting walls and other obstacles to protect their territory from the police and rival gangs, thereby isolating residents from the city and the city from the favelas. (Riley et al. 2001: 527).

This dual perception of the favela is reflected in the research developed by the Brazilian Institute of Economic and Social Analysis (Ibase). According to Ibase, 78% of the ‘asphalt dwellers’ (i.e. of the people that live in formal neighborhoods) believe that the favela dwellers are sympathetic; 61% believe that the *favelados* are friendly and polite. On the other hand, the favela dwellers are considered to be mistrustful by 75% of the asphalt dwellers. Further, 57.5% of the latter think the favela people are lazy, and 37% believe they are arrogant. (Ibase 2009). The research also sought to investigate whether the two groups – favela and asphalt dwellers – believe that there is prejudice against the favela. In both groups, the majority answered affirmatively (78% and 74%, respectively). Moreover, the Ibase also disclosed that 49% of the asphalt dwellers deem that ‘the favela hinders the life of the city of Rio de Janeiro’. (Ibase 2009: 8).

As shown above, the favela of soccer, samba and merriness jumbles with the favela of the wanting, lazy, and illegal in the people’s imagination. What follows is an analysis of how these two contrasting perceptions influence the framing of the favela problem by those who are expected to solve it.

4.2 The contrasting stories in framing the favela problem

The last section discussed the perspectives and viewpoints of Brazilian society – and Rio's society in particular – regarding the favela, which, as explained in chapter three, correspond to the institutional action frames. This section will now disclose in greater detail what the different policy frames of the favela problem are, so as to attempt to match them with the four policies presented in chapter two. For that, it should be reminded that frames are not self-evident entities and, therefore, need to be constructed for analytical purposes. In accordance, this section will look at speeches, pronouncements, interviews and other kind of documents where public officials state their position about the policy issue, in order to appraise the rhetorical frames. In the cases where there is data available, it will also examine the objectives stated in the policy designs (or similar documents) for an assessment of the action frames.

As argued in the last section, the favela is perceived by society in a dual and contrasting way. This has – and this is the argument this work has been trying to make – led to a policy controversy. As stated in the working hypothesis, incompatible frames of the favela problem follow from the two perceptions of the phenomenon presented above. After all, as indicated in chapter three, frames are 'underlying structures of belief, perception, and appreciation'. (Rein and Schön 1994: 23).

The first frame, which will be referred to as *progressive frame*, perceives the favela problem as the insufficiency of State action in the favelas, in regards to the provision of public goods and equipment and the assurance of civil and social rights of that population. The problem is thus not the violence generated by the drug trafficking, which might or might not be related to the problem. The problem is therefore not one of public security, but a social one.

The favela is seen in the progressive story as legitimately part of the city, which leads to the prescription of having it integrated into the so-called formal city. Moreover, this narrative frame advocates for the guarantee, by the State, of the rights the favela dwellers have as citizens. Consequently, the policies that reflect the progressive frame tend to have a more participatory approach, as they aim at empowering the favela people. Finally, the favela as it is understood by this narrative could be depicted as a piece of the machine (society), which need to be repaired and incorporated into the machine for the it to work properly.

The second frame, hereinafter called *regressive frame*, considers the favela problem to be the lack of State monopoly of the use of force in such territories. The control is rather exercised by the organized criminal groups, of which the drug trafficking is the most prominent kind (as indicated in chapter two). As stated by the current secretary of Security of the state of Rio de Janeiro, 'the great problem that Rio de Janeiro suffers today is the violence. And this violence is generated by the [drug] trafficking.' (Beltrame 2007).

The favela is then perceived as an annoyance for the allegedly legitimate part of the city. What should be done is thus to stop it from bothering the people in the asphalt. For that, the drug dealers – which are the enemies in the

storyline – should be fought off, so the State can ‘occupy’ and regain ‘control’ over the territory. The favela problem is therefore a public security problem.

It is important to note that the names ‘progressive’ and ‘regressive’ for the frames do not imply any value judgment. Rather, they refer to the proximity with the government’s approach to the favela from its appearance until the 1980’s. Thus, the regressive frame refers to one that corresponds to the story about the favela told by the public authorities for about a century (as exposed in chapter two). The progressive frame, on the other hand, is one that deviates from that perspective for it sees the favela as part of the city, and hence has a very different prescription for the problem. These two frames are summarized in table 1.

Table 1
Frames table: contrasting frames of the favela problem

Progressive frame	Regressive frame
Diagnostic	
Deficiency of State action (e.g. provision of public goods and equipment) and of State guarantee of social and civil rights [for the favela dwellers].	Lack of State control over the use of force [in favela territories].
It is a social problem.	It is a public security problem.
The violence is not necessarily related to the problem.	The violence that follows from the drug trafficking is the problem.
Favela is (or ought to be considered as) part of the city.	Favela is a nuisance to the city. It is the place of the informal, the illegal, the illegitimate.
Prescription	
Integration of the favelas into the city, both physical and social	Contain the violence
...and provision to the favela dwellers of their rights as citizens.	...and ideally regain the monopoly of force in the favela territories.
Metaphor	
The society is a machine and the favela is a piece of this machine. → The favela should be fixed and attached to the society, where it belongs to.	<p>Favela is a disease. → It should be cured or at least contained.</p> <p>Solving the favela problem is fighting a war. → The favela should be invaded, occupied, and control should be exercised over the conquered territory.</p> <p>Drug dealers are enemies. → Drug dealers should be taken down, and it is legitimate to use violent means to achieve that.</p>

Having table 1 as a reference, the subsections that follow will investigate the action and/or the rhetorical frames of the four policies been analyzed by this work. Documents that express the opinion of public officials that are involved in the formulation of such policies, as well as documents that expose the design of their objectives, are, in accordance to the methodology proposed in chapter three for the Frame-Critical Policy Analysis, the basis for the investigation. Attention will be given to the framing and reasoning devices present in such documents, in an attempt to disclose the narrative frame that underlies each of the policies.

4.2.1 The wall policy: ecolimits or sociolimits?

This section aims at examining the favela problem as it is portrayed by the policy of construction of walls surrounding favelas in Rio. For that, it will present the policy in a more detailed way, in complement to what was said in chapter two. Also, it will look at the stated objectives of the policy, in an attempt to reconstruct its action frame. Then, it will discuss the repercussion of the policy and argue that the policy appear to have unstated objectives, which are the focus of the debate on the policy. Thus, a close look at the rhetorical frame of the wall policy will be crucial to disclose its view on the favela problem and what it proposes as means of mitigation.

In March 2009 the government of the state of Rio de Janeiro announced a program to construct walls surrounding nineteen favelas in the state capital (Rio de Janeiro city). The program, implemented by the Environment State Department (SEA), has a total cost of 40 million reais (around US\$ 24 million), to be financed by the State Fund of Environmental Conservation (*Fecam*). The first 3 meters high wall went under construction in the favela of Santa Marta (South Zone), in March 2009. (Folha de São Paulo 02 April 2009b). Similar walls have already been built in other favelas, such as Rocinha.

The government's claim was that the program would restrain the horizontal expansion of the favelas and, hence, help protect the city's natural patrimony. (OB 2009b). Given this (stated) objective, the walls were called 'ecolimits' (as indicated in the Bill n° 245/2009). Such justification has been, however, questioned and hardly criticized, both nationally and internationally. As an illustration of those repercussions abroad is the characterization of the policy by the United Nations as a 'geographical discrimination'. (O Estado de São Paulo 06 May 2009). At the national level, the dispute was to a great extent based on the (official) statistics on the growth of the favelas where the program was to be implemented.

Indeed, the numbers presented by IPP show that the favelas to be target by the policy are among the ones that grew the least in the city. They had a growth of 1.18%, while all the favelas in Rio, together, increased by 6.88%. (Planeta Sustentável 08 May 2009). The Santa Marta, for instance, not only did not grow between 1998 and 2008, but had a decrease of 1% on the occupied area in the period. (IPP *apud* OB 2009b). Notwithstanding, Santa Marta was the first favela to receive the wall. Together, the favelas that are located in the South Zone, which are the majority of the ones in the program (eleven out of the total nineteen) and were the first on the government's list to receive the wall, had a negative variation of 0.2% in the occupied area between 1999 and 2004. (Lopes and Cavallieri 2006).¹⁷ These are not, however, the only data that appear as counterfactual to the government stated purpose for the policy. As pointed out by Observatório de Favelas (2009b), regarding the occupation of

¹⁷ It should be noted that there are green areas that require environmental protection in other parts of the city besides de South Zone. The North Zone, for instance, has forest reserves.

areas of environmental preservation that are above 100m height in the municipality of Rio de Janeiro (which include hills and forests), 69.7% is occupied by the upper and middle class, and only 30% by favelas.

In light of such evidence, it seems plausible to question the objectives presented by the government for the implementation of such policy. Hence, the action frame in the wall policy case seems fuzzy. It presents elements that refer to more than one depiction of the problem: environmental and public security issues. The possibility of occurrence of hybridity in action frames is predicted in the Frame-Critical Policy Analysis approach (see chapter three). As a result, the attempt to reconstruct the narrative of the wall policy will be based on the discursive realm. It is worth recalling that both the rhetorical and the action frame contain the depiction and prescription of the problem. For that, not looking at the action frames does not compromise the analysis. The documents selected for such exercise comprise the viewpoints of some stakeholders, as well as of intellectuals that are concerned with the matter.

As argued by the sociologist Ignácio Cano, the wall policy has also to do with public security, but this intention has been hidden by the government to not foster contention. (Folha de São Paulo 02 April 2009a). In addition, Rossino de Castro Diniz, the president of the Federation of Favela Dwellers Associations of the state of Rio de Janeiro (Faferj), claims that the favela inhabitants should not be deprived of having access to the forest, but rather be part of the effort to preserve it, constituting a 'true ecolimit'. (Planeta Sustentável 08 May 2009). The city councilor Reimont Santa Bárbara argued that building walls surrounding the favelas is a segregationist measure. For him, 'the public authority wants the [favela] communities to live in [...] *senzalas*¹⁸ of the modern world.' (O Globo 05 June 2009).

For Observatório de Favelas (2009b),

the project starts to look like another restrictive policy or yet, as put by many, a biased policy, and it is pieced together with the shameful initiatives adopted by the public authority throughout history in relation to the favelas, always ruled by removal and containment. (OB 2009b).

The Faferj organized an assembly on the 06 May 2009 to discuss the issue and propose ways of protesting against the wall policy. In that event, the president of the Dwellers Association of Rocinha (the biggest favela in Latin America), Antônio Ferreira, presented the results of a plebiscite done in that community, where 1,056 people voted against the wall policy and only 50 for it. (Miliotti 2009). Antônio Ferreira also argued that they should 'fight not only the walls of concrete, but also against the walls of prejudice, of discrimination and of social apartheid'. (Ferreira 2009 *apud* Miliotti 2009).

It should be pointed out that the policy receives 'total support from the City Hall', as declared by the Mayor Eduardo Paes himself in the program *Roda*

¹⁸ *Senzala* is the Portuguese word for slave quarters.

Viva, on the 11 May 2009. Not only does the municipality endorse the wall policy released by the state of Rio, but it also has its own wall policy. Instead of an 'ecolimit', in this case the wall is called 'acoustic protection barrier'. Also announced in 2009, the municipal walls are to be installed on two express highways, which pass through thirty seven favelas. The main purpose of the wall, according to Eduardo Paes, is to protect the people that live by the highways from the noise produced by the traffic. He acknowledges, however, that the measure might also help bring more security to the highways users. (Correio do Brasil 12 October 2009).















Se Benze que dá, a civil society group from the Complexo da Maré (a complex formed by sixteen favelas) has protested against the measure. In a letter published on the internet on the 07 May 2010, the group states that

what is represented today in the form of 'acoustic barriers' and 'ecolimits' is, in fact, a re-edition of this same policy that aims at stigmatize and criminalize a great part of the *carioca* population that lives in the favelas. (Bloco Se Benze Que Dá 2010).

Likewise, Itamar Silva argues that 'the wall divide, create ghettos. It goes against our struggle to defend that favela belongs to the city.' (Folha 02 April 2009a). Therefore, the analysis developed in this section indicates that according to the debate around the wall policy, the favela problem in Rio is as a matter of public security, as it is defined as the lack of legitimate control over such areas. The prescription of isolating the favela territories suggests that the latter is seen as a nuisance by the 'asphalt society' (i.e. the part of the society that lives in the formal city), given the violence that results from the drug trafficking. Following this rationale, the illegal and illegitimate should be contained through walls, which serve to protect the 'asphalt society' from the violence – or even to prevent it from being reminded of all that poverty in its surroundings (as in the municipal walls).

Based on the evidences presented above and having table 1 as guidance, the narrative frame of the wall policy can be displayed in the table 2.

Table 2
The frame of the favela problem according to ecolimits policy.

Progressive frame		Regressive frame	
Diagnostic			
Deficiency of State action (e.g. provision of public goods and equipment) and of State guarantee of social and civil rights [for the favela dwellers].			Lack of State control over the use of force [in favela territories].
It is a social problem.			It is a public security problem.
The violence is not necessarily related to the problem.			The violence that follows from the drug trafficking is <i>the</i> problem.
Favela is (or ought to be considered as) part of the city.			Favela is a nuisance to the city. It is the place of the informal, the illegal, the illegitimate.
Prescription			
Integration of the favelas into the city, both physical and social			Contain the violence.
...and provision to the favela dwellers of their rights as citizens.			...and ideally regain the monopoly of force in the favela territories.
Metaphor			
The society is a machine and the favela is a piece of this machine. → The favela should be fixed and attached to the society, where it belongs to.			<p>Favela is a disease. → It should be cured or at least contained.</p> <p>Solving the favela problem is fighting a war. → The favela should be invaded, occupied, and control should be exercised over the conquered territory.</p> <p>Drug dealers are enemies. → Drug dealers should be taken down, and it is legitimate to use violent means to achieve that.</p>

It is noteworthy – and that is also valid for the next tables that will be further presented – that the check sign means the policy frame being analyzed is in line with the given characteristic of the progressive or the regressive frame, while the cross means it is not. In case the evidence does not permit judging whether the frame is in accordance with the point being made, the column stays blank. Therefore, as shown in the table, the wall policy matches the regressive frame.

4.2.2 The Favela-Bairro: an innovative approach to the favela

Following the same methodology developed in the analysis of the wall policy, this section will disclose the frame that informed the formulation of the Favela-Bairro (action frame), while presenting in a more detailed way the program and the context in which it was developed. Moreover, it will look at the frame (rhetorical frame) that underlay the debate regarding Favela-Bairro in such stage. In examining both action and rhetorical frames, attention will be given to the framing and reasoning devices, so as to reveal what story Favela-Bairro tells about the favelas in Rio de Janeiro.

The Favela-Bairro was implemented in 1994 by the Municipal Housing Department of Rio de Janeiro (SMH), with the goal of implementing infrastructure, public services and social policies that would integrate the favelas into the 'formal city'. More specifically, the program had as its aim 'to complement or construct the main urban structure (sanitation and democratization of accesses) and to offer the environmental conditions of reading the favela as neighborhood of the city' (Decree n° 14.332 of 07 January 1995 *apud* Cardoso 2002).

Part of the housing policy of Rio de Janeiro city established in Municipal Master Plan of 1992, the Favela-Bairro has as its main focus the urbanization of the favelas. The infrastructure work that has been done includes, for example, basic sanitation works, removal of the areas with landslide risk, creation of new accessways, and the construction of public equipment. That was the emphasis of the phase one of Favela-Bairro, concluded in 2000. Phase two aggregated to the urban infrastructure projects social service plans for children and teenagers, and plans of income and employment generation. (Prefeitura do Rio de Janeiro 2003). Additionally, the process of complete land regularization was initiated within the Favela-Bairro – although it has not received too much attention nor resources. (Cardoso 2002).

The program was financed mainly by the Municipality of Rio de Janeiro and the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB). (Cardoso 2002). Phases one and two of Favela-Bairro had a budget of 300 million dollars each, and comprised, together, 168 communities assisted by the program. (Prefeitura do Rio de Janeiro 2003).

Some civil society organizations participated in the program. They were involved with delivery of services, according to contractual arrangements. (Riley et al. 2001). Their engagement would be key to one of the policy's pledges: the participation of its direct beneficiaries in all stages of the Favela-Bairro implementation. As asserted by the manager of the project, such participation is intended 'to change people's behavior, developing citizenship... [and] to ensure the sustainability of the upgrading done by encouraging the community to maintain it'. (Riley et al. 2001: 530).

The Favela-Bairro is considered a success, and has influenced the implementation of similar programs in other cities in Brazil and abroad: in Vitória, Salvador and Belém, in Brazil; and in cities in South Africa, Paraguay, Venezuela and Ecuador. (CREA RJ em Revista 2005). Also, it was internationally recognized for its worth, being even indicated by the UN World's Cities Report 2006/07 as an example to be followed by other countries. However, as indicated by Cardoso (2002), there are a few problematic points about the program. Firstly, it does not comprise measures to deal with the housing deficit. Secondly, due to the criteria for selection of the favelas where the program would be implemented, these were not the neediest ones.

Despite the criticism that the Favela-Bairro received, the program does have as its basis the recognition of the necessity to change the condition of social and physical exclusion of the *favelados*.

Leaving aside Favela-Bairro's actual ability to foster physical and social integration, what the program demonstrates is a strong vision of how the city should be and how the upgrading of favelas can contribute to that vision. In Rio, there has always been a tendency to see the favelas in terms of their impact upon the rest of the city and the middle classes, but that impact has nearly always been interpreted (especially by the press) as negative. What Favela-Bairro is now attempting to do is redefine that relationship to make it positive, to redefine the perceptions the (economically, socially, culturally and geographically) divided residents of the city have of each other.' (Riley et al. 2001: 528).

In an attempt to construct the rhetorical frame of the Favela-Bairro, hereinafter this section will be based on the analysis of documents produced by or that contain the opinion of some of the public officials involved in the formulation and release of the program in 1994. They are Maria Lúcia Petersen, who was the project manager of the SMH; Sérgio Magalhães, then secretary of the SMH; and César Maia, the mayor of Rio de Janeiro in that year. Moreover, the view of intellectuals and other people involved in the policy are considered.

As pointed out by Randolph (2001), the objective of the Favela-Bairro as they appear in the discursive realm is to integrate the favela into the neighborhood. This perception of the need for the incorporation of the favela into the formal city comes from the recognition that 'a pluralistic city like Rio de Janeiro cannot be understood merely as an area split in two: streets vs. hills; a legal city vs. its slums; a city of the rich vs. one of the poor' (Conde and Magalhães 2004: 7). In accordance, in Favela-Bairro

the two dimensions of integration – urban interconnection between the road systems and between the services, and building a new perception of urban diversity – embodied the essential goals of tearing down material and symbolic barriers between slums and neighborhood. (Conde and Magalhães 2004: 15).

As a matter of fact, as stated by the then mayor César Maia, 'the Favela-Bairro is a program of social, economic and urban integration.' (Maia 2005). The social integration element is highlighted by Conde and Magalhães (2004), according to whom 'the framework set for the Favela-Bairro initiative [...] overcame prejudice to raise slums to the status of the city.' (Conde and Magalhães 2004: 14).

Petersen (2004) contributes to the understanding of what the favela problem is by saying what it is and what it is not (which, as argued in chapter three, consists in the act of framing). For her, 'the worst problem is not the violence, but the poverty.' (Petersen 2004). That is why, according to her, the Favela-Bairro did not intend to solve the issue of violence: 'it is evident that it was not to the Favela-Bairro to solve the issues of urban order. But the police were neither able to resolve the guarantee of the liberty to come and go in the [favelas].' (Petersen 2004). In this passage, Petersen also points out another concern of the Favela-Bairro program: the necessity of assuring not only social but also civil rights to the favela dwellers.














The story of the favela problem that is told by the Favela-Bairro is then one of insufficient attention by the State to the favela dwellers, both in relation to the provision of public goods and equipment, and to the guarantee of some of their constitutional rights – e.g. free mobility, which, as pointed out in chapter two, is burdened by the organized crime groups. Accordingly, in order to solve the problem it is necessary to integrate the favelas into the city by building infra-structure and equipment as in any formal neighborhood, which should be combined with the promotion of their social integration into the *carioca* society. For the latter, it is necessary to de-stigmatize the favela. Hence, as argued by Magalhães (2003), ‘the first essential measure is to differentiate that the favela community is not necessarily the place of violence. [...] It is necessary to differentiate this because such misunderstanding is the matrix of a great prejudice.’ (Magalhães 2003). Moreover, the prescription for the problem, according to this narrative frame, also incorporates guaranteeing the rights that the favela dwellers hold as citizens.

As Hebert de Souza¹⁹ (2004) indicates, the Favela-Bairro program was believed to be able to lead to such outcome. For him, ‘the road to democracy in Rio cuts across Favela-Bairro.’ (Souza *apud* Conde and Magalhães 2004: 29). Indeed, one of the features of the program design is the element of participation. The measures prescribed by the Favela-Bairro indicate the idea shared by those responsible for policy formulation of the favela as being part of the city, and thus deserving to be treated as such.

The narrative frame of the Favela-Bairro is summarized in table 3.

¹⁹ Hebert de Souza was an influential activist, being part e.g. of the movement against the dictatorship and the one for land reform in Brazil.

Table 3
The frame of the favela problem according to Favela-Bairro

Progressive frame		Regressive frame	
Diagnostic			
Deficiency of State action (e.g. provision of public goods and equipment) and of State guarantee of social and civil rights [for the favela dwellers].			Lack of State control over the use of force [in favela territories].
It is a social problem.			It is a public security problem.
The violence is not necessarily related to the problem.			The violence that follows from the drug trafficking is <i>the</i> problem.
Favela is (or ought to be considered as) part of the city.			Favela is a nuisance to the city. It is the place of the informal, the illegal, the illegitimate.
Prescription			
Integration of the favelas into the city, both physical and social			Contain the violence.
...and provision to the favela dwellers of their rights as citizens.			...and ideally regain the monopoly of force in the favela territories.
Metaphor			
The society is a machine and the favela is a piece of this machine. → The favela should be fixed and attached to the society, where it belongs to.			<p>Favela is a disease. → It should be cured or at least contained.</p> <p>Solving the favela problem is fighting a war. → The favela should be invaded, occupied, and control should be exercised over the conquered territory.</p> <p>Drug dealers are enemies. → Drug dealers should be taken down, and it is legitimate to use violent means to achieve that.</p>

The Favela-Bairro policy presents, therefore, a progressive framing of the favela problem. This is also indicated by Magalhães, whose description of the formulation of the policy indicates the change of the government's approach to the favela in Rio: 'When we started, 10 years ago, the housing policy of Rio de Janeiro, in the map of the city where it was favela was a space in blank. As if it did not exist.' (Magalhães 2003).

4.2.3 The BOPE

In a similar way as it has been developed in the previous two sections, the analysis of the storyline of the BOPE will attempt to unveil the depiction of and the prescription for the favela problem. However, since this public policy is not a program but a police unit, and because it currently has different functions than its original ones, the analysis will focus only on its discursive realm.

The BOPE (Special Police Operations Battalion) is the Squad Team of the state of Rio de Janeiro. As other special units, it was created, in 1978, to intervene in cases in which the common police were not able to act. Nowadays, the BOPE policemen are specialized in rescuing hostages and

fighting crime in high risk areas. (BOPE 2010). Notwithstanding, as pointed out by Soares et al. (2006),

the BOPE was not prepared to tackle the public security challenges. It was conceived and drilled to be a war machine. It was not trained to deal with citizens and control lawbreakers, but to invade enemies' territories. (Soares et al. 2006: 4).

The BOPE, which currently has a strength of 400 men²⁰, carries very heavy armament and makes use of unusual violence and fear to 'fight' the drug dealers. (Souza et al. 2006). For that, they rely also on their image. As pointed out in chapter two, they are supposed to look scary: their uniform, instead of being blue like the common police, is black; and the emblem they carry on their cars, clothes and caps is a skull impaled with a knife and two pistols. The latter symbolizes the victory over death, which is also implied in their slogan 'Go and win!' (Neto 2008 *apud* SIC Notícias 2008).

For Rodrigo Pimentel (2008), ex-soldier of the BOPE, this special police unit is a cult: it has a passing ritual and rites of belonging to a group that is unique. For Pimentel (2008), all the mysticism that regards these rites, as well as the black uniform, the skull, and the songs used in the trainings work like 'a shield against corruption'. This is indeed considered to be one of the most distinguishing features of the BOPE, regarded as 'the only police that cannot be bought'. (Pimentel 2008 *apud* SIC Notícias 2008).

Although known for being incorruptible, the BOPE is also known for being very violent. Indeed, as indicated above, this is the very image they try to sell. According to the ex-commander of BOPE Mário Duarte, 'the criminal should be afraid, very afraid [of BOPE]. An outlaw that does not fear [it] is because they have not met the BOPE.' Another passage of Duarte's speech gives a good idea of the narrative frame of the BOPE: 'We engage so much in *combat* that we constantly produce knowledge and develop new techniques. Then we transform all this into *war*.' (Estadão 17 October 2007). As noted by Marcelo Freixo (2007), a member of the Rio-based NGO Global Justice, 'in cities like Rio de Janeiro there is a culture of war, a notion that the enemy has to be destroyed. Often this serves to legitimize illegal police action.' (Amnesty International 2006). In accordance, Pinheiro Neto (2009) describes the work of this special police unit by saying: 'our combat is a combat of an endless war, of a war against crime, a real war.' (Época 20 June 2009).

In this 'war', BOPE makes use of abusive force against the favela population. This can be explained by the negative and generalizing image of the favela inhabitants that the public authority has, as it is illustrated by an interview with Governor Sérgio Cabral. Talking about the relationship between birth rate and criminality, Cabral (2007) said:

²⁰ Only in 2008 the BOPE allowed women to join its forces.

It has everything to do with violence. Take the number of children per mother in Rodrigo de Freitas Lagoon, Tijuca, Méier and Copacabana²¹; it is [like the] Swedish pattern. Now take it in Rocinha. It is a pattern of Zambia, Gabon. This is a factory of delinquents. (G1 24 October 2007).

Consequently, the use of indiscriminate violence is justified as it aims at defeating the delinquents, the drug dealers – considered to be the enemies, the main source of the disorder that the favela causes in society.

The approach of the BOPE to the favela and its inhabitants is also indicated, for instance, in some chorus use in BOPE training sessions. In a letter published by the newspaper *O Globo* (24 September 2003), dwellers from the South Zone of Rio denounced the use, by the BOPE, of chantings that incite violence against the favela people. According to them, while exercising, the group of soldiers would scream things such as ‘favela outlaw/we don’t sweep with a broom/ we sweep with grenade,/ with rifle, machine gun’; or ‘the interrogation is too easy to do/ take the *favelado* and beat him until it hurts/ the interrogation is too easy to end/ take the outlaw and beat him until you kill [him]’. (*O Globo* 24 September 2003).














The portrayal of the favela problem as a war that has to be fought in order to avoid the nuisance it represents to the rest of the society justifies, according to this perspective, the use of indiscriminate violence as a way to achieve such goals. The violation of human rights in BOPE’s practices is acknowledged, for instance, by Luiz Eduardo Soares, ex-National Secretary of Public Security and anthropologist, according to whom

the police of Rio de Janeiro became part of the problem of violence, part of the cycle that reproduces itself. The policemen are means of the State violence – sometimes criminal and irresponsible [...] they are trained for the accomplishment of unconstitutional missions, which involve even extermination. (Soares 2008 *apud* SIC Notícias 2008).

Taking all the discussion above into consideration, the storyline unfolded in the debate surrounding the BOPE is one that frames the favela problem as a matter of insufficient State control over the favela. The negligence of the State makes it easier for the drug dealers to exercise power over the favela, which has been promoting violence and bothering the ‘asphalt’, considered the ‘legitimate’ city. The prescription for that is, through the use of a counter-force (the BOPE), to avoid such a nuisance to society and ideally to recover the territory occupied by the enemy. Such a narrative frame is summarized in table 4.

²¹ Rodrigo de Freitas Lagoon, Tijuca, Méier and Copacabana are wealthy areas of the city of Rio de Janeiro.

Table 4
The frame of the favela problem according to BOPE

Progressive frame		Regressive frame	
Diagnostic			
Deficiency of State action (e.g. provision of public goods and equipment) and of State guarantee of social and civil rights [for the favela dwellers].			Lack of State control over the use of force [in favela territories].
It is a social problem.			It is a public security problem.
The violence is not necessarily related to the problem.			The violence that follows from the drug trafficking is <i>the</i> problem.
Favela is (or ought to be considered as) part of the city.			Favela is a nuisance to the city. It is the place of the informal, the illegal, the illegitimate.
Prescription			
Integration of the favelas into the city, both physical and social			Contain the violence.
...and provision to the favela dwellers of their rights as citizens.			...and ideally regain the monopoly of force in the favela territories.
Metaphor			
The society is a machine and the favela is a piece of this machine. → The favela should be fixed and attached to the society, where it belongs to.			Favela is a disease. → It should be cured or at least contained. Solving the favela problem is fighting a war. → The favela should be invaded, occupied, and control should be exercised over the conquered territory. Drug dealers are enemies. → Drug dealers should be taken down, and it is legitimate to use violent means to achieve that.

As the table 4 shows, the BOPE narrative matches the regressive frame. This is remarkable in a speech by Rodrigo Pimentel, ex-BOPE member. For Pimentel (2008), ‘despite of its truculent, violent methods... [the BOPE] is what the society of Rio de Janeiro wants nowadays’, which for him is something lamentable. (Pimentel 2008 *apud* SIC Notícias 2008).

4.2.4 The UPP: bringing regressive and progressive frames together

This section develops the analysis of the last of the study cases that aim at helping to achieve this work’s proposed objective of understanding the existence of a contradictory approach to the favelas in Rio de Janeiro by the public authority. The realms of policy action and of policy debate will be analyzed, so as to reconstruct the narrative frame that underlies the UPP policy. The documents that were examined unveil the opinions of some of the most prominent people involved in the formulation of this policy, among which are Sérgio Cabral, governor of Rio de Janeiro state; José Mariano Beltrame, the State Secretary of Security of Rio de Janeiro; and Mário Sérgio de Brito Duarte, the UPP commander.

The UPP (Pacifying Police Unit) is a public policy released in the very end of the year 2008 by the Rio de Janeiro State Security Department (SESEG/RJ), with the aim of promoting security in favela areas. The UPP is a type of community police that does its policing activity in such a way as to bring close together the population and the police, and to give support to social policies in the favelas. In its official website, it is defined as 'the police of peace'. (UPP Reporter 2010a).

The first favela where an UPP was implemented was the Santa Marta, where it has the approval of 98% of the inhabitants. (UOL 01 December 2009). The other favelas that already have an UPP installed so far are Babilônia, Cantagalo, Cabritos, Chapéu Mangueira, Pavão-Pavãozinho and Tabajaras (also in the South Zone); Andaraí, Formiga, Borel and Turano (in the North Zone); Cidade de Deus and Jardim Batam (in the West Zone); Providência (in the center); and Salgueiro (in the municipality of São Gonçalo). (UPP Reporter 2010a).

The recently reelected²² governor Sérgio Cabral promised to keep investing in the UPPs during his mandate that starts in 2011. (Folha 02 October 2010). According to his electoral campaign proposal, from 600 thousand to 1.5 million people will benefit from the UPPs. (Cabral 2010). So far, 15 million reais (around US\$ 9 million) were invested in the Police Academy, which is going to graduate 60 thousand police officers up to 2016, of which a great part will comprise UPPs. For the year 2010, for instance, the prospect is of at least 3.5 thousand new UPP officers. (Mattar et al. 2010).

Each favela 'pacification' process has four steps. The very first step is the entry of BOPE in the favela, a moment when some conflict can occur. Secondly, it is the 'stabilization' phase, when possible focuses of resistance are removed and the UPP assumes the control of the operation. Thirdly, the definitive occupation takes place, and the UPP starts doing preventive work. The final phase is the 'post-occupation', when monitoring and evaluation of the results are developed, and institutional articulations with the favela are established.

The community policing is at the same time a concept and a strategy that is grounded in a partnership between the population and the public security institutions. (UPP Reporter 2010a). Such a partnership, in the case of Rio, aims at restoring the peace in territories previously occupied by drug dealers and other organized crime groups. Indeed, the main objective of the UPPs is 'to recover to the State territories that are impoverished and controlled by [drug] dealers.' (Beltrame 2009).

Despite its main concern is with public security, the story of the favela problem that is told by the UPP policy also refers to the social aspect. This is illustrated by the statement of Capitan Felipe Magalhães, the Commander of two UPP units: 'we are glad to know that we are part of their upbringing, of the upbringing of a community that does not live together with the trafficking

²² Sérgio Cabral was reelected as governor in October 2010.

violence anymore and can, thus, run after their rights as citizens.’ (Felipe Magalhães 2010 *apud* UPP Repórter 2010b).












Social policies are indeed considered as part of the prescription for how to solve the favela problem. As stated by Beltrame,

it is not only security that is going to solve the problem of the needy communities of Rio, but a set of public policies, of which security is one of them. Security we have already guaranteed here [in favela Santa Marta] and in other pacified places, but now we need a series of other interventions in the social realm for us to complete this project. (Beltrame 2010 *apud* UPP Repórter 2010c).

Hence, regaining State control over the favela territory is seen as a necessary measure for, but not sufficient to mitigate the favela problem. The State control over the use of force is the first step to reach the social integration of the favela and the guarantee of citizenry rights of that population. That is why the policy-makers involved in the formulation of the UPP policy believe that ‘the UPPs represent an important “weapon” of the state government of Rio and of the [State] Security Department to recover the territories lost to the trafficking, and to promote the social inclusion to the most needy part of the population.’ (UPP Repórter 2010a).

As it can be noted from the discussion above, among the four policies that are object of analysis of this study, the UPP policy is an unparalleled case. This is because, as it can be noted from the previous arguments, the storyline of the UPP is one that considers the favela problem as relating both to the social and the public security realms. Thus, the impressions regarding the UPP in the initial stages of this work as a policy that was in accordance with Favela-Bairro (i.e. with the progressive frame) were proved wrong. After reconstructing the action and the rhetorical frames, this work disclosed that the UPP narrative frame does not match the one of Favela-Bairro. Instead, the UPP policy has a frame that combines – and therefore distinguishes from – the regressive and the progressive frames, as it is shown in table 5.

Table 5
The frame of the favela problem according to UPP.

Progressive frame		Regressive frame	
Diagnostic			
Deficiency of State action (e.g. provision of public goods and equipment) and of State guarantee of social and civil rights [for the favela dwellers].			Lack of State control over the use of force [in favela territories].
It is a social problem.			It is a public security problem.
The violence is not necessarily related to the problem.			The violence that follows from the drug trafficking is <i>the</i> problem.
Favela is (or ought to be considered as) part of the city.			Favela is a nuisance to the city. It is the place of the informal, the illegal, the illegitimate.
Prescription			
Integration of the favelas into the city, both physical and social			Contain the violence.
...and provision to the favela dwellers of their rights as citizens.			...and ideally regain the monopoly of force in the favela territories.
Metaphor			
The society is a machine and the favela is a piece of this machine. → The favela should be fixed and attached to the society, where it belongs to.			Favela is a disease. → It should be cured or at least contained. Solving the favela problem is fighting a war. → The favela should be invaded, occupied, and control should be exercised over the conquered territory. Drug dealers are enemies. → Drug dealers should be taken down, and it is legitimate to use violent means to achieve that.

Finally, it is worth noting that the UPP narrative frame does not match any of the metaphors presented in table 5. The reason for this is the fact that was just mentioned above: unlike the other three, the UPP policy has a frame that merge some aspects of both the regressive and the progressive frame.

4.3 The narratives on the favela problem: understanding the policy controversy

Having examined the four policies and disclosed their respective narrative frames, this section will discuss the implications of such analysis for the question to which this work aims to answer: how does the perception of the favela by the public authority act upon the formulation of public policies for the favelas in Rio de Janeiro? While doing that, the section will also provide an overview of the actors that are involved in the wall policy, the Favela-Bairro, the BOPE and the UPP.

First, it is important to remark on the points in which the four storylines converge and the ones in which they diverge. As the analyses above show, the narrative frame of the wall policy and of the BOPE for the most part match the regressive frame, while also offer evidence to deny the progressive frame.

The only difference in these storylines is the lack of evidence in the documents examined about the BOPE that could contradict the ‘integration aspect’ as a prescription (see table 4). The frame reconstructed from the Favela-Bairro, on the other hand, goes in line with the progressive frame, and negates the regressive frame in all points but in the recovery of the state monopoly of force as a prescription. Finally, the UPP presents a narrative frame that resembles neither the regressive nor the progressive frame. Rather, it lays out a narrative that contains elements of both the model frames. In the UPP story, the favela problem is at the same time the lack of state control and of state action in the favelas. In the paragraphs below, an attempt will be made to situate these analyses in relation to the main research question.

Foremost, two points are particularly important to be recalled from chapter three. One is that problem-framing refers to the process of defining what is and what is not the problem. The other is that frames are ‘underlying structures of belief, perception, and appreciation.’ What follows is that the way the public authority perceives the favela shapes their framing of the favela problem – as also argued before. In order to have a better understanding of this phenomenon, though, one should not disregard the different stakeholders involved in the wall policy, the Favela-Bairro, the BOPE and the UPP.


Without aiming at exhausting the entire list of those involved in the issue, a few will be brought into attention. Firstly, there are the favela inhabitants, a group in itself formed by at least three subgroups: (i) the drug dealers, (ii) the dwellers association, and (iii) the ordinary favela inhabitants. The relation between those three, described in greater detail in chapter two, is one of dependence. The drug dealers exert high influence over the ordinary inhabitants and often also over the dwellers association. The latter is coerced to support the drug dealers, which depend on them for maintaining their control. Those who are not involved in the organized crime groups, commonly rely on the drug dealers to provide them with money or other kind of assistance. The interests of these subgroups are obviously not homogeneous. The drug dealers seek to maintain their power, which is in line with their ‘virile cult’ (see chapter two), and keep profiting from the drug trade. The ordinary favela inhabitants want a better quality of life and more security, as the policies of Favela-Bairro and UPP, for instance, propose. This goes, however, against the interests of the drug dealers, as it means more control by the State over the favela areas.

Secondly, there is the so called ‘asphalt society’, that is, the part of the society that lives in the formal neighborhoods. For them, the primary interest is most likely public security. A secondary interest could be the betterment of the life conditions of the poor that live in the favelas, an interest that surely varies from individual to individual. Thirdly, although to a lesser extent, private companies can also have some interests at stake when it comes to the favelas in Rio. An illustration of this is the fact that Coca Cola and other major companies are donating funds to the UPP initiative (The New York Times 10 October 2010), as a way to promote themselves.

Finally, and probably most importantly given the purpose of this work, there is the public authority. The actors involved in the formulation of each of the policies were already mentioned previously in this chapter. Still, it is

valuable to have a big picture of them as well as of how they interact. This is what the diagram below attempts to do. Prior to that, however, when talking about this group of stakeholders, two points are worth recalling from chapter three. First, that this actor exercises power having the mantle of the public administrative authority. Also, that interests are shaped by the frames one holds, and the latter are often used in such way as to promote one's interests.

Diagram 1
Overview of the actors involved in the wall policy, Favela-Bairro, BOPE and UPP.



As indicated in the sketch, although the policies were released by two different levels of the government (BOPE, UPP and wall policy by the state government; and Favela-Bairro by the municipal government), they interact and support each other. The City Hall, for instance, endorses the security policy that is the duty of the state of Rio de Janeiro. Thus, it somehow agrees with the two police units that were analyzed in this work (BOPE and UPP). Also, it is involved in the wall policy (ecolimits), through the management of the funds that come from a federal program – the Growth Acceleration Program (PAC). (SMH 2010). Besides, they act together with the ecolimits policy by promoting the plantation of trees alongside the walls. (G1 28 April 2009). The state government, on the other hand, also supports the urbanization program of the municipal government by contributing with funds. Finally, as a side remark, the federal government also gives funds to the wall policy and the Favela-Bairro (policies that have contradictory frames and are formulated by different government levels).

The conclusion that can be drawn from this is that the level (local, regional or national) of the public authority where the policy is formulated is

not the factor that explains the policy controversy in regards to the favela problem. As a matter of fact, they support each other's initiatives, which reflect both the progressive and the regressive frame. Moreover, the interaction among the BOPE and the UPP, both state government's policies, corroborate this perspective. As clarified in section 4.2.4, the BOPE is part of the pacification processes that the UPP exerts in the favelas. In other words, for the 'police of peace' to be established, the 'police of war' has to go first to the favela. Therefore, the public authority is, in a same level of governance, prescribing to the favela problem two contrasting polices.

The policy contradiction is also not explained by different partisan positions. This is because, as argued by André Marengo dos Santos (2001), the Brazilian political realm is characterized by the 'existence of precarious links of partisan loyalty among the national politicians.' (Santos 2001:75). An illustration of this is the fact that César Maia (the mayor of Rio de Janeiro during the release of the Favela-Bairro) had three mandates as mayor of Rio de Janeiro²³ and in each one of them he belonged to a different party. The contrasting approach to the favelas cannot, therefore, be explained by differences in political parties' views on the matter.

In addition, it should be recalled that the policy controversy case that is under investigation here is somehow a special one, as it differs from the majority cited in the literature. In the case of the favela problem, the controversy is not among two (or more) contending parties that frame a given problem in different ways. Rather, it is about one (compound) actor – the public authority – that holds divergent storylines of what is problematic about the favela in Rio de Janeiro. What the analysis of the four policies has shown is that, differently from what was expected in the design of this investigation (see chapter one), there are not only two, but three different frames among the four polices that were studied. The analysis of the UPP indicates that a third distinct story has been told about the favela in Rio.

There are, therefore, three different narrative frames about the favela problem, and all of them reflect the way the favela is perceived by the public authority. This perception is twofold: the favela is seen by the public authority both as a source of trouble for the society and as a reason for pride, as it is the soul of the *carioca* culture. To the first view of the favela corresponds what was called here the regressive frame, which is equivalent to the narrative frames of the wall policy and the BOPE. The second perspective on the favela correlates to the progressive frame, to which the Favela-Bairro matches. Finally, the third narrative frame, which was surprisingly disclosed through the analysis, is the one present in the UPP policy. This frame combines characteristics of both perceptions of the favela – and thus of both regressive and progressive frames.

The fact that there are three problem-framings does not lead, however, to the refusal of the working hypothesis (that the dual perception of the favela led to two contrasting problem-framings and characterized a policy controversy).

²³ In 1993-1996 for the PMDB, in 2001-2004 for the PTB, and in 2005-2008, for the DEM.

The contrasting ways in which the favela is perceived by the public authority does indeed reflect on the contradictions of the latter in framing the problem. The findings only slightly differ from the working hypothesis as there are three rather than two contrasting frames.

Chapter 5

Conclusion

This work aimed at finding out why the public authority approach to the favela in Rio de Janeiro is so contradictory. It looked at four public policies in order to examine their narrative frames, so as to disclose what the policy-makers consider to be problematic about the favela (and what they disregard as being so) and what they prescribe as measures to mitigate/solve the favela problem. The frame-critical analysis of the policies indicated that the policy controversy is not a matter of the government level (local, regional, national) where the policy is formulated. Rather, the divergent storylines of what is problematic about the favela in Rio de Janeiro is due to the existence of a dual perception of the favelas.

More specifically, it showed that there are three different problem-framings. Firstly, there is the progressive frame, which regards the issue as a social problem. It is a narrative of the favela problem as a deficiency of State action in the favelas in terms of providing public goods and equipment, and guaranteeing citizenry rights. Secondly, the regressive frame considers the lack of State monopoly in the use of force in the favelas to be the problem. The issue in this perspective is a public security one. Finally, there is the frame of the problem by the UPP policy, which views the problem as being both the lack of action and of control over the favelas. In light of this, the working hypothesis was confirmed. However, it should be remarked upon that there were not two (as predicted in the beginning of the research) but three contrasting frames of the problem.

Given that frames guide an individual's analyses and practices, looking into the frames of the public policies for the favelas in Rio helps in achieving a deeper understanding of what has been done to ease a problem that is of great relevance for Brazil, and for the city of Rio de Janeiro more specifically: the issue of the favelas. It does so by disclosing what is considered problematic by the public authority, as well as by indicating the measures they propose as the solution for the problem that has been framed. The relevance of this study lies therefore on the fact that it provides valuable insights on the public policies for the favelas in Rio de Janeiro. It offers a comprehensive discussion on what the public authority has been doing regarding the favela problem, bringing into the debate enquiries (and hopefully some answers) about its contradictions. Moreover, it contributes to the understanding of the favela phenomenon, by providing a valuable discussion on the main issues that outline the current reality of the favelas in Rio de Janeiro. Further, it points out to the necessity of breaking up the 'black box' of what has been called the favela problem, and offers some tools for doing so.

That being said, a few points should be made in terms of policy recommendations. Firstly, the progressive and regressive frames can be argued to be incomplete and therefore inaccurate narratives of the favela problem. This is because the favela problem is in fact a combination of both the deficiency of State action and the lack of State control over the favelas. It is

both a social and a public security matter. Therefore, what is suggested herein is an approach to the favelas that takes both elements into account. The narrative frame of the UPP comes close to the problem-framing being proposed. Nonetheless, there is a concern about the interaction of the UPP with the BOPE, being that the latter corresponds to the regressive frame. As exposed in chapter four, the BOPE is part of the pacification process that the UPP does in the favelas. Although the UPP operations done so far have not been very conflicting, having the BOPE being part of it is somehow to agree with BOPE's actions. Hence, although the recommended policy frame encompasses the public security as part of the description of the favela problem, it does not agree with the abusive approach carried out by the BOPE. The suggestion is for a prescription that does include public security measures, but that does not violate human rights (as the BOPE does). Lastly, the recommendation is also of a policy that is enduring, as the issues to be addressed concerning the favela problem (e.g. the stigma of the favela, and the lack of trust in the police) are not to be solved in the short run. In sum, what is being proposed is a lasting and inclusive public security policy that is based on respect for human rights, combined with social policies that aim at promoting the social inclusion and the citizenry rights of the favela people.

In conclusion, what the investigation developed in this piece indicates is that the policy controversy regarding the favela problem in Rio is due to the existence of a dual perception of the favelas by the public authority. One of these perceptions is of a favela that is a reason for collective pride for it having the roots of samba and representing the cheerfulness that is so characteristic of the Brazilian culture. The other is of a favela that is an illegal and violent place, that is the responsible for all the problems of the city. While the first image of the favela is based on historical facts and cultural grounds, the second one is based chiefly on a stigma that has been socially reproduced for years. The solution for this policy controversy may start, then, with breaking out the co-reproduction process of the favela stigmatization and the (regressive) problem-framing that follows from it (as the perception of the favela as a nuisance leads to the regressive frame, which in turn reinforces such a perception through the policies that are designed based on such framing). This could be done, for instance, through the release of public policies that promote the recognition of the favela as part of the city, so as to change the way the society as a whole perceives the favela. The expected outcome, as any social learning process, would certainly not come in an immediate and uncomplicated way. Nonetheless, as the Secretary of Security Mariano Beltrame (2009) stressed 'either society embraces and welcomes these areas or nothing will actually change.' (Beltrame 2009).

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